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STUDIES IN THE MAKING OF CITIZENS



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THE MAKING OF CITIZENS

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF METHODS
OF CIVIC TRAINING

By CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM

*Professor of Political Science in the
University of Chicago*



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TO

MY DAUGHTER ELIZABETH

EDITOR'S PREFACE

Broadly speaking, the common purpose of these inquiries in eight modern states has been that of examining objectively the systems of civic education, of determining the broad trends of civic training in these nations, and of indicating possibilities in the further development and control of civic education. In two of these cases, Italy and Russia, striking experiments are now being made in the organization of new types of civic loyalty. Germany, England, the United States, and France present instances of powerful modern states and the development of types of civic cohesion. Switzerland and Austria-Hungary are employed as examples of the difficulty experienced in reconciling a central political allegiance with divergent and conflicting racial and religious elements.

The series includes the following volumes:

Civic Training in Soviet Russia, by Professor Samuel N. Harper, Professor of Russian Language and Institutions in the University of Chicago.

Great Britain, by Professor John M. Gaus, Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin.

The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, by Professor Oscar Jászi, formerly of Budapest University, now Professor of Political Science in Oberlin College.

Making Fascists, by Professor Herbert W. Schneider, Professor of Religion in Columbia University, and Shepard B. Clough, Instructor in History in Columbia University.

Germany, by Prof. Paul Kosok, Long Island University, New York City.

Civic Training in Switzerland, by Professor Robert C. Brooks, Professor of Political Science in Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.

France, by Professor Carleton J. H. Hayes, Professor of History in Columbia University. (This is a part of the Columbia University series of "Studies in Post-War France" and is included here because of its intimate relation to the other volumes in the series.)

Civic Attitudes in American School Textbooks, by Dr. Bessie L. Pierce, Professor of History in the University of Chicago.

The Duk-Duks, by Dr. Elizabeth Weber, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College, New York City.

Wide latitude has been given and taken by the individual collaborators in this study, with the understanding, however,

(1) that as a minimum there would be included in each volume an examination of the social bases of political cohesion and (2) that the various mechanisms of civic education would be adequately discussed. There is inevitably a wide variation in point of view, method of approach, and in execution of the project. Investigators differ as widely in aptitude, experience, and environment.

Of the various investigations the questions may be asked: What part do the social groupings play in the spirit of the state? What is the attitude of the economic groups which for this purpose may be considered under certain large heads, as the attitude of the business element, of the agricultural group, or of labor? What is the relation of the racial groups toward the political group whose solidarity is in question? Do they tend to integrate or disintegrate the state? What is the position of the religious factors in the given society, the Catholic, the Protestant, the Jewish? How are they related to loyalty toward the political unit? What is the place of the regional groupings in the political unit? Do they develop special tendencies alone or in company with other types of groupings already mentioned? What is the relation of these competing loyalties to each other?

It cannot be assumed that any of these groups has a special attraction or aversion toward government in general; and the analysis is not conducted with any view of establishing a uniformity of interest or attachment in any type of group, but rather of indicating the social composition of the existing political units and authorities. It may well be questioned whether there is any abstract loyalty, political or otherwise. These political loyalties are determined by concrete interests, modified by survivals that no longer fit the case and by aspirations not yet realized. The cohesion is a resultant of conflicting forces, or a balance of existing counterweights, a factor of the situation. All these factors may change and the balance may be the same, or one may change slightly and the whole balance may be overthrown. It is the integration of interests that counts, not the special form or character of any one of them.

Among the mechanisms of civic education analyzed are those

of the schools, the rôle of governmental services and officials, the place of the political parties, and the function of special patriotic organizations; or, from another point of view, the use of traditions in building up civic cohesion, the place of political symbolism, the relation of language, literature, and the press, to civic education, the position occupied by locality in the construction of a political loyalty; and, finally, it is hoped that an effective analysis may be made of competing group loyalties rivaling the state either within or without.

In these groups there is much overlapping. It would be possible to apply any one or all of the last-named categories to any or all of the first. Thus the formal school system may and does utilize language and literature, or symbolism, or love of locality, or make use of important traditions. Symbolism and traditions may and do overlap—in fact, *must* if they are to serve their purpose; while love of locality and language may be and are interwoven most intimately.

In the various states examined, these devices were traced and compared. The result by no means attains the dignity of exact measurement but supplies a rough tracing of outlines of types and patterns in different cities. It is hoped, however, that these outlines will be sufficiently clear to set forth some of the main situations arising in the process of political control and to raise challenging questions regarding the further development of civic education.

It may be suggested that the process by which political cohesion is produced must always be considered with reference to other loyalties toward other groups in the same society. Many of the devices here described are common to a number of competing groups and can be more clearly seen in their relation to each other, working in co-operation or competition, as the situation may be. The attitude of the ecclesiastical group or the economic group, or the racial or cultural group, or any of them, profoundly influences the nature and effect of the state's attempt to solidify political loyalty; and the picture is complete only when all the concurrent or relevant factors are envisaged.

These devices are not always consciously employed although

they are spoken of here as if they were. It often happens that these instrumentalities are used without the conscious plan of anyone in authority. In this sense it might be better to say that these techniques are found rather than willed. At any rate, they exist and are operating.

These eight or nine techniques are only rough schedules or classifications of broad types of cohesive influences. They are not presented as accurate analyses of the psychology of learning or teaching the cohesive process of political adherence. They presuppose an analysis of objectives which has not been made, and they presuppose an orderly study of the means of applying objectives; and this also had not been worked out in any of the states under consideration.

The writer of this volume on *The Making of Citizens* has endeavored to gather together the threads of the eight volumes on as many nations and weave them into a central interpretation. The writer has compared these systems with reference, first, to the social composition of civic loyalty; then with reference to the special civic techniques employed; then has compared the eight systems as a whole; and finally has made a critical analysis of modern trends in the nations studied, with some reference to other states.

I have kept in as close touch as possible with the work of my colleagues who were engaged on the special studies, both by conference in this country and by visits in other lands. Some weeks were spent with Professor Harper in Russia, with Professor Jászi in Austria, with Professor Kosok in Germany, and all of the nations studied during the inquiry were visited, with the exception of Italy, which I have not seen since my sojourn there during the war. I do not profess to have anything like the special knowledge of the particular nations possessed by my collaborators, but I have spent many months in all of them with the exception of Russia, and am not wholly unfamiliar with their political processes, political personalities, and the literature of their political science.

If errors are found in my description, analysis, or interpretation of the system of civic training in any of these states they

should be attributed to me and not to the collaborators, from whom I might have learned better, and whose advice and counsel I must have overlooked. Nor are my collaborators responsible for the conclusions and suggestions appearing in the last two chapters of this volume. In time, a finer-meshed analysis of civic training will doubtless be supplied, but this will involve much more intimate knowledge of the processes of social and political cohesion and training than we now possess, both of the learning process and of the ways and means of pressure groups and propaganda.

In this connection it is important to observe that in the course of this inquiry the American Historical Association appointed a "Commission on the Social Studies in the Schools," and there is now under way a comprehensive study dealing with many important aspects of civic and social training in the American school system. The problems of objectives, of curriculum, of methods of teaching, of teacher personnel, of measurement and attainment of objectives, of public relations, are all being considered with great care; and many of the questions raised in this series will be considered and answered in the forthcoming report of the Commission. This and other reports now in process will serve to illuminate more clearly hitherto unexplored territories in the domain of civic education and make it possible to advance more rapidly and intelligently than ever before.

It should be stated that the study of *Civic Training in Germany* by Professor Kosok is to appear in the near future, delayed by a combination of adverse circumstances; that a volume on the *History of Italian Patriotism* by Professor Robert Michels will also be a part of this series; and finally that it has been found desirable to postpone the study of the United States until the completion of the report of the Hoover Commission on Recent Social Trends.

It would have been useful to include in this series a number of other states, both Occidental and Oriental, and some of the South American as well, but limitations of time and expense made this impossible. Other studies will be made by other investigators, and the purpose of this series will be amply served

if interest in and discussion of this important subject are aroused. It is clear that the value of such a study as this will be determined not by its finality, but by its influence in stimulating other and more important inquiries in this field.

I wish to acknowledge my great indebtedness to my collaborators in this undertaking and particularly to my colleagues in the University of Chicago, Professors Harper, Pierce, and Lasswell, whose counsel has been of the very greatest value at many points along the way. Many valuable suggestions and criticisms have been made by my professional associates. I am particularly indebted to Professor Hayes, not only for his special collaboration in this study, but also for his *Essays on Nationalism*, his *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, and for his Report to the Social Science Research Council (U.S.) on *Scientific Studies of Nationality and Nationalism*, which I hope may soon be in type.

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CHARLES E. MERRIAM

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF CIVIC EDUCATION

The farmer brings a share of his hard-earned produce to the tax-gatherer. And does so gladly. A circle of friends surrender their leader to the police, without a murmur. The soldier obeys the order that sends him to almost certain death, without a protest. Or, on the other hand, the official command to fire is unheeded by the soldier. The tax laws are defied and disregarded. The criminal is shielded like a patriot, and celebrated like a martyr. The old flag is trampled underfoot with jeers and oaths; a new flag waves, and cheers and tears salute it. Out of what does this come, this changing loyalty; and under what conditions does it disintegrate and disappear? How did this pattern of political behavior come into being? Out of what material was it woven? Why did it decay and fall away? This is one of the most interesting problems in political life, and its solution one of the most difficult.¹

But the question is not confined to political society alone, for the same query may be raised in any group, whether civil or ecclesiastical, or business or social. For in all these societies there appear similar patterns of obedience and conformity, so well developed as to become almost automatic in action, and yet capable of disintegration and destruction. What are, we may ask, the essential elements in the texture of group cohesion?

Still more difficult to answer is the question, What determines the choices between competing allegiances or loyalties? What factors make the decision between the conflicting claims of family and state, or between neighborhood, church, and lodge, or business and the state, when they clash as they inevitably must? Many of the most tragic moments in human experience have been centered in the struggle between the competing loyalties of such transcendent interest in so many lives. Indeed so

¹ See Michels, *Patriotismus*.

surcharged with emotion have many of these crises been that little analysis of a critical character has ever been made. What must have been the struggle between family and state when the inflexible Roman magistrate condemned his own son to death? When the pious nun forgot her vows to save the thief? When the elders contributed graft so that the dedication of the House of God might not be delayed? What must have been the feeling of the devout soldier whose bullet pierced the heart of his disloyal priest?

We are involved in an intricate whirl of competing loyalties, alternately attracted and repelled by one and another, in an endless series of forming and dissolving interests, the nature of which is still but dimly comprehended.¹ Political cohesion, although by no means the only one of these central attractions, is one of the most powerful and meaningful for social life. Sovereignty may come and go in the verbal sense, but political cohesion remains.

If we look, first of all, at subhuman groups and even at life-forms much lower in the scale of being, the phenomena of domination and subordination are everywhere evident, and the formation and dissolution of groups goes on without ceasing.² "We know," says Allee, a student of animal aggregations, "that what were formerly regarded as 'social instincts' in the breeding season have been further analyzed in large part into various types of chemical or other tropisms." And he continues, "A first advance in social life is made when these groupings serve to promote the welfare of the individual forming them." Even in these worm-like wrigglings of lower forms of life are seen the beginnings of group cohesion, and its origin is found in a functional advantage for members of the group.

As the scale of life rises from the lower to the higher forms,

¹ See Royce, *Loyalties*; Bryce on "Obedience" in *Essays on History and Jurisprudence*.

² W. C. Allee, *Studies in Animal Aggregations*. See also Jennings, *Behavior of the Lower Organisms*; Herrick, *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior*; Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior*; J. S. Szymanski (1919), "Zur Analyse der sozialen Instinkte," *Biol. Zentral*, Bd. 33, 649-57; an interesting analysis of this whole subject is given in P. Deegner, *Formen der Vergesellschaftung im Tierreich* (1918).

and as structure and action become increasingly complex, the problems of the group are correspondingly multiplied and complicated. The lower forms of cohesion tend to become highly intricate types of co-operation into which many puzzling factors enter. In the miniature world of the bees and wasps and ants¹ fascinating complexes of association and cohesion are encountered, while, higher up, among birds, horses, sheep, wolves, are discovered still more imposing evidences of gregariousness and still more striking examples of interrelation and co-operation.

In the family, the clan, the church, and the state are still more complex and tenacious groupings, whose cohesion and disintegration constitute a long series of problems in group adherence and enthusiasm. In the primitive forms of social organization, these examples are sometimes even more striking than in civilized groups, and here may be found some of the most significant material for the understanding of modern political and social organization.² If biology explains the lower forms of life, psychology the subhuman groupings, and anthropology the primitive human developments, it remains for social science to account for the behavior of the social groupings on a higher level; and for politics to interpret the special governmental or patriotic cohesions.³

All of these group aggregations, on whatever level of life, may be regarded from the functional point of view with reference to the actual service performed by the group, or with reference to what may be termed its survival values. In these values or advantages of group aggregation may be observed the explanation of group existence and continuance as a part of a great life-process. Thus the preservation of life through the better maintenance of temperature or moisture conditions; protection of life against the attacks of toxic substances in the lower levels; the attacks of enemies in the higher; more convenient ordering of life conditions; more advantageous situations for the production of the goods of life—all these are factors in determin-

¹ See Wheeler, *Social Life of Insects*.

² See Elizabeth Weber, *The Duk-Duks*.

³ Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid a Factor in Evolution*, and other similar titles.

ing the creation and continuance of the various types of social groupings found in various stages of their existence.

On the more complex levels of social life these interests, advantages, survival values, are again re-interpreted in terms of ideologies—moral, social, political—systematically organized and developed theories or philosophies of group life, some of which are adjusted and adapted to the given state of life and some of which are soon passé. The inevitable conflict between the old and the new is of course the essence of much philosophical controversy and in the past has often overshadowed the examination of the values and the advantages of the specific form of association in question. The clash between the old theory and the new situation or between the new theory and the old situation is a persistently recurring phenomenon, and the sharper the clash the more commonly is emotion relied upon to supply the gaps in the dogmatic certitude of authority or rebellion.

Earthworms and caterpillars and ants and bees and wild horses and primitives do not rationalize the advantages of aggregation, but they utilize them, though they say little.¹ The interplay of ideologies begins on another level of human development, when conscious formulation of life interpretations begins, although it must be conceded that a mere observer might discover many similarities between the external behavior of modern crowds and mobs and the action of primitives and sub-human groups. Lynch law seems to be known among wild elephants for example and employed, although for a more justifiable purpose perhaps, in the elimination of the old and outgrown specimens of the group. The phenomena of war, slavery sub-, super-, and co-ordination are of course a commonplace of life among ants and many other types of animal aggregations. The philosophies and their accompanying hypocrisies appear only when the life stream has thrust its way farther down the drift of time.

Modern critics display much impatience with these rationalizations and their frequently transparent futilities of logic and

¹ See the playful discussion of the "Philosophical Ants" by Julian Huxley in his *Biological Essays*.

science, but they possess a functional or survival advantage which cannot be ignored in a full view of the process of human life. Their use is partly that of tribal or group rhythm or morale which has often a survival value, although logically indefensible; and secondly, they direct attention, even though remotely in some cases, to a consideration of the objective values and advantages in the group arrangement. Sometimes, it is true, they may tend to inhibit calm consideration of these very values, and sometimes they may succeed in obscuring them by false and *ex parte* explanations of the significance of the particular group and its importance in relation to others. But on the whole the rationalizing process, while not scientific and even though at times seeming to be in the way of objective or scientific treatment, nevertheless tends toward an orderly and ultimately scientific analysis of the important process of group cohesion.

Distinction must constantly be made, further, between loyalty to the political order *per se*, loyalty to a special political unit such as Germany, and loyalty to a particular system or rulers. Even rival nations may agree in maintaining the deference due to political organization and order as such, and at this point their efforts converge. They may or may not agree on the propriety of upholding a special type of political order, such as monarchy, or democracy; and they may or may not agree in the effort to support a particular ruler or rulers in a special territorial domain.

At the outset and throughout, the complexity of the problem of civic allegiance must be recognized. We may distinguish:

- A. Recognition of the values and habits incidental to political organization in general.
- B. Recognition of the values and habits incidental to political power centered in a special territory.
- C. Recognition of the values and habits incidental to a particular political order, as monarchy, or aristocracy, or democracy, the domination of landlords, warriors, priests, business, or labor.

The most fundamental values are those found in relation to governmental organization as an important and necessary life-

function, and inevitably some sort of habituation is essential for this purpose. Closely following this are the meaning and values of the special territorial group which is the *situs* or focus of a given state or nation. But the education for the political order as such and the special form of it may be and actually are somewhat different in character, and at times may be conflicting in their direction and claims. The type of education required for the political order in general is different from that required for the production of the good German or the good American. One has reference to a general system upon the elements of which practically all political experts might agree, and the other to a special allegiance to a special territorial-ethnic-cultural group. There are fundamentals upon which citizens of all the eight states here considered might be given common training, and there are special allegiances upon which there would at once arise the most violent disagreement. A German teacher might instruct French children in the practices of government up to a certain point. Or a French teacher might instruct German youth in the basic principles and practices of the political order up to a certain point, at which he would be obliged to pause. That point is the specific training in Germanistic or Gallic political attachment and loyalty.

Another type of training is that requisite for the cultivation of the attitudes and habits desirable for a particular political order, as a monarchy or a democracy or some other form of political organization regarded as fundamental in the given situation. Thus there must be a special training to appreciate the advantages of the English parliamentary system, another for the special virtues of the Soviet system, another for the Fascist, another for the special qualities of the American. This training is closely intermingled with that for political order as such and the special territorial state, but is distinguishable; and it may be totally changed without much impairing the others. Thus in Russia the training regarding the ancient régime was abruptly abandoned for an entirely new type of training in the values of the Soviet order. Similar changes occurred in Italy under the Fascists and in Germany under the new democracy; in all the

other countries from time to time as their revolutionary phases passed.

In the case of a personal government such as a monarchy, there is also involved a habituation in the recognition of the special qualities and values of the particular holders of power, the reigning family or families. In the case of democratic governments, the personal factor is unimportant, except so far as it may be necessary for the maintenance of an adequate degree of respect for constituted authority.

The political order, the German political order, and the German democratic political order require different shades of civic education in order to make them effective. There are very many common factors in special forms of political organization, but the sharp dividing line comes when the lines of the territorial state are drawn.

Commonly these types of training are merged in one, and no distinction is consciously developed; in fact it is part of the system in many cases that no possibility of difference may appear or occur to the subject. The citizen must believe that no other political order than his own is tolerable in his community, and that no other territorial adjustment than the present is thinkable. To question either of these two fundamentals in any given state is akin to treason. In outside countries they may be regarded, however, as nothing more than local phenomena, slogans rather than facts, group emotionalism rather than political realism.

These presuppositions of civic training are intimately interrelated to the balance of social, economic, ethnic, religious, regional and other situations. Political order, the present territorial limits of it, the present form of political organization, are all in a sense causes of, or at any rate contributory to, economic prosperity, race recognition, regional habituation, prestige, and a wide variety of specific advantages accruing to individuals and the group. When this substantial content melts away, the presuppositions take on a sickly hue and may be rudely cast aside for some more alluring forms of allegiance. This does not happen for light and transient causes, but it may come at the end of a

series of disintegrating processes, one of which has been vividly traced in the volume on the decline of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Further the political is constantly competing with non-political groups which penetrate and permeate the political at many points. Each of these competitors has its own attachment system, at bottom not unlike that of the state itself. The church, the ethnic group, the economic class group, the cultural associations, and many others, form competing systems with which the state must from time to time conflict and from time to time co-operate. The civic pattern must on the whole coincide with these other patterns of social groupings, and adapt itself to their ideology, their presuppositions, and their ways and works.

Civic training is thus adjusted in whole or in part to social training in the broader sense of the term, although there are times when there are tragic conflicts, some of the most deeply moving in the whole range of human emotional disturbances. Race and country, religion and authority, class and nation, neighborhood and state: here lies the material for many dramatic scenes of internal and external struggle. Civic education has little significance when taken as if it were a thing apart from the rest of human life. This does not mean that civic feeling may not be examined by itself, but only that it must always be related to the larger pictures of which it is a part, even though from time to time a dominant part. It cannot long be forgotten that political loyalty depends upon the balance of social interests of which it is an index, and without which it is nothing. The feeling of political loyalty must in the long run have a functional basis—must serve some useful social purpose in the life of those associated in the community. Otherwise allegiance dissolves and another grouping takes place, drawing in new social elements and fashioning them together in new patterns. The new pressure upon the old loyalty may be military force, or economic need, or cultural advantage, or whatever else, disintegrating the older pattern of patriotism and shaping a new one. The pages of history are filled with the records of dissolving

states, and museums with ancient crowns once worn proudly by great potentates.

Loyalty seldom admits its provisional quality, for this seems incompatible with the attributes of sovereignty and the proud sense of independence. But the student of government has no illusions regarding these haughty political attitudes, and observes the intimate relation between the social strength of the interests served and the intensity of the patriotism developed; and the corresponding decline as the functional value of the state goes down. Some of the most fascinating political situations are those in which the struggles of old and new political loyalties are delineated in the tragic drama of an individual life or that of a group of individuals caught for the time in a desperate choice between hard alternatives. These illustrations may be found not only in the change from one political order to another, as from monarchy to democracy, but still more sharply defined in instances where territorial loyalty is involved, and the new allegiance goes over to a territorial outsider, as in cases of annexation, or regrouping of territories to form a new state. Many interesting examples are found in the plebiscites for determining political affiliation, and the arguments and influences invoked in such cases are full of meaning for the student of the political process.¹ Here may be seen in the making the patterns of political loyalty, in all possible stages of development and disintegration, shading over into each other in a rich variety of allegiance types. The same process may also be seen in the great migratory movements of mankind in the course of which men detach themselves from the fatherland or the motherland, and seek a new home and a new allegiance under what for the moment is an alien flag. The history of the United States in recent times is full of illustrations of the shifting allegiances of these types and of types of transition of political loyalties. But the question how much economic pressure, or ethnic pressure, or religious or cultural pressure is necessary to induce the patriot to change his allegiance has never been intensively studied and the whole field remains for the most part a *terra incognita*, invit-

¹ See Wambaugh on *Plebiscites*.

ing the attention of the student of government disposed to wander from the more professional or usual subjects of inquiry.

But in a study of civic training the realistic and functional aspects of the problem can never be safely ignored for long. The state must make its case not once and for all but continuously for each new generation and each new period. Competing territorial arrangements, economic alignments, ethnic rapports, cultural cohesions, are always in the background, and whenever they can present a more attractive picture than that of the present state, down goes the old allegiance and up comes the new. Plans of civic training that do not reckon with this social background of political power are defective in conception and certain to be ineffective in their attempted execution. The appearances of power are deceiving. The attitudes of authority, the gestures of command, the glittering displays of force, the apparently omnipotent reach of punishment are not always what they seem; and the most impressive embodiments of force may crumble into ashes. Bayonets must have human beings behind them, and these persons must have the will to obey; otherwise the whole motif of the scene is gone. Facing the stern lines of authority with its steel and stone, and looking perhaps in haughty faces equally steely and stony, it is difficult to realize the poverty of power; but the history of revolutions is full of tense moments when authority crumbles and falls; succeeded almost instantly by another bearing the same false front of omnipotence and unassailability.

Some of the sharpest clashes are those between the ordinary ideas of the good and the civic presuppositions of conduct necessary to the attainment of the civic goal. Ethical teachings of certain types are by common consent suspended in war and in a measure in diplomacy. To lie, to steal, to kill, to bear false witness: these are the commonplace of war, although the anathema of social relations in time of peace, and even in times of war within a special political group. The very fact of variations in the ethics of groups makes it necessary to examine each of them separately in order to come to a conclusion in regard to any of them.

It must be asserted with equal vehemence, however, that the full understanding of systems of civic education will not be reached unless they are taken as a part of a total social situation, in the midst of which they are set and as a part of which they function. Failure to do this is the basic error of many studies in civics which are confined to the strictly structural and more narrowly and formally governmental relations to which it is assumed that politics is restricted. In point of fact an essential function of the specifically political is this very co-ordination, balancing, and integration of patterns. This constitutes one of its most distinctive characteristics; and to ignore this is to overlook the basic fact in the political process.

Other groups proceed without a sense of special responsibility for the maintenance of equilibrium or integration, and they may do so functionally without destroying their survival values. A cultural group, for example, justifies itself in the life-process by the development of certain, let us say, artistic creations of value to mankind. What type of order prevails, if any, is a question of minor consequence to the cultural group out of which comes the great painter or the great poet, whose work serves the race in quite a different fashion. Economic classes struggling over production or distribution of material goods are not primarily concerned with the general system, and at times may shatter it in their own interest. But the all-round view and the integrating action is specifically the special task of the politicist, assuming of course that his services really are functionally valuable to the other groups whose agent he may be considered to be for many purposes with which they do not wish to charge themselves particularly.

Of the many social groupings the political is of course only one but perhaps the most important, or, if this is contested, as it may be, a very important one. What are its advantages or survival values in terms of the life process? From without, the political group undertakes to protect its members against economic loss, against slavery, against invasion of their ways of life, physical injury or even death, to protect the cultural values of the group as interpreted by them. From within, the political

group commonly serves the purpose of maintaining a system of order, justice, welfare, a set of understandings, a form of equilibrium under which the social and economic processes of the community, or at least of its dominant section, may go on more continuously than would otherwise be the case. External conquest and internal chaos are the great obstacles the political group must overcome. Further, however, the political group possesses the functional value of facilitating the organization of mutual aid in the community, over a range of processes which from time to time cover almost all the essential activities of human life, but commonly include only a limited number of them at any given time.

It may happen that the state incites war and destruction among otherwise peaceful groups. It may be and it has happened that the state has fallen into the hands of exploiting groups who have produced life-conditions of a lower rather than a higher type. And in consequence theorists have from time to time advanced the anarchistic conclusion that the state possessed no functional advantage whatever and might well be abolished in the interest of human advancement. In more recent times governmental ineptitude has called out the slogan of "de-politicizing" our social processes.

With the discussion of the interesting question whether there should or should not be a state at all, or whether its sphere of activity should be a broad or a limited one, we are not here concerned, except as it may be incidental to the problem as a whole.¹ It is sufficient for our present purposes to point out what the political group commonly and typically does, and from that to go on to a consideration of the ways and means of obtaining and maintaining civic solidarity. It may be that the particular form of authority in a particular state should not survive, or that the particular state at a particular period of history should not survive, or even that political organization itself as such should not survive. It is evident that particular political groups have often become in the general judgment of mankind

¹ Modern theories of the state are discussed in Merriam and Barnes, *Political Theories, Recent Times*.

common nuisances. Likewise particular rulers have in the common judgment of their community become disadvantages rather than advantages. And elaborate theories, legal and philosophical, have been developed to defend or destroy these special forms of political organization. But this is true of all group phenomena, social and economic as well as political, and, in all, the same ebb and flow of authority may be seen, the same struggle for the possession of the ideologies and symbolisms as well as the more concrete economic advantages of authority. Economic orders, religious orders, cultural orders, go up and down, sometimes more rapidly and sometimes more slowly than those of the political type; and the process of integration and disintegration may be traced in all with equal directness.

It is in this very fact of change that the significance of the attempts to develop civic solidarity and civic training for that purpose is to be found. To this end every modern state develops a far-reaching program designed to maintain the morale of its constituent members at a point where their activities will fit in with and perform the functional activities necessary for group survival. This program may or may not always be consciously contrived; it may be quite unconsciously arrived at and employed. Or it may be carefully thought out and consciously applied.

From one point of view and perhaps the larger, it would be possible to examine the social situations favorable to political group survival, taking them in their broadest implications, and attempting to discover types of cases tending toward or away from group advantage and survival. In the process of history there are constantly changing economic developments, technical and cultural shifts and lags, discoveries, and new adaptations of human skill and inventiveness. What are the conditions we might ask under which states have fallen or survived? This would involve, however, a very large-scale study, and perhaps in the end it would not be possible to arrive at conclusions of a satisfactory character from the point of view of scientific analysis or even probability. At any rate it has not been undertaken here.

In this comparative study it is proposed to examine the group and regional interests constituting the substantial basis of the political unit, and following that the main types of methods or techniques utilized in the stimulation and maintenance of civic solidarity of the political group.

It cannot be assumed that any of these social groups has a special attraction or aversion toward government in general, for their specific interest and experience is more important than their general attitude toward government as such. Business, for example, is not uniformly patriotic, but under certain circumstances may be intensely devoted to the existing political unit, and under other conditions may be antagonistic and revolutionary. Labor is not uniformly attached to the existing political unit, but at one time may be bitterly antagonistic and again may be warmly attached to the state of which it is a part. Nor are agrarian groups characteristically loyal or disloyal. Racial groups may or may not be loyal to the central authority of their political jurisdiction. They may indeed be bulwarks of authority or sources of continuing unrest, as circumstances may vary. Religions likewise may be a strength or a weakness with reference to the central axis of power, as the political and social equilibrium varies—at one time giving divine sanction for the political group and at another directing the lightnings of their wrath against the powers that be.

The analysis is not conducted then with any view of establishing a uniformity of interest and attachment in any type of group, but of indicating the social composition of the existing political units and authorities. These units are complexes of widely different interests, and the purpose of the analysis is to show the composition and interrelations of these groups, or the principal ones among them, in any given political society; and then to compare these situations in a variety of states.

In each country the type of civic solidarity is affected by these factors and their interrelation and interplay. In the light of these substantial common internal elements, the phenomena of tradition, ideology, and the special techniques of training may be most clearly observed; and in fact cannot be understood

without some such background of real interests. Germany and England and Russia and the United States emerge much more clearly when the basic social factors and their integration in a system of political unity, morale, and loyalty are observed. This might be accepted as almost axiomatic, except that the common descriptions of civic solidarity often proceed as if the political were working in a vacuum.

The purpose then of this analysis is, it may be reiterated, not to show the peculiar susceptibility of any special form of social grouping to the appeals of political loyalty, but, on the contrary, to indicate the shifting character of these allegiances and the overshadowing importance of the final balance of interests and attitudes. It is the central integration of interests that counts, not the special form or character of any one of them.

It is just at this point that many historic attacks upon the state, at one time by religious groups, at another by racial groups, at another by economic groups, have gone astray. The political authority and at times the particular political unity have survived all these assaults of other social groups, because they were aimed at a special factor, or factors, in the construction of political loyalty, as for example the factor of unwelcome race domination of the state, or unwelcome religious domination of the state, or unwelcome economic class domination and management of the state. But when these situations were altered or the pressure somewhat shifted, the political balance still remained, with the substitution of other sustaining elements in the composition of political loyalty. Thus the Russian political unit emerges from revolution with undiminished political morale and unity and loyalty, as did the French state after attacks of the agricultural and bourgeois groups on the landlords and feudal authorities. A new political loyalty takes the place of the old in the German political community, with a shift in the balance of social forces. In modern Austria the same process is evident, after the destruction of the older Austria. This does not of course exclude the possibility that the greed or unwisdom of a particular group in control of the destinies of a particular political unity may precipitate its downfall. But out of its ruins

arises another form of unity and authority, in which the attacking elements, using for the moment the slogans of criticism against the state *per se*, may themselves appear as the center of power and the chief proponent of the newly organized political unity and loyalty. The revolutionist becomes the chief loyalist; the destroyer of the particular government the defender of the state.

The examination of these factors will be followed by the study of the special methods or technique employed in the various states under consideration, and a comparison of these devices in the states as a whole. The classification of these methods is admittedly an arbitrary one, but it is hoped that it will serve a useful purpose in showing broadly the most important forms of civic training. The particular plan is of course wide open to criticism, and it is freely conceded that a much better one might be found, and in all probability will be found by some other inquirer in the not distant future. A finer analysis waits upon more complete understanding of the inner nature of the process of political cohesion. The present purpose will be abundantly served if this inquiry helps to distinguish in some degree the varying methods employed and further directs attention toward the importance of more minute and effective analysis of the whole problem.

In this group of techniques of civic training extensively employed in the nations studied are included: the formal school system; the governmental services—naval, military, bureaucratic; the political parties; the special patriotic organizations.

From another point of view we may reckon with the following devices for fixation of political interest: language, literature, and press; symbolisms and ritualisms of various sorts; the love of locality; the use of traditions. In these groups there is inevitably much overlapping. It would be possible to apply any one or all of the last series to any or all of the first series. The formal school system may and does utilize language, literature, and the press, or symbolism, or love of locality, or make use of important traditions. Symbolisms and traditions may and do overlap, while love of locality and language may be and are

interwoven most intimately. A more intimate knowledge of the learning process in civic education would make possible a different analysis but this lies in the future, when civic and social objectives are better understood and the modes of attaining them studied more technically. In the meantime the purpose of the rough classification is served if any progress is made toward a closer analysis of the techniques commonly employed in the states being examined.

The school system is very commonly utilized as a means of inculcating the traditions and skills of the group, and in many instances is one of the most important agencies for the accomplishment of this purpose. In some cases the schools are used with direct purpose and in others much more indirectly, but everywhere the formal educational system is an outstanding agency of civic training. It may seem like a far cry from the tribal initiations of primitives to the modern elaborately organized and widely extended educational system, but substantially they are alike in many particulars in their training for the group ways. With the development of universal and compulsory education covering a considerable span of life, the importance of this institution for the purpose of fostering group solidarity becomes increasingly evident.

The army, the navy, the administration, and other governmental services are important agencies in the development of civic solidarity. Under certain circumstances, it is true, they have precisely the opposite effect, but broadly speaking they constitute one of the most significant of the unifying instrumentalities of the state. The German army and the British navy, by way of illustration, are outstanding examples of this type of cohesive power. Parliamentary and judicial bodies have also their influence, but without the same dramatic appeal as the defense organizations. In states where hereditary nobility survives its influence is potent. The attitude of the public toward the servants of the state or the masters, as the case may be, is of profound importance; for in these political persons with whom citizens have many contacts or who catch the public eye is incarnated the abstract unity of the community, and

through them may be spread enthusiasms, adherences, and loyalty, or the opposites of dissatisfaction and opposition. The ways and means of utilizing these organizations differ widely in various nations, but in all of them they constitute a very important factor in the perpetuation of group loyalty. They supply the colorful human element through which the invisible and intangible commonwealth is made real to the mass of the people.

Political parties under certain circumstances are material influences in developing civic interest and morale. The parties are more human than the state and they supply a nearer and more intimate form of allegiance to many of the citizens. Many are enrolled in the party ranks and interested in their activities who would never enter the service of the government, except in time of war. Parties concern themselves with affairs political in a fashion not otherwise found. They assume a certain responsibility for the criticisms or the conduct of the government as the case may be; and in a sense they become a part of the government. Not only do parties arouse interest in the state and induce participation in the simpler forms of its government, but they have the further advantage of tending to reduce the element of conflict between the clashing factions and interests in the greater political unity. The party contests sometimes obviate resort to war and permit the substitution of peaceful although noisy forms of controversy. Elections take the place of military campaigns and, however unreasonable they may seem at times, they are more reasonable in modes of action and less wasteful socially than armed conflict; and their wounds are more quickly and completely healed. Through parties there are developed important personalities and memorable electoral and parliamentary struggles. The party heroes and the party conflicts become a part of the political mores and tend to solidify the civic interests and enthusiasms of the state.

Here again what is one man's meat is another's poison, and there are situations under which precisely the opposite effect is produced. Parties may prove under these conditions divisive and disruptive, and may tend to weaken rather than to strengthen the state. In such cases there will be found, however, a basic

lack of balance in the social composition of the state, which the parties do not wholly create, but which they reflect, and, of course, may even accentuate at times. On the whole, it is important to examine the rôle played by the political party in different countries and its relation to civic solidarity, political unity, and morale.

Special patriotic organizations are set up in some communities with the avowed purpose of promoting patriotic sentiments and enthusiasm. In the United States, France, and Germany, these are especially numerous, but they are found in various forms in all states, often operating indirectly rather than openly as in other cases. The actual influence of these organizations may perhaps be exaggerated, but they cannot be ignored in any systematic survey of the contributory factors in the creation of the state's loyalties. Their modes of organization and types of action differ widely in different political situations, but they have a bond of unity in their devotion to the task of stimulating the patriotic interest of the mass of the community to a higher pitch.

How does the political unit compare at this point with other forms of social grouping? This is an interesting problem to which almost no attention has thus far been given. Very broadly speaking, it might be said that the political organization makes more use of the organization of factions called parties. Other groups have not been so successful in encouraging the organization of factions with the reasonable expectation that through their conflicts there would develop a higher form of group unity. It has been a more common policy to discourage factionalism and emphasize the advantages of unity. The use of the group "political" machine is significant, notably in the ecclesiastical field. The propaganda functions of special patriotic organizations are common to all kinds of social aggregations, again notably the churches. The school system is of course a common carrier of all sorts of community skills, and all social groups share in the use of this instrumentally for indoctrination and training. In more recent times, with the secularization of the schools, the state has been able to make much more effec-

tive use of them than in earlier days or even now, where schools are under ecclesiastical control. The use of language, literature, the press, the employment of symbolisms of various types, the rôle of devotion to locality, the application of traditions, are of course common to all of the foregoing agencies. The educational systems, the governmental services, the parties, and the special organizations all make use of each of them in various forms, as occasion offers.

The rôle of language and literature in shaping group cohesiveness and loyalty has long been recognized. It is more effective in molding the political group than any other with the exception of the cultural group, termed the "nationality" or "nation." It carries indeed a double appeal, to the understanding and the emotions as well. A common language is a medium for the interchange of ideas in their many finer *nuances* and makes possible a discussion of common interests and policies. At the same time the familiar sound of one's own language contrasted with the barbarity of all other tongues constitutes a bond of union. The special atrocities of foreign languages are in fact special attractions for those to whom they are familiar, and who rejoice in the distinctive quality, say of the Russian *x*, or the English *th*, or the German *oe* or the Italian *r*. They serve as the indexes of the group, precisely as, in the earlier days, the Shibboleth itself. What is true of the language is even more applicable to its literature in which the common memories and common ways of the group are enshrined, and which serve as powerful unifying agencies, cutting across all manner of divisive influences of other orders. In modern times, the effect of language and literature, a force from time immemorial, has been intensified by the agency of the press, an indispensable instrument in the maintenance of all contemporary groupings. How these cohesive forces are utilized in various political systems will be more carefully considered in the following chapters. It is sufficient at this moment to advert to their great importance in the group-building process. In multilingual states, the divisive influence of language often constitutes one of the most serious obstacles to political unity.

The press is clearly one of the greatest of adult political educational agencies. Political events, issues, personalities are presented to the citizens, with more or less accuracy and fairness, but in any case with persistent repetition and vividness of color and expression. The journalistic group may not only aid or oppose men and measures, but they may and do affect profoundly the basic political attitudes in the community, and whether they are allied with or in antagonism to the political order or the ruling personnel is a question of grave importance in any political society. To some extent, it is true, the press mirrors rather than makes the public attitudes, but this concession still leaves the journalists in a position of very great political importance.

From the point of view of the political group, the general interest of the press in things political is as important as its specific attitude, since political activity is built upon the interest of the citizen in the political process. When the political loses its appeal, then the decline of authority is on the way. The press, then, is one of the important elements in the formation of political cohesion, and highly significant in any analysis of the process of political education. It is the old-time buzz of rumor intensified and accelerated by modern scientific methods.

In some ways closely akin to language is locality. Both rely upon the rôle of the common and familiar in the determination of human attitudes, and they do not reckon in vain. While the smaller city state and the feudal state, especially in times of much less mobility than in modern days, might develop a very intense devotion to the special local area, the modern political group has made extensive use of the same sentiment, even when men are no longer bound to the soil. In a very specific sense group loyalty rests upon attachment to the land in a particular area, and if the present area seems larger than in city or feudal state, the rate of mobility in modern times may make this appearance less real. Just as the citizen tends to identify himself with his forefathers as revealed in his language and literature, so he tends to identify himself with the familiar soil of his native land and the emotions that center around it. Thus the eye and ear are both enlisted in the cause of the group he tends toward.

Undoubtedly, interstate migration, the drift toward the cities, the higher rate of modern mobility, affect the force of this tendency but it still remains as an important factor in group morale, and no statesman or scientist would think of ignoring its bearing upon the nation of our day. Urbanism is also capable of developing its localisms, as the history of the city state clearly shows, and the field is not left to ruralism alone.

The rôle of the familiar in shaping attitudes has never been sufficiently explored by psychologists, but it is plain that it has many claims to consideration. The stranger has been traditionally the enemy, and the land and people unknown traditionally to be feared. The territorial basis of the state has made it easier for the political group to exploit this tendency than for any other non-territorial group, such as the religious or the economic or the cultural. The land in fact becomes personified and its invasion becomes an assault upon the bodily person of our state, or ourselves, written large. This idea is best expressed in the term fatherland, or mother-country, in which the ideas of the land and the ancestral origin are intertwined in a double-strength combination of high value in group coherence. The significance of these elements in the life of the modern state is indubitable.

In all systems there is found a cult of group coherence, expressed in various forms of ceremonialism and symbolism. Of these the flag expresses the most vivid symbol of political unity. Holidays, music, art, memorials, ceremonial rites, and observances of various kinds are included in this classification. In each state there is found an impressive array of vivid and colorful pictures, rhythms, events, in which the prestige and power of the political authority is presented, and the individual is identified with their beauty and strength. In some cases the ceremonies involve general participation, as in the collective songs, in parades, reviews, and other mass demonstrations, enlisting large numbers of persons, and often arousing them to the highest pitch of patriotic enthusiasm. The "Marseillaise," "America," the "Internationale," "Giovanezza," "Deutschland über alles," "God Save the King," are illustrations of the impressive

character of colorful songs which survive with accelerating prestige accumulating with repetition by succeeding groups of ardent loyalists.

A vast amount of energy is devoted to national or at least public buildings, whose dignity and costliness are continually impressed upon those who see them, and some of them like Versailles continue their artistic importance even after their political meaning has been liquidated. Many of these symbolisms, such as the flag and music, are utilized chiefly for military situations, but others are less colored with war psychology and may be employed wholly or chiefly for peaceful occasions. Of this description are the celebrations for important heroes such as Lincoln, Lenin, and others of a character partly political and partly cultural.

In symbolic forms the political group is richer than any other, except the ecclesiastical, to which it yields in impressive ceremonialism. At times the symbols of church and state combine their forces in common support of the politico-religious order. Sometimes the struggle between the political and the church authorities for possession of crucial days or ceremonies reveals the strategic importance of these occasions, and their reality in the maintenance of power and prestige.¹

The political society constantly seeks to develop and maintain its solidarity through the impression of its traditions upon young and old alike. The fund of common memories is an important possession of the tribe or nation; its cohesive value is very large, and is never neglected in any system. The common triumphs, the common defeats, the great names, the great days, the great qualities and traits, are a part of the heritage as much as are the land, the stores, the structures, the equipments and mechanisms belonging to the community. How to hand these possessions along to the next generation, and how to impress them upon the wandering attention of the present, is one of the great tasks of the dominant forces in the group. Inevitably this problem absorbs the interest and mobilizes the activity of a considerable number of specialists, and the co-operation of a far

¹ See Schneider and Clough, *Making*.

larger number who aid in the continuing process by which the political mores of the society are perpetuated. What the primitive tribes impress upon the initiates at the memorable time of their induction into citizenship is under modern conditions accomplished by a long process of drilling in tribal attitudes, and by constant repetition and reiteration from childhood to the grave.

Now, if there were an unbroken line of continuity in tradition the task would be relatively simple—but many perplexing complications are caused by novel situations, and by the necessity of readjusting old allegiances to them. In Russia and Italy, for example, under Soviet and Fascist rule, a different type of loyalty must be generated, and this necessity has been the mother of many new and interesting innovations, described in the volumes of Harper and Schneider. Fascism of course assumes that it builds upon the basis of Italianity, but the Soviet authorities break with Russian nationalist tradition and build upon a class foundation without regard to the older substructure. In either case we come upon a problem of very great interest in the organization and operation of civic training, and especially in the constructive formulation of new policies, growing out of altered situations.

In most states the traditional national inheritance takes the reasoned form of an ideology, a form of political theory, expressing the political credenda of the political community. Thus there is a French ideology in which is expressed the basic political doctrines of the French;¹ another for Germany, and another for each of the countries of the world. In Russia the central theme will be communism; in Italy it will be Fascism; in England monarchy modified by democracy; and in the others democratic rule. But the theory will also contain national attitudes toward various phases of the governmental process. The German will dwell upon expert administration; the American upon liberty; the French upon centralization; the Swiss upon federalism. And in each nation there will be constructed a series of preferences or aversions and special achievements in the field

¹ See the admirable summary in Hayes, *France*.

of governmentalism, which are handed on as the heritage of the political community to posterity. These ideologies will not be presented on the basis of careful comparison with the claims of other states, but will reflect a general and somewhat unreasoned attitude in a state toward its own special characteristics. The careful measurement of national attitudes would probably reveal interesting variations and differentiations, but thus far there has been no effort in this direction. And when the measurements were concluded it might be found that the chief differentials were not those distinguishing nations, but various groups, grades, and strata which did not follow the lines of political communities. The central core of characteristics might be found much more homogeneous than differentiating. But upon these important points we have thus far no evidence other than the somewhat chauvinistic accounts of national traits, or their description and characterization by rough standards of measurement which are very obviously open to challenge.

In all of the states considered these various factors may be combined in a blazing central personality which becomes their carrier. Social interests, ideologies, symbolisms, traditions, aspirations, memories, may all be focused in some overshadowing human being, through whom they are brilliantly interpreted and expressed, given life and color, and made to appeal to all. Thus Washington and Lincoln, Bismarck, Lenin, Mussolini, Gladstone, Disraeli, the Duke of Wellington, Clemenceau, Napoleon, are figures by means of which the national memory and hope is stimulated and made real in the life of the community from generation to generation. The appeal of these personalities is more direct, wider, and more effective in many ways than other forms of approach to the loyalist potentialities of men, and in every system full use of them is made for the purpose of building up the civic feeling and morale of the group. These figures stalk through school, council hall, party, symbolism, tradition, and reinforce the more abstract methodology with concrete and vivid life.

In the succeeding chapters these devices will be traced through the different states studied, and a comparison made

between them. It is plain that the result will not attain the dignity of exact measurement, but will rather be in the nature of a rough tracing of types in widely different settings. It is hoped, however, that these outlines will be sufficiently clear to set forth the main situations arising in these processes of political control and raise some important problems regarding their further development.

It may be suggested again that the processes by which political loyalty is produced must always be considered with reference to other loyalties to other groups in the same society. Many of the devices described are common to a number of groups and can be clearly seen only in their interrelations, working in co-operation or competition with other groups as the situation may be. Thus the attitude of the ecclesiastical group, or the economic group, or of racial or cultural groups, profoundly influences the nature and effect of the state's attempt to solidify political loyalty. And the picture is complete only when all the concurrent or relevant factors are envisaged.

Intricate and difficult of comprehension as some of these patterns are, they lie at the basis of power and control systems, and however crude, must constantly be employed and invented to deal with these situations. The device may be as simple as a feast for the crowd or as complicated as a formal system of civic education, but in one form or other, the pressure must constantly be maintained if the life of the state is to be preserved. This recurring problem will be discussed in the following chapters, and an effort will be made to produce a somewhat more complete analysis of the situation than has yet been made, using the eight states as examples.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF CIVIC COHESION

At a given moment the civic cohesion of the political group is an integration of different social and individual forces and attitudes finding an equilibrium in the state. The loyalty of the individual to his church, to his class, to his race, to his locality, blend into a loyalty to the state; or divide and disintegrate into conflicting allegiances and attachments. How these conflicting interests, loyalties, cohesions are combined, and how they are united in a particular territorial state, such as France or Germany, is a matter of profound interest to the political scientist and to the maker of states, for in these combinations lies the life of the state—the mystery that doth hedge about not only kings and kingdoms but all commonwealths as well.

It is now proposed to examine the economic class, the ethnic, the regional, and the religious factors in civic cohesion, with reference to each of the several states under consideration. What is the rôle of business, of labor, of agriculture in the making of the citizen? What part does religion, Romanism, Judaism, Protestantism, the Greek church, play in state building? What is the place of the racial groupings in the complex of the state? What is the influence of regionalism in the structure of political morale? And what is the relation of all these competing loyalties to each in the final integration or disintegration of political loyalty?

Although in this discussion particular attention will be given to the economic forces, the factors of racial composition, religious associations, and regional situations, these are not by any means the only types of association with which the state must reckon. They are the most important and most frequently emerge in the struggle for the equilibrium of dominance and subordination. But there are also cultural organizations and affilia-

tions of a wide variety—artistic, educational, scientific, social, of all descriptions and with all sorts of international overlapping and interrelationships.

Over long periods of time and widespread populations, the family has played an important and not infrequently a dominating rôle. In the Western and modern states here studied the family is now a unit of very great importance in the social life of the nation, and not without significant political relations. Thousands of families are interlaced in the larger fabric of the state, and influence it in unnumbered ways. No wise state builder would for a moment ignore the practical importance of these deep-rooted attachments. But the family no longer rivals the state as such, however much its ramifications may influence particular acts or policies of government.

The Masonic order is a conspicuous case of a fraternal group with international ramifications of the most important character, and from time to time it is full of meaning in the political situation. Business, labor, scientific organizations, are also international in their composition, and in increasing measure. And many other types might be mentioned, both within and without the state. All of these must be reckoned with in the structure of the state's inner fiber and the condition of its morale.

It cannot of course be assumed that there is anything approaching complete solidarity in any of these groups. Business may mean small-scale or large-scale business; the agrarians include the great landlords, the small holders, and the farm tenants and workers; the labor group contains individuals of the most highly skilled and paid crafts and the workers on the very margin of skill and subsistence. Within these, group attachment or allegiance to the state may vary widely with reference to times, situations, personalities. And it will be found that there are statist and anti-statist types running through all groups with temperamental affinities that cut completely across group lines.

The consideration of these groups is therefore useful only in so far as these limitations are borne in mind, and as the broad

purposes of such appraisal are held in view. Overstressing the significance of the group coherence will defeat understanding political cohesion just as surely as ignoring their importance in the composition of the state.

ECONOMIC GROUPS¹

The historic basis of state power has been the rural agrarian group, since agriculture has long been the chief occupation of mankind. This tradition carried well down to modern times, and in the patrimonial theory and practice of the state found its most interesting expression. Under this system the land is, in a way, the state, carrying with it the people on the soil, and land ownership is convertible into political power. The landlord is the political lord as well, and private law is public law too.² Agrarians themselves challenged this theory, later business challenged this fact and theory, and labor, in more recent times. Considered in terms of groups, agriculture has tended to lose, while business and labor have tended to gain, in political power. The large landowner declined in authority and the small owner failed to develop an agrarian organization with equal political power and prestige. Labor in the nineteenth century rapidly developed a sense of solidarity and a type of effective economic organization and thus this group tended to assume a non-national or international form, and to proclaim a new class unity transcending territorial political lines. Internally the labor group found its way slowly into responsible political power, and in many cases fell into sharp conflict with the prevailing political authorities.

Business developed its organization with great rapidity and first shared and then took over the substance of political authority from the landowner, or tended to do so. The personal ownership of business did not, however, connote the direct ownership

¹ An interesting study in this general field is that of Waldemar Mitscherlich, *Nationalstaat und Nationalwirtschaft und ihre Zukunft*. Another is Francis Delaist, *Political Myths and Economic Realities*. The literature on the question of class relations is too extensive to permit detailed citation. Special studies of this and other problems of social cohesion are found in the individual volumes of this series.

² Cf. von Haller's *Restauration der Staatswissenschaft* for the eulogy of this system.

of government, except in a few selected industrial—mining and manufacturing—areas where this was practically true of the owners of the works. Broadly speaking, business is the most powerful economic factor of our time, and it tends to uphold government as such and particular governments and governors. To such an extent is this true that the assertion has been made that Democracy is the creation and the tool of Capitalism—a control maintained through the immediate agency of political lawyers.¹

Agriculture still supplies the traditional basis of political authority. This is in fact a survival from an earlier period, but it also reflects the interest of the peasant proprietors in the government of which they are a part, and, from another point of view, the pietistic rural attitude toward authority, both in the religious and the political world as well. While there is an international agrarian organization, the Green Internationale, two of them in fact, the Communist and the Capitalist, it does not compare in power with the international business group, or with the international combinations of labor, Red or otherwise. The rural regions supply a fund of respect for authority, a type of interest in politics, a considerable group of party leaders. They still remain the stalwart defenders of the traditional political cult, although no longer its chief beneficiaries.

The labor group has come in recent times into the sharpest contacts with political authority, is least proportionately represented in government, is most attracted by a class loyalty of another type, and most widely questions the sacredness of authority. Notwithstanding all this, they may become in times of crisis the chief bulwark of political authority, as against anarchism or communism.

It is dangerous to generalize too broadly, but one may safely say that in all of the eight states studied the business group has found distinct values in the political community, with the clear exception of Russia and perhaps of Austria-Hungary, at least in minor degree in this last case. In all the other instances the commercial groups have discovered specific advantages in the preservation of the political society and they have tended to

¹ Cf. Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*.

support it substantially, both within and without. They have utilized its force in strikes, in tariffs, trade protection abroad, solicited its aid in industrial development, and often have not hesitated to corrupt its officials. The early affinity between economic mercantilism and political nationalism has continued down to the present day, and the combination of economic and political advantage has endured as a substantial basis of political unity and morale. Business has been keenly alive to the effects of adverse or friendly legislation and in consequence has been one of the chief supporters of the political order within its proper sphere, as interpreted by industrialists.

On the other hand, industrial interests have been quick to realize the necessity of readjustment of political boundary lines and hence have been at times indifferent to the frontiers of the territorial state as now constituted. International agreements favoring trade or stabilizing currency have been resisted by nationalists and supported by economic interests. Precisely in our day many industrial interests may be found as advocates of certain forms of international agreement, the League of Nations, the World Court, or other proposals for international stabilization.

It is not necessary to assert that business is more concerned with civic cohesion than other groups, an invidious form of comparison, but it may be that industrial interests have had a more clearly perceptible investment in the political group than any other in most of the states concerned. If and when their substantial interests were not served, industries were no more concerned with the state's prestige than any other group, but frequently it happened that they were or seemed to be. As the phrase goes they did not allow patriotism to interfere with their pocketbook. In a situation like that of Russia where the pecuniary system was overturned, they became hostile to the maintenance of the authority of the newly established political order. But in Germany they entered, dubiously at first, into the political balance of the new republic, and aided in its stabilization.

The agricultural group, in so far as one may generalize safely,

is as a rule, in these states, solidly arrayed behind the existing political order. This is true of the large landowners and usually of the smaller ones with the exception of Soviet Russia. In states like Germany, Hungary, Italy, and England large landed estates still play an important rôle in the government and affairs of the state, and, in fact, disputed until recently with the industrial interests for primacy. In France, Switzerland, and the United States where the smaller landowner was more commonly encountered and where the prestige of the large estate had largely disappeared, these smaller owners were powerful adherents of the state, and bulwarks of coherence. Agrarians did not display the keen interest of the industrial groups in international policy or in expansion or in wars, but they followed closely the problem of taxation and the burdens incident upon their special interests.

On the whole, the rural regions were likely to be more acutely sensitive to the maintenance of high standards of integrity in public affairs than the industrial, although less interested in the technical efficiency of expert governors, and they cultivated at all times a traditional interest in the ceremonials of the group. Losing in population to the urban industrial centers, and in economic power and prestige to industry and to labor in less degree, the agricultural interests were enlisted in support of the civic morale of the group, and they solidly supported the political order of their political unit, both in war and in peace.

In Russia after the revolution they assumed jointly, although not equally, with labor the conduct of the government and the reorganization of the economic and political order. In this movement the proletarian group took the lead, but the agrarian group were closely identified with them and shared in the burden they assumed. The overthrow of the large landowner was their chief concern, but, aside from the *émigrés*, they allied their fortunes with those of the Communists for the purpose of carrying out this plan; and they joined with them in the development of a remarkable form of patriotic cult.

The labor group was organized last and developed its types of political leaders more slowly than the agrarian or the business

element of the population in the several states. They did not have the heavy investment interests of business or the property interest of agriculture, and they frequently fell foul of the law and the government in strikes and other disturbances of a similar character. From the middle of the nineteenth century on, they were often influenced by the Marxian doctrines which contemplated a labor-class enthusiasm and loyalty rather than a regional political one. At the outset of the movement many of the ablest leaders of labor were opposed to political action and labor as a party remained outside the political arena for a long time. This was notably true in England and in the United States. During all this time the labor movement remained critical of the political order as such, of the particular political order in a particular state, and of the special persons in political control at a given time. In some instances they predicted the ultimate downfall of the state, and the substitution of some form of industrial organization in its stead. This did not, however, stand in the way of active participation in nationalistic wars as they developed from time to time, or other patriotic demonstrations as occasion offered.¹

As the political status of organized labor became stronger, the antagonistic tendency toward government tended to disappear and labor began to align itself more definitely with the political order of the state. This was especially noticeable among the Social Democrats in Germany, the Socialists in France, and later the Labor party in England. Labor not only entered into political contests but became influential in parliamentary bodies, and at last assumed positions of responsibility in the national ministries themselves. Ebert was a conspicuous illustration of this tendency, as was Bissolati in Italy. On a smaller scale in provinces and cities there was large representation and in some cases control of the political situation by the labor forces. Thus they tended to become increasingly responsible for the conduct of government and to support more and more ardently its general morale.

After the war this tendency was even more marked than be-

¹ See C. J. H. Hayes in Merriam and Barnes, *Political Theories, Recent Times*.

fore. In Russia the labor group took the leadership in the Revolution and in the organization and conduct of the government. The dictatorship of the proletariat was the complete assumption of the responsibility for political activity and for the development and maintenance of the civic interest and enthusiasms necessary to carry on the government. In Germany also the labor groups entered the field of political responsibility, and, with the election of Ebert as president, were for the time during the most critical period of its history the most important factor in the government of that country. The socialistic and communistic groups should, of course, be sharply differentiated.

In these two states, then, Germany and Russia, the labor group in reality undertook the burden of government, and passed from a negative to a positive position in the political order. In Russia they encountered the active and unrelenting hostility of the business group, and in Germany at first the indifference and later the co-operation of the industrialists. In Austria and Czechoslovakia, after the war, the labor forces were recognized and became an integral part of the governing group, but this was too late to affect the now fallen empire. In the United States the labor elements remained for a long time indifferent to political activity, then later preferred the policy of balancing between the major parties; and at no time assumed the burdens of responsible government in the federal field, and rarely in the local. In Switzerland the socialist group, representing the industrial workers, refused until 1929 to accept a position in the Federal Council, but did not decline responsibility in the local cantonal governments.

In Italy the socialist forces remained in unvarying opposition to the World War, consistently refusing either to help or to hinder the conduct of the military enterprise. Other labor elements were, however, organized in the cabinet, as in the case of Bissolati. After the Revolution under Mussolini, they remained in the government's inside group, particularly under the leadership of Rossoni. Here they remained subordinate, however, to the superior influence of the business and military groups.¹

¹ See Herbert W. Schneider and Shepard B. Clough, *Making Fascists*, chap. i.

On the whole, labor groups in these states saw more plainly than did the others the harsher side of governmental activity, and regarded the political order much less enthusiastically. They saw less direct advantage to themselves than did the large owner of land or business. At times they seemed to be benefited by tariff regulations or by immigration restrictions or reluctant social legislation, but, on the whole, they felt themselves ignored by the government except in times of war or of other national crisis. Furthermore, the labor movement developed a more enthusiastic and dramatic support of another and competing loyalty than did the business or the agricultural elements. The music of the "Marseillaise," or the "Internationale," touched them deeply. Marx and Lenin, notable figures directly representative of a class, and the Red Internationale as an ideal undoubtedly appealed with more emotional power than either the green or the "yellow." To many, the labor movement became a substitute both for religion and patriotism, and they found expression for ideals of an ecclesiastical and political nature long repressed. Inevitably as the power of labor grew greater, and as it began to assume more and more direct responsibility for the conduct of the government, this attitude of antagonism began to alter, and became one of greater devotion to the group in which they now possessed a proprietary interest, until, as in Russia, the labor state itself became a cult and a form of devotion.

It is of course difficult to make any accurate comparisons between the position of the economic groups in the several political systems, but there are certain generalizations that may be safely made. In all of the cases considered the business group plays a leading rôle, with the exception of Russia and of old Austria-Hungary. In all of the groups considered agricultural interests likewise play a leading rôle, and in the two cases in which business is relegated to the rear, Russia and Austria-Hungary, they are also conspicuous in their position. In two of the states labor occupies the dominant position, Russia and England, and a somewhat subordinate position governmentally in others. It has developed notable strength politically in Germany and France, and in England. In Switzerland, the United

States, Italy, and old Austria-Hungary, the labor group has occupied a less important place in political affairs.

If we look outside the boundaries of the state, business and labor have found broader units of interest, and competing loyalties have been set up, between the political state and the labor class in one case and between the political state and the international financial group in the other. The international proletarian class movement is of course far stronger numerically and in the development of cult and symbolism, while the international financial movement has all the silent power that comes from possession and prestige.

The agricultural movement has developed fewer affiliations across national lines, remains local and somewhat unco-operative, and, consequently, in view of the consolidating tendencies of modern times, is isolated and imperiled. Notwithstanding this, the agrarian group contributes more to the traditional cult of the state than any other group, and develops fewer alarming tendencies toward disintegration of the existing or traditional national political orders. Their heroes, their memorials, their failures and triumphs, lie in a more remote past than do those of the other groups, and they look forward and around with less keen interest and enthusiasm than do business and labor. Agrarian grievances may and have resulted in rebellions and revolutions of the most savage nature, and such contests as the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution have centered in the struggle between the large landowner and the disinherited. With the attainment of small landholdings, however, the agrarian movement is likely to be satisfied, especially if there goes with this some recognition of its political importance. But when the land becomes theirs, a type of satisfaction ensues in the exercise of the proprietary interest, and further disturbance is less likely to occur. Under the Soviet system a policy of nationalization of land developed, and gave a new turn to the agrarian movement, the implications of which are large.

Cutting across these economic lines, there is a type of solidarity frequently developed between the small capitalists in the business group as against the larger ones, and the small farmers

in the agrarian group as against the larger landlords together with a certain group of skilled labor. This combination of small business and small farmers is often thrown together in the "middle class," which, united with various types of "white-collar" workers and professional groups, is often a powerful factor in political affairs on such occasions as it may develop cohesive tendencies. This middle-class group is now relatively on the decline, but thus far has been one of the staunchest supporters of the modern state, holding a balance between more extreme elements, and finding a deep satisfaction in the development of the power and prestige of the political community.

ETHNIC GROUPS¹

The racial groupings present many striking instances of associations maintained without regard to the territorial and political boundaries of the state. Without undertaking to define too closely the characteristic differentials of modern races, a subject upon which more has been asserted than proved, it is clear that there are separate combinations of people which may ultimately be developed as biological patterns or social culture patterns, and, in any case, are widely influential in determining courses of life conduct. Types such as the German, the Slav, the French, the Hungarian, the Czech, the Italian, the Irish—all these are significant factors in the life of the political unity, and have a fundamental bearing on the growth and preservation of various types of political loyalties. When they are disintegrated and competitive, they may jeopardize the life of the combination and when they are firmly united they form one of the strongest ties that can combine to constitute a state.

From the point of view of racial analysis it is clear that there are at least three types of states in the group under considera-

¹ A vast mass of material has been developed upon this point, ranging from obvious propaganda for special racial groups to more careful and objective studies. *Das Minoritätenproblem und seine Literatur* (Berlin, 1928) contains an elaborate list of titles on this subject. See also the periodical publications, *Nation und Staat*, *Natio*, and *Les Minorités nationales*.

From another point of view are such works as Arnold van Gennep, *Traité comparatif des nationalités*; Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*; F. R. Garth, *Race Psychology*.

tion: (1) unitary, (2) multiple, (3) multiple with a dominating group.

In the first group of states in which the racial¹ stock is fairly well unified, are France, Germany, Italy, and perhaps Russia. In the second group of states, with multiple race stocks as the basis of the political society, we should place Switzerland and Austria-Hungary. In the third group of states, with a multiple racial basis, but with one outstanding group, we should place the United States and Great Britain and perhaps Russia, also.

Of the first class, Italy and France are the most nearly compact, since there are few non-French in France and few non-Italians in Italy, except for the recent inclusions of the after-war period. There are few French outside of France and thus the French group is compactly included in the boundaries of the old France, regardless of its newly included territories in Africa and elsewhere. Of Italians there are many who no longer live within the political state of Italy, and who therefore constitute an outside Italy of no little importance in political and other relations.

Germany is racially unified with the exception of a few Poles, now largely returned to Poland. On the other hand there are many Germans who do not live in Germany, some of them territorially near at hand, as in Austria, and others, scattered to remote parts of the globe, especially in North and South America. Pan-Germanism consequently raises a problem of major importance in the life of the German state, and inevitably affects the national system of cohesion and of civic training. The German culture may be considered apart from its political connections, but the political and the cultural may also be united in dreams and aspirations of a political character.

Of the multiple type, two states have been considered, Switzerland and Austria-Hungary. In Switzerland there exists a combination of three racial groups, the German, the French, and the Italian, in the ratio of 70.9 per cent German, 21.2 per cent French, and 6.2 per cent Italian. In Austria-Hungary there

¹ The term "racial" is employed here in the absence of any other word to express the ethnic-cultural group such as English, Italian, etc.

was seen a union of the German (23.38 per cent), the Slavs (45.59 per cent), and the Magyars (19.71 per cent). Both states accordingly presented extraordinarily difficult problems in the maintenance of a stable political equilibrium and in the creation of political morale. In one instance a permanent state has been formed and in the other there has come dissolution, for the time at least. The analysis of these situations presented at length by Jászi and Brooks in their respective studies, gives a vivid picture of the complications of a government and a type of civic morale dependent upon a multiracial form of balance and co-operation. The linguistic problem alone is one of staggering difficulty. Parliamentary co-operation and conference in many tongues is difficult, while at many other points language enshrines attitudes and emotions of long-standing and of deep meaning in the lives of citizens.

A third type includes states with a multiple racial basis with one predominating stock. This class includes England and the United States. In its broadest sense the British Empire is of highly heterogeneous nature. In the narrower sense, however, the insular group is more compact, notwithstanding the fact that there are wide differences between the English, the Welsh, the Scotch, and the Irish. Of these, however, in recent times, only the Irish group has proved incapable of absorption in the central unity attained by the three other groups. The experience of England with Ireland illustrates vividly the possibilities of political unbalance and the destruction of political morale resulting from internal controversy. In any case there are no barriers of language between the four groups, speaking a common tongue with variations.

The success of the British in maintaining a type of political unit in a group so widely divergent from the racial point of view and so widely spread out geographically is one of the most interesting examples of civic cohesion here examined, and points to possibilities in the development of this art. With the English-speaking groups mentioned above the problem is simpler, but with the Boer, the Hindoo, the Egyptian, there are acute possibilities of disorder. Nor can it be said that in all of these

cases the experiment has been an unqualified success, and recent disorders may be readily construed as forecasting other bitter experiences.

In the United States there has also existed a heterogeneous combination of racial groups of a very pronounced character. In this combination the English-speaking group predominated and by a rapid process of assimilation, the English language was quickly made the common tongue, without any survivals of significance. As a rule the newly arrived racial groups were not politically important for some time, and they were not reckoned at the outset in the political balance or in the necessity for the formation of a political morale through some type of civic training. By the time they arrived at political consciousness and activity, they were assimilated with the other groups and no longer possessed a pronounced racial interest in politics, with few and scattered exceptions. In any case, no racial group at any time assumed an anti-American attitude, but on the contrary there was competition in national enthusiasm and devotion—a competition in which Irish and German were entered and later the Italian, the Slav, and other groups likewise.

In America it must also be observed that the racial co-operative process was very greatly facilitated by the economic and other factors in the situation. The races did not all arrive at the same time, but the first settlers were the English and allied groups, who in turn received the others one by one as they reached the shores of the new country. The newcomers were not as a rule of the dominant economic or governing classes of their respective countries, and were hence readily taken up politically and otherwise by those who were looked upon as old-timers. Thus there was little opportunity for the outbreak of racial rivalries of the type so easily discernible in Austria-Hungary or even in Switzerland. By a gradual process the new races were absorbed in the melting pot of the older. The most acute antagonisms developed between the blacks and the whites but the economic, cultural, and numerical advantages of the whites made this scarcely a rivalry at all. The black struggled not for domination but for recognition as a human person. The

maintenance of national morale among these apparently divergent groups was not therefore a difficult task, and the Americanization of the new groups was carried on with surprising rapidity, and in fact frequently without any adequate recognition of the cultural values of the newcomers. In one sense the problem was not how to absorb them, but how to preserve them sufficiently to benefit from their varied cultures.

What is the relative strength of the ethnic groups and the political and economic groups? How do they fare in cases of conflict when the individual must choose between race and country? How do these deep-seated but competing loyalties stand when placed upon the field of competition? These are questions which must be answered with very great discretion and with many reservations, pending more exhaustive study of this subject.

Of the "racial stocks," called so for lack of a better term, the French display the greatest tenacity and persistence in resisting the claims of other and competing loyalties. Irish, German, Russian, Italian, American, English, Swiss components and Austro-Hungarian components are absorbed in various other states to which they emigrate, but the French seem capable of offering resistance to other political associations. America absorbs all other groups, and the Americans themselves are assimilated by the Canadians in Western Canada. The French, however, seem to resist at all points and to remain insoluble in other mixtures. The only comparable European group is that of the Poles, who have resisted the German pressure in recent times most stubbornly, but have succumbed to the nationalizing influences of the Americans. On the other hand they have not shown great facility in absorbing peoples of other types in their own political associations.

One situation at least is clear, that, where the ethnic and the political groups coincide, the combination is a very powerful one and that, where they are divided, the resulting equilibrium is a very insecure one. This is upon the assumption that the racial elements are of equivalent or approximately equivalent strength, numerically, culturally, and economically. In any

event the traditional and symbolic strength of the ethnic group is very great. Its roots run far back into the past, and it is able to rally the recollections of earlier times to its support. Language and literature are contributory to its development and continuance long after either political or economic power may have disappeared. The great Germans in the racial or nationalistic sense, the great Frenchmen, the great Italians, the great Russians are all persistent factors in the production of the sense of political solidarity, or at any rate, of cultural unity. These complexes are often more enduring than those of the political groupings, running their roots far back into the mythical past. Cultural symbolisms of the most impressive type are available for the service of the ethnic association. And when these are reinforced by the economic interests of the time or place or individual, the result is notable.

During the last one hundred years the efforts of these ethnic groups to obtain political expression and recognition and in many cases independence has been one of the outstanding political phenomena of the time. During the World War, in particular, the concept of self-determination woke to new life and became a slogan of great international significance. Since that time the efforts of racial groups have been even more pronounced than before. At times this political recognition of the ethnic elements has an economic value of great importance, but in other instances there is little apparent economic gain involved and in some instances positive economic loss.

With rapidly enlarging economic units arising from the swift development of methods of communication and transportation, and with the demand for larger markets caused by the larger scale system of production in certain regions, the ethnic unit has been greatly strained and the outcome remains full of difficulties. The division of old Austria-Hungary into three independent political units offers an illustration of the intricate economic problems presented by the small state in a modern world, no matter how compact its ethnic basis may be or how well developed its political ambitions. A small state occupying a strategic position or neutralized as is Switzerland may maintain it-

self for a long time; but the smaller state astride the highways of commerce finds the economic defense of its territorial boundaries increasingly difficult, and in the long run may be forced to seek a modification of its organization.

On the fringes of the political units are found many illustrations of the hard choice between political and economic advantage that must be made by nationalistic groups. Do the Poles, if more prosperous economically in Germany, prefer Polish or German political allegiance? Do the Germans in Austria, if economic conditions in Germany are hard, prefer union with Germany or will they wish to remain independent politically and more happy financially?¹ Will the prosperous Italians in the United States prefer America or Italy in time of stress, when choice must be made? Thousands of such decisions must constantly be made in situations where economic and ethnic allegiances clash.

In the value system of individuals both ethnic and economic prestige is rated highly, and whether economic well-being or the self-expression of the population group is paramount will depend upon a whole complex of factors which cannot be explained offhand. When men think of the past, the traditional memories are sure to quicken the ethnic urge, but when they think of the present or perhaps the future, considerations of well being and prosperity loom larger. There are many other images that may blur or confuse the situation, and make the decision far less simple. Among these not the least are religion and geography or localism.

It is even possible that the individual may find that he enjoys a wider range of liberty and broader possibilities of self-expression under a system that does not politically represent his ethnic affinities, and his experiences or attitudes may make these significant in his mental or emotional horizon. And this may be true, not only of political liberty in the narrower sense of the term, but also of moral liberty or cultural liberty, or any other form of liberty for which the individual may long. Thus the

¹ Interesting material concerning plebiscites on annexations is found in Wambaugh, *Plebiscites*.

German may find political liberty in America or the American might find a wider range for artistic expression in French environment.

The precise bases upon which the decisions are reached in such cases have never been subjected to careful analysis in any wide range of cases, and such an inquiry presents fascinating possibilities for the interested student, whether in the field of larger group pressures, tensions, and trends, or in the personal constitution and experience of individuals. In view of the widespread migratory movements of the last hundred years, there is abundant material for the investigator¹ who is willing to search out the diverse patterns developed or laid bare by these restless shiftings of populations.

On the whole it might be said that the strongest support from racial unity is received by France, Germany, and Italy, the least powerful by Austria-Hungary and Switzerland; and that in the middle group would be found Russia, England, and the United States. Of all these nations the most powerful ethnic foundation is found in France. Here the ethnic stock is more closely knit; here we find practically all of the French group under the same political roof, with only scattering exceptions such as the French Canadians and the French colonials if they be called exceptions. Italy has lost many of its natives to America, North and South. Germany is compact ethnically but many of its nationality are found in other states, both in Europe and in the Western Hemisphere.

In all of these states with the exception of Austria-Hungary and Switzerland there is an ethnic culture at the base of the political state, lending support to the political activities of the society, reinforcing it at vital points where the political organization might not so readily carry over its program of action or so easily maintain the morale of the aggregation. It may be said once more that we are not undertaking to answer the question whether these groups called ethnic have in fact any distinct physical, racial characteristics, differentiating them from others, or whether they are primarily culture patterns of a distinctive

¹ See Wilcox, *Trends of Migration*.

nature. Whether biological or culture pattern, the evidences of it are clearly present, and the relation of this group of tendencies or attitudes to the political morale of the society is manifest in the most conspicuous way. We have here one of the most fundamental elements in the texture of civic cohesion in the modern state.

REGION¹

The effect of regional or sectional loyalty upon the composition of the state, and upon the sense of state allegiance is of no small importance. A region may be outlined in terms of physical geography or the old-time barrier boundaries, indicated by nature as lines of military demarcation. But many of the older criteria of political geography are inapplicable to boundary lines under modern conditions. Rivers may unite rather than divide populations. Mountain ranges are not an effective barrier against the invaders of the air. Oceans may more easily be spanned by a bridge of ships. In many instances distances are not measured in miles but in minutes, in time of transportation which may be a jagged line depending on selected routes for rapid transit. Distance and physical obstacles are still, to be sure, factors of very great importance in relation to political boundaries, but not as in the days when man's control over nature was less than now. Furthermore, the great improvement in means of transportation has made territories and populations relatively independent of the local food supply, of raw materials for industrial purposes; and thus again transformed the conditions of political and social existence. Under present conditions it may easily happen that parts of different nations are in closer touch than parts of the same nation. England is the classic case of the development of a state in violation of the earlier canons of political geography. While, therefore, we must constantly reckon with regionalism as an element in the structure of the

¹ Important studies have been made by the geographers in this field. See O. D. Von Engeln, *The Geographical Factor in National Development*; Camille Vallaux, *Géographie sociale*; Brunhes and Vallaux, *La Géographie et l'Histoire*; and a long series of others contributing important data for the study of this aspect of the political problem. See Merriam and Barnes, *Political Theory, Recent Times*, chap. xii, for a discussion of the general position of the geographers.

state, the rôle of territorial isolation is on the decline, and of less importance than ever before in the making of political patterns. Economic geography and means of communication may become more important than imposing natural barriers, which a century ago might have been decisive of national boundaries.

Yet under certain conditions geographical regionalism may be a factor of prime importance in organizing or disorganizing the elements of state unity and strength. This is of special importance when the particular region happens to be the seat of some economic, ethnic, or religious grouping, and the strength of each component element is reinforced by another or by a series of others. Religion plus a region, or race plus a region, or a race plus region and religion makes a combination of no little influence on the structure of state authority and prestige.

There are widespread areas in which no special regions emerge, from the political point of view, and there are relatively small areas in which there are several regions of political importance. Russia, for example, is not much disturbed by political regionalism, while Britain has encountered many territorial complications of the most acute character. Even in the small state of Switzerland there are sharp divisions of regional loyalty. Certain regional areas, in which there are clearly evident differentials of civic loyalty and allegiance, exist in all of the countries under discussion. In all states there are urban and rural regions, and there are also industrial and agricultural regions, and usually the urban industrial and rural agricultural coincide, although there may be mining and manufacturing industries in almost all rural territories.

The territorial area is obviously important in proportion to the development of means of transportation and communication, both as commercial and military agencies; and, further, regions must be judged from the point of view of the current unit of government. In our times the presence of the relatively large country state and the swift advance in methods of inter-communication have relegated regionalism to a comparatively unimportant position as contrasted with the feudal period of small territorial states or with the ancient city states. Within

the national state the railway and the telephone have conquered space to such an extent that the older forms of territorial isolation have become no longer adequate as focal points for civic pride. The nations themselves are now regions in the larger community of the family of nations, in which their nationalism tends to become regionalism and localism.

The development of large-scale production, of the larger market that goes with it, of the greater economic unit of the time, raises the very gravest questions regarding the territorial basis of the modern state. Is it adequate to meet the commercial needs of the time? Or is it outgrown or beginning to become obsolescent? It was long contended, for purposes of war, that the ideal state would be self-contained, self-sufficient, able to exist without the aid of any of its neighbors, or the smallest number possible. In a world where peace was insured, this consideration would no longer apply, or its application would be less immediate and direct. But even in a world of peace, the problems of tariffs and other restrictions upon outside investment would raise the same problem in another form, and the answer would inevitably favor the larger territorial unit as against the smaller.

Now this is an argument to be employed by the nation against its own constituent members who may resist its nationalizing control, but it is also an argument that may be used against the smaller nation itself by a larger nation or by a community of states in some more inclusive federation. In Western Europe it is this consideration that is troubling the calculations of the state-makers. They begin dimly to see a form of political organization in which the nation may assume a place not unlike that of the present-day city in Germany or Italy, as contrasted with its independence a few generations ago.

Regionalism tends to diminish in importance as intercommunication and economic organization develop. The political unit was always a function of these factors and the relation continues to be in periods of rapid change as in times of immobility or of relatively little movement. It would be idle to conclude that regionalism had no meaning at all, but it is equally fatuous to

proceed as if it were now as important as it was under widely different conditions of intercommunication.

To the region there also attach many subtle values of high utility in the formation of national sentiment. Around the immovable territory cluster many attachments in a moving world. All the lure of the familiar is at its command. Thus the ancient mountains, the old plains, the majestic rivers, the lakes, the seas, the color of the seasons, all these enter into the picture of the native land.¹ The childhood scenes, the places of recreation, the memories of battle with the foe, or with the still more stubborn soil, local sunshine and storms, are factors in the weaving of a texture of the common and familiar, to which the personality inevitably attaches itself. The moods of reminiscence sweep along these channels from time to time in the life of every individual, and as they go they take on the color of a political attraction, which may surpass all others.

“Breathes there a man with soul so dead who never to himself has said, This is my own, my native land?” expresses the organization of the familiar in terms of the soil and of the state also. For soil and state, patrimony and patriarch, land and people, have come down together from time immemorial. Of course, it is possible that this sentiment might attach itself, primarily, to the city or the local community or the world at large or the county or the local ward; but in point of fact under the modern political order, the tendency is to bring them together under the symbolism of the state which for the time at least has overshadowed the others in its superior attractiveness. In another period the attachment might be otherwise made. The psalmist spoke of his worship of Jerusalem, a city; likewise, the Roman, of Rome. In the medieval period the city again emerged and Florence or Venice was the object of the poet’s song.

Since the days of the nomad state and the adoption of its sessile form, the land and political power have possessed a peculiar affinity for each other. With the break-up of the system under which the inheritance of land carried with it the inheritance of political power over the people on the land, and with the

¹ For admirable illustrations of this see Gaus, *Great Britain*.

further tendency to abandon the agricultural economy as the chief way of life, the whole basis of the modern state seems to crumble, at this point. But the poetical and sentimental tendencies have not yet caught up with the changes in the economic and political world and still utilize the older imagery, which of course still does have a wide application in great ranges of the world's area and population. The newer imagery of the city and the factory just begins to emerge, and has not yet woven itself into a political form. Furthermore, the high rate of mobility in the economic and political structure of later days will make this a difficult task for some time to come, although in the end it will doubtless be achieved.

The states we are considering fall roughly into two groups. In one the regional differentials are of considerable significance in the state structure and in the second group they are of relatively little importance.

Group I includes England, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland. Group II includes France, Italy, Russia, Germany, and the United States.

Britain's widespread territorial lines seem an invitation to the development of sectional interests and sentiments antagonistic to central control. India, Egypt, South Africa, Australia, Canada, Ireland, and the islands of the sea, scattered all over the globe—this might seem the very description of rampant regionalism. In many of these instances there are also racial and religious differences, emphasizing the geographical separation.

Gaus quotes Lord Milner:

"I am a British race patriot. . . . It is not the soil of England, dear as it is to me, which is essential to arouse my patriotism, but the speech, the tradition, the spiritual heritage, the principles, the aspirations of the British race. . . . I feel myself a citizen of the Empire. I feel that Canada is my country, Australia is my country, New Zealand my country, South Africa my country, just as much as Surrey or Yorkshire."¹

The British navy, British trade, British diplomacy, have been able to bind these scattered fragments of empire together in a working political unity, and to develop and maintain an effec-

¹ See Gaus, *op. cit.*, chap. v, "The Citizen and the Empire," p. 75.

tive form of solidarity and morale. The severe test to which British allegiance was subjected during the World War left no doubt as to the vitality and tenacity of the sentiment, and the strength of the central pattern of imperial loyalty. The picture of the nation as a whole has been superimposed upon the picture of the individual regions, and another territorial allegiance has been generated. This whole policy is of course radically different from the classical ideal of a self-sufficient state as nearly as possible isolated from the rest of the world. The difficulties encountered in India, in South Africa, in Egypt, in Ireland, and earlier in America indicate clearly the importance of regional differences, while the triumph of the central empire shows the possibility in modern times of overcoming these various localisms, and combining them in a new synthesis of allegiance and authority. In a world of developed intercommunication, the possibility of such combinations naturally increases with advancing mobility.

In Austria-Hungary sectionalism was of very great importance, not only because of the geographical configuration of the land, but because ethnic and religious differences coincided with these territorial lines. The geographical separatism of Hungary and of Bohemia might not have interfered seriously with the formation of a central state, but the coincidence of these territories with a Hungarian group in the one case and a Czech in the other was the source of serious difficulty, by no means insuperable, but none the less considerable. Economic differences tended to accentuate the territorial differences, as the agrarian development in Hungary, the financial centers in Austria, manufacture and mines in Bohemia.¹ Likewise, religious differences entered into the situation: the early Czech tendency toward Protestantism, as against Catholicism.

Sectionalism, in the absence of another policy, was thus able to develop an intensity and power that shook the unity of the central state, and ultimately led to its overthrow. The imperial policy of divide and rule, of balancing one group against

¹ See Jászi, *Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy*, Part V, "The Dynamics of Centrifugal Forces."

another in the interest of the central power, tended to encourage the growth of sectionalism, and to stand in the way of any tendency toward leveling of local barriers. A wise policy of federalism might have made co-operation easier, and perhaps bridged the way to a central nationalism, but this was contrary both to the silent drift of the social forces and to the conscious plan of the ruling powers. Regionalism, in consequence, served as the ready basis for all the centrifugal forces that were ready to center around it. Bohemia and Hungary became territorial symbols around which ethnic groups rallied in force, and to which their local loyalty attached itself with increasing intensity.

The sharply broken contour of Switzerland, small as its superficial area is, produced many isolated regions in which there developed a strong local consciousness, and a keen interest, precisely in independence in local governing affairs. In few if any of the eight states discussed here did there develop so powerful and tenacious a local pride as in the Swiss cantons, which although close together in terms of miles were often separated by physical obstacles of most formidable proportions. The very mountain ranges which made it possible to defend Switzerland as a whole made possible at the same time the development of separatism and localism of an intense character.¹

“The Swiss Federal Citizen,” says Brooks, “is always in first instance a Bernese, Basler, Zürcher, Glarner, or Appenzeller. In that which he names his liberty a bit of his native heath is inviolably preserved.” Or again “The Swiss are fond of likening their country to a rambling old chalet with twenty-two rooms, all strikingly peculiar, but all under the same broad and sheltering roof.”

This intense devotion to locality has been one of the outstanding characteristics of Swiss political and social life for many generations, centuries even, and has colored the whole situation. The climax to the clash of localisms came in the civil war (Sonderbund) of 1847, when geographical and religious lines coincided, with Protestants on one side and Catholics on the other. Since then the solidarity of the Swiss republic has con-

¹ See Brooks, *Civic Training in Switzerland*, page 407.

stantly been strengthened and the localisms have been correspondingly weakened. Opening of ways of communication has removed much of the earlier isolation, now invaded by the tide of motor traffic, and the whole country has been bound much more closely together than before. The World War at one time threatened to split Swiss allegiance between the Central Powers and the Allies, but in the end the effect was to tighten the bonds of national unity, and produce a still more compact national feeling.

Both in Germany and in the United States territorial regions were the centers of powerful resistance to unionizing tendencies, and in both these cases the solution was not reached without the instrumentality of war. In America the Southern region had become the center of the economic institution of slavery, which stood out in striking contrast to the manufacturing and free agriculture in the North and West. The rival patterns of allegiance developed under this situation led to a titanic contest in which the fate of the Union long hung in the balance. Following the Civil War, however, there came a new alignment in which regional differences, while causes of partisan struggle, did not in any sense interfere with the maintenance of the national idea of unity, or with the habit of obedience to the national state. From the point of view of physical geography, the various regions of the United States might under European conditions be the material from which nations were shaped. The East, the South, the Rocky Mountain area, the Coast—any of these and minor subdivisions within them are large enough and isolated enough geographically to constitute an empire.¹ The force of economic and social conditions, however, and the rapid development of transportation has been sufficient to counteract local tendencies and to bring about a solid national unity. These regions inevitably develop differences in economic and social interest, which are often the occasion of sharp political conflict, and conceivably might become still more intense and bitter. But within recent times these geographical sections have not menaced the central pattern of allegiance to the national group.

¹ F. J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History*.

In Germany, likewise, regionalism was an important factor in the creation of the national political pattern. In Catholic South Germany there centered religious differences widely apart from the Protestant tendencies of North Germany, and this was accentuated by a slight differential in culture pattern between Prussian and South German. The ethnic and industrial differences were not of primary importance but they were of some significance and in combination with the regional isolation and the religious differences were sufficient to cause a long struggle preceding the full establishment of the Reich in its later form. Since that dramatic struggle from which emerged the triumph of the nation, the industrial forces and the growth of transportation have aided materially in the unification of the several states into a central whole. The World War might conceivably have emphasized separatist tendencies, but on the contrary tended to weld the nation more closely together than before. Indeed the German ethnic-cultural-political group looks toward the inclusion of Austria and with grave concern on the lost population in the Tyrol and elsewhere.

In both Germany and the United States the way to national unity was found through the instrumentality of federalism, a device which in both cases began to be discarded as soon as its functional purpose of achieving unity was once achieved. The German *Staat* became in the latest constitution a *Land*, while the American state rapidly lost its real meaning in the growth of what had been originally a federal system of the pronounced type. The Polish fragment in East Prussia and the Alsace-Lorraine section on the Rhine showed the possibilities in the one case of the disintegrating influence of a region coinciding with a strongly marked ethnic-cultural pattern, especially if reinforced by a religious sentiment and coloring. The distant possession of the Philippines illustrated the same possibility in the political life of the United States.

In the Latin cultures represented by France and Italy, regionalism played a less important rôle in the modern form of these states. In the formation of France through the transition from the feudal to the national form, the regions were of very

great importance, but in the modern state these differences have only a historical value and are not reflected in the structure of the political pattern of modern France. In any case the regions do not represent wide differences of an ethnic character, the religious differences are not acute, and the economic divergencies are chiefly those between the rural and the urban. What is now termed French regionalism reflects a new emphasis on local cultures on the one hand and on the other a protest against administrative organization, but in no sense threatens the central loyalty to *la Patrie*.¹

The territorial separation of the constituent parts of the present Italian state by the tenacious block of the central group of Romanists on the Peninsula was a serious impediment to the formation of modern Italy, and, as in the case of Germany, the United States and Switzerland, this was overcome only by force of arms. There still remain sharply defined areas in Italy, and sharp contrasts between the industrial North and the agricultural South, but these have not taken the form of an anti-statist policy or sentiment centering in any special region. There are also certain racial differences between the northern population with its strong tinge of Gothic and the southern with its trace of Saracen, and there is a difference in cultural levels, as measured by the degree of literacy in the respective sections. Both the economic class movement expressed by the socialists and the religious order of the church antagonized, "obstacled" as the Italians say, the state, but these forms of opposition did not find a special local situs, except that socialism centered in the industrial region of Turin, and the religious movement centered in Rome.

The colonial possessions both of France and Italy were considerable, but they were only a small part of the nation's power and a still smaller part of its pattern-making political agency. Both of them met with bloody opposition from time to time in the course of their African adventures, but in no sense did either victory or defeat in these far-away territories go far toward raising or depressing the national morale. Both French and

¹ See Hayes, *France*, chap. xi, "The Propagation of Regionalism in France."

Italian political and social culture found their center of gravity much nearer the political capital.

The Russian state, covering about one-sixth of the globe in a fairly compact physical organization, presented relatively few acute regional problems, either under the old régime or the new. In the main the several geographical divisions of Russia adhered uniformly to the central state, even when there were ethnic bases for regionalism, as on the Chinese or other borders, as in the Ukraine, or the Turkish borderlands of the larger state. The range of Russian territory was so far flung that it seemed to make relatively little difference whether any particular areas were devotedly attached to the parent center. In addition to this there was always, either by law or by custom, more commonly the latter, a wide degree of autonomy for the separate sections of the great geographical expanse. These local areas developed a sense of region, but this did not lead them to attack the larger empire or Soviet as the case might be. On the contrary they seemed to be willing to accept the general protection and supervision of the central power provided it were not too meddlesome in the affairs of the province or locality.

None of these areas coincided either with a differentiating economic class interest, or with a widely divergent ethnic group interest, or with a religious interest; and in consequence the territorial position alone was not sufficient to develop any counter-nationalistic sentiment or dogma. Regionalism, therefore, was not a serious problem in the formation of the Russian state pattern of allegiance. Under the Soviet government in particular there was developed a loose sort of federalism in which ethnic regional elements were allowed full play for their local language and culture on condition of the recognition of the general supremacy of the Soviets and general acquiescence in the policy of the communist state.¹

More important now than the earlier territorial divisions is the modern contrast between the urban centers and the rural. This is especially marked in Germany, England, and the United States, while in France the contrast between Paris and

¹ See Harper, *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*.

the rest of the republic is marked. In England, the urban population is so large that rivalry with the rural communities has passed the stage of serious conflict, but in Germany and the United States the problem is an important one. The upward thrust of the cities in these nations is full of political meaning, and of great importance in the consideration of the central pattern of national loyalty. In Germany there are two important city-states, Hamburg and Bremen, with a demand for others; and in the United States the larger urban centers, or metropolitan areas, challenge the supremacy of the states of which they are parts, and raise important questions regarding the balance of political power in the Union. These new metropolitan regions are everywhere full of life and power, and struggle hard for recognition in the centers of authority.

There are yet no indications, however, that the rise of cities threatens the national political cohesion. What is more apparent is the gradual assumption of political authority by the urban populations as they increase in wealth and numbers. The contest between rural and urban centers is carried on with the recognition of the supremacy of the nation as the common superior of both, and their separatism has at this time no color of anti-nationalism. It is of course possible that there may again arise powerful unions of cities, rivaling the power of empires, but thus far there are few signs of such a development in modern conditions.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF CIVIC COHESION—*Continued*

RELIGIOUS GROUPS

If one were blindfolded and struck the map of Europe at a random place or time he could not be sure whether he would find the churchman and the statesman arm in arm, or exchanging the epithets of "heretic" and "traitor" and mutually exiling each other from the respective kingdoms over which they presided, and all with right good will. The church is older than the modern nation, although it does not antedate the state itself, for in the dim light of early political origins the political and the ecclesiastical functions seem frequently to be found in the same hands.¹ That the same person should be at the same time the head of the state and head of the church is still, indeed, a fact in modern political life as in England of today and Russia until very recent years.

From the long controversy between the Roman church and the Holy Roman Empire there emerged a disunited church and a disunited empire. A few national states appeared on the one side and a long series of churches, Catholic and Protestant, on the other; in some cases indeed these were national churches, such as the Anglican. But there developed the union of the altar and the throne—the combination of the national church and the national state, in defense of the divine right of kings. This alliance was broken in the democratic revolutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and the outcome was once more the separation of church and state in various forms, more or less complete. The secularization of the state was one of the notable movements of the time, and carried with it many important implications for the development of civic morale.

¹ Lowie, *The Origin of the State*; Holcombe, *The Foundations of the Modern Commonwealth*, chap. iii.

What we next find in Western Europe is a considerable number of powerful national states and about the same number of powerful churches. The Greek or Orthodox church, the Roman Catholic, the Jewish faith, and the various branches of Protestantism—the Lutheran, the Anglican, the Dutch Reform, and the groups of the type of Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Calvinist. Inevitably these political and religious societies engaged in a thinly disguised struggle for power in which many alliances and many antagonisms were created, and in which the whole problem of the relation of religious loyalty to political loyalty was drawn into question. Especially in France, Germany, and Italy there were bitter struggles both for the symbols and the substantials of power.

Not only was the prestige of the church dimmed by the rivalry of the competing state as an arbiter of human conduct in many fields of human behavior, but the foundations of its authority were assailed by modernism in many forms. The swift change in social conditions and the rush of scientific knowledge of human behavior made it necessary to adapt the earlier forms of religious approach to entirely new situations, and the difficulty of making the adjustment with sufficient rapidity weakened the general confidence in the prestige and authority of the ecclesiastical organization, broadly speaking. Large groups were alienated from the church and secularized in form or fact; and the allegiance of many others was seriously shaken. Divisions within the ranks of the ecclesiastics themselves aided materially in the process of weakening the general morale of the religious group in modern society, since they prevented a strategic retreat at the appropriate moment and made constructive advance more difficult. The state took over the charitable functions formerly managed by the church, acquired the supervision over the marriage law and divorce, and the regulation of many ways of life hitherto uninvaded, as in the case of rules required by the advance of public hygiene and by the complication of urban and industrial life. The making of definite regulations governing these phases of life became the task of the political association on the advice of technical experts, and secular en-

forcement and adjudication naturally went with them. Likewise the educational function, formerly the task of the church, was taken over in great part, with many important exceptions of course, by the government of the political groups; and the church was relieved of this important range of activities, the control and conduct of which had been an important element in the practical direction of human behavior.

From the economic point of view, the revenues of the church and its properties were reduced in amount, not only by violent appropriation by the state, but also by the failure of the church to compete successfully with the political and cultural groups reaching for economic power and attaining it in very ample measure. And in particular the church suffered from the competition at this point of the school, now in large measure secularized, and a successful contestant for large sections of the community's revenue. In a way the school took over many of the functions of the church and also something of the prestige and idealism of that institution. Combinations in the form of church schools of course tended to modify or obscure this tendency in many places, but not with complete success in view of the secular character of modern science.

Nevertheless the religious ideology, symbolism, and pattern of life persisted with very great strength and tenacity, and was one of the most significant of all the factors in the organization of social and civic cohesion during this time. The ecclesiastical associations still retained many of the most effective ways of developing and maintaining loyalty to their own leaders and their purposes. In this facility in the promotion of interest and allegiance they were second only to the political group, if even there. The church covered the range of the past, the present, and the future; could invoke the aid of tradition on the one hand and the treasures of hope and faith on the other; was able to employ the hope of heaven and the fear of hell. The ecclesiastical agencies were able to appeal to the highest forms of personal allegiance to God and lesser forms of divinity, to saints and fathers in a most illustrious line of descent. The religious ideology was personified as in no other group and given a per-

sonal relationship and connection with the individual. Furthermore the ceremonialism and symbolism of the church was unsurpassed in any of the other social groupings. Music and art combined to establish forms of cult and worship of the most moving type, calculated to play upon the most precious memories of the past and the fondest hopes of immortality. Ecclesiastical dogma furnished a finely woven mesh of rationalization that seemed irresistible to those who came within its magic circle, affording a refuge from uncertainty and doubt and a rule of conduct for every way of life. The personnel of ecclesiastical leadership was in many instances very impressive and adroit in dealing with other social groupings. If this was not always true of the rank and file of the clergy, it was characteristic of the more important leaders. Hard-pressed in the competition for personnel as was the state by the reorganization of the economic forces and, in addition, by the heavy loss to the educational systems, the ecclesiasts nevertheless maintained an imposing front and were able to carry on a persistent and effective propaganda of the faith, not only at home, but in far-flung territories in distant lands.

All in all, the ecclesiastical societies were factors of very great importance in the organization of civic morale and loyalty in any modern state, and especially in the very states under our consideration. The religious attitudes and groupings must be carefully examined in their relation to the organization of political power and the spread of political education in the several political aggregations to be examined here.

What then was the position of the religions toward the civic morale and training of the eight states we are analyzing? In what ways did they support and in what ways obstruct the development of political authority in these special areas? We deal with four main types of religious organization, the Roman Catholic, the Greek Orthodox, the Jewish, and the Protestant, the latter term covering a variety of religious denominations of which some are of largest importance.

Of these religions, the Jewish faith finds relatively few but influential representatives in all the nations examined. The

Catholic religion is found in all although in Russia its membership is relatively weak. It is dominant in Italy, in France, in Austria-Hungary, and strongly represented in all of the others. Protestant denominations are strongest in Germany, England, Switzerland, the United States, with only scattered groups in the other states. The Greek Orthodox church until the revolution dominated in Russia.

These states fall into three groups, with reference to their religious affiliations and relations.

In Group I there is a formal alliance between church and state. The Anglican church is the official and established church of England; and the Catholic religion was the established church of Austria-Hungary.

In Group II there is no national alliance with any church or any established religion. Switzerland and Germany are divided between the Roman Catholic and the Protestant denominations;¹ and the United States has no alliance with the church, but its religious allegiance is spread among a wide variety of groups, Protestant and Catholic and Jewish.

In Group III there is a strong antagonism between the political and the religious groups. In Italy the feud between the Vatican and the Quirinal, although somewhat modified under the régime of Mussolini, still smolders, and is a basic fact in Italian political life. In Russia the wide breach between the Greek and Roman churches and the Soviet government is an important consideration in civic life. In France there have been heated controversies between the state and the Vatican, resulting in the secularization of the church properties in 1905 and in strained relations since that time, somewhat improved since the war, but still in a difficult condition.

We may now analyze the situation further both by religions and by states with a view to estimating the significance of the religious factors in the social balance of the political community.

¹ There is church establishment in certain cantons, and close relations with the church in German states.

JUDAISM

The Jewish religion whose adherents are found in all states and in all groups, economic and cultural, does not rest upon any territorial basis, and has no ambition for a territorial foundation. Toward the end of this period the Zionist movement was revived and became a subject of intense and general interest, but there was no general idea that the territory of Zion would become the abode of the Jewish people. Rather did the discussion have the value of presenting again the memories of the earlier years, with the symbolic values that arise from the representation. In the Zionist movement the dignity and permanence of the group was visibly expressed and displayed to the adherents of the race wherever they might be found, but not as a central territorial Hebrew state.

Nor did the Hebrew group possess political ambitions, except as they appeared in individuals. The Jewish believers did not aspire to control the political organization of any of the modern states, nor to manage its policies in any direct way. Individual statesmen of distinction appeared and took their places high in the service of many nations, but the group as a whole entertained no ideas of specific control of any nation as such. Nor did they aspire as a religion to dictate policies to the government on questions lying between the borders of law and ethics. In this respect they were far less likely to clash with the state than were the Catholics or the Protestants. In fact, in many jurisdictions the Jews were obliged to struggle for political status equal to that of the surrounding citizens; and in some cases, as in Russia, they were not able to attain this legal position fully. They found difficulty in fully establishing their own economic and cultural position in terms of political recognition or even security, and they cherished no dreams of political control over any existing nation.

Without national ambitions of their own and scattered as they were among many states, it might have been presumed that the Jewish group would develop either a theory of anarchism on the one hand or a theory of supernationalism on the other. These doctrines might have been the refuge of men who

were not responsible for any government, nor attached by ethnic and other bonds to any particular state system. In this way, the religio-ethnic system of the Hebrews might have set up formidable obstacles to the progress of political groupings, on the theoretical side at least. But while there have been conspicuous representatives of Jewry in the field of anarchism, as for example the well-known Emma Goldman, and while there have been prominent internationalists of the Jewish persuasion, as Norman Hapgood, it cannot fairly be said that the group taken as a whole has evinced any more substantial interest in these ideologies than the members of any other ethnic or religious group. And on the other hand there have been equally conspicuous representatives of the Jewish type writing in defense of the established political order and of the cult of particular nations with which they were associated, such as Disraeli, Prime Minister of England, Preuss, draftsman of the German Republican constitution, and Kelsen of the Austrian.

It is true that Jewish names are associated with the rise of modern socialism, which cannot be considered apart from the name of Karl Marx, and likewise with Rothschild in international finance and banking. Following the great apostle of the class struggle and the new economic order are many others of lesser fame but yet of great power and prestige. Socialism sets up an ideal of the international brotherhood of the proletariat, and this may become a competitor with the nationalistic ideal, with its geographic-ethnic base. It is also true that State Socialism may and does establish many intimate relations with the national state, as clearly seen in Germany and France. In any case the socialist movement finds its base in an economic situation rather than a religio-ethnic, and cannot be regarded as a by-product of any religious organization or tendency. Teutons, or Slavs, or Italians, or French, believers or unbelievers, may be enrolled in its ranks and aid in the advancement of its organization and propaganda. To connect it with the Jewish religion as such is a far cry.

Indeed, the chief interest of the orthodox group lay in the doctrines of the Old Testament. Precisely, these teachings are

nationalistic or even tribal in their character, and give neither aid nor comfort to other theories of political organization. These doctrines may be modified by the changed situation of Judaism, but not sufficiently to alter their fundamental character.

CATHOLICISM

Far more nearly political in its nature is the Catholic church, and far more intimate in its contacts with the modern state. First of all the Roman church possesses a definite territorial seat in Rome, over which it holds exclusive jurisdiction. The Holy See sends and receives its diplomatic agents. The Roman church has a unified hierarchy with a powerful organization, and it has traditionally contended for the right to guide human behavior in whatever channels were necessary for the better life, as interpreted by the church rather than the state. In these borderlines of behavior, claimed perhaps by both church and state, there have been large possibilities of conflict. Nor has the Catholic church accepted the doctrine of the separation of church and state, but it has consistently, although not steadily, demanded state recognition as the official religion, state financial support of the church, and ecclesiastical control of education where possible. These demands have been insistently pressed forward as the occasion seemed to warrant, and with shrewdly varying degrees of rigidity and flexibility. And in recent years the political policy of the church has been pressed forward with great vigor.

This position has led to sharp conflicts with the government of nations from time to time. Especially bitter were the controversies in Germany in the days of Bismarck and in France in 1905. In these cases, however, the struggle turned upon questions of church organization and church property, rather than on the basic relation of the ecclesiastical group to the political, and in neither instance were the foundations of political authority called in question. In the early part of the nineteenth century the church looked with suspicion upon all attacks upon the *ancien régime*, exemplified in the institution of monarchy,

but this position was subsequently modified, and there has been no recent conflict with the principle of democracy.

Nor has the church seen fit to attack the bases of nationalism, but has in general accepted the nation as a modern political instrument. During the World War its priests blessed the efforts of the several nations and gave them such support as might be. The head of the church has encouraged international movements, especially those directed toward international peace, but has not in so doing attacked the validity of the omnicompetent state, as long as it did not invade the sphere of religion and undertake to dictate there. In cases of conflict between a religious rule and a political rule, the church has assumed a complaisant attitude toward passive disobedience and sometimes toward active disobedience of the law. But it has endeavored to avoid open conflict where possible.

With socialism the church has been unsympathetic, and has not hesitated to denounce its fundamental doctrines. In this aspect, the church has discouraged the development of what might be regarded as the greatest rival of the territorial political unity. These attacks upon socialism have been due chiefly to its materialism and opposition to organized religion, and do not apply to the Christian social movements developed extensively in modern European states. The church then has supported the state against the attacks of the international proletarian movement, although opposing it in other fields where they came in conflict.

In some states the Roman church has initiated the policy of supporting a political party organization, and thus brought sharply to the front the problem of the respective relations between the political and the religious. Church parties have been found in Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, of the states here considered. As an outcome of the *Kulturkampf*, the powerful Center party was organized by the church and has maintained itself ever since in a position of political authority and power. In France *L'Action Française* has long been in existence and has played an important rôle in French political life. In Italy *Il Partito popolare* became the official organ of the ecclesiastical

hierarchy in Italian parliamentary days. In Switzerland the Catholic Conservatives are a powerful agency. These political factions have defended first of all the rights and privileges of the church in their particular societies, and beyond that have advocated a varying type of political program, tending away from the extreme left and toward the center or right of the political equilibrium of the time.

In such cases the clericals gain by the presence in deliberative bodies and in public administration of considerable bodies of direct representatives, who may be relied upon to present the position and claims of the church as such and to propagate a social theory reflecting the general attitude of the church group, as this attitude may be politically interpreted from time to time. On the other hand they suffer a certain loss in prestige in assuming responsibility for governmental action or inaction.

THE ORTHODOX (GREEK) CHURCH

The Orthodox Catholic church is found strongly represented in only one of the states here considered, namely Russia. Under the old régime the church might almost have been regarded as an annex of the empire. The czar was also head of the church, functioning in a dual rôle as the apex of two organizations. The church preached authority to the powers that be, contentment with things as they are, as a rule discouraged all forms of criticism of or antagonism to governing authorities; and it had no special program of behavior regulation to develop, either through the state agencies or its own. In the revolutionary political and social movements leading up to 1917 individual priests took an active part but, on the whole, the clerical group remained indifferent or hostile. It was frequently charged that many of them were the secret agents of the government. With the Revolution came an upheaval that dispossessed not only the political authorities but also the religious as well. The details of this movement will be discussed later, but for the moment it is sufficient to say that the outcome was the exclusion of the Greek church, temporarily at least, from the group of influences contributing to the civic training of the Soviet community. This

is not to say that religious attitudes did not continue underneath the surface of the dominant anti-religious authority, and that these attitudes did not influence political behavior in some degree. The very doctrine of passivity taught the peasant under the old régime now applies under the new government and doubtless has its influence in the maintenance of the status quo. Thus the Soviet authorities profit by the preachers of the group they proscribe.

PROTESTANTISM

The Protestant churches did not develop the same trend toward universality as the Catholic or the Jewish faith, but through scattered sects undertook the work of religious advancement where and as they could most advantageously. In the absence of world claims, they were more likely to identify themselves with national groups than the others as in the case of the Anglican church or the German Lutheran or the Huguenot in France. As a rule they had no reservations about the national state, but were likely to aid it with enthusiasm. The clergy were themselves national in great part and nationally trained, English, German, or American, as the case might be, and strongly under the influence of their respective nationalistic groups. Under these circumstances they had little difficulty in adjusting themselves to the pattern of political interest and enthusiasm, and were disposed to mingle in political affairs, not as members of an international religion, but as nationals of a particular state. This was especially true in England and the United States. In America especially the clergy were active in the formulation of legal codes of moral conduct and in the enactment of these rules into law. In other states, however, this was less common.

Protestantism was in short closely identified with nationalism. Its origin in fact was strongly nationalistic and there was always a certain relation between the new religion and the national state. The rebellious churches naturally sought protection from the Roman church wherever support could be found, and the nationalist authorities were in many instances found to

be willing allies. In this sense Protestantism has had a much more intimate relationship with nationalism than has the Roman church.

It has also been urged with great plausibility that there is an intimate connection between Protestantism and the growth of modern capitalism.¹ Whatever may be the cause, it is clear that there is a high development of industrial enterprise in many Protestant states, and in relatively few of the Roman religious persuasion. One might easily stress relationships too strongly, but there is at least a more than superficial connection between the Protestant groupings and nationalism, capitalism, and democracy, and this circumstance unquestionably has its bearing upon the problem of civic training for modern state life. This fact, together with the ethnic homogeneity of many of the Protestant sects, bears very directly upon the problem at hand. But the development and power of French and Italian nationalism shows that a strong civic sentiment may be created without these favoring circumstances.

On the other hand, there is an anti-authoritarian aspect of Protestantism. In the tradition of the New Testament there is a strong strain of indifference to the political factors in modern life. "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's." If a man smite thee on one cheek turn to him the other also. If he compel thee to go with him a mile, go with him twain. In these and other doctrines there lies the germ of political indifferentism and of a type of state antagonism later developed by Tolstoi in his remarkable discussions of political organization and objectives, and the way out; and in later times by Gandhi. From yet another point of view, Protestantism preached the overthrow of authority, in the ecclesiastical field to be sure, but still authority intrenched and established by centuries of power. Protest, rebellion, revolution—these were inherent in the new movement, and not without their psychological effect upon the contemporary world. This strain in Protestantism has sometimes been

¹ See R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*; Max Weber, *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*.

made the basis of anarchism, or in earlier times of antinomianism and of the Anabaptist cult. From this particular point of view, it might be contended that there is a stronger authoritarian tendency implicit in Catholicism than in the basic presuppositions of the Protestant denominations but for the fact that the Protestant challenge of the state has been less sharp and its alliances with government more frequent.

SHARP ANTAGONISM BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE

By all odds the sharpest struggle between the political and the ecclesiastical way of life has been that in Russia. Here under the Soviet régime the Orthodox church was placed under the ban. Its property with the exception of that used directly for ecclesiastical purposes was nationalized. Its state revenues were discontinued and, most serious of all, religious teaching and training were forbidden at least for the young. In the bitter struggle that ensued the state carried forward the attack with ruthless competence, stopping at no means deemed essential to the end in view. Not only was property confiscated but many members of the clergy were imprisoned for long periods of time. Finally, after a dramatic trial, several of the higher clergy were condemned to death and executed on charges of treason to the Soviet government.¹

On the wall of the Soviet city hall in Moscow was inscribed "Religion the opium of the People," although directly opposite it was the shrine of a noted saint, to which devotees could be seen resorting each day with their floral offerings and their devotions. The Russian civic morale was therefore developed in the face of the violent opposition of such forces as the ecclesiastical group might rally in the nation; and they were many. The cross no longer blessed the crown, but invoked anathemas upon it; and in every possible way antagonized the attempt to build up a state without the support of the ecclesiastical authority of the earlier period.

The other outstanding situation in which the ecclesiastical

¹ Fully described in Spinka, *The Church and the Russian Revolution*; and in Harper's volume on *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*.

and the political elements have been at swords' points for many generations in Italy. For centuries Italian nationalism was obstructed in the realization of its hopes by the presence of the papal states, and of this frustration the politics of Machiavelli was the great historic monument. Not until 1870 was it found possible, with the aid of French arms, to establish the Italian nation, and under the leadership of Mazzini, Cavour, and Garibaldi to realize the long-cherished dreams of the Italian national patriots. At this time the territorial basis of the Papacy was removed, and the head of the church became the "Prisoner of the Vatican," refused to accept the annual grant voted him by the government of Italy, and a policy of irreconcilability was adopted. The schools were secularized by the state, and, on the other hand, good Catholics were forbidden to take part in the Italian elections. Italian nationalism was consequently obliged to make its way without the support of the clerical group, and in the face of a boycott of political activities. In this case, furthermore, the Italian state was contending not merely with a local church but with the central seat of an international organization, widespread in its membership and prestige. The personnel of the Italian church, recruited from a wide variety of candidates, was of a superior type in its higher ranges at least; the church possessed large properties and ample revenues; its outstanding leaders and strategists were assembled at the religious capital of Catholicism; and Rome was not only the central city of the nation but also the historic and traditional home of the Roman ecclesiastical hierarchy. From the economic point of view the pressure of population upon means of subsistence was very severe, and it was difficult to maintain an adequate standard of living. There were problems such as no contemporary state was obliged to face in its struggle for power and recognition.

On the other hand, the Roman imperial tradition was enormously powerful and subtly pervaded the traditions and ideals of the Italian people. There were emperors even before there were popes. The triumphs of the Roman arms, the majestic structure of the Roman law, the monuments of Roman admin-

istration, were universally impressive; and the Italians responded readily to these stimuli of interest and loyalty. With Roman nationalism there were linked from the first the hopes of liberalism, although later the republic lost. At the beginning these hopes were fastened upon a republic, but the house of Savoy assumed the leadership of the new movement and the work was crowned with the establishment of a monarchy instead of the republic of which Mazzini had dreamed. This was, however, a constitutional monarchy with a well-developed parliamentary mechanism, and thus in an indirect way the ambitions of nationalism and democracy were both realized in the new régime.

In any case, the picture of the Italian nation emerged from the situation, and captured once more the imagination of the people. The Cross and the Crown carried on a warfare with weapons of unusual power and effectiveness, but the Crown in this instance gradually consolidated its power and established its position as the dominating factor in political life. The various sections of the peninsula were drawn together into a texture of national loyalty, and although some resisted this process more than others, in the main the effort was successful. The state began even to cherish plans of expansion and to undertake campaigns of African imperialism, although in these efforts it was less successful than in other directions. This developing nationalism was to some extent obstructed by clerical influences, but made rapid headway notwithstanding all obstacles. In the World War, Italian nationalism, fired by D'Annunzio, plunged into the conflict, and emerged with a more highly united nationalistic sentiment than before. At the end of the period the ban upon electoral participation was lifted, and a distinct Catholic party was formed—Il Partito popolare, in which Catholic forces were consolidated for political action.

The Fascist movement emerged from the after-war conditions and intensified still further the *egoismo sacro* of the earlier period. At first the attitude of Fascism was anti-clerical, but in its later phases the Fascisti sought an accommodation with the church and succeeded in reaching a temporary adjustment at

least. The contests over the control of the schools, the battle for the holidays, the rival symbolisms competing for sympathetic attention and adoption, are all precise cases in point illustrating the complex character of group allegiance and the possibilities of analysis of its technique. The Crucifix, the portrait of the king, and that of Mussolini, on the walls of the Italian schoolroom, tell the story. The dominance of the nationalistic pattern and color indicates the vivid possibilities in this cycle of action, and makes all the more important the more intimate analysis of the constituent factors in this powerful complex. The Concordat and the Treaty of 1929, re-establishing the territorial independence of the church, and providing for church marriage and strengthening Catholic instruction in the schools, marked another stage in the development of the struggle between the ecclesiastical and the political societies for the control of human conduct.

The French state illustrates almost all of the possible phases of relationship between church and government. In the palmy days of the Bourbons, the union of the altar and the throne was notable for its strength, and for the general fusion of religious and political authority. Monarchy, said the eloquent Bishop of Meaux, is a second religion; and the two religions, first and second, went merrily on to the French Revolution. The state drove out the dissenters and the church blessed the state. In this uprising the political and the religious orders went down together, only to be later reinstated again together. After many delays the church accepted the republic and the state accepted once more the church, although not on the earlier basis of intimacy and interrelationship. French aid to Italy, enabling the Quirinal to win its national position against the Vatican did not of course lead to more friendly relations between the Roman church and the French state. A crisis was reached in 1905 when the French Republic undertook and carried through a policy of disestablishment of certain church orders and their properties, after a bitter struggle with the powers of the Romanists.¹

Notwithstanding the frequent clashes between state and

¹ The French situation is fully described in Hayes, *France*, chap. v.

church, the weaving of the texture of French national spirit and French civic morale has not been seriously affected by these religious struggles. The religious authorities seem more Gallican than Roman at heart, and they have contributed to the maintenance of the political order from within and to its support as against the outside enemy. Neither anarchism nor socialism has been encouraged by the clerical forces, nor has any aid or comfort ever been extended to the foe in time of war, either directly or indirectly. Whatever religious differences have arisen have been within the ethnic circle of the French nationality; they have not been accentuated by differentials of the type that have embittered the Irish controversy with Britain or the Czech controversy with Austria-Hungary. In so far as Italian, Austrian, or Spanish influences have entered into calculation, they have weakened the position of the church and correspondingly strengthened the state.

Furthermore the religious solidarity of France has contributed to the civic position. With the exception of a relatively small number of Jews and scattered Protestant sects, the population is solidly Catholic, and no serious religious dissensions can occur, except perhaps those between the religious groups as such and the agnostic element in the community. Thus in the absence of a competing church, Catholics may the more readily criticize and oppose their own ecclesiastical organization.

In England and formerly Austria-Hungary, the church has a more definite connection with the state through the instrumentality of church establishment. This involves the nominal headship of the church by the political ruler, the support of the church from public revenues, and certain relations between the political and the clerical appointing powers in the case of church officials. In later times, since the principle of toleration has been established, other religious denominations have been allowed to exist and flourish alongside of the official religion, as the Catholic in Germany and the Nonconformist groups in England, and in all cases the Jewish. As the Anglican church in England so the Lutheran church in Germany is to some extent, although not by any means entirely, a national church; the

alliance between church and state has proceeded amicably, and has been in the nature of an offensive and defensive alliance. Had these religions been the only ones in their states, the case would have been much clearer and the combination a much more powerful one. For obviously a national church, that includes only a fraction of the membership of the unit, is in a relatively weak condition, just to that extent. In Britain,¹ England, and Scotland, each had its own church, and Ireland was Catholic, while the other members of the empire had no official church at all; and there were the Jews to consider. Likewise in Germany there were the Catholics, the Jews, and various other religious sects of varying strength. In Austria-Hungary the domination of the Roman group was sufficiently strong to make it the common religion of the state, although there were many Jews, and, in Bohemia, the powerful remnants of the early Protestants and later dissenters, who still remained a factor in the community notwithstanding the unrelenting efforts to reduce them.

Germany was the scene of a bitter struggle between Bismarck and the Holy See, from which Bismarck emerged with somewhat diminished prestige and after which the church entered the political arena as an organized political party. From that time on, however, there was no serious breach between the clerical and the political groups, and both united in support of the German national interests and the Crown. Emperor William spoke from time to time as with divine sanction, but this did not draw down upon him the wrath of the especial custodians of religion. During the war the civil authorities received the unstinted support of the clerical forces who were outdone by none in their enthusiastic support of the righteousness and justice of the national cause.² In the post-war period the ecclesiastical forces both in and out of Parliament have been strongly aligned with the new republic and with the maintenance of the civic morale of the new régime. The Center party has occupied a responsible

¹ Ireland had a State Protestant church until 1869.

² The Peace Resolution of the Center party in the Reichstag during the war caused bitter attacks by Nationalists.

and leading rôle in the political life of the nation, and has stood against the extremists, both right and left.

In short the German state for generations has been intimately allied with the ruling ecclesiastical powers and has maintained close connection with them throughout the development of the absolutist and liberal periods of national growth. The clash with Bismarck during the *Kulturkampf* is the only important exception to this harmonious relationship. Authority in Germany has been of a religio-political character, equally imposing in both spheres of human life, one reinforcing the other in most relations of life. The deep significance of law and order has been impressed upon all the citizens of Germany as a basic factor in a civilized community, while at the same time the necessity of military action has been presented as an essential part of a nation's life.

In none of the states considered was there a closer partnership between Cross and Crown, Kaiser and Kirche, than in the German nation. In comparison with Italy for example the strength of the politico-clerical combination was immensely superior in the German system, and this tended to give to the Germanic order a strength and tenacity of an unusual kind. The strands of religion were woven into the national life of the society in a manner that tended to give compactness and unity to the social life of the state, and to supplement political power in moments of weakness with religious faith and zeal.

In almost equal degree the English church or churches were united with the political authority in the British domain. The Anglican church was supported in its breach with the Roman church by the political powers of the day, and the alliance has continued unbroken down to the present day. Likewise the Nonconformists supported the governmental system with unremitting zeal. To this statement one must make the important exception of Ireland where the divergency of religious faith, added to ethnic differences led to the most violent collisions over a long period of time. It must also be noted that there was more than one church during this time, the Anglican, the Scottish, to say nothing of the Nonconformists and the Jewish,

and the religions of the overseas territories. At no point in the line of authority was there any serious breach with the religious hierarchy, but a steady reinforcement of political command by the preaching of religious duty. To this the Quakers and other pacifist sects might seem an exception but this was relatively small in the larger life of the nation. The political order, the reigning powers, the broad national policies were seldom questioned by the church dignitaries. They were accepted as a part of the social system of which religion itself was an integral part, or of a divine order in which man was destined to work out his salvation. The church did not play a rôle in the party life of the community, although its individual members were closely allied with partisan groups and sat in the House of Lords especially as party members. On the whole, the alliance of the Anglican church was with the conservatives and the Nonconformists with the Liberal party and toward the end of this period with the newly formed Labor party. But there was no independent political action by the clericals as in Germany and in France, and this peculiar challenge to the power of the political governor was not raised.

A considerable body of theory defending the independent position of the church was developed, exemplified notably in Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*; but while this was in a sense a criticism of the omnipotent state, it did reach far into the popular sources of political power, at the beginning at any rate, whatever may have been the ultimate consequences of the analysis.¹ It is not without significance that in England the Labor party, thought by many to foreshadow the rise of a new form of labor state, was strongly pietistic in its origins and tendencies, and in this respect was sharply differentiated from the German Social Democratic movement in which the materialistic philosophy was strongly represented, or the Communist development in Russia with its anti-religious philosophy of life.

On the whole, the British political unit has enjoyed in ample measure the support of the clerical powers, who in a sense have subordinated their ecclesiastical aims to the purposes of the em-

¹ See Gaus, *op. cit.*, chap. xiii, "Civic Influences of Religion."

pire, in fact if not in theory. For generations there has been no sharp cleavage between church and state, as in France or Germany or Italy, and the political unity has been the beneficiary of this remarkable situation, so conducive to the development of the power of the state.

In Austria-Hungary the church for generations was a powerful factor in the life of the empire. The Roman was the dominant faith and the official and established religion of the state. In the fifteenth century the power of the political group was invoked to crush out the pre-Protestant developments in Bohemia under John Hus, and from time to time thereafter the aid of the state was utilized to repress the evidences of religious dissent whether Protestant or Mohammedan. There were also powerful Protestant influences in Hungary. Spanish Catholic influences were at work for a long time in molding the character and purposes of the empire, and the influence of these forces is well-described in the dramatic account given by Jászi.¹ Of all of the nations here considered the religious influence was most powerfully felt in Austria-Hungary. Here more than elsewhere the clerical and the political influences might be said to have administered the affairs of the community jointly. Nowhere was the state more readily amenable to the wishes of the clergy. Austria helped to bear in great measure the burdens of the Roman organization, supplying much of its personnel, contributing to the conduct of administration and the determination of its larger policies.

On the other hand, the political authorities were strongly supported by the church, whose dignitaries did not hesitate to preach the divinity of kings and passive obedience to the subjects of the emperor. As Austria-Hungary did not enjoy the unified ethnic basis of the other nations, or permit the flame of democratic enthusiasm to play upon the imagination of the group, reliance was necessarily placed more and more upon the healing influences of the ecclesiasts and they did not hesitate to supply either the needed stimulus or anaesthetic for the community. It may be noted, however, that religious support was

¹ *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, Part III, chap. v.

purchased at a high price—the ruthless suppression of dissenting groups, not merely religious in character, but also ethnic as in the case of the Czechs, and with the neglect of other aids for the maintenance of civic morale of the type elsewhere analyzed in this volume.

Of all the states discussed it may be said that the formal relationship was most intimate in Austria-Hungary and Russia. The Roman in one case and the Greek in the other functioned in the closest relationship with the political authorities. The Catholic influence was, however, more akin to domination than that of the Greek, which latter seemed subservient to the wishes of the empire. If Italy is an example of too wide a division between the clerical and the political influences in social control, Austria-Hungary is perhaps an example of the dangers of too near a relationship between them. The church firmly entrenched in power may prove a jealous mistress, and presented many difficult problems for the political authorities to solve.

In the two remaining states of this group, the United States and Switzerland, there is no national church and little intimate relationship between political and ecclesiastical authorities. Switzerland contains Protestant and Roman elements scattered through its population. In the United States the Protestant denominations predominate, with a large representation of Catholics and a considerable percentage of Jews. In these cases the separation of state and church is carried through with some degree of consistency, and is established as the settled policy of the nation.¹ Both these states are democracies, and in neither is there any vestige of a hereditary aristocracy; nor any occasion for the gilding of hereditary holders of political power with some trace of divinity. In both states the educational system is secularized and very largely in the hands of the political authorities, with religious teaching developed under the control of the clericals. In neither has there been a serious breach between state and church for nearly a century, and in neither has serious tension been felt. In both instances the political powers

¹ In some Swiss cantons there are church establishments and originally there were state religions in a number of American commonwealths.

have commanded enthusiastic support of the church groups, both in the task of maintaining internal order and in the function of national defense. In America the Jewish group universally and the Roman group in general have accepted the state control of the educational system.

Switzerland, in 1847, was the scene of a civil war, the Sonderbund, in which the religious factor was a controlling consideration, with the Catholic groups supporting separatism and the Protestant, as a rule, the power of the central government. The victory of the federal government ended the separatist movement, and since that time there has been no sharp antagonism focusing on religious problems. But the Catholic Conservative party is a factor of great importance in national life.

In America, moreover, the Protestant clergy have been active in the political life of the nation on specific questions falling under the head of "moral issues" such as slavery and the prohibition problem, and they have been interested in the passage and enforcement of a great number of laws dealing with vice, gambling, and various forms of disorderly conduct. The early Puritan tradition was that of a practical theocracy, and that tradition, while by no means dominant, is by no means dead, and continues to play a significant part in the drama of political life.¹

In both states, the separation of the clerical and the political branches of activity has not resulted in any lack of enthusiastic support of the state by the clerical dignitaries. In both nations the maintenance of civic morale has been aided by the churches as a part of the political ethics of their constituents, and no form of sabotage has been practiced against the prevailing political powers and the established political order.

When considered with reference to the ethnic elements composing the state, these religious factors are of great importance. In Switzerland, fortunately for national unity at least, the ethnic and religious lines do not coincide. On the contrary, many of the French are Catholics and many others are Huguenots or old-time Calvinists. Many of the Germans are

¹ H. W. Schneider, *The Puritan Mind*.

Lutherans and others are Romanists. The Italians are Catholics, but constitute only a small percentage of the population. Had all the French been of one faith and all the Germans of another, the formation of a state unity would have been very greatly impeded. In America, however, the Protestant groups are more nearly native American, while the Catholics are more nearly, although not wholly, from the later immigrant groups.

This completes a brief survey of the religious groupings and their relation to the formation and continuance of civic morale in the eight states here under analysis. Much more intimate detail, it goes without saying, is found in the special studies of the several nations, the conclusions of which are brought together here for the purpose of presenting the pictures in a comparative way. It should of course always be borne in mind that these religious trends cannot be successfully separated from the other ethnic and economic considerations which are blended together to form an ensemble, which, in the end result, we call patriotism or civic loyalty. They are separated here only for the purpose of momentary analysis which will fall far short of its purpose if it results in the piecemeal study of the problem.

Broadly speaking, it must be concluded that the religious groups play an extremely important rôle in the series of social interests out of which the state emerges. This is also true if we approach the problem, not from the institutional point of view, but from the psychological. Both institutionally and psychologically the religious is fundamental in the study of the political. The formal separation of church and state is important but it does not end the problem of the relationships existing between these basic types of social control and their total relation to what we term human behavior. In life an actual integration must be made, whatever the legal status.

Of very profound significance is the rôle of the church in dealing with those types of human behavior with which the law cannot deal well for a variety of reasons. In one set of cases public opinion may not be sufficiently educated or crystallized, in another the disadvantages may be too great to warrant the enactment of a law. In yet another set of cases, the issues may

not be "justiciable" as in the case of group struggles between industrial or racial contenders, or between nations themselves. In this borderland the patterns of conduct can be traced in part by the jurist, but he may be greatly aided by the churchman who informs himself upon the basic facts in question. No one recognizes more quickly the limitations of law than the lawyer, the statesman, or the student of government; and no one more readily welcomes the aid of those who are in a position to help organize types of behavior where the law cannot now and perhaps never can function. On these borders the churches have a very significant rôle to play and frequently they are most effective at this point in social relations.

The substantial conflicts between the clerical and the political forces come where there is a clash of policies with reference to the special domains of human conduct to be placed under the respective jurisdiction of these power units. If the state invades too far the domain of the ethical or moral, or the church the domain of the political, then there is material for conflict of the sharpest character. Education and legislation are the readiest battlegrounds of these contending forces. Deeper than all questions of property, revenues, patronage, ceremonial, and personal prestige, is the recurring question as to what phases of human behavior are to be regulated by the one group and what by the other, in a swiftly changing world where there are many readjustments and adaptations to be made from day to day.

The position of the church has undoubtedly been shaken in modern times. In a period of tribal political groups with tribal gods the church shares with the state the power of command. In a period of an international church as in the medieval period with an international state of a weak type, as was the Holy Roman Empire, the church is still relatively powerful. But a weakened international church among very powerful national states is not in so advantageous a position from the religious point of view; and hence the church has tended to become an adjunct of the political organization and to lose its earlier position of independence. Added to this is the circumstance that the church itself has tended to compete with the state upon

civil grounds, instead of relying upon its own peculiar aptitudes and abilities of a non-political character. A semi-secularized church dealing with an aggressive national state is not in a position to exhibit its most persuasive influences. Nor has the church been able to deal until recently with central problems such as the maintenance of social justice in a rapidly changing period of economic growth, when a social attitude is as important as a written law; or in the development of an attitude toward war, consistent with the demands of modern idealism.

Both state and church in historic times have made free use of magic in the inculcation of respect for authority. But the modern trends of science have made this increasingly difficult, and the transition to the new ways of life has not always been successfully made by the ecclesiasts. Education has fallen into the hands of the nonreligious groups and has not been dominated by religious taboos, as in the earlier period when it was the adjunct of the clerical group.

It is evidently possible to construct a powerful form of political loyalty without the aid of the religious forces in the community, in the short run at any rate. In Italy the Fascists succeeded in developing a strong form of political allegiance, without the aid of the clericals but without their open and full opposition. In Russia the Soviet régime was equally successful in building up a Soviet cult and enthusiasm against the open and unrestrained opposition of the Orthodox church.

What often happens in the long run is the acceptance of the political régime by the church, which once more becomes its support and shield. On the other hand, the state abandons its hostile attitude toward the clerical forces and likewise becomes tolerant and lends support to the church in one form and another. When the ceremonialism of the two institutions coincides, the result is a powerful incentive to conformity on the part of the members of the community. If both counsel obedience, if both exhort to enthusiastic service, then the outcome is likely to be a high type of civic interest and morale in a given situation—is likely to be, but not always, for both state and church with their dogmas and ceremonies may go down “in one

red burial blent," as in the French and Russian revolutions. When they come into competition, the result is inevitably a weakening of the sense of enthusiasm for both state and church, from which both are likely to suffer not only for the moment but for some time afterward.

THE INTELLECTUALS

A discussion of the influence of various groups on the formation of civic cohesion in modern times would be very incomplete without some reference to the class known as the intellectuals, if class they may properly be termed. In contemporary states, both western and oriental alike, these intelligentsia are likely to be found actively engaged in the task of organizing national memories and hopes around a framework of a political structure. History, literature, art, ideology, are woven together in an attempt to develop a political interest and loyalty, centering around the national state.

In a brilliant passage Hayes recognizes the rôle of the French intellectuals in shaping the nationalism of that state. "The work of the intellectuals," says he, "has been artificial; others might have made another and different synthesis. And what is most artificial about the whole phenomenon of contemporary French nationalism is the fact that it has been consciously taught to and thereby imposed upon, the mass of Frenchmen."¹

The same process may be observed in Germany, in Italy, conspicuously in modern Soviet Russia, to mention only the most notable illustrations. In all these instances the theorists, the historians, the linguists, the artists, have contributed enormously to the political cohesion of the nation. Their work cuts across the lines of race, religion, region, economic class. They find recruits and followers in all these groups, and align them with the central political loyalty.

It is quite true that these elements may be found in opposition to established patterns of authority, and may aid in the process of disintegration as well as that of integration. In recent times their influence in the states here studied has been thrown

¹ Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

on the side of national cohesion, but in other instances the intellectuals have aided in forming the new national cohesions emerging from the older establishments, or struggling to emerge. In either case their influence must be reckoned in the evaluation of the process of political loyalization.

DOMINANT AND COMPETING LOYALTIES

It is evident that in these nations there are actively competing types of group loyalties to which individual allegiance may attach and in which individual personality may find an outlet of expression. The ethnic group, the economic group, the religious group, the political group, and many other types of associations, each has its own solar system to which it attracts the social particles. If the question is raised, which of these is most powerful, the answer must be that it depends on the immediate axis of reference, the special pattern of action considered either at the moment or during a period of time. Each has its own type of group training, its own cult, its own symbolisms, its own heroes and traditions; all centering around the maintenance of the group morale. Every individual is a member of many of them, more or less active, more or less closely attached. In the ordinary course of events he adheres to and supports or obeys them all, as the cycle of his life or the period goes round. He is a churchman, a statesman, a business man, a racialist, in turn, and each in the best of faith, as the occasion demands. If all these allegiances are integrated in a unified pattern either of individual or of social life, the result is a powerful combination of social unity and force. If all his gods, all his traditions, all his leaders, all his interests, indicate the same course, then he pursues it with enthusiasm and with wholeness of spirit that gives him power. His integrated personality drives on its way, without hesitations, qualms, or doubts toward the appointed goal. It is when the gods disagree or doubt or quarrel or war, that the hour of difficulty comes for many, and perhaps for all except the stoutest defenders of the special faith. If his ancestors say yes and his king says no, and his god says yes and his pocketbook says no, then comes the crisis in which com-

peting loyalties are tested and tried, and in which we may observe the texture of which these loyalties are made. Most of the time and most of the way, adjustments and compromises are made, and there is no strife between the guides of life. Human existence is not for most men a perpetual struggle between competing gods, striving to reduce him to their domain. Usually there is some form of harmony, coming as a result of tradition or perhaps of sharp struggle for a time.

It is not to be assumed that these loyalties are deities, though for the moment here personified, driving him from the outside thither and yon. They are phases of his own life-process, for the moment caught and held. These loyalties are, to be sure, as real as he is, or any other part of the social process, but no more so—and no less.

What causes the differentials in the culture patterns we do not definitely know, but we observe deep marks upon social life made by invention of new tools or weapons, by new discoveries of lands or secrets, new leaders of magnetic force, new ideologies framed by cunning minds, new cults and new ways, springing up from some new situation itself arising from war, or pestilence, or famine or the act of God or the public enemy. Impacts of group upon group may of course precipitate new patterns where the group itself might otherwise seem to be stabilized. The more ultimate causes of social variations have not yet been adequately explored, but these are some of the factors involved in shifts and changes out of which new groupings and new forms of allegiance must spring. From the point of view of the statesman, these varied cultures with their wide ranging historical antecedents are accepted as a part of his problem of adjustment and equilibration. How far and in what way these patterns are themselves modifiable by conscious methods will be considered in later chapters of this volume.

Which of these groups is nearest the center of gravity in social pressure, it is not always easy to say; nor is there any fixity in order or precedence. In the states here examined, the ethnic group is perhaps the most common carrier of the social pattern. And if the ethnic is combined with the religious there

may emerge a disruptive force of the greatest consequence. Or an ethnic-economic combination contains elements of great strength.

The sharpest conflict in British history was occasioned by an ethnic-religious combination in a somewhat isolated region. In Germany the greatest menace has come from regional-religious groupings. In France the most startling problems have been those raised by the competition of the church and on a smaller scale by the rivalry of the economic groups. Russia is threatened by economic and religious groups not assimilated to the new order. Austria-Hungary was attacked by regional-ethnic groupings of a very formidable character, with some religious color. Switzerland encountered the peril of religious, ethnic, and regional separatism, which long impeded the growth of the state. Italy was imperiled by religious groups occupying a strategic geographical region in the center of the putative state. America was rocked by war arising from a regional-economic system struggling with the trend toward national unity under a competing economic order.

In no state are all the factors of a unified religion, a unified economic group, a unified ethnic group, blended in a unified political grouping, without serious regional differences. Looking forward, the economic areas tend to grow larger. The international character of religion is likely to continue with its nonlocal tendencies. Nor does it seem more likely that a unified ethnic basis will be easier to find in the future in view of the mixing migratory tendencies already developed and facilitated by the improvements in means of transportation and communication. In the field of economic groups the drift is divisive, and the indications are not conclusive as to greater unity in the future. The labor group may or may not be able to enter the seats of power without further disrupting the state, but in any event a process of reintegration must be faced.

The balance of group interests is in short a continuing problem, of which no permanent solution is possible. The readjustment of changing groups, interests, and fixations is precisely the continuing task of the political agencies of the community,

and in this lies their functional value. Likewise the maintenance of political morale is another aspect of the same problem, and will be a perpetual problem of political societies. The strength and direction of interests will vary from time to time, but the problem of adjusting and co-ordinating these variations will continue indefinitely. What the statesman or scientist can do is to analyze the most important factors in the given situation and endeavor to bring about the most useful combination possible, under the given circumstances, recognizing that these circumstances and situations are in a constant state of flux. The important consideration is the interrelation of these interests and groups. Their strength and direction are important only as measured by and against the strength and direction of all the others, and in the light of the total situation.

CHAPTER IV

COMPARISON OF TECHNIQUES OF CIVIC TRAINING

It is now proposed to examine in detail the various techniques employed in the different states for the purpose of promoting the civic attitudes and enthusiasms of their people. The eight principal types will be examined with reference to each of the other countries under scrutiny, and then an analysis will be made of the relative significance of these competing forms of civic training.

At this point it may be appropriate to recall again the following considerations:

1. That these devices are not always consciously employed by any set of rulers, although they are spoken of here as if they were. It often happens that these instruments are used without the conscious plan of anyone in authority. In this sense it might be better to say that these techniques are found rather than willed. At any rate they exist and are effectively operating.

2. These eight techniques are only rough schedules or classifications of broad types of training. They are not presented as accurate analyses of the psychology of the learning or teaching process, unfortunately very incomplete at this time.

With these important qualifications in mind, it is in order to proceed to a consideration of these methods in a comparative fashion, beginning with the school system.

SCHOOLS¹

In every country the school system, whether in public or in private hands, is an important agency in the determination of

¹ Special studies of particular value in this field are those of E. H. Reisner, *Nationalism and Education since 1879*; Paul Munroe, *Education and Nationalism of Retarded Cultures*; J. F. Scott, *Menace of Nationalism in Education*; Prudhommeaux, *Enquête sur les livres scolaires d'après guerre*.

The reports of the League of Nations Subcommittee of Experts for the Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League, especially that of 1930, are very valuable, while the publication, *Educational Survey*, contains material of current importance.

the attitudes of the next generation. The schools are the organized transmitters of group tradition and of group wisdom, and, on the plastic mind of youth, group characters may be written almost indelibly. What some of the primitive tribes attempted to do in a week, is undertaken in a modern educational system in a period of eight to twelve years, or more. Especially in recent times the school system is doubly important. In the last hundred years education has become compulsory, and it has been extended over a much longer range of life. Universal, compulsory, secular education has revolutionized the position of the schools in the life process, and made education one of the chief instrumentalities of modern society. Within a period of one generation the entire population of an average state passes through its schools, and this generation receives the impress society chooses to stamp upon it through this agency. There are, it need not be said, many other types of education than those received through the formal educational system, but this is the most systematic and most highly organized, most consciously contrived for the purpose of influencing directly the next generation.

The French state has always emphasized the significance of education as a vital factor in social and national life. The school system is primarily a national one, and the central school administration is in a position to impress the general outline of a plan upon the whole republic, not however without some local limitations and variations. A fairly symmetrical system has been developed in which civic patriotism occupies a conspicuous place—a system, indeed, in which patriotism and morality are adroitly blended. Manners, morals, and love of country are practically one in the story of social life unfolded before the French child in the school system.¹

Hayes comments upon the uniformity of the texts, upon their national tone, upon their moralizing tendency, upon their preponderant attention to happenings in war, and upon their

¹ See Hayes, *France*; also Scott, *Patriots in the Making* and the *Menace of Nationalism*.

omission of discussion or particular reference to other nations.¹ In recent years there has been some modification of these tendencies especially with reference to war situations,² largely through the efforts of the organization of teachers in France. On the whole the French system stands out as one of the most compact and direct agencies for nationalizing the coming generation.

The unusual degree of centralization in the French system makes it possible to organize a somewhat uniform system, and apply it consistently throughout the whole nation. This has been diligently undertaken and executed and throughout the republic a system of instruction in French patriotism, *instruction civique*, obtains. Here again the emphasis is placed upon the history of the French people, their wars, their victories, their national heroes, with emphasis upon French traits and ideals, and with relatively little attention to the position or characteristics of other states of the world.³ No other system so intensively cultivates the field of its local history with so little diversion of interest in other directions. The schools do not teach hatred of other nations, but, indirectly, that they do not exist or that they should be quietly ignored, with the possible exception of Germany. It is a process of training by exclusion of interest from one and concentration on the other and central point.

As in the other nations already considered the French emphasis is placed on the historical rather than the analytical phases of civic life and allegiance. Its basic skill, as in the others, lies in the presentation of a series of impressive pictures of manners and morals at an exceptionally impressionable period of life and reliance upon the enduring quality of these impressions. *La France* emerges from the studies, regnant and serene.

The German interest in and genius for education has been a notable factor in the cultural development of modern Europe, and the use of the schools for civic purposes has not been neglect-

¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. iii, "The Educational System."

² See Prudhommeaux, *Pour la paix par l'école*.

³ See Hayes, *op. cit.*

ed. While there is not a uniform national system of education as in France, the various state systems, of which the Prussian is of course the most important, have carefully inculcated the patriotic idea in the minds of the school children.¹ This process has involved, especially, the careful teaching of the history of the German group, and the inculcation of the ideas of order and respect for constituted authority. The well-known German historical interest and spirit has supplied the background upon which the preliminary instruction in the political affairs of the German people might be set. It is important to note, however, that the new German Constitution contains an article requiring the teaching of international good will in the schools of the Reich.²

Inevitably the question as to what shade of history should be taught has been a subject of animated controversy between defenders of the old régime, of the present régime, and of the régime hoped for by the communist faction. And regardless of what the texts may say, the personality of the teacher and his or her political sympathies play a large rôle in the determination of the impressions actually made upon the minds of the young children.

In the German system, strong emphasis has been laid, both in formal texts and in teachers' attitudes upon the importance and dignity of the political order. The *Staat* looms large in the social values of the society and equally in the school instruction the *staatlich* element occupies a position of prime importance. No group developed earlier than did the Germans the conception of the dignity of the state, of its legal significance as an entity, and the prestige of administration. The *Genossenschaft* theories of the Teutonic law so masterfully described by Gierke, the Hegelian majesty of the state, and the elements of technical skill and permanency incorporated in public administration by the benevolent despots: all combined to set up a tradition of

¹ See Kosok, *Germany*; Alexander and Parker, *The New Education in the German Republic*.

² Article 148, "In all schools effort shall be made to develop moral education, civic sentiments, and personal and vocational efficiency, in the spirit of the German national character and of international conciliation."

the political, which the schools have been useful in perpetuating in letter and in spirit. The elements of respect for established authority and for competent administrative service were stronger in this blend than were facility in compromise and adjustment—the administrative as sometimes distinguished from the political.

In the transition from the autocratic régime to the constitutional, and from the monarchic to the democratic, are seen many of the most interesting phases of the evolution of civic training in a given system.¹ These to be sure do not affect the relation of the individual to the political order as such, but seriously affect the attitudes of individuals toward the particular political régime under discussion.

The Swiss² and the American systems are both local rather than national in scope, but in both the civic content of the school training is strongly emphasized. In the American system, the teaching of history is relied upon as one of the most important methods of inculcating ideas favorable to the maintenance of the political order and to the special form of it at the given moment. In recent years extraordinary measures have been taken to guard against any type of history teaching in which national heroes might not be fully appreciated.³ In some of the states laws have been enacted, specifically prohibiting any form of teaching in any manner derogatory to the national historical characters. More commonly statutes have been enacted requiring the teaching of the constitution or the principles of the government as an obligatory part of the primary-school instruction, the number of hours varying in different states.

In view of the heterogeneous character of the population and the extent of immigration until recent years at any rate, unusual emphasis has been placed upon the Americanization of all elements in the population. For this purpose the use of the school system has been invoked in an extraordinary degree, al-

¹ See Kosok, *op. cit.*

² The Swiss system is described in Brooks, *Civic Training in Switzerland*, chap. vii.

³ See B. L. Pierce, *Public Opinion and the Teaching of History in the United States*.

though without any centralized direction, except in certain states as New York and Pennsylvania. The chief instrument of the schools in this connection has been the historical accounts of the founding and development of the nation, and the biographical emphasis upon national heroes of the type of Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Lincoln. The use of the schools for the inculcation or development of traits of citizenship in the larger sense of the term has been less extensive, although there have been many experiments in the field of student self-government.

In general the method has been as elsewhere that of uncritical indoctrination rather than of critical analysis and constructive synthesis. Notwithstanding the very wide diversity of systems and methods employed in the United States, the characteristics of a standardized system are preserved.

Confronted by the problem of reorganizing civic attitudes under the new régime, the Communists in Russia have seized upon the schools as one of the most effective agencies for the purpose of building up a new generation impregnated with Communist doctrines and ideals. With this end in view they have systematically and comprehensively swept the field of school instruction in the effort to impress upon the mind of the pupil the significance and value of the Communist order. Revolutionary history, struggles, victories, heroes, achievements are developed from the earliest years of the school curriculum to the last, often with great skill and always with great enthusiasm. From the first grade the child learns of Lenin and his deeds, of the failure of capitalism, of the principles of communism and its meaning for the working class. The Communists declare that the school systems of capitalist countries have always taught their special doctrines, that they have not and will not remain neutral, and that the Communist order must likewise utilize the school system for the propagation of its special ideas.¹

Of the thoroughness and consistency of this system, there can be no question, or of the relentless determination with which

¹ For full details of the way in which this basic idea is carried out, see S. N. Harper, *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*.

it is pressed forward by its proponents. No other system of civic training is contrived with so persistent an emphasis upon the major purpose of the dominant economic and political order. It may be asked whether in the Soviet régime the emphasis is placed primarily upon allegiance to the economic class of the workers, or upon allegiance to Russia. Immediately and directly the working class is stressed, but indirectly and unavoidably Russia emerges from the picture as an outstanding figure in the family of nations, conspicuous by reason of its peculiar system, and in fact persecuted for that very reason; but still standing there as a solitary figure, tragic and prophetic. There can be no doubt that the Soviet system has tended to intensify the spirit of Russian nationalism, notwithstanding its effort to avoid the implications of nationalism and to develop the structure of the international or class state. The Soviet system appears as an economic order rather than a political one, but the geographic, ethnic, cultural Russia is still there, and not far in the background at any time. The democratization of the economic order, the political order, and the educational system under the new régime does not diminish the importance of this situation in any manner, but on the contrary tends to enhance it.

In this group of states, then, the educational system occupies an important place in the development of civic training, and has been consciously employed for that purpose.

In the second group, composed of Italy, Austria-Hungary, and England, the use of the school system has been quite differently developed and for less direct civic purposes, whatever the indirect effect may be. Austria-Hungary, as a state, did not systematically make use of the school system as a means of stimulating allegiance to the empire. There was no general theory of universal education to start with, and the development of the school systems, such as they were, was left to the individual state, Bohemia, Hungary, Austria. In any case no elaborate system of civic training was outlined and uniformly applied throughout the confines of the empire in the hope of arousing interest and enthusiasm for Austria. There was school control for linguistic or religious reasons, in the separate re-

gions but this did not extend into the domain of a conscious attempt to create nationalism.

In Italy the school system did not develop as in the other states and the percentage of illiteracy remained very high down to the present day. The divorce of church and state produced two systems of schools, one for civil and one for religious purposes, and the antagonism of the two destroyed the unity of the system and its practical effect for purposes of national education. No serious and systematic attempt was made to teach Italianism through the school system. In more recent times under the Fascisti a determined effort has been made to utilize the school system, from the lowest grades on up, for the purposes of inculcating the Fascist creed and ideals. The Cross has been allowed to reappear in the modern school room, as well as religious teaching, but with it the picture of the king and Mussolini; and at the same time there has been a significant development of the cult of nationalism as interpreted by the philosophers and symbolists of the new régime.¹ The organization of the school children, the cult of Mussolini, the employment of the Fascist symbolism, the inculcation of the new theory of the state and of economics—all are parts of the same general design directed toward the result of civic education in the spirit of the new régime.

The new type of civic education, developed under the leadership of Gentile, is conceived in the spirit of Hegelianism and nationalism, and is adapted to the anti-democratic premises of Fascism. "The political implication is," says Schneider,² "that moral freedom is attained by an inner sharing in the cultural and traditional life of the people, not by a formal and mechanical participation in democratic institutions." And, furthermore, the religious implication is "that the individual can live in the universal spirit only through the national spirit, and that the people are more Catholic than the church."

Corresponding to this point of view, the school system has

¹ The general outlines of the Fascist theory of education are given in Schneider and Clough, *Making Fascists*, chap. v.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

been elaborately reorganized, with especial attention to textbooks and teachers. A Textbook Commission headed by a highly competent scholar presented an elaborate report on the whole question of content of courses, and recommended among other things the systematic instruction in Italian patriotism. At the same time steps were taken for purging the teaching lists of those who were not in entire sympathy with the spirit of Fascism.

Thus it is clear that the new régime in Italy is fully aware of the importance of the school system in the process of civic education and proceeds systematically to utilize this agency in every way suggested by the ingenuity of the leaders in the educational movement.

An examination of the English school system in its relation to civic training reveals a general denial of any conscious attempt to engender national sentiment through the agency of education. In fact, one finds an indignant repudiation of any such unbecoming purpose.¹ Only in more recent times, since the advance of the Soviet propaganda, is there evidence of uneasiness and the beginning of a systematic attempt to employ the schools for the direct inculcation of dominant principles of economics and politics. Broadly speaking, the English schools are neither centralized nor public, but decentralized and private in their operation, partly private, partly public. There is therefore no single English system, as in France, and the local variations are numerous.

Like the other systems, the English schools utilize the agency of history for the development of interest in national fortunes and national personalities, with inevitable emphasis upon the English traits and individuals. On the direct teaching of government as such they lay little emphasis, and are inclined to challenge its value.

On the other hand, the English system indirectly is one of the most important of all factors in the growth of civic interest and allegiance. This result is accomplished through the use of the

¹ See Gaus, *Great Britain*, chap. viii; Helen Wodehouse, *Survey of the History of Education*.

schools as instruments for the development of self-government, through the utilization of certain schools and universities as training schools for governmental service, and by the use of the schools as agencies for the teaching of social distinctions and values. England has been traditionally governed by a type of English "gentleman." What constitutes his characteristics, and how they may be interpreted from time to time, is early taught in the schools. The rules and the personnel for interpretation are both found there and the cult is fixed there. Those outside do not belong in the old-time political sense. The traditions of these schools handed down and somewhat modified from generation to generation were in effect the basis of English government, and were imposed upon an apparently willing community. They were not a written code, but were in the nature of assumptions never directly taught and never subject to direct challenge. What a gentleman should or should not do was not set down, but was indirectly absorbed. Under new conditions, with the rise of other and competing schools and with the advent of Labor and the relative decline of some of the older groups, a new situation appears in which the older systems of civic training may be replaced by some other method, but thus far at any rate the outlines of such a system are not visible. What will happen to the school system in the transition from social aristocracy to democracy, or to some other form of aristocracy than the traditional one, is of course an interesting problem upon which those interested may speculate, but upon which there is no definite clue available, at least not to the writer.¹

In conclusion one might be inclined to generalize to the effect that the newer the régime the more vigorous the use of the educational system for civic training, and cite the cases of Russia, Italy, and America. The older systems of France and Germany are exceptionally developed, however, and one cannot safely assert that only the new régimes endeavor to utilize the educational system for propaganda. And the English system, in the background, in spite of the general denial of an attempt at conscious utilization of the schools is a classic example at

¹ See Scott, *Menace of Nationalism*.

least of the indirect and unconscious employment of the educational system.

The fact is that in all cases the school system is the basic factor in the development of civic interest and loyalty, and the chief instrument for that purpose.¹ Whether the use of the schools for mere indoctrination is the most intelligent method is another question which will be fully discussed in the closing chapters of this volume. In modern civilization the school tends to take the place of force and fear in the earlier régime and of religion, the family, the army, in the later, and it succeeds to all the rights and privileges as well as the power and prestige of the ecclesiastical group. In the scheme of civic education it looms largest in the series of techniques employed to develop civic feeling and allegiance.

GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES

The various governmental services play an important rôle in generating political loyalties. Great personalities emerging from the army, the navy, parliamentarians, the great spectacles organized around them, the contacts of the governmental personalities with the citizens from time to time, the general attitude of the masses toward officials, the standing and importance of governing groups in relation to the personnel of other and competing groups—all these facts are of the very greatest significance in the formation of political interest and enthusiasms in the modern state, or in any political grouping whether ancient or modern.

The states here considered fall into two main classes. In Group I, consisting of England, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, the governmental services play a very important part in the civic interest of the nation. Their prestige and their renown is one of the most valuable assets of the political community, and they tend to develop in the population of the state high regard for the political organization and marked confidence in its decision. In Group II, including Italy, Russia, the

¹ Some of the special problems relating to formal instruction in civic training are discussed in chap. ix.

United States, and Switzerland, the governmental services are of less vital importance in generating and maintaining the interest and enthusiasm of the citizenry. France seems to occupy a median position to which attention will be directed later. Of course, these distinctions might readily be too strongly emphasized and I refer to them as tendencies rather than as fixed differentials, tendencies toward a type or form of civic training in these nations.

It will be observed that the hereditary nobility, which for a long time supplied much of the color and enthusiasm of modern states, has largely disappeared as a controlling factor in all the nations considered. In some of them the nobility remains as a decidedly important political group, but in none does it appear to dominate nor does it actually control. In England its influence is still strongest, and in Germany and Italy it remains a factor in the life of the state. In France the titles remain, but without much more than social prestige. In Russia, the United States, Switzerland, even the titles have melted away, and the hereditary group has no longer a place in the political life of the state.

In England, the navy, the nobility, and the civil service still occupy a position of very great importance in molding the political attraction of the citizens of the empire. While to the constitutional theorists and philosophers the Crown continues as a venerable ruin of ancient prerogative, its social activities still cast a glamor over the life of the people. The king and court still figure largely in social life and still exert an incredible influence on the community. As the powers of the Crown have diminished politically, they have been replaced by a myth which now serves as the unifying bond of the whole empire; and of course the less actual power for this purpose, the better. The effect of unending ceremonials centering around their majesties and their court is undeniably an important factor in vitalizing the picture of the abstract state and the still more remote empire of Britain.

The army has not played so important a part in British life, but the navy for generations has enjoyed vast prestige, and its

personnel has added to the lustre of the governmental group. Without its distinguished naval heroes a great gap would be left in the popular idea of England. The higher civil service recruited from the upper classes of England and occupying positions of trust at home and abroad has also played an important part in the civic interest of the community. On the whole they have commanded the respect and confidence of the mass of the community and their skill and adroitness in administration have tended to raise the value of the political group in the eyes of the average man. Significant figures in the parliamentary set are important here, but will be considered more particularly in succeeding paragraphs, under the head of the rôle of the political party. Thus the nobles, the naval heroes, the higher civil servants, sometimes, to be sure, the same people, have helped to cement the state by the continuity and consistency of their personnel.

In Germany, the nobility, the army, and the expert civil service were the center of the Prussian state, of the other German states, and the dominating influence in the Reich. The elimination of the nobility and the lessened prestige of the military group has altered this situation in recent times, but the position of the nobility, while weakened, still continues and the same may be said of the warrior group, still a great factor in the control of the empire. The German bureaucracy, the most highly educated and competent, continues, however, and still enjoys great prestige with the mass of the German people. To them a government is conceived in terms of the specified and concrete individuals intrusted with the performance of the functions of government. In comparison with business, religious, or cultural groups, the personnel and capacity of these individuals vindicates itself as competent and trustworthy. *Pro tanto* the state receives an increment of confidence. While there have been from time to time complaints of the inflexibility of the administrative service and satirical references to its pomposity, and more recently some traces of corruption, in the main the impression produced has been that of integrity and competence,

and German officialdom has helped to build up a tradition of the dignity and desirability of the government.¹

With less success the Austro-Hungarians endeavored to make use of the agents of state activity to impress the imagination and arouse the enthusiasm of the citizens of the empire. For this purpose the armies were employed and the professional servants of the administration. But the professional service did not attain the dignity or ability of the German, and the armies enjoyed no such prestige as the French and German military forces, in the latter days at least. There were sharply divisive ethnic influences at work both in the armies and in the administration, and both of these operated against the formation of a sense of state solidarity.² It seemed at times as if the solidifying influences of the military tended to break up the central state as in the case of the Hungarian army, and to cause bitterness and discontent, as in the relation of the Czechs to the administrative services in Bohemia and their supersession by the German elements.

In the second group, the influence of governmental personnel is less clearly evident. The distinctive quality of superior governmental service is wanting and the general impression of state officials is less vivid than in the group just considered.

In old Russia the nobility as a whole was not very effective, the army was unpopular, and the administrative service incompetent and often corrupt. In the new régime the emphasis has not been placed on any branch of governmental service as the unifying bond of the Soviet group. The Red army, it is true, has many elements of vividness and display, but the Commissars are drab and uninteresting in themselves, however dramatic the sweep of their program may be. Great spectacles are not organized around either the civil or the military services, but find their center in the mass demonstrations in which the trades and other popular organizations participate extensively on numerous occasions. A distinct effort is made to dramatize the working class and its various economic institutions of

¹ See Kosok, *op. cit.*

² See Jászi, *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, Part III, chap. iii.

a mass character wherever possible, and to throw into the background the traditional political figures of the earlier régime. The color of the new movement is found in the Communist party, which will be considered in succeeding paragraphs.

Likewise in Italy the Fascisti are the chief reliance of the new régime for the development of interest and enthusiasm for the new type of grouping. The bureaucracy was never very competent or popular in the older days, and has gradually been replaced by younger adherents of the new cause. The nobility was always a considerable factor in the maintenance of general enthusiasm, clustering around the House of Savoy and its intimate relations with the founding of modern Italy. But under the present régime, the nobles are discreetly relegated to the background and their influence except where allied with the fortune of the Fascisti is somewhat reduced.

In the United States and in Switzerland little emphasis has been placed upon the governmental services as aids in the development of national unity and solidarity. Switzerland as a neutral country and the United States as an essentially non-military state have relied little upon the military class or caste as an agency in formulating an attitude on the part of the citizenry. The supremacy of the civil over the military authorities has always been a cardinal principle of American political theory, and there has always been a distinct jealousy of any attempt at political influence on the part of the army or navy group. That military victories and military personalities have been important factors in molding national tendencies is of course inevitable but the constant presence of military leaders has not been a significant factor as was the case in Germany or in England in the case of the navy.

The civil service in the United States has never been placed upon a professional basis, except in a few instances, and its frequent incompetence and corruption has been such as to minimize its influence in the formation of enthusiasm for the state. It is true that the negative impressions of severity and autocracy have been wanting, but the positive impression of government servants as supplying inspiration for the community

through sheer force of intelligence and reliability has also been missing. The spoils system has not been the source of general enthusiasm for the state.

In Switzerland the civil service has been upon a higher plane than in the United States, but even so it has not been dramatic enough in quality to count strongly as an agency for development of civic enthusiasm. Its honesty and competence has been unquestioned, in which respect it has been more like the German, but it has not been as aggressive or significant as the administrative service across the border.

It should be noted, however, that the Swiss popular army, the *Landsturm* in which universal service has been required has been a nationalizing influence of no little importance.¹ While seldom called into action, it has nevertheless been useful in bringing before the eyes of the citizens of the republic in a vivid and concrete form the service of the commonwealth. Maintained upon a more democratic basis than most military systems, it has not suffered from some of the petty tyrannies that have often served to make soldiers, it is true, but to inspire in them the desire to fight first of all their officers and oppressors.

France occupies in many respects a median position. The French army has been a unifying force of inestimable value to the state. Its victories, its heroes, from Napoleon to Foch, its series of military personalities constantly in evidence, its intimate association with struggles for the life of France, have made it one of the chief unifying forces in the French group. From time to time the anti-militarist movement has made headway, but in the main the sweep of emotion and interest has been in the other direction and has always emerged triumphant.

The administrative service of France has also been upon an expert basis, characterized by intelligence and integrity, but without perhaps the element of expertness and the tendency toward leadership found in the older German system. The syndicalistic tendencies in the French administration have also produced divisive effects of the most pronounced character; and they have in effect built up a rival organization within the state

¹ See Brooks, *Civic Training in Switzerland*, chap. vi.

in the case of postal and railway employees with quasi-independent jurisdiction. Whatever may be the ultimate effect of these developments, the immediate tendency has been undoubtedly in the direction of disruption and disunion. In the higher circles of government there have been many rumors of corruption and betrayal of trust and these have to a degree undermined the confidence of the community in the steadfastness and reliability of the governing group. The relation of this condition to the party life of the community will be considered in later sections of this volume. It cannot of course be concluded that in the wide range and variety of contacts of citizens with governmental service any considerable number of them are tinged with this color, and, on the other hand, generally speaking the civil services command the confidence and respect of the mass of those with whom they come in contact.

The administrative personnel of the various states is then of very large importance in determining popular attitudes toward the political community. Integrity, competence, fair dealing, intelligence, and leadership inspire confidence in the work of the group; vivid personalities and spectacles arouse the interest and inflame the enthusiasm of the mass of citizens for the patria; and if arrogance and excesses are avoided, there is built up bit by bit a habituation to the officials of the state and a willingness to support the existing régime.

What the modern state has lost in the brilliance of the hereditary cult, has been gained in the broadening of the base of citizen support and responsibility under the democratic régime. Universal suffrage, universal education, the opening of careers to those with ability, the sense of common power and responsibility: all these have contributed in no small measure to the strengthening of the hold of the state on the average man.

POLITICAL PARTIES

In the modern state political parties play an important rôle, not only in the organization of opinion and selection of office, but also in the stimulation and maintenance of interest in the

affairs of the public group.¹ They attract the allegiance and stimulate the political activities of men and women in ways and at times when the other governmental services do not and cannot. The parliamentarians, the regular party workers, the large group of volunteers, are all under the influence of group sentiment and interest which in a sense they create by their participation. The compromises, the corruptions, the incompetencies, the insincerities of parties are such as to turn away from them many intelligent and influential citizens from time to time, but none the less the parties remain as a continuing influence in the stimulation and expression of civic interest on the part of the masses of the community. They are an integral part of the system of adult civic training in most modern communities.

The analysis of the party system shows that it performs many functions in the broader political and social process of which it is a part. These may be grouped as follows: selection of official personnel, formulation of public policies, conductors or critics of government, political education, intermediation between individual and government.

Its wide-flung net of activities centering around clubs, societies, formal and informal, social and semisocial activities, draws in a great number of citizens who otherwise might remain outside the political pale. But in the party they find an interest, however casual it may be in some cases, while in others the party becomes the abiding place of permanent convictions regarding political affairs. As Gaus says, "The ambitious may find in these movements a career, the humble a society." In far more intimate fashion than "law and order," the party is the none too competent friend of the none too competent voter, not too industrious, or too logical, or too severe—himself more human than the law which often holds itself divine.

In a negative sense the political party system is of value to the central political loyalty pattern, in that action within the state is induced through it, rather than direct action in extra-legal or illegal ways. It is when social groups turn their back

¹ Merriam, *The American Party System*; Michels, *Political Parties*; Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*.

on the party and begin to use non-legal or direct action tactics that the state is in greater danger. When the dissenters and incipient revolutionists decide to enter the party lists, the advantages to the political system are obviously great, for in this case to use the old phrase they are "using ballots instead of bullets." The party system, of course, does not of itself create such attitudes in the community, and if they do not already exist the party system will not solve the problem, but the party will take advantage of such habits and attitudes and facilitate and utilize their development.

In Group I of the states considered, consisting of United States, England, Germany, France, and Switzerland, the political party plays a very active rôle in the civic life of the nation, and occupies a very conspicuous part among the agencies creating governmental interest. In Germany, France, and Switzerland, the party is important but somewhat less so than in England and the United States.

Group II consists of Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. In two of these states a so-called but pseudo-political party plays a part in the life of the state, although it approximates the character of a governmental service rather than a party as commonly understood.

The United States and England have utilized the two-party (sometimes three-party) system in the main, and have brought the party into the center of national political life. The climax is seen in the great parliamentary and electoral struggles with national encounters often with thrilling effect. The party campaigns, the party leaders, the party problems, the parliamentary crises, all these have had untold influence in awakening and continuing political interest on the part of the mass of the citizenry. It is difficult to think of the political development of these countries without calling up the image of Gladstone, Disraeli, Lloyd George, Lincoln, Roosevelt, Wilson, and many others almost equally eminent.¹

In America the political parties exercise an important na-

¹ See J. A. Spender, *The Public Life*; Merriam, *Four American Party Leaders*.

tionalizing influence, first by bringing together the regional or sectional interests whose divisive tendencies might be fatal to national unity, and then by drawing together the nationalistic groups from among the newly arrived immigrants. These elements were quickly assimilated by the dominant political parties and sped on the way toward Americanization in a manner not possible in any other social agency, with the possible exception of the school. The colorful quality of much of the party life in the United States was partly offset by the incompetence and corruption of many active partisans, whose disloyalty both to party and to government produced a disquieted and distasteful disposition on the part of many citizens. But in the main and notwithstanding these unpleasant features of party processes, the party loomed large in the life of the society, and tended to stimulate interest in things political, as compared with the life of other groups. In England the political and especially the parliamentary battles, the latter fought upon an unusual stage, are of the very greatest importance in the national civic development and their life and color were perhaps the most important of the great spectacles of England. Without them, the political life of the group would have been of quite another type. If in the United States the party has been of very great value in the assimilation of new elements and in giving the sections a national attitude, in England the party has served an important purpose in providing a means by which the newly conscious classes might be gradually brought into the seats of power. First the business and middle-class groups were initiated through the party and then in more recent times the group of organized labor. Almost without striking a blow these new forces have been brought into the center of power through the agency of the party, and without shattering the central pattern of loyalty to the empire.

In France, Germany, and Switzerland, political parties are also of great moment in the civic life of the group, but perhaps less so than in England and the United States. From one point of view, the multiparty system of Germany and France makes

possible sharper and more definite issues and contests correspondingly more fundamental and more dramatic.¹ The right, the left, and the center, and their intermediate stages make a place for a wide variety of shades of opinion, and furious battles for supremacy result from the impact of these conflicting forces. In this sense it might be said that the multiparty system is more provocative of civic interest than the two-party with its relatively less colorful programs and contests. Once on the parliamentary stage, however, the two-party system offers perhaps greater possibilities of dramatic division on the one side or on the other. Under the many-party system combination must be made in which the vividness of the electoral distinctions are often obscured by the temporary alliances inevitably developed in order to obtain a majority. Furthermore, if parties happen to coincide with sharply defined religious, ethnic, or economic distinctions, the divisive effect of the contests may be somewhat greater than in the other system where these differences are to some extent blurred over. A Catholic party, or a Polish party, may emphasize differences with the state, and the controversy may tend to raise doubts regarding allegiance as well as to solve them. This tendency undoubtedly exists.

Neither in France nor in Germany has party service attained the high level of confidence and competence seen in the administrative service, and there has been much cynicism regarding the politicians' career. In the higher politics of France there have been many grave accusations of corruption, and many expressions of dislike for the trading practices of the deputies and their satellites. To a less extent this has been true in Germany, although even here there have been grave instances of dereliction in official duty, and many suspicions in recent times. As types of adult civic education, then, the parties occupy a central position in these two states of modern Europe, a position which could not be filled by any other existing or known device to interest the average man in things and persons political. The Swiss system, likewise a multiparty system, occupies a similar place in the life of that state, and serves as a focus of interest

¹ See Gosnell, *Why Europe Votes*.

for the community. If the central parliamentary life of Switzerland is less dramatic, the local manifestations of political activity, such as the *Landesgemeinde* in Appenzell, supply what is needed¹ in color and generality of interest.

In Group II the political party plays a relatively limited rôle. First of all, in Austria-Hungary, the national party system was never fully developed. The stage was set for parliament and the parties were organized, but ethnic and class considerations far outweighed the imperial interest in importance. Parties were divided upon racial lines and upon economic class lines, and the broader distinctions between liberal and conservative were blurred over and found expression only with the very greatest difficulty; and the parties were local rather than imperial.

In Russia and Italy new forms of political organization have been developed in place of the political party. These are the Communist party and the Fascisti, both of which carry on functions different from those of political parties. In both, intensive types of political education are carried on, with unusual forms of responsibility attached to the obligations of membership.

In old Russia political parties, as known in Western Europe, were never any more than feebly developed. The autocratic system of that time forbade the assumption of governmental responsibility by a parliament or a party and the general repression of freedom of political activity made a real party organization out of the question. The personalities and ceremonials relied upon for support were those evolving from the old régime of hereditary political power.

Since the revolution, the Communist party has occupied a very important position in the life of the new state, and perhaps more than any other one factor has guided the destinies of the politico-economic community. Strictly speaking this is not a party at all in the sense in which the term is commonly used, but it is rather a select group of citizens who become responsible for the conduct of affairs. The number of Communists is estimated at two million, chosen by a process of co-optation. They assume wide powers and responsibilities, are limited in their rate

¹ See Brooks, *op. cit.*

of income, are subjected to severer pains and penalties in case of violation of the law, and, more than all this, they take on in a very special way the conscious responsibility for the guidance of the community, both on its political and its economic sides. They are given an intensive political education and are in turn educators of the people. The communist cells or units, scattered through organized social life, maintain political control over the voting electorate in some such fashion as a party organization does in a democracy. The animating spirit is of course that of a consuming zeal for the proletarian cause, which to them becomes a second religion, or, more accurately, the only religion.

The industry, integrity, enthusiasm of the Communists provides the chief basis for the maintenance of the state. The contacts of the citizens and electors with the Communists are of such a type as to command general respect, mingled no doubt with fear and greed. While this group does not excel in technical competence as a type of civil service, and in economic affairs may perpetrate tragic blunders, in the main their intelligence, industry, and evident devotion to the popular cause has enabled them to command the respect of the great mass of the community. They constitute the chief agency for civic training in the Russian organization, and the whole system is incomprehensible without them.¹ They are not interested in the development of national sentiment or enthusiasm; on the contrary, they assail this as a bourgeois device intended to support the interests of the capitalistic group. Their direct support is given to the international proletarian movement, in which theoretically the ethnic elements are of secondary consequence. From this point of view their goal is a world unity and world organization of the proletarians. In practice, however, the isolation of Russia and the frequent attacks, economic and otherwise, made upon it by the Western powers has had the unexpected effect of stirring Russian national pride and rousing a much deeper spirit of national enthusiasm than had hitherto existed. Thus in a way the international Communist becomes a defender and exponent of a form of nationalism, *malgré lui*.

¹ For full description, see S. N. Harper, *op. cit.*, chap. ii.

In Italy under the older régime the party life was highly organized but not wholly useful in the growth of political interest and solidarity. There were many political parties, several of which combined in order to set up a government. These majorities were frequently found to be very unstable and in the latter part of the period were dominated by a spoils system built up by the astute and powerful Giolitti, the first type of a modern national boss. The general corruption and favoritism rampant in party life prevented the party system from serving as a powerful instrument for the development of national allegiance, enthusiasm, and interest. Men of distinction appeared in public life, as Sonino, Orlando, Nitti, but factionalism was very common and very disturbing; and the overshadowing figure in the picture was that of the genial boss from Torino, who ruled by a system not unlike that of Walpole in earlier days in England.

Since the revolution under Mussolini, the party system has been destroyed, and the rule of the Fascisti has taken its place. The Fascisti are the *élite* of the nation, self-elected and self-perpetuating, holding their position by force, fear, persuasion, and by every device known for the perpetuation of power. The number of this group is estimated at a million and there is a constant struggle as to whether this figure shall be expanded or diminished. As in the case of the Communists there are both frequent purgings and frequent additions. Through the Fascisti membership which is scattered throughout the country the various agencies of political and social control are brought into line with the central designs of the ruling group in the political community, and political domination is in this manner insured. Furthermore, the members of the Fascisti furnish not only political power but also the life and color of the political circle. Their energy, their enthusiasm for the cause, their devotion to the sacred spirit of the new Italy, inspires the community with mingled feelings of respect and fear. Like the Communists they may not always excel in technical competence, as they may be innocent of the old tradition, but this they offset by compelling enthusiasms which approach the frenzy of a religion. If the old

nobility is to be overshadowed, if the parliamentary and political life is to be surpassed in interest, if all the earlier symbols of nationalistic democracy are to be superseded, it is clear that this can be done only by a group of tremendous vitality and capacity for the invention of new formulas and symbolisms and vivid types of political and social action. It may fairly be said that this difficult mission has been accomplished at least for the time with which we are dealing.

From the point of view of political theory this new group represents the élite whose natural right to rule and whose superiority had been long emphasized by Italian philosophers of the school of Mosca, Pareto, Michels, and their French predecessor, Sorel. From the practical point of view the Fascist organization assumes the necessity of destroying the old party system, modern liberalism, parliamentarism, and the spirit and institutions of modern democracy.¹

Both the Fascist and the Communist parties, so-called, are in effect integral parts of the actual responsible government. In a sense all parties may be looked upon as parts of government, but in these particular cases the result is but one party, no opposition is tolerated, and the party is the government without possibility of effective resistance through channels other than violence and reprisal in kind. In both cases this may be and sometimes is explained as a temporary phenomenon made necessary by the revolutionary stage through which the movement is passing, but, whatever the outcome may be, for the time being the party is the head of the governing mechanism, and not primarily a medium between government and citizen.

Taking the parties as a whole, it is evident, then, that they are one of the major factors in the organization of civic interest and enthusiasm. There are wide differences in methods of organization and in types of activity, but the general course of the parties is such as to arouse a high degree of interest in the affairs of the political community, and to carry the citizen along on a tide of enthusiasm regarding diverse policies and personalities which are the subject matter of party controversy. Even the

¹ Schneider and Clough, *op. cit.*, chap. viii.

citizens who in a superior manner jeer at the parties and condemn their fatuity and folly still do so on the theory that they might better express a deeper sentiment for the state; and in this the critics unconsciously ally themselves with the propaganda of the state.

Other groups have their contending factions; they are the common lot of all groups ecclesiastical or otherwise; but in none is the stage so well set as in the political, and in none are the differences so easily reconciled and so well composed in real action. In other groups factions may tend to permanent feudism with the most disastrous consequences, such as may be seen in the theological struggle where abiding enmities result from what in politics would be a friendly struggle, genially recalled as a pleasant episode after it is over. The very hypocrisy of politics makes it easier to forget and to forgive, and thus in a sense its weakness becomes its strength. The parties supply one of the greatest of shows or spectacles, one of the grand tournaments without which life would be relatively dull and drab. At times the party spirit seems almost a form of general intoxication of the type which no law however drastic can ever hope to reach. The colorful personalities, the opposing principles, the wild enthusiasm of their advocates, the fierce fury of the partisans, the great speeches, the climax of the party struggle in electoral battles or in the halls of parliament, when the renowned champions face to face decide the destinies of the state—what a developer of interest in the state.

SPECIAL PATRIOTIC ORGANIZATIONS

One of the interesting developments of recent times is the establishment of special patriotic organizations for the purpose of promoting enthusiasm for the nation or the state. Societies are assembled in order to stimulate civic interest either in the youth or among adults—special custodians of the civic training of the community, although not by special appointment. Precisely how effective they are in all cases, or even all taken together, no one knows, but they are at any rate one of the most

common devices for defense of national traditions, and as such they will be examined at this point in a comparative way.

Two groups of states are found. In Group I, including the United States, Russia, Italy, Germany, France, and Switzerland, there is a considerable development of special societies for the promotion of civic patriotism, both juvenile and adult. In Group II, including Austria-Hungary and England, there are few or no societies for the direct and special purpose of advancing civic training.

In Group I, there are various reasons for the appearance of special forms of patriotic organization. In Russia and Italy these societies are part of the general movement for the reinforcement of the ideology and habits necessary for the support of the revolutionary régime. In the United States the basic factor is the heterogeneity of races and the desire to Americanize or nationalize them more expeditiously or fully. In Germany the motive was the defense and the spread of German culture, especially on the part of the pan-Germanists; in more recent times the defense of positions which were perhaps as much class attitudes as nationalistic, as in the case of the extreme nationalists (*völkisch*) and the Red Front of the Communist group.

By far the most comprehensive plan is that of the Soviets.¹ The Communists have outlined a system of political education extending from the earliest age on through life. The first form of the organization is called the Little Octobrists, in memory of the October revolution of 1917, and it includes children of the age of eight to ten. After this comes the association of the Pioneers, covering the period from ten to sixteen. Beyond this are the Young Communists (Komsomol), fourteen to twenty-three, from which the more successful may advance into membership in the Communist party itself. It is estimated that there are over three million members of the Komsomol. In a way these organizations are modeled after the Boy Scouts, but with many important variations, adapted to the special needs of the Communist program.

The ritual and the objectives are intended to attach the in-

¹ See Harper, *op. cit.*, chap. ix, "Soviet Civic Organizations."

terest of the children and the youth to the principles and the personalities of the Communist cause. Thus the five-finger salute of the Pioneers stands for the five continents which are ultimately to embrace communism. The Pioneer badge is the red flag, with the symbol of the sickle and the hammer, and a campfire of five logs burning with three flames. The five logs represent the five continents of the earth and the three flames the III or Communist International. The motto on the badge is "Always Ready." A special costume and a salute are a part of the ceremonialism.¹ There are five Customs, which include health, tolerance and cheerfulness, early rising, promptness, industry and perseverance, economy and care in the use of people's property, and refraining from smoking, swearing, or drinking.

One of the most active workers in the Pioneer movement has been Krupskaya, the widow of Lenin, whose general statement regarding their aims is given in the following quotation:

The Pioneer movement reaches the children at that age when the personality of the individual is still being formed and promotes the social instincts of the children, helping to develop in them civic habits and a social consciousness. It places before the children a wonderful goal, that goal which has been brought to the fore by the period through which they are living, and for which the working class of the whole world is fighting. This goal is the liberation of the toilers and the organization of a new order in which there will be no division into classes, no oppression and no exploitation, and where all the people will live a full and happy life.

On the practical side the children are encouraged to urge the establishment of more schools, help carry on the campaign against illiteracy, combat insanitary conditions and practices,

¹ The five laws of the Pioneers are:

1. The Pioneer is faithful to the cause of the working class, and to the precepts of Illich.
2. The Pioneer is the younger brother and helper of the Young Communist and the Communist.
3. The Pioneer organizes other children and joins with them in their life. The Pioneer is an example to all children.
4. The Pioneer is a comrade to other Pioneers and to the workmen and peasant children of the whole world.
5. The Pioneer strives for knowledge. Knowledge and understanding are the great forces in the struggle for the cause of the workingman.

aid in raising the cultural level of the family, and especially of the peasant family, act as correspondents for their newspapers, and establish wall newspapers, a typical Russian device of their own. It is estimated that there are some 4,000,000 Pioneers including Little Octobrists. From the Little Octobrists to the Pioneers to the Young Communists to the Communist party there is an unbroken chain of political education, directed toward the general indoctrination of the mass of the youth, and toward the development of especially gifted leaders and teachers among them.

Of the practical success of this effort there can be little question among those who have observed it at close range. One of the chief difficulties curiously enough has been to restrain the aggressiveness and in some instances the arrogance of the newly developed youth, who at times undertook to lay down the law to their teachers and their parents, a situation not so remarkable as it might seem in view of the backwardness of school and family in many parts of Russia under the old régime. This youth system overlaps the adult system, as the voting age is 18 and the military age the same. Some 200,000 of the Young Communists are in the Red army, and 200,000 others in the ranks of the Communist party.

For adults, the Communists have devised no special forms of patriotic association, but have worked out an imposing system applicable to the entire community. This new ideology rests upon the working-class philosophy, upon the campaign for education and sanitation and for the development of technical skills of value in the process of production. It is made effective through a far-ranging organization of political education in the factory, in the home, in the school, and on every possible occasion. No such systematic attempt to reorganize the political attitudes of a community has ever been made, as that now going on under the direction of the Soviet authorities. It challenges the interest and attention of all those concerned with the development of civic attitudes by means of consciously controlled and systematic efforts on the part of the community. Without regard to the desirability of the objectives sought, the

system, as such, is worthy of the most careful examination. Many suggestive aspects of the problem of indoctrination are presented by this system. The Boy Scout movement of Western Europe, the ancient traditions of Russia, and the ideology of the Communists are interwoven in the fabric displayed by the Soviets.

The Italian system faced less formidable difficulties than the Russian, and is far less complete in range of effort and in perfection of detail. The bases of the economic and the religious order have been left undisturbed, or at least relatively so, and only the foundations of the political order have been assailed, and even these somewhat obliquely. The Fascist task was in the main that of replacing the doctrines of liberalism and those of hereditary nobility with some other form of political attitude and disposition. Neither the capitalists nor the ecclesiasts have been really assailed and on the contrary their support has been enlisted, even if not always cheerfully accorded. The chief reliance has been upon the cult of Mussolini, the demonstration of the superior energy and efficiency of the Fascist type of rule, and the stimulation of the spirit of Italian nationalism.

Chief among the Italian organizations are those intended for the education of the youth. For this purpose the Balilla for the younger boys, the Piccole Italiane for the girls, the Avanguardia for the older boys, and the Giovani Italiane for the older girls are the principal agencies. For these groups an elaborate system of Fascist patriotic and military instruction is provided (in the case of the boys); and promotion runs from the Balilla to the Avanguardia and from the Avanguardia to the Fascist party and the militia. In the grand *Lera Fascista* the Avanguardia are annually received into the Fascist party with great ceremony. So great is the importance attached to these organizations that the Fascists dissolved the counter group of Catholic Boy Scouts in 1928, although they were later permitted to carry on activities, confined, however, solely to religious objects and solicitudes.

The following table illustrates the paralleling of organizations in state and church:

Azione Cattolica	Instituto Fascista di Cultura
Federazione Sportiva Cattolica }	Balilla
Esploratori Cattolici	
Federazione Uomini Cattolici	Fasci
Unione Femminile Cattolica	Fasci Femminile
Gioventù Femminile Cattolica	Giovani Italiane
Fanciulli Cattolici	Piccole Italiane
Universitarie Cattoliche	Gruppi Universitari Fascista
Associazione Scrittori Cattolici	Federazione Scrittori Fascista

The leaders in this campaign of instruction are chiefly officers of the Fascist militia, who direct their efforts toward the making of good Fascists, physically and doctrinally, as well as in the military sense. Other patriotic organizations are found in considerable number and variety. Some of these center around sporting activities, some around the militaristic side of life, some are imperialistic in their aims, others of a more general nature with propaganda more incidentally developed. Thus the various forms of Veterans' associations, the National Union of Reserve Officers, and the Italian Naval League are important types of patriotic organizations in their respective fields. The Fascist colonial institute, the committee for the diffusion of Italian culture abroad, and finally the Foreign Fasci are notable in the cultivation of Italian interests outside the peninsula. The Dopolavoro is another type of a social welfare organization taken over under Fascist direction, with a Fascist spirit.

These groups taken together with the Fascist party and the Fascist militia constitute an extraordinary array of special groups of citizens organized for the defense of the Fascist state, and prepared to take whatever measures are necessary, whether educational or military, for this purpose. They prosecute their purposes with great energy and with a type of religious zeal, not wholly unlike that of the Soviet groups in the defense of communism. In both cases, the party, the army, the youth movement are closely integrated, and the whole force of the educational, economic, and governmental system is employed to support the movement.

In the United States the number and variety of special patriotic organizations is considerable. Their task is quite a dif-

ferent one from that of the Russian and the Italian, although there is some similarity in method. The American problem is partly that of reconciling the diverse ethnic bases of the American people, and partly a class purpose of protecting the ideology of the propertied group against that of the communist or other radical propagandas. The ostensible motive in all cases is that of the defense of nationalism, and the development of sounder civic habits of thought and action. In the most important instance of all, the major objective has been that of character-building with civic interests as incidental and collateral.

The most widely spread organization in the United States is the Boy Scouts and its companion groups the Girl Scouts and Camp Fire Girls. Others more specifically political are the National Security League, the Minute Men of the Constitution, the Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution, the Colonial Dames, the DeMolay, a society developed under the auspices of the Masonic order, and many other organizations more or less specifically patriotic in their purpose and activities.

By far the most numerous of these organizations is that of the Boy Scouts which has a membership of some 800,000, with an additional 200,000 in the organization for girls. The membership is recruited largely from the middle and upper classes with relatively little support from the laboring group. Regionally the chief strength is found outside the South, and it is stronger in the cities than in the rural districts. Specific attention is given to the performance of civic duties, and these form a considerable part of the Scout activities.

A considerable program is also outlined for adults, partly for adult immigrants and partly for adult natives of all descriptions. It is difficult to generalize regarding the widely scattered organizations concerned with this task, for they differ in many important respects in objective and in emphasis. It may be said, however, that they are concerned with the quickening of civic interest and responsibility and, second, with the dissemination of the traditions of the United States and their proper appreciation by the community. In a third, but not universal, class of cases they are concerned with the defense of the

propertied group against all types of "radicalism." In other cases they are anxious regarding the maintenance of what in their judgment constitutes an adequate system of national defense.

How far these organizations reach below the surface of the national life, is a question not easy to answer. In certain classes and certain regions their influence is considerable, but there are wide ranges of area and population upon which they make no impression whatever and wherein their activities are perhaps scarcely known. The occasional tendencies toward militarism, toward intolerance of freedom of speech, and toward ancestor worship, must be considered in any appraisal of their fundamental influence upon the general stream of thought and habit. These particular attitudes have aroused hostility and antagonism in many quarters, and have weakened the influence of these special groups with the community as a whole, however much it may have strengthened them with special classes in the country.

It might be presumed that in France the close-knit texture of national feeling would make special patriotic organizations superfluous. But in fact they are found in great profusion, numerous, colorful, energetic in their efforts to stimulate the civic feeling of the French citizen, and preserve his attachment to the nation. Many of these national societies, however, are not national, but local. Some of them are directly and generally patriotic in purpose, as is the League of Patriots, the Patriotic League of French Women, the French League, and the Federation of National Leagues, which includes a series of other associations.¹ A wide range of societies are built around the military group. These include scores of associations of war veterans—in France only recently combined in a central society. Alongside them are the Remember League, the French Memorial Society, and others of the type of the Michelet Committee, the French Recovery, and the French Hearth. Another group is concerned with the French colonial relations, and this embraces the French Colonial Union, the French Colonial and

¹ See Hayes, *op. cit.*, chap. viii, "National Societies," for full discussion of this point.

Maritime League, and other similar organizations interested in colonial propaganda. An important element in this combination is the French cultural societies, such as the Alliance française, the Legion of Honor, approaching 200,000 members, of whom over 20,000 are foreigners, and even the dignified French Academy with its general guardianship of French culture. Still other forms of association which stir patriotic impulses are the increasingly numerous sport organizations, arising chiefly since the war, primarily athletic in interest, but secondarily a channel for the development of civic interests and feelings.¹ Inevitably one encounters also the Boy Scouts (*Scouts de France*) and with them the Girl Scouts with their uniform emphasis on the development of national sentiment and attachment.

These societies do not have the concentration and drive of patriotic organizations in Russia, Italy, or America, but what they lose in this respect they make up for in artistic variety and smaller group enthusiasm. The Legion of Honor, for example, is an exceedingly impressive and effective organization, while societies like the Remember League, the Society for the Protection of the Unknown Soldier's Shrine under the Arc de Triomphe are full of emotional appeal in artistic form and admirably adapted to the group within which these techniques are operating.

Patriotic organizations are fewer in number in Switzerland than elsewhere, but those existing are important and effective in their operations. The New Helvetic Society is one of the most notable associations for political education anywhere to be found—*pro Helvetica dignitate et securitate*. Concerned with the welfare of the Swiss abroad through its well-known Ausland-Schweizer Kommission, it is also interested in discussion of national problems, and maintains a constant activity in this direction. Originally organized in 1761, it obtained a new lease of life during the late war, when Swiss national integrity seemed to

¹ "What gives our stadium its peculiar character is the rifle range beside the play-field," said the president of the Union of Societies of Physical Education and Preparation for Military Service, in

be threatened, and grave Schweizer met to consider again the ways and means of preserving national unity. The most interesting function of the Society is the encouragement of discussion on important national problems under impartial auspices, and the dissemination of the results throughout the community.¹

Another type of Swiss organization is the Union of Swiss Civic Courses, dating from 1910—a union interested in civic and political discussion in various centers throughout the country, and in the promotion of systematic instruction in civic education. This Verein der schweizerischen Staatsbürgerkurse has twenty seven active units in which lectures and discussions are carried on; and, in addition, a periodical, *Der Staatsbürger*, is published.

Finally come the Boy Scouts with activities similar to those of the same organization in other countries. There is this difference, however, that there is less emphasis on ritualism in the Swiss Scouts, and that the Swiss histories recount the victories of peace as well as war, and are in general somewhat more liberal in their tone than those of other states. For this the sharp local criticism of the Scout organization is doubtless responsible in some measure. During the war the Boy Scouts were given actual work of a semi-military nature, in the interest of the protection of Swiss neutrality.

The Swiss patriotic societies are less active than those of other states, and less feverish in their behavior; but they are supplemented by a considerable variety of other societies mostly of a local nature in which various aspects of Swiss life and character are portrayed, especially in ceremonials and festivals of one sort and another.

The German patriotic organizations have also been numerous both before and since the war.² In the earlier period these societies were interested chiefly in the promotion of specific objects such as a larger navy backed by the Flottenverein, or more commonly in the promotion of German culture, under the in-

¹ These activities are fully described in Brooks, *op. cit.*

² See Kosok, *Civic Training in Germany*.

fluence of the spirit of pan-Germanism. Of this character were the Navy League and the Pan-German Union.

Since the war, however, the nature of the special patriotic organizations has taken on a different color and assumed a quite different purpose. The Steel Helmet on the one hand and the Red Front on the other are typical of opposing points of view, which clash in German political life at every turn of the way. The Steel Helmet represents the views of the extreme nationalists and carries forward a propaganda of German nationalism directed partly against the democrats, and subversive of the old political order, and partly against the Reds who seek to overthrow the old economic order. Some perhaps dream of the restoration of the earlier military-monarchist state and think of these orders as a cloak for such a purpose, but others have in mind the establishment of national dignity and world position. In the same category are the Shock Troops (Sturm-truppen) of the Fascists.

Likewise the democratic organization for the defense of the constitution (the Deutsche Reichsbanner) carries on a series of efforts directed toward the maintenance of the existing political order, and against all its foes whether right or left wing. The virtues of the citizen in the constitutional democratic state are especially emphasized by the proponents of this organization, and a concerted and determined effort is made to train both young and old in the new system. The celebration of Constitution Day is a part of such a program, and other occasions are employed for the same general purpose of stimulating interest in the existing political régime of democracy. The Berlin Institute of Politics (Hochschule für Politik) is a part of the same general program of education in the fundamentals of a liberal state.

On the other hand the Communist party maintains a vigorous attack upon the existing institutions both economic and political and especially, through the organization known as the Red Front, strives to educate the various classes of the community in the doctrines appropriate to a new order. Meetings, demonstrations, distribution of literature, are carried out upon a con-

siderable scale for the purpose of spreading the new type of political and economic education. To the effectiveness of this fiery movement among the workers there is much testimony, but on the whole the trades' unions and the social democrats have resisted these attacks with propaganda of their own. The German imitation of the Russian system has not been, however, without some success in penetrating the ranks of the opposition.

Most of these groups agree, it will be observed, in the importance of the basic civic qualities, and differ only with respect to the particular order under which these qualities may develop or which they may best serve. They undertake to develop within the circle of the political a special set of virtues especially adapted to a monarchy or a republican or a communistic order, but they are careful not to go against the current of political order and habit. It is true that their unlawful conduct and their unstinted denunciation of those in authority may have the effect of arousing antagonism or indifference to the political order, but this is an indirect and collateral result and not the chief issue either in purpose or effect. In the main all German groups agree upon the basic importance of maintaining *Ordnung*. Whatever else the dominant pattern of political organization may be it must have the basic note of order and justice. The idea of the political is so deeply imbedded in the German tradition that the artificial efforts to strengthen the habit are attributable to the desire to develop a shade of civic attitude which may be colored right or left or center as the case may be.

In Group II there are few special organizations designed for the main purpose of the promotion of civic training in the community. In Austria-Hungary there was no attempt made to set up such a type of machinery on an imperial scale. Organizations with this type of specific interest were found among the Hungarians, the Czechs, the Germans, disguised under some ethnic or cultural purpose, but of specific organizations of the type above described there were none. The Sokols might and did at times cover plans for fostering allegiance to a new Czech

state, and, likewise, the cultural societies among the Hungarians who were ever active.

England has not thus far felt quite the same need of special patriotic organizations for the inculcation of national sentiment. The political parties maintain elaborately organized and effectively conducted systems of party education, and have even set up special schools of party training to which partisans may and do resort. These party schools are in effect agencies of political education, but this is couched in terms of party rather than general training. Conservative, Liberal, and Labor schools and educational agencies carry on what is substantially a form of political education, all the more effective because of its indirectness. All parties agree upon the supremacy of Britain, upon the habits and attitudes necessary to that end, and unite in the celebration of the appropriate events and personalities in Britain's national life.

The Boy Scout movement, however, originated in England and still has wide vogue there.¹ This is primarily a character-building organization, and its political purposes are only incidental to its larger and chief end. The same comment may rightly be made upon the Girl Scout movement. The use of the Scout movement in other countries in a modified form, as in Russia and Italy, marks a deviation from the original plan and purpose of the Scout founders, but illustrates clearly the large possibilities in a system which gives access to the habit-forming period of plastic youth. In England as in other countries the Scout movement has been chiefly recruited from the well-to-do and the middle class, without much reach into the laboring group, encountering in fact criticism in this quarter. Other types of organizations for patriotic purposes are those with an imperial purpose such as the Overseas League, the League of the Empire, the Royal Colonial Institute, all of which carry on a form of imperialistic propaganda. Of a local character are the four national societies for the preservation of places of civic importance. The Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or

¹ Sir Robert Baden-Powell, *Scouting for Boys*.

Natural Beauty, the Commons and Footpaths Preservation Society, and the Scapa Society, to say nothing of scores of local societies and groups for similar purposes. Women have organized the Women's Guild of Empire and the British Women's Patriotic League, interested in various forms of political activity from the Conservative point of view.

Through these and other organizations the nationalistic civic education constantly goes on, reinforcing the other elements in the process of civic cohesion.

In general, we may conclude that the special forms of patriotic organizations are likely to be most strongly developed in the newer types of political orders, and where, consequently, defense is most urgently required, as in Russia and Italy notably, or in the new Germany. Under modern conditions they are likely to be linked up with the protection of a special form of economic order, such as Communism in Russia or Fascism in Italy, where it is evident that the economic-political system feels the need of some special support for its maintenance.

In the older states the protection of the civic process is conducted in less obvious and more subtle ways, of which the English is the most remarkable, but, even in France and the United States, there are conspicuous developments of special reinforcing societies, busy with the task of arousing patriotic sentiments; and, with increasing facility in mass education and advertising, it seems likely that these methods will be widely spread in the near future.

So far as these societies are directed at the youth of different states, they meet severe competition, partly from the economic class groups which endeavor to capture their own youth, partly from the religious associations which drive in the same direction of control over the habit-forming period, and partly and much more so from the formal schooling system which tends to take over all the transmissible skills and incorporate them in its own close-knit system of general instruction. The struggle between Catholics and Facists for the control of the youth movement in Italy is an interesting example of the competition which goes on everywhere. The organization of socialist and communist sport

movements in Germany is another case of a class struggle for the youth. In fact, the growth of religious sporting movements everywhere shows the trend of the times, and, particularly, the recognition of the importance of this phase of national life. But it would appear that the modern school system is likely to emerge victor in this unequal contest if its aggressive tendencies continue to project themselves in the life of the next generation as they have in the last.

As in other forms of civic education, the special patriotic organizations are strongest when their function is to bridge over a gap, not too great, in the social forces of the community. If they encounter strong divisive factors of religion, race, region, economic interest, then these techniques tend to be taken over by these elements themselves; and instead of supporting the state, they may become the chief foci of infection and resistance. They are strongest when they are directed at civic indifference and sloth, and weakest when they must make headway against strongly organized and separatist social groups or attitudes. When they are too frantic or vociferous, one may suspect that their cause is none too strong, or that some great crisis is in process in the basic life of the political community.

CHAPTER V

COMPARISON OF TECHNIQUES OF CIVIC TRAINING—*Continued*

TRADITIONS

The development of civic interest and attachment by means of the traditions of the group is one of the oldest and best-established instrumentalities of survival. The process is found in dramatic form among the most primitive tribes in the earliest stages of civilization. The early initiations are admirable illustrations of the value and power of these drastic methods of transmitting the tribal tradition in impressive form.¹ The youth who passed through one of these arduous tests could not fail to be impressed with the importance of what the fathers had to teach him in regard to social living. If his memory failed him, the physical scars of his initiation might serve to remind him of the place of tribal tradition in the life of his group.

On a higher level of civilization, much the same method is pursued in passing on the group tradition to the succeeding generation as a part of its heritage. Fastings and fears, and physical hardships and acute anguish of body and of mind are no longer made a part of the ceremony, but substitutes of equivalent value have been found which serve the same basic purpose of transmitting the experience of the race or group in condensed form to those who follow.

The underlying design is of course to set up a group of the living, the dead, and those who are yet unborn, a group of which the individual finds himself a part and of which he is in fact glad to count himself a member, and by virtue of that fact an individual of no mean importance in the world. All the great group victories he shares in; all the great men are his companions in the bonds of the group; all its sorrows are by construction his; all its hopes and dreams, realized and thwarted alike,

¹ See Weber, *The Duk-Duks*.

are his. And thus he becomes although of humble status a great man, a member of a great group; and his humble life is thus tinged with a glory it might not otherwise ever hope to achieve. He is lifted beyond and above himself into higher worlds where he walks with all his great ancestors, one of an illustrious group whose blood is in his veins and whose domain and reputation he proudly bears.

Implicit in this mass of hero worship are certain maxims, sayings, attitudes, ways of doing things, that are peculiar to the special group, and that may determine courses of conduct in critical situations. These are the things that every Russian or German or Italian knows, and that every Russian or German or Italian or American will or will not do in various types of situations. In a changing world these sayings are interpreted by the wise men of every present-day group and made to fit into a course of conduct, likely to be favorable to those who enjoy power and prestige at the given moment. In this lies their greatest value as parts of the mores of the time and of the general system of social and political control. They place in the vested authorities the power to interpret tradition in the name of tradition, and to assume social direction in the name of the historic past. To find a rule and also find someone to interpret it authentically: that is the function of tradition and one which it has often performed.

The cult of the traditional then plays an important part in systems of civic training, sometimes more so and sometimes less so, but always an important part. It is of course intimately related to the techniques of symbolism, language and literature, love of locality, which will be considered in the following pages. For the moment attention may be fixed upon the general pattern of traditionalism upon which the other aids are based.

France and England as the oldest of these states enjoy the largest measure of historical tradition, although the line has been interrupted in modern times in France. On the other hand, in Russia, Italy, and Germany, the revolutionary movement has been so recent as to minimize the influence of the past and force a concentration upon the present. Likewise in the United

States the rapidly changing conditions have made it less easy to dwell upon the past and more simple to meet the problems of the present day, although this has not been so characteristic of the political as of the social and economic worlds, even here. In Austria-Hungary traditions were highly developed, but they were more likely to be the traditions of Hungary or Bohemia than the traditions of the larger empire, and hence were as likely to be divisive as unifying. It is a fallacy to conclude that all traditions are helpful to the central group. On the contrary, they may be disruptive in the extreme, and it is constantly the task of the central power or the centrifugal, as the case may be, to destroy old and build up new lines of acceptable and useful tradition.

We may inquire then more closely into the precise character of the traditions with survival value, and into the methods by which they are sifted out for the preservation of the desirable and the elimination of the useless. Here it is evident that all depends upon the axis of political reference, the point of view from which utility or disutility is judged. To a state in process of centralization like Germany or the United States in the mid-century, localistic traditions are a menace to the attainment of the national objective. But from the point of view of a society in process of decentralization, as in the case of the Holy Roman Empire, the centralistic traditions are undesirable and useless, while those of the local unit are pre-eminently satisfactory. But, when the country, state, or nation is under way, the localism of the city or other area becomes again antagonistic to the unification of the central power. Hence it is evident that the problem of selecting traditions is one of prime importance in the life of the state.

Ethnic and cultural traditions under some circumstances are of very great value in building up civic morale, but only in cases where they run with the political order. Otherwise they may contain the seeds of destruction for the state, and every effort will be made to diminish their importance and to provide substitutes for them. Thus the German tradition is immensely useful in the consolidation of modern Germany, but divisive in

Austria-Hungary. The Polish tradition, ethnic and cultural, is of the very greatest value for modern Poland but was undesirable in parts of Prussia under German rule, and strenuous efforts were made to suppress it. In one state, the religious tradition, whatever its form, may be very useful, but in another it may prevent the formation of a unified pattern of political behavior.

It cannot be assumed then that all traditions are carefully handed down, but chiefly those having a specific value in the given situation and for the given purpose; and especially in a rapidly changing society the relative value of traditions will be found to shift with greater ease than in more nearly static conditions. The question may be asked then, Who selects the traditions to be transmitted, and what is their content? What traditions will best serve the ends of the English state? What type of traditions will be most advantageous to the German or the Soviet state? What part of the group experience should be systematically transmitted to the next generation by the American nation? In all these cases, what should be emphasized, what should be glossed over, what should be suppressed? What heroes, what events, what traits, are to be held up, as models for the young, and as symbols for the adult? What fundamentals are pre-eminently desirable and what special differentials are valuable for the special group, French, English, or otherwise?

The answer to these questions has never been seriously undertaken, and what actually happens is a somewhat blind process of selection of historical pictures which in a general way are presumed to represent the interests of the group, that is, best for the given situation in which the political group finds itself. It is assumed that pictures of great men, of important events, of striking successes, of great sacrifice and achievement, will tend to develop interest in and attachment to the political group. The relative value of competing pictures is not very definitely appraised. In borderline cases of rival traditions, what will determine whether one decides to throw in his lot with Germany or Belgium? Or to become an American or an Italian? Or to become a Pole or a Lithuanian? Or to become a partisan of the

central nation or of the local state as in Germany and the United States in their bitter separatist struggles? How should we go about it to convince a group of the dubious, using for the moment the agency of the traditional alone?

To one who has analyzed closely the processes actually pursued in typical states, it is plain that no systematic procedure has been followed, but that the transmission of tradition is a somewhat groping selection of what in a general way is presumed to be useful in shaping habits of political cohesion. In more recent times there are of course striking evidences of an opposite policy of critical analysis of traditions, notably in the case of the experiment made by the Soviets. But, broadly speaking, the traditional policy has itself been traditional, handed down and accepted without very careful analysis. The advent of universal education and of democracy are forcing the issue more insistently than ever before, but even now the criteria of judgment are still unshaped and unscientific.¹

Nor can there be any clear answer to the question, Who selects the traditions for transmission? This also is a blind process, in which co-operation and concurrence are reached by clumsy efforts at adjustment. And, of course, complete adjustment is never reached, for there are constant struggles for the possession of the tradition-transmitting power. With the development of the educational system and of special patriotic organizations, the controversy may readily become more acute in the future than it has been in the past. Inevitably as various groups in the community stand to win or lose by emphasis on this or that tradition which may be for the moment useful for their purposes, they will endeavor to swing the weight of influence in their direction. The unending power struggles for the domination of the whole group and its symbols make such a situation a constantly recurring fact in the life of any growing and changing state.

The tradition-transmitting process must always be considered, further, in the light of the competitive relation with all

¹ A constructive policy of civic training will be discussed in the closing chapters of this volume.

other tradition-transmitting groups. While the political community is building its structure, the ecclesiastical group is also active; the ethnic groups are unceasing in their efforts; the economic and cultural groups are likewise busily engaged in shaping a type of group interest and cohesion of their own. With all of these the state must make a constant series of adjustments and readjustments often of the most delicate nature. While political tradition may glorify a military hero, the church may exalt a saintly man of piety; while the state may present the great qualities of a parliamentarian, the ethnic group may develop competing heroes in the literary or artistic field; and the deeds of great business and labor leaders and the triumphs of science offer many interesting pictures attractive to the average man. When all of the traditions are blended into one composite, central, national picture, the situation is relatively easy, and this is the goal toward which the modern, nationalistic politician, consciously or unconsciously, strives. But in the nature of the case it is not easily attained or held, and, indeed, the characteristic quality of the political is the task of constant reorganization and readaptation of these elements for the purpose of maintaining a short-time equilibrium in social life which will permit many forms of social activity with relatively little interruption.

With reference to particular states of the group here considered, there are wide divergencies respecting the uses of tradition for the purpose of civic training. It may be said at the outset that the usual basis for tradition has been the fortunes of the personal holders of hereditary political power. The kings and queens and royal families and the elaborate ceremonies of court offered a dramatic and popular setting in which to stage the group memories. But in all of the eight countries under discussion, this seat of power has been changed and the hereditary place-holders retain a modicum of their former authority. Only in England and Italy are there still rulers by virtue of birth, although the nobility yet retains influence in France and Germany. Thus the personal tradition upon which civic education was hung for centuries has been shattered and substitutes must be

found in more modern situations. Italy cannot go very far back with its royal tradition, only to 1870, and England finds the line of authority interrupted by the revolutionary events of the seventeenth century.

Russia has thrown tradition to the winds, both in the political, the economic, and the religious circles of human life, and has begun the task *de novo* of reconstructing a new type of Marx-Lenin proletarian tradition. The new cult centers around the history of the workers' movement in Russia and in other lands, and endeavors to build up a tradition upon which the coming generation may stand. Marx and Lenin are its central figures; and the numerous revolutionary movements, all of which are pictured in the remarkable Museum of Revolution in Moscow, supply the historic background. The tradition of the nobility, of the large landowner, of the bourgeois middle class, are emphatically rejected, and the new proletarian doctrine with its personalities, and its accounts of popular movements, is the material out of which a new form of tradition is being constructed. It will be observed that, while the past is nominally discarded, it returns in the reliance placed upon the historical development of the revolutionary movement, sometimes liberal in nature and sometimes more distinctly communist in character. An impressive Soviet song, "They Died for Us," sums up the effort to bring together the historic experiences of the numerous groups of revolutionaries—agrarian, democratic, communist—who from time to time have rebelled against the old régime, during the past two hundred years.

The Fascist movement in Italy also represents an effort to build up a new tradition, but without so general a break with the past as in Russia. The Fascists endeavor to utilize the Roman imperial tradition on its cultural and political sides, and to make full use of the nineteenth-century nationalistic phases of their history. There is a place for the Caesars and for Dante, and Machiavelli, and for Mazzini and Cavour. The rôle of liberalism and modern democracy are, however, relegated to oblivion, although liberal names are retained. Democracy is no longer identified with the Italian movement as in the days of

Mazzini when nationalism and liberalism were almost synonymous. Nor is the monarchical tradition centering around the House of Savoy longer pre-eminent in the picture of current Italy. Nor does the ecclesiastical tradition of Italy play any important part in the conception of the new Italy of which the Fascist dreams. There is a distinct effort to develop a moral quality in the new citizenship, but not a traditional religious quality, for obviously this would operate to the advantage of the rival capital at Rome. In the main, then, we find a recurrence to the imperial traditions of Rome, emphasized in the building of the new tradition, with Mussolini as the worthy successor of the earlier Caesars, adding possibly to their prestige from the rich materials of modern times. On the other hand, there is the construction of the new cult of Italian youth, glorified in Giovanezza. It resounds from one end of the state to the other. For purposes of rationalization, a new ideology of the philosophy of the Fascist state is developed, and will serve its purpose in the new political edifice.

Germany, likewise, has been faced with a serious problem of tradition-reconstruction. Since the revolution, which traditions shall be preserved and which shall be discarded to form the new fabric? The German nationalist victory dates only from 1870, like the Italian, and the ideals of German unity are embodied in the new synthesis of citizenship. The monarchist tradition is abandoned, however, officially if not unanimously, formally at any rate for the moment; and the cult of liberalism is revived. Historically, nationalism and liberalism had gone together in Germany as in Italy. Germany now revives the liberal theory and recombines it with the nationalist, while Italy celebrates the divorce of nationalism and democracy. The economic, religious, and cultural traditions present problems in the formation of the German pattern, but there are no serious difficulties, relatively speaking, with the ethnic basis of the state. The historic figure of Frederick the Great and later that of Bismarck are still esteemed and still employed. For the moment the great military hero of the war, Von Hindenburg, stands out as the central political personality in the state and bearer both

of old and of new traditions. The divisive traditions of the extreme right and of the extreme left present a problem for statesmen, more difficult perhaps than is the usual lot of the statemaking.¹

The hereditary nobility no longer figures as the central fact in allegiance, or the idea of personal loyalty to the emperor, but the Reich has been substituted, and the somewhat more abstract idea of devotion to the German culture and German political unit. The German *Staat* has for a long time enjoyed prestige and position greater than is ordinarily accorded to the political society and consequently the transition is not as difficult a task as it might be under other circumstances. With their keen interest in the analytical, the Germans are also groping toward an understanding of the essential factors in citizenship, and are likely to make progress in this direction, and, if progress, application of it through the educational system.

Switzerland and the United States are two types of states, with a common democratic basis of long standing. In neither has there been emphasis upon the traditional figures arising from the groups of those holding hereditary political power. In both, the nationalistic and the democratic movements have developed together. In wealth of historic tradition, however, Switzerland is richer, and these resources have been freely employed in the construction of the federal state. Switzerland has had the unusual task of bringing together a political tradition which should not antagonize that of two different confessions, or of three different races, or of many different geographical sections, each with a distinct local consciousness and interest of its own. In this respect tradition has not infrequently proved disrupting instead of unifying. In this situation, however, the geographical isolation of the country and the common struggles against the common foe have served the purpose of providing a fund of common memories of success and failure. By an interesting process of absorption, the local traditions have been woven into a general tradition of the Swiss, which is now firmly

¹ The shift in instructional emphasis from the older monarchical tradition to the new is interestingly described by Kosok, *Germany*.

established. What was once local and anti-national is now proudly hailed as Swiss.

An event like the recent war shook the Swiss structure to its foundations, but the storm passed and Switzerland remained with perhaps a higher form of national consciousness and interest than ever before. Some say that the war saved the political life of Switzerland.

How to persuade a French Swiss that he should not align himself with France or a German with Germany or an Italian with Italy, has been a task for the higher statesmanship. Part of the explanation is found in the fact that ethnic and religious lines do not always coincide. Thus the Frenchman may be a Protestant who does not wish to go into Catholic France; or the German may be a Protestant who does not wish to go with Catholic South Germany. In this way the land of Switzerland became the beneficiary of the clashes of interest between race and religion, and produced a unique political combination.¹

In the United States tradition plays a relatively small rôle in social and economic life and organization. The newness of the country, the tides of immigration, the swift rush for the development of a new continent, the rapid growth in population and wealth, the urban concentration, and the new forms of industrial organization have all been unfavorable to the growth of deep-seated social traditions. The Americans have typically been pathfinders and pioneers rather than stabilizers of established ways. America inherited the legal, political and social traditions of the English, but these were soon modified in important particulars, both with reference to monarchy and nobility, and with reference to social aristocracy which survived in England but did not continue in America. America itself passed through many revolutions in the nineteenth century: the democratic revolution in political control under Jackson; the regional revolution in the Civil War; the business revolution in the formation of new units of production and business organization.

¹ Very interesting analysis of the formation of the concept of Genevese and Swiss is given by Piaget in his *Le jugement et raisonnement chez l'enfant*. See also Brooks' suggestive analysis of the whole situation.

The traditional, however, played a very important part in the civic training of the state. By an interesting type of compensation, the changing world of social and economic forces was offset in many cases by an unchanging political world, in which the truth politically was embodied in a closed constitution, subject to interpretation but not to material change. But this school of interpretation while general was by no means exclusive, and there were many other views and opinions of a more liberal character.

The emphasis on the traditional was especially significant in connection with the Americanization movements. The great tides of immigration following the Civil War and, especially, in the quarter of a century preceding the World War, brought about a considerable degree of ethnic heterogeneity in the United States, and many efforts were made to accelerate the process of assimilation of the newcomers to the American ways of life and, especially, of course, ways of government. In the course of the endeavor, great emphasis was placed upon the traditions, the political traditions of America. Its history and heroes were presented on every possible occasion with a view of impressing the specifically American upon the aliens. The culmination of this movement came in the legal restriction of immigration in the years following the World War under the joint influence of the organized labor group, of nationalistic sentiment, and elements among the employers who feared the radicalism of the foreigner.

Following this movement there ensued a long campaign for the purpose of emphasizing the position of American traditions in public life. Laws were enacted providing for the protection of national heroes against defamation, and, in other ways, an elaborate propaganda of tradition was carried on. The value of tradition was also utilized by certain industrial interests who wished to avoid any serious or radical change in their public status, and saw in a static legal system developed under earlier conditions a defense of their economic position. In this way a conservative economic attitude was intrenched in a conservative political position, and tradition and prosperity were linked

together. The traditional cult of liberty became, for example, a barrier against interference with liberty of competition, as against public regulation of some types of undesirable competition.¹

On the whole, however, the changing situation in America made the effective employment of traditions a relatively difficult task, notwithstanding the elaborate apparatus of traditionalizing. Superior economic opportunity and freedom from the burdens of militarism and autocracy were stronger lures and more powerful means of cohesion than the preaching of the earlier practices of the Fathers.

Furthermore, the competition with other traditional systems was never severe. The new ethnic groups were not in a position to counter-attack the American and made no effort to do so. The real danger was that the desirable features of those systems would be destroyed along with the others, and that nothing of other cultural values would survive the assimilating process, so sweeping was its rush. Nor was the rivalry of religious loyalties and traditions a serious matter, for the nation was predominantly Protestant, and the Catholic and Jewish elements fitted readily into the national life without serious attempt to arouse antagonism or with few specific points of controversy. Nor was there competition again from the traditions of economic groups with patterns of their own to push forward. The farmer was not the peasant of the old world; the labor group was imperfectly organized, and business was in too rapid a state of transition to grow traditions easily.

French tradition is of a peculiar type, owing to the frequent changes in the form of government during the last century and a half. France can no longer rely upon the tradition of monarchy or of the hereditary nobility. Some of the old titles survive and there are still pretenders to the throne, but they are not controlling factors in the life of modern France. As in the case of Germany, the French tradition reaches back through forms of government and appropriates whatever is useful in the history of the nation. The great kings and the great generals

¹ See my *American Political Ideas*, chap. xi-xii.

under other political orders still belong to France and effective use is made of them in the molding of modern interests and allegiance to the French political community. Since the downfall of feudalism in the sixteenth century the French centralized state has had no serious rival for loyalty and affection on the part of the community. Ethnic solidarity has reinforced the French tradition, and the class divisions on economic lines have not been sharp enough to jeopardize allegiance to the nation, in most instances. It may be recalled, however, that France is the home of scientific anarchy as developed by Proudhon, and of syndicalism as expounded by Sorel and a multitude of others. The religious tradition has clashed with the political upon more than one notable occasion, but in a crisis the Frenchman is more likely to be a statesman than a churchman.

In a usual manner the French have been able to utilize the trappings of tradition for the development of a habit of political compliance and obedience. In a higher degree than any other state except perhaps Britain they have been able to utilize their past for the preservation of the solidarity of the present. An examination of the content of the French textbooks which constitute the basis of civic instruction shows the exclusive emphasis on the history of France, with the inevitable tendency toward the disproportionate emphasis on the position of the French republic among the states of the world. France and its glorious past occupy the center of the stage, as in perhaps no other system. Over three centuries of national existence and national achievement are drawn upon to illustrate the value and significance of French political existence and the importance of preserving and perpetuating it in the life of each new generation.

Of all the countries here considered, England is in the best position to make use of political tradition in the development of political morale. The English revolutions are now two centuries and a half in the background, and the continuity of government since then has been nominally unbroken, however many quiet revolutions in industry or society may have occurred since then. The mechanism of royalty and hereditary nobility still operates, suffering, to be sure, diminution of authority, creaking a little

perhaps, but still retaining that type of social prestige which is so well adapted as a setting for the glorification of the traditional. The gradual retreat of the hereditary group and of the landed aristocracy before the rising industrialists and the laborites has been well screened by the institutional contrivances which lose their nominal force but retain some of their inner meaning. Furthermore England has been governed and in fact still is ruled by a form of social aristocracy, in which wealth and hereditary tradition are skilfully intermingled. Out of social life there emerges the concept of the English gentleman as the arbiter of behavior in every walk of life. This mold supplies the form upon which tradition may be shaped, and, likewise, the personnel by whom it may be interpreted.

The rules of political behavior are consequently evolved from this essentially traditional basis, consisting of historic precedents with such modifications as may be authentically interpolated from time to time. The rich political life of England and the development of its law, its parliamentary institutions and its national policies, afford abundant material for illustration and reinforcement of the maxims that constitute the essence of English political prudence. Wars, generals, admirals, political leaders, judges, kings, queens, princes, national crises, doubts, defeats, and triumphs are at hand for the purpose of instruction of the rising generation and the edification of the adults.

The rapid expansion of England to its present imperial dimensions, and the revolutionary shifts in power within England itself have prevented the ossification of doctrine, and have necessitated the maintenance of a type of political flexibility, enabling the statesmen supported by the public to deal with shifting situations. Underlying this there must be a form of political sophistication in which doctrine plays a secondary rôle and a type of action occupies the prime position. For this purpose the English traditional system has been an admirable background, always bearing in mind that the traditional is more apparent than real, and that underlying its traditional form there is a vigorous movement constantly in progress. The result has been an unusual combination of the modern and the traditional

form of action, mystifying to many, and by others accounted as hypocrisy or sometimes as merely muddling through. Bagehot aptly characterized the British system years ago as essentially a process of "illogical moderation." The best traditions are those that do not interfere with present needs and policies.

At no time has the British system been more dramatically developed than in the present theory and practice of the British Commonwealth of Free Nations, unified under the benevolent auspices of the British Crown, jointly held. For legalistic purposes the ancient Crown, under this interpretation of joint ownership by the organic members of the Union, becomes something of a myth, but for practical purposes it becomes an important symbol of imperial unity, otherwise difficult to construct and maintain. This is indeed a triumph of untraditional traditionalism.

Britain has been obliged, furthermore, to meet the severe competition of conflicting traditional systems. At home the Irish ethnic tradition, reinforced by religious differences, has presented a problem of the first magnitude, and across the seas the ethnic differences in India, South Africa, Egypt, reinforced by religious traditions of a different order and by territorial isolation, have compelled the traditionalists to defend their domain in combats where failure meant destruction to the political group or at least to its ambitions for expansion and advance. Within England, however, the church tradition of the Anglicans has been a powerful support to the position of the political groupings, and the non-Anglicans have also aided the political pattern of action. The persistent alliance of Catholicism with Irish separatism tended to weaken the more general Catholic position in the empire and to remove it from the field of active competition, a situation which may be somewhat altered by the independent position of Ireland under the new constitutional arrangements.

The active support of England in the late war is, however, a convincing proof of the skill with which the traditional British system had impressed the outlying territories in widely scattered parts of the world with its superiority and tenacity. Not

only was the territorial isolation of the Canadian and the Australian overcome, but also the ethnic-religious incompatibilities of the Indian and the South African and a long series of other minor groups scattered all over the seas. India indeed affords an interesting example of the triumph of the political tradition over competing religious traditions of Moslem and Buddhist, embraced by persons of a widely different ethnic stock. The symbolisms and other methods by which these British traditions have been transmitted and impressed upon various diverse groups will be further considered in succeeding passages of this volume.

Finally, in Austria-Hungary, we encounter an example of the use of tradition, but in unskilful hands. The Austrian rulers unquestionably exerted what influence they could, through the instrumentality of tradition, to produce and preserve a type of civic interest in and enthusiasm for the empire. They were able to center this effort around the monarchy and the system of hereditary nobility, and to strengthen their appeal by the court life of Vienna, one of the most interesting centers in Europe. Unquestionably the glamor of the court exerted its influence upon the entire empire and especially upon the provincial lords and commons who were from time to time drawn into its vortex.

It was brilliantly said of the Austro-Hungarian situation: "Elsewhere the descendant has an easy task in entering into the heritage of the fathers because it contains a single will and a uniform sense. In us, however, shout a hundred voices of the past, the struggle of the fathers is not settled, each must decide it anew, each must choose among his fathers, each must pass through the entire past again."¹

The tradition was not a moderate one, however, and was shaped clearly in terms of *ancien régime* to which the empire was dedicated. It was essentially a dynastic tradition rather than a popular one, a futile effort to rally a central loyalty around the persons of the royal house. The history of Austria was full of glorious episodes, but also of cruelties and repressions within the

¹ Quoted from Hermann Bahr by Jászi, *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 180.

bounds of local Austria as well as without; and in the later period of the empire the tradition was one of loss and decline rather than of victory and prestige. It is also clear that the imperial authorities were never fully aware of the value of organized tradition as a factor in the political life of their group, but relied more frequently upon agencies of diplomacy, force, and brutal repression as means of obtaining general consent and compliance.

Austria proved incapable of dealing with the counter-traditions by which it was enveloped and assailed upon every side. The ethnic traditions of the Czechs, the Magyars, and the Germans were disruptive in the extreme, and an ever present menace to the life of the imperial state. They appeared to contain more elements of life and vigor than those of the larger unit. The religious tradition of the Catholic supported that of the state, but, on the other hand, there were bitter survivals of Protestant annihilation in Bohemia, still lingering and intensely hostile to the Catholic hegemony. The landowners' tradition was friendly to that of the empire, but at times allied itself with the local ethnic elements, as in Hungary, and preferred separatism to the central control of the overlords in Vienna.

The socialist tradition alone cut across the lines of ethnic and geographical separatism, but this unifying tendency was opposed by the empire, and extraordinary methods pursued from time to time in the hope of total repression, a situation which only intensified the antagonism to the central political group in power. Where race, religion, and geography coincided as in Bohemia, there appeared a complex of anti-imperialism of the most powerful kind, and one which the resources of the imperial leaders were unable to combat successfully.

The use of tradition in Austria is, therefore, a striking example of great difficulties, which were not overcome by the central political group. Inflexibility and lack of imagination characterized a system which eventually collapsed under its own weight, in a situation where more adept management might have produced quite different results.¹ This also constitutes a

¹ See Jászi, *ibid.*, Part VII.

brilliant example of the competitive struggle of traditions which every governing group must be able sooner or later to resolve in some way or other. We are not here concerned with speculation on the question whether the central Imperialists might have done what they did not do, but with the importance of an incident in the general use of traditions as molders of civic interest and generators of civic allegiance.

SYMBOLISM

In all states there is found a cult of group coherence, expressed in a wide variety of ceremonials and symbolisms.¹ These are found in early stages of primitive life, and they appear in the highest forms of civilized association. They are by no means peculiar to the political type, but characterize the life-process of all groups, economic, religious, cultural, and otherwise. Impressive situations, either historical or hoped for, are presented in a desirable light, with life, warmth, and color; and vigor and vitality are developed in the otherwise abstract sentiment of group unity. Flags, music, festivals and holidays, initiations, coronations, funerals, weddings and christenings, demonstrations, monuments, buildings and public ways, all play their part in the ritualism which envelops social life in a network of observances, intimately associated with tension moments in the lives of great masses of individuals. When an old group goes under, its symbolisms often survive its life, as the Roman eagle still stands as a symbol of power; and when a new society emerges it proceeds with all possible dispatch to develop symbols of its own.

Powerful devices have been produced by all groups. Mighty among them are the Cross and the Crown, historic symbols of church and state, sainthood and knighthood with their ceremonial background. Flags have been from time immemorial the emblems of cohesive groups, especially the political; while music has preserved for the group symbolic unity in peace and war. Holidays and festivals serve the purposes of the group or cult,

¹ See Whitehead on *Symbolism*; Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism*; Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, chap. vi, "The Play of Ideas;" Michels, *Patriotismus*.

impressing their symbolism deep on the participants. If the state has the tremendous and savage symbolism of human conflict expressed in war, the church has the symbols of birth, wedding, death. If the state has the prison and the scaffold, the church has the excommunication, confession, penance, the pains of hell, and the dreams of heaven. Kings and princes, rival saints, archangels and kings of kings, cardinals and bishops and popes, compete with generals, statesmen, emperors, with great savants, great artists of every race, region, and religion.

Which of these groups has the most impressive flags? Which of them has captured the most appealing songs and poems? Which of them the larger and more impressive array of holidays and festivals? In the service of which is found the most impressive and majestic architecture? Which of them stages the most colorful demonstrations and mass movements? Which has taken the nomenclature of streets and ways most completely under its control? To answer these it would be necessary to carry through a long series of studies in political symbolism, and in the end, perhaps, there would remain no impartial judge competent to render a decision. Each group has its own symbolisms, which, shot through and through as they are with experience and emotion, seem the dearest, and surely are the most powerful in their appeal. The important point is that the students consider these symbolisms in the light of their relation to groups and situations with which they are inseparably allied, and consider further the relation of these various symbolisms, one to the other. For life lies in their totality rather than in their separate and individual treatment. It is when all these symbols are adjusted and reinforce each other that the complex appears in its most vivid light.

In all of these states there is found a high development of the use of symbolic devices, and it is difficult to classify them in any useful way. It may be said, however, that the political symbolisms of the United States and of Switzerland are perhaps less highly developed than in some of the other states where the hereditary tradition is older and more closely associated with the trappings of the hereditary nobility. But even in these

countries there are impressive and colorful moments in the national life, and it has been amply shown that the republican background may develop vivid representations as well as the royal. In fact, the revolutionary movements in the various lands have supplied more color than almost any other life-situation in recent times.

Among the more conspicuous of the holidays or festivals are the royal birthdays where royalty still survives, and of statesmen in other cases. Days commemorative of civic crises are also universal—the Fourteenth of July in France, the Fourth of July in America, Constitution Day in Germany, May Day and Revolution Day in Russia, the Anniversary of the March on Rome (October 28), the *Leva Fascista* ("militia day"), Switzerland's Federal Day. There are many other local days observed in various countries, such as the birthday of Rome and other municipalities, and the natal days of other political units of less than national significance. And similarly local heroes are locally celebrated on a smaller scale.

In the domain of music the political symbol is highly developed. It is impossible to undertake any comparison in a field where judgments differ so widely, but certainly all would agree on the vitality of the French "Marseillaise," the Russian "Internationale," the Italian "Giovanezza," which have gone round the world. The impressive "Deutschland ueber alles," the "Star Spangled Banner," and "God Save the King," are surcharged with symbolic significance not only in their own territories, but on a wider field. The songs of Switzerland and Austria-Hungary each had a value locally, but are less generally familiar. It may be said that these are all fighting music, the outgrowth of military situations, and in a sense this is true. Many of them embody a certain idealism, however, in addition to the ferocity of a fighting song, and are forward-looking as well as backward-looking in their appeal. This is notably true of the "Internationale," while the spirit of the "Marseillaise" is that of emancipation and the downfall of tyranny.

The real value of these musical symbolisms, however, is in their appeal to a rich body of associations, called up in the in-

dividual out of his own experience and those around him. They have a distinct survival value, in that they summon from the depths of ancestral experience the group coherence and tenacity without which it cannot maintain its independent existence. Their real tests come when the song of one group impinges upon the song of another—the local upon the national, or the religious group song upon the political, or the ethnic upon either. Which will stir the heart most deeply in the borderline cases, the musical appeal of the church, or the patriotic song of the state, or the haunting melody of the race, or the song of the family, or the war cry of the class? In many a person this test is made, searching some of the deepest emotions of his nature. But, of course, the final decision is affected by many other factors than the rhythmic alone; although the musical may be one and in a number of marginal cases may be the decisive one.

Undoubtedly the most condensed symbol of political unity is the flag, which from centuries back has been a token of the group, and most commonly, although not exclusively, of the political community. There are of course ecclesiastical flags and cultural group flags and economic class flags and all manner of social group flags. By common consent the political flag is the most distinctive and its connotations most clearly understood. The flag is primarily a military symbol, serving its main purpose in times of battle as a means of identification in the earlier times and still to some extent. One of the first tasks of a revolutionary political order is to devise a new flag to wave as the symbol of the new régime, showing its colors in the literal sense of the term. The cult of the flag is maintained, however, in times of peace as well as war, and other values are read into it. In the United States the flag ritual has been especially developed in the period following the World War. In Germany the rivalry of the flags of the empire, the republic, and the Red flag led to many a bloody struggle of competing crowds. On Constitution Day, 1926, I observed a number of establishments flying the Prussian flag, to avoid entangling alliances.

The symbolism of the state uniform is also of importance in an appraisal of these appeals to color and form as supports of

civic tradition. Originally the uniform was cultivated by the hereditary group for distinctive purposes. The decline of class distinctions, however, and the disappearance of the nobility as a separate order has very greatly reduced the importance of the differentiating meaning of the state livery. Only in the army does the wearing of the uniform survive in its original value, and here it is, of course, of very practical importance. Red, blue, gray, green, and their variations are intimately associated with the military fortunes of the states, and the color scheme cannot be separated from the fate of the British army, or the French, or the German.

Diplomats still wear on state occasions their distinctive garb and orders or decorations, but otherwise the statesmen have come to wear ordinary costume, or, at the most, are classed among the frocks and the top hats. The modern world is not, however, without its colorful survivals of the compelling power of the uniform, as is evident at coronations and inaugurations, or in London in the deliberations of the Council of the City of London. Judicial robes likewise persist as evidences of the professional dignity of the special group of judges, and the robe is also worn by practitioners in certain jurisdictions. Police still retain the uniform in civil service, as do firemen, and nurses, at times, in public health service; and a few other officials may be found in the same category. In general, however, the overwhelming tendency has been toward the elimination of the differentials in uniform marking the line between functionary and the plain citizen. One other survival of the uniform in the political group is the penitential garb of the prison inmate, a dubious form of protective coloration, hanging over from the time when those who incurred the displeasure of the political group might be variously branded, scarred, and maimed in token of their status—the brand of Cain in all its innumerable variations.

Architectural symbolism has also been called upon to support the claims of the body politic. Towering edifices proclaim the majesty and dignity of the state, and impress even the casual with their social meaning. Capital buildings, town and city

halls, palaces of justice, monuments and monumental figures, adorn conspicuous places in every commonwealth. The Houses of Parliament in London, the Reichstagsgebäude in Berlin, the Hôtel de Ville in Paris, the capitol building in Washington, the Kremlin in Moscow, are among the most impressive pieces of architectural display anywhere to be found, while palaces and halls are scattered everywhere. The figures of great political heroes are likewise important in the visualization of the state. Westminster Abbey and Trafalgar Square in England, the Washington and Lincoln monuments in Washington, the Place de la Bastile, Place de la Concorde, and the Tomb of Napoleon, the Red Square in Moscow, the Sieges Allee in Berlin; these are notable illustrations of the general use of the monumental in perpetuation of the purposes of the political group. They are continuing object-lessons in civic training, the objective of innumerable pilgrimages to these civic shrines. War memorials are, of course, scattered over every land, commemorating the sacrifices or the victories perhaps in great national struggles. The most notable of these in modern times is the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The most aggressive symbolism is that of the Soviets, who have covered Russia with the images of Lenin, and have established thousands of Lenin Corners, visible reminders of the meaning of the revolutionary cause. The Red Square, red under the *ancien régime*, and still red with quite another connotation, affords an interesting example of the facility with which symbolisms may be transferred from one order to another. Pulling down the memorials, especially the personal ones, of an earlier group, is an impressive opening for the new symbolism, but the conversion of the old is equally possible and frequently occurs.

The streets and public places have been largely appropriated by the political group and exploited for their special purposes. And as perhaps one fourth of the superficial area of most cities is taken up by public ways the significance of this cannot be too readily emphasized. An analysis of the street names in any of the great capitals, or in the smaller cities for that matter, shows an overwhelming preponderance of political names. Religious,

cultural, and class figures are represented, but only in a relatively small percentage of cases.

An uninitiated observer, seeing for the first time a modern city from the air, might be struck with the competing types of architecture. He would see the spires of churches on every hand; he would see the smokestacks of modern manufacturing as well; he would observe the spread of impressive educational structures, and he would notice the massive town hall and other political buildings. He would perhaps find the ecclesiastical group with the most impressive structural monuments, but he would find the political community fully represented in the picture; and if a moving picture were unfolded before him, covering a century or so, he would observe the gradual decline of the ecclesiastical and the rise of the commercial, the educational, and the cultural, and, likewise, although not in the same advancing ratio, the political.

Many of the state activities would be represented by buildings and places less spectacular in appearance and less impressive to the eye. Examples of this are the institutions for the care of the defective and dependent, for medical care, for recreation, for education, prosaic types perhaps of public works, whose symbolic value on the traditional side at least is not so well developed as that of the more magnificent and ornate structures. Yet they represent, on the whole, a continuing series of specific and useful services rendered to the citizen by his group, less impressive than the more warlike memorials traditionally constructed by the political group.

A powerful stimulator of civic interest is the great spectacle or show organized by various groups for the celebration of some group rite or ceremony. The size, splendor, and impressiveness of these exhibitions is one of the indexes of group solidarity and vitality. In these moments the group may be said to live its fullest and highest life and the member of the group to be lifted up with it to its heights. What then are the great sights which might be exhibited to one who sought for political demonstrations? Military and naval reviews are among the most impressive exhibitions of organized political life, and their color and

movement are inspiring even to those who hate war. Great mass meetings, either of parties and factions or of the whole citizenry assembled on some occasion of state, are likewise impressive to any observer, and still more to the actual participants. The swaying of the multitude under the inspiration of some popular orator is full of life and power, while the unled action of an ungovernable mob is even more so. Or the sweep of a great parade with bands and music and marching feet is heartening to friends and disquieting to foes. In more highly organized form the great parliamentary discussions are often impressive to the last degree, when conducted upon a high plane of political ability. The great actors in the great drama of state have a compelling power upon the political community, of which few are fully conscious, but which is felt long after the echoes have died away.

Coronations under the hereditary régime and inaugurations under the new order are impressive moments in the life of the state, and their pomp and solemnity dignify the political group in its own eyes and in those of observers, friendly or unfriendly. In a hereditary scheme all the domestic events of the nobility become a matter of public concern, although sometimes with questionable advantage where there is too great a gap between the dignity of the ritual and the personality of the participants. "One disadvantage of the monarch as a symbol is that he may behave as a human being as well as a symbol: he may be insane like George III or self-willed like Victoria."¹

The funerals of great state personalities are useful moments for civic training and are so employed in all groups political or otherwise. They provide the framework for the repetition of the virtues of the deceased and also the virtues of the group of which he has been a part. All the maxims and sayings of the tribe or nation may on such occasions be taught at a moment when the hearers are unusually susceptible to impressions of a civic nature, and when the words of the teacher are reinforced by the solemnity and the sadness of the occasion. A sense of common loss pervades the group and intensifies the solidarity of

¹ Quoted by Gaus, *Great Britain*, p. 51.

the citizens, as well as the feeling of the importance of their society.

Thus the funeral rites of Lenin were vastly impressive to the thousands who assembled in the Red Square in the dead of winter, and took part in the final tribute to the departed hero. The interment of Edward VII was uncanny in the impression made by the gorgeous spectacle that wound its way through the streets of the capital city. The funeral passage of Lincoln was one of the most impressive events in American history. The last rites of Bismarck were profoundly impressive, and compelled the rehearsal of his statesmanlike services for the German Reich.

The greatest and most impressive spectacle of the political group is of course war, foreign or civil. The impact of armed forces, the outstanding battles, with victory or defeat, as may be, the tragic losses in persons and property, the scenes of danger, death, sacrifice, struggle—these surpass all others in dramatic quality, and, in fact, have supplied much of the imagery of other groups. Unquestionably the civic value of these scenes is very great, and their influence of abiding quality. But there lurks a danger in the cup of war, to war itself, for from it may come war-weariness, war-exhaustion, lack of confidence in the ruling group; and this in turn may spell the disintegration of allegiance and the melting of the power either of the order or of the state. The Russian monarchy was dissolved in the midst of a great war and another political group sprang up almost by magic; likewise the Kaiser in Germany and his military entourage were as if by miracle overthrown and sent tottering to their ruin. Of like quality was the Austrian participation in a losing venture, and with like result. In this case, not only disaster to the personal holders of the highest power in the state, but the dissolution of the political group itself comes as a sequel. In a world of widespread opposition to the institution or of reluctance to employ this agency, its spectacles are not as impressive as before, or, if equally so, may produce an opposite effect in the weakening of civic morale instead of its stimulation and strengthening.

These then are types of symbolisms employed, consciously or unconsciously, in the promotion of civic morale in the various states here canvassed. If one were so far master of the material world that he might command moving and talking pictures of these events and group the cases in appropriate fashion, he would be able to give a much more intimate knowledge of the political process than is usually the possession even of those who pass as politically sophisticated. For in this civic ritualism lies the secret of the state, or, more accurately, one of them; since these ceremonialisms devoid of an interest and advantage content will not long endure. When their vital core is gone, they are promptly cast away and others sought for and found without much delay. It is the great fallacy of the ritualists that in the form alone lies the power, whereas the power really lies in the intimate relation of the symbol and the vital force it seeks to stimulate, release, express. Nothing is more tragic than the sight of holders of dead symbols invoking obedience in their lifeless names from those whose eyes are fixed upon the more vivid symbolisms of a new political or other order. The fleeing Kaiser might storm impotently; the pitiful shadow of the emperor or of all the Russias in captivity at Ekaterinburg looked in vain for a salute from the soldiers. The symbols of power in these cases become inciting irritations and their only power is to inflame and arouse opposition. As with the political so with other types of group symbols. They are not immortal and their power holds as long as they serve vital interests.

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Among the most effective agencies of civic unity and cohesion are language, literature, the press, the radio, moving pictures—the great vehicles of intercommunication. Language is a powerful bond of unity in groups political or otherwise, and its far-reaching effects cannot be overestimated. The written word and its artistic and cultural forms of expression in literature are almost equally potent. The press is also an organ of great importance in the framework of a political community, under present conditions even more than in the earlier periods.

Language, literature, and the press taken together are formidable in the whole broad range of instruments useful in the development of group cohesion.

A common tongue is a powerful bond of unity, as the lack of it is a constant source of misunderstanding. The unfamiliar speech is the traditional sign of the enemy, and the familiar, the mark of the friend. Men resist with the very greatest tenacity efforts to deprive them of their native tongue, or to take the common language, their Polish, their German, their Italian, from their children or from public and formal use. Even the most drastic forms of compulsion are likely to be defeated by the marked persistence with which men cling to their own language and resist to the utmost every effort to take it from them.

One of the first symbols of the emancipation of a group is the restoration of its language to a position of priority. Thus in our times the Czechs, the Poles, the Irish, the Lithuanians, have hastened to proclaim their own tongue as one of the first fruits of freedom, and even more they have made their own language the basis for movement in the direction of cultural independence. The struggles going on between Italians and Germans in the Tyrol, between Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia, illustrate vividly the importance of linguistic priority and the desperation and tenacity with which men will battle for it. It does not of course follow that all persons speaking the same language will be found under the banner of the same political community; or that there will not be states in which there is a wide diversity of tongues. There is unquestionably a tendency in the direction of unity, but a tendency that may be offset by other circumstances.

Of the groups considered here the greater number have a unified or fairly unified language basis. Germany, France, Italy, the United States have relatively few exceptions to the general uniformity and the same is true of England in the original islands and through a wide stretch of the dominions. Linguistic differences are found in the United States, but they are the survivals of immigrant groups and the language scarcely endures to the second generation. There is perhaps no country in

the world so nearly unilingual as the United States. The Russian tongue is employed throughout the Soviet territory with some variations as in Ukrainia.

Two states of this series undertook the task of reconciling diverse language groups in a common political unity, Switzerland and Austria-Hungary, one successfully and the other not. Switzerland was able to bring together the French, the German, and the Italian tongues, to say nothing of the Swiss which is somewhat different from any of them, although most nearly approaching the German. The Austrian empire struggled with the irreconcilabilities of German, Czech, Hungarian and some Slav tongues other than Czech; and it must be said unsuccessfully. Few persons mastered three languages, although many were able to use two. It became necessary to authorize the use of three languages in parliament and in certain cases in the courts, with the result of delaying and demoralizing the proceedings. Likewise the publication of laws and decrees of an official character must be multilingual. One of the first acts of the Czechs when politically independent was to change the names of streets, public places, and governmental districts back to the Czech, and to put an end to the bi- or trilingual announcements of business firms.

The unusual difficulties presented by the mastery of German, Czech, and Hungarian stood in the way of any general campaign for bi- or trilingual education, as did the further fact that many of the population learned German or French and a smaller number, English. Even had there been an aggressive purpose to reduce the barriers of language, which there was not, it would have been a herculean task, and success dubious. Linguistic obstacles constantly arose to impede any advance toward a closer political unity. The language constantly served as a rallying point, on the other hand, for the geographical and ethnic aggregations which the several languages served.

The Swiss overcame their linguistic differences, but under less difficult conditions. The number of Italian-speaking persons was relatively small, 7 per cent, and it was possible for a wide range of citizens to deal with French and German, a task rela-

tively simple when compared with the problem presented by Hungarian and Czech in addition to German. The official languages are French and German, and laws and documents are issued in both languages. In the local cantons there are examples, however, of unilingual systems. Furthermore there has been a very considerable interpenetration of linguistic groups. In the main, the languages have been regional but there has been a wide spread of populations over the country, and, with some exceptions, in extreme sections of the state one is likely to encounter a considerable proportion of bilinguals. It is also to be considered that there are the dialects called *Schwyzerdütsch* which are distinctly the product of Swiss conditions and which are spoken as a sort of vernacular by a large proportion of the population. A high standard of literacy in the population, universal education and free teaching of language systems in the schools, the international character of Switzerland, all have helped to relieve the strain of the trilingual division in the community.¹

In the expansionist or imperialistic policies of the chief states here studied, the use of language has been a very important agency. The English, French, or Russian tongue has followed the flag, and has been utilized as a means of political integration among the native groups. As many backward peoples included in these contacts are unilingual, the addition of another tongue has not presented the same difficulties as in the case of more cultivated groups, and thus the political effect of the spread of language has been more than commonly important.

The possession of a common literature is also an advantage which will certainly be employed in the construction of a type of political morale. If languages have a familiar and soothing sound, literature lifts the individual up to a height of pride, as a joint proprietor in a great enterprise—French, German, English, Italian. The writers of poetry or of prose raise the individual out of himself into a higher world of dreams and aspirations, or they touch the deeper emotional chords of human nature and

¹ The large number of tourists in Switzerland and latterly the presence of the League of Nation's capital at Geneva have tended to provide an English *lingua franca* of a type.

thrill him through and through with exquisite music which he associates with the common tongue and the political community of which he is a part. How intimately is England associated with Shakespere and Milton; or Germany with Goethe and Schiller; or France with Racine, Molière, and Hugo; or Italy with Virgil or Dante or D'Annunzio; or Russia with Tolstoi or Tchekov or Dostoievsky? It is true that some of the literary immortals become the common intellectual property of the world, and are claimed by all lands; but even in these instances there is a special proprietary right in the land of their nativity. Nothing is more usual in fact than the struggle over the mantle of the great man, as Poland and Lithuania contend for Simkiewicz, as in the earlier times competing cities claimed the birthplace of Homer.

A great poet, then, or a great dramatist, or a great writer of prose is a national asset of the very highest character and all these possessions will be utilized consciously or unconsciously by the makers of civic morale. Exile and outlawed, perhaps, the enthusiasts, while excluded from political power and responsibility fan the flames of group literature, keeping alive a cultural unity when all else has gone. Greeks, Hungarians, Poles, Irish, take the first step in the revival of their early literature, the primary appeal to the pride and solidarity of the group. Germans and Italians struggling to attain national unity and political independence make their first advances not on the field of battle but in the development of national literature, poetry and prose, dramatizing their common ideals and aspirations amid the disorganized possibility of a state. It is quite true that literary and cultural power are by no means always expressed in political form, and may even become so satisfying in themselves as to inhibit a desire for the throne.

The literary artist, then, may become a cohesive force tending to draw together groups which may be organized in political form. But he is also a transmitter of the group experience and a teacher of group traditions or ideals as the case may be. The great political rationalizers such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Locke, Mill, Bryce, may or may not possess literary quality that

will carry their words through great masses of readers. Some of them like Rousseau or Thomas Paine have had the quality of popular appeal, and have worked powerfully on the political imagination of peoples; in these two instances, it is true, destructive of the old order.

But alongside of the civic training through the philosophers and perhaps more powerful in depth and intensity of appeal, are the poets and dramatists who serve as transmitters of group traditions, or sometimes as the shapers of customs and laws.¹ Their emphasis or omission, their adjectives and adverbs, their selection of favorable and unfavorable types for portraits, their asides, their implicit presuppositions, are powerful weapons in defense of or in assault upon a political or other order, probably more powerful in defense than in attack. Examples of this high driving power are seen in E. E. Hale's *A Man without a Country*; Kipling's *Stalky and Company*.

There can be, of course, no guaranty that the force of literary artistry will not be disruptive, and frequently this occurs. There are revolutionary forces as well as conservative in the creative process of the artist, and the political group has at times felt their disintegrating power. This is especially true when literary genius coincides with an ethnic group or with a religious or economic group, out of line in the central political adjustment. So Tolstoi in Russia, Romain Rolland in France, and a flood of minor poets and writers of all classes and groups, emerge in all times of tension.

Yet as men are still in the main unilingual, except in unusual cases, language often supports the existing order, and inculcates unconsciously the maxims and wisdom of the elder statesmen. This may not include their temporary policies, which may be the object of severe criticism, but the deeper underlying political presuppositions of the group, and the cultivation of types of political behavior favorable to the life and growth of the group. No power group, even with all the force of its important patronage, can expect the unvarying support of

¹ See Woodrow Wilson in *Mere Literature*, on the significance of the poets as law-makers; John Drinkwater, *Patriotism in Literature*.

the literati, but they may reasonably look in the direction of aid in the maintenance of civic enthusiasm and interests, and the expression of group interests and ambitions in attractive form.¹

It must always be observed, furthermore, that literature may become the agency, not merely of the political community, but of a wide variety of other unities. The church may claim its aid in the development of the mores of an ecclesiastical type; the ethnic group whether politically recognized or not will be helped by it; the economic classes and the regions will find aid and comfort in literary demonstrations. Whether these diverse literary educational systems fit into the political pattern or not, must always be considered in the light of the interest balance upon which the state fundamentally rests. Of course this factor itself is one of the elements in the balance.

With their greater age and longer established national life, the English and French systems of literature are the most powerful for political purposes, and have amply demonstrated their value as instruments of state policy alone. Their great literary chieftains have rivaled the generals and the "frocks" in welding together the national group, and in impressing upon the mass of the people the types of group experience usefully transmitted to the succeeding generation. Much might also be said for the power and efficacy of German poetry and literature, as reflected in Goethe, Heine, and Schiller. Russian literature has been somewhat divisive, and Italian has often presented the imperial or clerical rather than the national picture to the discouragement of the practical establishment of a real political unit of a modern type. American literature has been fused in the English, with some independent developments of its own, such as Hale, Whitman, and Lowell. Swiss literati have made important contributions to political and national sentiment.

PRESS

Modern journalism plays an important rôle in the development of habits favorable to the maintenance of the political

¹ See Hayes comment on the rôle of the literati in the formation of French patriotism (*op. cit.*, p. 16).

group. News is human interest, and the center of news is the political. The amount of space devoted to political events in the modern press is large, and the educational value of the political features of the press is of very great importance. Whether the journals reflect or create public interest is not easy to determine, and in fact both are probably true. And of course the religious, cultural, and other group presses present their own points of view and radiate their own special types of interest. They are in a sense overshadowed, however, by the daily political press with its vast circulation and constant hammering upon the attention of great masses of people. The press is beyond question the greatest of adult political educational agencies. Through it the great personalities are made known and largely interpreted; the great events are reported, colored perhaps in the reporting; political advice is offered *in extenso* in editorial columns; and the maxims and sayings of the group are transmitted by countless reiteration.

Usually the press supports a political order, usually the nationalistic political order under which it exists, and very frequently the particular persons or groups in immediate authority. It is not typically a-political, or anti-authoritarian, or out of touch with the dominant economic factors in the given government. The large investment ordinarily required in an important journal, the intimate relation between commercial advertising and journalistic prosperity, often brings about a friendly rapport between the business group and the newspaper proprietor, and this will inevitably affect the policy of the journal from time to time. Powerful newspapers, from time to time, however, in the hands of independently minded owners may assume a position of their own in important situations and in the determination of significant lines of policy.

In two of the states under consideration, Russia and Italy, the press at the present time is without reservation an instrument for the defense of the new régime, and in that capacity carries on an unceasing campaign in behalf of the principles of the new order. Other types of presses are not permitted at present. In Austria-Hungary freedom of the press was tolerated, but

with many burdensome restrictions tending to reduce its efficiency at many points.

In the remaining states, freedom of the press is enjoyed, and the press is predominantly nationalistic in character. The great journals of these states and a wide variety of minor ones are interested in political affairs, and continuously encourage interest in and adherence to the existing political unit as such, to the political order in that unit, and often to the particular persons in authority. This does not apply of course to many forms of group press such as the religious, the ethnic, the economic, or the cultural, any of which may espouse other than political interests both in their emphasis and in their direct attempts at influencing the citizens. Thus the Catholic press in Italy, as in the *Osservatore Romano*, or the Communist press in Germany, or the German press in Czechoslovakia might assume a far different attitude toward the particular political unity, and tend to break it down rather than build it up.¹ Even the feeblest press is considered an important item in the propaganda of any cause, political or anti-political, governmental or anti-governmental. Crude as the Soviet "wall papers" are, they nevertheless are factors of importance in the advancement of the interests of the dominant régime; and simple as are the "sheets" of revolutionary groups their power is attested by the vigor with which they are hunted down and the severity with which they are repressed.

It is obviously not the purpose of these pages to analyze the political power of the press, as seen in the determination of the course of political events. This would be an interesting study, but is aside from the field in which this inquiry lies. To trace the relation of Lord Northcliffe and his successors, or Hearst, or *Le Temps*, or *La Corriera della Sera* (in the old days), or Hugenberg, would no doubt be a fascinating inquiry. But we are here concerned with the press as a continuing agency for the building

¹ It is not the purpose of this discussion to consider to what extent newspaper attitudes are "inspired" or subsidized either by governments or groups, but their general position toward the process of civilization of the community, or politicization perhaps better.

of civic interest and allegiance through a period of years and how it may be reckoned as an instrument in the development of civic education. From this point of view, it is clear that taken together, language, literature and the press, are among the most powerful of all the instrumentalities in creating civic interest and habits. Arousing interest, curiosity, emotion, intelligence, as the case may be, they may indirectly implant the maxim upon which government rests, and help to shape the habits upon which a particular political community is dependent for its very life.

Not only may these agencies serve as transmitters of tradition, but it is also interesting to observe that they may function as agencies for the modification of the order, and for the flexibility of its course. Even under the most absolute type of despotism, there is room for the court jester, who may ridicule the order and its rulers under the guise of diversion. It must be conceded that there are always elements of amusement in the deeds of the governors and in the political mores of the community. The cartoonist, the humorist, the satirist, has his place in modern journalism, and it is a large one as in the broader field of literature. His comments upon things and ways political are often of the most profound significance, even when masked under the appearance of nonsense. Many caustic observations on the Soviet régime are found in the humoristic press of the régime and pass unchallenged. Will Rogers is one of a long series of unlearned commentators upon the political mores of America, and his nonsense often contains the elements of statesmanship, and even more of civic education. Likewise in Germany and France, the journalistic jester is always present. Thus the rigidity of a given order or the basic political mores of a community may be given a degree of criticism, and a type of flexibility may ensue, otherwise impossible, through more formal agencies. As a sense of humor frequently helps an individual to maintain his equilibrium more effectively, so a political community is often aided toward a better orientation of itself through the indirect suggestions of those who are not nominally entrusted either with knowledge, power, or responsibility. Humor often opens a chan-

nel of self-examination when all others are effectively blocked by authoritarian principles and by the routine of dignity and solemnity. There is such a thing as too much respect for authority, and too slavish an obedience; and the offset to this may be found in challenging irreverence and impatient cynicism. In the political group where definite sanctions are attached to obedience and where opposition may entail serious and immediate consequences, the necessity for an outlet is greater than in other groups where the channels of criticism may not be so securely blocked.

RADIO AND MOVIE

In more recent times, the radio has become an instrument of intercommunication of great importance to the state-builder. It reaches millions of citizens daily and almost hourly, and its types of material are capable of influencing fundamentally the attitudes and the action of great masses of population, reached in no other way as quickly and as frequently. Through various forms of licensing and other regulation it is possible to exercise control at all times, and the degree of censorship and limitation will of course depend upon the nature of the political system and the degree of emergency felt.

It is yet too early to express any opinion upon the effect of the radio on the process of civic training, but it is clear that there are very great possibilities in this novel instrument of human interrelationship. Both in internal affairs and in international relations the power of broadcasting may become more important than any other single agency of intercourse. Thus in England the government employed the radio to present its own side of the case and no other, thereby influencing public sentiment in an important way. The Soviet government broadcasts news of its policies throughout Russia, and other sections of the world as well, and is thus able to develop a vast campaign of education and propaganda. Presumably all types of interests will engage in the struggle for the control of this important agency of argument and information and persuasion; and the type of equilibrium reached, if any, will vary from time to time

and system to system. In any case the possibilities of this instrument for civic education are enormous.

To other agencies of civic education there has been added in recent times the moving picture and the talking movie. These instruments of education may be employed directly in the schools as parts of formal courses, or they may enter into the larger field of adult education. Millions of persons are reached daily through these agencies, and are profoundly influenced by the material and interpretations presented in impressive form, incessantly, and in moments when they are open to suggestion. Unquestionably, here is an agency of prime importance which will have very large place in the future development of the educational process.

The great cost of films tends toward the monopoly form of production, and at the same time the abuses of the film incline governments toward policies of regulation, more or less strict. On the other hand, the development of the small movie machine spreads out in the individual direction, and tends toward decentralization.

Battles for the control of the movie between various social groups—religious, industrial, political—have already begun and will continue to rage in the future, as specific occasions of conflict arise. Nominally the government holds complete control in its hands through the right to regulate and repress, but since the government itself is an equilibrium of groups, this type of rule cannot be absolutely arbitrary, but must reckon with social forces as broad as the community itself.

Not only is the movie a powerful factor in the political education of an individual state, but the internationalization of films gives rise to important questions regarding international attitudes. What is the international influence of French or German or Italian or American or Soviet films? And what influence does the interchange of films exert upon the formation of international attitudes and understandings? Obviously this may be an irritating influence or the opposite in nature, and may tend to build up an international pattern of interest or intensify existing prejudices. Vast possibilities lie in the develop-

ment of this phase of intercommunication, and he would be a bold man who would undertake to forecast the outcome.

In any case it is perfectly clear that the movie enters the list of instrumentalities of civic education, with every probability that it may play a colossal rôle in the future, as its full possibilities are unfolded through experience and experiment. Hitherto only a few insiders have been able to know through actual observation and experience, the realities of political situations, and from this came their sophistication and in some degree their special skills in manipulation of human kind. Through the movie (talking), however, it will be possible to present all possible types of political situations—dominance, subordination, conference, adjudication, rebellion, administration, agitation. A rich variety of types of political action, now familiar to the experts, may be presented to the mass of the citizens, in close-ups and slow-downs, in such a fashion that the political process may be far less of a mystery than has been traditionally the case, and that much larger numbers of persons may acquire the feel and flavor of politics, and become more skilful in dealing with its process, personalities, and problems. It is of course also possible that these instrumentalities may become the transmitters of crowd hatreds and mass prejudices, inflamed to still further heat and rashness. In any event the future builder of state-patterns will find here a challenge to his inventiveness and adaptability.

It is clear then that the factors of language, literature, press, radio, and movie are of very considerable value in the continuous civic education of the modern state. Old groups cling to them to the last gasp and new political communities seek to use them to the fullest possible extent in the establishment of their new states. The familiar verbal garb is woven into a text of community, while the ways and customs incidental to political virtue are inculcated admirably through the agency of literature and the press. Literature is less readily controlled through governmental agency than the others, but language, the press, the new instruments of radio and movie, are in repeated instances made the subject of desperate attempts on the part of the polit-

ical authorities struggling to turn them toward the purposes of the governing body or the political community.

LOVE OF LOCALITY

Love of locality is an attachment to the soil, or neighborhood more accurately, for it includes a whole complex of other sentiments clustering around a particular bit of the earth's surface. There are not only familiar spots and scenes, mountain or sea, or meadow, or lake, or forest, or stream, bits of local geography long familiar and interwoven with experiences of childhood, youth, and age, but also friends and familiars scattered all along the way. Associations of the most tender and likewise of the most bitter sort gather around particular spots, and there grows up an affection for the place itself, or if not an affection an emotion of a definite nature, whatever it may properly be called. The pictures of early scenes are an important part of the visualization of life that looms so large in human affairs.

Particularly is it true that in long-settled and agrarian countries where there is relatively little mobility of population, the feeling for the soil becomes a sentiment of very great importance in the life of the whole community. This may become one of the strongest factors in the basis of the political community. It is also true, however, that the love of locality may become one of the strongest factors in opposition to the establishment of a larger territorial unit; and in many historic cases this is precisely what has happened. The smaller units have resisted consolidation to the bitter end, and have made admirable use of the love of locality as a means of opposition to centralizing tendencies. In the destruction of feudalism and in the establishment both of modern nationalism and of federalism, localism was one of the most effective agencies in the prevention of the consolidating process. In the earlier days in England and France the same sharp struggle went on, before the central unity of the nation was acknowledged and established. The separate states in Germany, Switzerland, and the United States clung tenaciously to their local privileges, and in all three of these cases forced a final resort to war as the way to unity.

It is clear that localism may be the basis of a small state as well as a large one, and in fact more easily, as the smaller territorial unit is more easily seen or visualized than the greater area. The city state of the classical days, or the small feudal state of the later period which might be swept by the eye from one commanding point, or the medieval urban state, again revived in the course of trade and culture, were readily fitted into that concrete attachment to the soil on which the political system so largely rested.

What must happen in the fixation of the larger country state of modern times is the transfer of attachment from the visually local to a larger picture of the whole state. This larger picture shades into the smaller and back again, in some such way as to blend them into one—a process we do not understand well if at all.¹ When once this is accomplished, however, the local may be used to reinforce the general with success, and the general becomes a series of cumulative locals plus the larger national effect and impression. Thus an English countryside blends into tight little England, and little England by some remarkable transition becomes the British Empire stretching around the world, on whose flag the sun never sets. These transfers are full of psychological interest, but have attracted the attention of few careful scholars up to this time. It is a process comparable to that set up by Freud in which the father complex is carried over into the larger state complex, in the greater patriotism in the larger sense of the term.²

What determines the decision when there comes a competition between two pictures is also a matter of profound interest to students of political psychology. What flashed in the mind of General Lee in 1861 as he paced the slopes of his beautiful estate in Virginia, looking across the Potomac at the capital of the nation? And how did the picture of the state of Virginia supplant the picture of the nation? Similar scenes were enacted in every country in Europe either in feudal times or in more recent days, and many bitter decisions were made by persons torn between

¹ See Piaget, *op. cit.*, for observation of Genevese children.

² Freud's theory is best expressed in *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*, 1921.

conflicting appeals to their local loyalty. These are the ineffable tragedies of individuals as well as of political communities. Back of these pictures are, however, solid cores of other interests, the economic, the cultural, the religious, helping to shape the course of the decision.

Of the states under discussion there are two principal groups. In Group I, including England, Germany, France, and Switzerland, the love of particular pieces of soil on which citizens have lived for long periods of time is highly developed and plays an important part in the political loyalty of the inhabitants. In Group II, including the United States, Russia, and Italy, the devotion to the soil or the locality is less conspicuous as a factor in politicization. England and France are perhaps the best examples of love of locality as an element in civic education. France is more largely an agricultural country, and has been less subject to the influence of the tides of emigration that have swept England. But on the other hand, there has been in England a powerful cult of the local, resting upon a more decentralized system of administration, and upon a poetic and emotional devotion to special localities. In France this localism is closely allied with the compact organization of the family group and in England with the singular power of the English home, a unit somewhat dissimilar from the French yet constituting a powerful element in social composition.

In neither of these states has the local influence been divisive for many generations, with the exception perhaps of the Irish sentiment in England; and, in both, a rich literature has celebrated the special localisms in a number of attractive forms. England has undertaken the task of organizing for the protection of ancient and historical spots, through the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty and carried on a campaign for their defense against the possible encroachments of modernism.¹ In Germany and Switzerland similar situations are found, but both have been until well on in the nineteenth century divisive rather than unifying in nature. The special localism of the Saxons and the Bavarians stood in the way of German na-

¹ See Gaus, *Great Britain*, chap. iv, "The Influence of Place."

tional unity, as did the individual cantons in Switzerland. But the majestic beauty of many spots in Switzerland has inevitably endeared the inhabitants to these places, and in Germany the love of locality is strongly emphasized. In Germany as in England special efforts have been made to familiarize school children, through various excursions, with the geographical characteristics of the country and with its historic monuments. German interest in geography has aided in this effort. Over special localities too the Germans have woven a spell of romantic beauty and charm.¹ The rapid urbanization and industrialism of Germany, and the flood of emigration have tended to weaken these sentiments somewhat, but they continue a powerful element in the central unity of the nation. Much later than in France and England the transfer has been made from the local and provincial to the picture of the greater Germany in "Deutschland über alles." Even yet, however, Berlin does not occupy the position of London in England or of Paris in France. It is still rivaled as a political city by Munich as the head of the Southern separatist sentiment, combining religious differentials with those of geography and traditional independence. Geneva is of course in no such sense the center of Switzerland as are the French and English capitals, and is sharply rivaled both by Zurich and by Basle and the actual capital, Berne, with their implications of ethnic and traditional difference.

In Group II devotion to special locality has not operated as powerfully as in the nations we have just examined, for a variety of reasons. In the United States the very great mobility and the newness of the population has prevented the growth of such a special attachment to the soil as in states where families have occupied the same land for many generations. Otherwise, industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and mobility have combined to prevent the high development of a sentimental devotion to special localities as an important factor in the civic education of the community.² The picture has been transferred from a small locality to the larger area of the United States of

¹ See Kosok, *op. cit.*

² Cf. Rudolf Heberle, *Über die Mobilität der Bevölkerung in den Vereinigten Staaten.*

America, upon which patriotic eyes are fixed in emotional moments as the center of loyal interest and enthusiasm. The new mobility in recent times made possible not merely by a remarkable development of railway communication, but the motor car and its general possession have still further tended to destroy isolation and to induce the adoption of places of special beauty and interest as common property. This has not prevented, however, the recent development of special interest in spots of historic interest, such as Jefferson's Monticello and Williamsburg.

Nor in Russia does devotion to special localities play as important a rôle as in England and France. Russia is primarily an agricultural country and the degree of mobility is relatively low, but, notwithstanding this situation, there is no evidence of especial devotion to the land as a factor in civic interest and allegiance. There is an abundance of localism in Russia, but it has little relation to political consciousness and interest. The locality, in fact, somewhat resisted the centralizing tendencies of the capital city bureaucracy as it still does under the Soviet régime, but this was passive resistance rather than an active opposition of an organized sort. Much of Russia was long in the familial condition rather than in the local-territorial, and might oppose the local government as well as the central. It has followed then that the development of the Russian political community has received relatively little aid from the localistic sentiment, but has had to depend more largely upon the appeal to the imagination through the image of the greater Russia and Slavic unity, a dream which has floated before the eyes of the people for many years, or more recently the proletarian appeal.

In Austria-Hungary there are found powerful attachments to particular localities, but in the imperial organization these factors were divisive rather than unifying. Attachment to the soil of Hungary or of Bohemia has been conspicuous, but it has helped in the construction of Czechoslovakia or of Hungary rather than of the greater empire of Austria. The central group in this case proved unable to compete successfully with the local attachments, and its overthrow was aided by them. In

this case, of course, the geographical localisms were reinforced by ethnic and to some extent by ecclesiastical elements of great importance.

In Italy there has been the most passionate devotion to special pieces of the earth's surface. The terraced mountainsides have been literally made by the human hand, and they have been inhabited for generations by the same families. In Italy, above all, mountain and sea have been celebrated by poets and literati for centuries, and nowhere has there been woven a more beautiful spell than over the hills and vales of this charming land. Yet this has often been the center of an urban localism rather than a national one. The cities of Italy were, many of them, independent states, as Genoa, Venice, Florence, Rome, with their own sovereign rights, equivalent to any powers in the world. These traditions survived the fall of the cities, and lingered long after the substance of power had been dissolved. The cultural heritage of cities like Florence still stands and rivals the brilliance and power of any competing image. Florentines tend to be Florentines still, even more than Italians, or at least than political Italians. In short, these localistic traditions are as likely to be disintegrating as otherwise, and for a long time were decidedly of this description. In the nineteenth century the image of Italy rose again, and the picture of a united state began to make headway in the popular imagery and interest. This central idea in time triumphed over localism and the church, and now stands as the dominant factor in the political life of the peninsula. But it is built upon a national scene rather than upon a local—upon an Italian-wide concept rather than upon devotion to particular portions of the earth's surface in Italy.

Many of the historic spots in Italy, furthermore, have been seized upon and become the property, so to speak, of other and competing groups. Thus the church claims Rome and many of the other world-famous portions of Italy. Assisi is clerical rather than political. Florence belongs to art and to the past as much as to modern and political Italy. And likewise Venice. A thousand spots celebrated by the classicists or later enshrined in religious traditions have only a minor value as political em-

blems and assets. The new régime naturally endeavors to weave them into the picture of the Greater Italy in a wide-sweeping appeal, but the cultural and religious vitality of Italy makes this dangerous for the politicist. He may find that the appeal and the applause go out in unexpected and undesired directions.¹

Devotion to the soil and its local associations is then an instrument of civic education, but it is not one that can always be relied upon by the political community or at least by nationalism. When these pictures may be used for reinforcement of an established pattern as in old England or in long-established France, they are of very high value. But the background must be properly prepared or the result may be the opposite of that desired, for the obstructive effects of localism are the commonplace of political evolution. With industrialization, urbanization, the decline of agriculture as a dominant mode of production and base of social life, with the great mobility of modern populations, with migration a more common phenomenon of social life, the significance of the love of soil is likely to diminish rather than increase.

Urbanism, especially, is likely to interfere with the earlier devotion to the soil characteristic of an agricultural period. The farmer in a way makes the land he tills, and he watches its whims and vagaries in the production of life-utilities with a keenness of interest and with a type of affection for the earth from which his living comes. This emotion does not so easily arise under the machine system of the urban industrial center, and with the higher mobility characteristic of the city population. There may develop, however, an urban loyalty in which the city may become the center of an intense interest and pride, so that one may proclaim himself a Roman, a Parisian, a Londoner, a Florentine, a Berliner, a New Yorker.² And he may become devoted to the streets and parks and monumental buildings of the new urban center. In any case, the love of locality

¹ On the triumph of nationalism over localism, see Michels, *Patriotismus*.

² The "Sidewalks of New York" is the title of a song illustrating this type of local appeal under urban environment.

will play a powerful rôle for an indefinite period to come and only the politically unsophisticated will ignore its deep meaning in the cohesion of the modern state.

The principal techniques for the development of civic enthusiasm have now been reviewed, and the next step will be the consideration of the eight systems as a whole. The analysis and appraisal of the several systems will be reserved for the concluding chapter in which the material regarding these instrumentalities will be brought more closely together for the purpose of evaluating these methods and of indicating the lines upon which the development of new systems seems most probable.

CHAPTER VI

A COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF CIVIC TRAINING

It is now important to combine the special systems that have already been presented in analytical form, to integrate these elements into a living whole, in which indeed their real significance lies. It is pre-eminently true that any system of civic education can be judged only in its assembled form, with the civic patterns adjusted to the other cultural patterns of human behavior. It is in the interplay between the group interests and the mechanisms of training, and between the political group interests and the general social interests with their special mechanisms and ideologies—in this complicated interrelationship—that the essence of the political situation may be found.

At the risk of wearisome repetition to some, we may again direct attention to the fact that the instruments alone without regard to the social interests involved lose their significance. The mechanisms are of value as they utilize the existing complexes of social interest and advantage and reinforce them with a rule of conduct or more commonly a way of life. Economic advantage, geographic isolation, religious prejudice or idealism, as one regards it, and ethnic composition are of fundamental significance in the composition of a political community, and no system of civic education has value unless it is able to work in harmony with them or with some combination of them. Up to a certain point the civic values *per se* may project themselves almost of their own force through the subtle agencies of tradition, but there comes a time when these bonds will no longer hold, and when the forces of the competing loyalties of which there are always legion begin to assert themselves. In that moment the clutch of the political begins to weaken and the tentative approaches of the other forms of allegiance may begin to manifest themselves, whether they are non-political or other-political. In short, the political can possess survival value only

as it continues to have a functional value in the given situation, and when that disappears tradition and custom can carry on for a short time and way only. Men do not cultivate political mores and carry on political struggles chiefly for the joy of it, although this is true in some cases, but because these political patterns of activity are related to other purposes and objectives of life. It is true that the political itself may at times occupy the center of the ring and become an interest, but not for long and not for always. Part of the time it must live on memories of the past, but partly also on hopes or fears of the future, or on the day-to-day pragmatic test of its living utility in relation to other life plans and ways.

In short, the political is always involved in a series of economic hopes and fears, tariffs, taxes, regulations, privileges, and social services of various types. There are always numerous groups to whom the formulas of politics appeal as a twin sister of the formula of their own social interests; a formula of religious advantage, libertarian, or the opposite, a way of race emancipation or the loss of ethnic autonomy, or some cultural patterns of other types, adding to the advantage or the prospect of human satisfaction.

It may be useful to set up first a comparison of the several states as a whole, examining them in their entirety with special reference to the particular mechanisms employed in each case. It is not of course feasible to rank the different states upon the value of their devices, except to say that the system of Austria-Hungary is obviously the least impressive in its outlines and the least able to hold a modern position. Russia and Italy offer startling examples of the development of systems of political education *de novo*, with a conscious and comprehensive effort to organize a method from the ground up. Russia is the more interesting of the two, from the technical point of view, because the construction of the Soviet civic training involved the setting up of a new cult, supplanting the older in the three fields of politics, economics, and religion, and thereby offering unusual possibilities of originality and imagination. But the Italian system presents peculiar difficulties in the development

of a *modus vivendi* with the old religious order and the economic and political, without the advantage of a distinct break except in the field of the political, and not completely even there. And it has both color and tone.

The German, French, Swiss, and American systems are similar in many ways. They represent types of civic education in which deliberate planning is emphasized, and a conscious effort is made to inculcate political interest and loyalty. In both, the agency of the schools and of the special patriotic organizations is conspicuous, the former far more important than the latter. The modern German effort is of especial interest because of the necessity since the revolution of weaving together the older tradition and methods of the earlier monarchical-hereditary nobility group with those of the democratic régime—a task in which there are many complicating factors jeopardizing success. The American is of interest because of the peculiar problem of blending a variety of nationalistic groups in the so-called melting pot of American social and economic life, and the formation of a unified type of political habit and allegiance. In both there is evident an interest in orderly and systematic development of civic mores, such as is notably absent in England or at least until relatively recent times.

The English and French systems have elements of similarity, notwithstanding wide differences in the organization and lines of activity. England has the oldest and most continuous tradition to build upon. The French political order has changed frequently in the last century, but the French nation is the most stable territorially of the groups here considered in the last three hundred years. France employs the school system much more directly than England, but its governmental services and political parties are less effective as educational and unifying agencies. Both have a powerful agent of civic habituation in the rich literature of their respective countries, with its many masterpieces of international as well as national value. No one can challenge the powerful quality of the French love for *la patrie* and of the British for England or the empire.

Yet there are wide differences between the British and the

French systems, notably the presence of the nobility and a system of social aristocracy in England, as compared with the more democratic system across the Channel, and in territorial and ethnic compactness. Further there is an important difference in the direct use of the school system by the French and the indirect employment of academic instruction by the British. The highly centralized educational system of France is readily adapted to the purpose of somewhat uniform civic education, and full use of this possibility has been made by those in charge of the French educational administration. The English system is still a combined private and public system, and remains decentralized as compared with the French.

The Austro-Hungarian system is unique in its neglect of the ordinary methods employed for the encouragement of civic interest and enthusiasm. The early theory that the way to preserve the empire was to encourage jealousy among the member states, and to maintain the balance of power among these contending interests, was later abandoned, but the shadow of this policy was cast down into the twentieth century. The empire never adopted a modern system of appeal to the elements out of which a federal state might perhaps have been formed successfully. Facing admittedly great difficulties, its methods were feeblest where they should have been the boldest and strongest, least developed where they should have been most elaborate and complete, and energetically developed withal. Austria-Hungary offers an interesting counterfoil to the competing systems of sister states, and is an impressive illustration of the negative side of civic education under modern conditions.

With these preliminary considerations it is now in order to examine these eight systems as a whole, and with reference to the integration of the patterns of political behavior.

GREAT BRITAIN¹

The British system of civic cohesion is one of the most interesting in the world, for it illustrates in the highest degree the re-

¹ See Gaus, *Great Britain, A Study of Civic Loyalty* and bibliography there cited: Wilhelm Dibelius, *England*; Ernest Barker, *National Character*; André Siegfried, *England's Crisis*.

sults of modernism in the economic and political fields—extraordinary skill in the development of industry and remarkable facility in political management. There are many puzzling situations in the British Commonwealth of Free Nations. Regionally, the system has a compact center and a wide-flung circumference. From the ethnic point of view Britain may be looked upon either as centralized or highly diffused, depending on whether one looks at the Islands (or a part of them), or at the wide ranging variety of races included in the empire. From the economic point of view, one may see the hereditary landowners slowly retreating from power long held, the dominant business group with their grip upon world finance and trade, and the giant figure of labor slowly slipping into the position of control.

The secret of the empire lies in the central core of England, Scotland, and Wales, in which cultural solidarity, regional concentration, religious toleration, and industrial prosperity have been intimately associated in a political community of unusual strength and unusual capacity for expansion and management. With singular facility the English language displaces that of Wales, and of Scotland, and even the bitterest Irishman came to use the English speech. A growing system of common law, unusual parliamentary institutions, unusual facility in dealing with alien peoples: these have characterized the political development of Britain. And all this has been accompanied by a striking aptitude for modern industrialism. The landed aristocracy have conducted one of the most skilful retreats in history; with rare finesse have taken into their fold the rising group of the industrial leaders, and later reconciled themselves, after a fashion, to the newer group of toil. But the social aristocracy stood and prosperity continued, with rude but not permanent interruptions.

The loyalty of the widely scattered and widely differing peoples of the empire has been held in an astounding way, and with sufficient tenacity to insure a fairly stable form of political order in territories as remote as India, Africa, and Egypt, and to rally these distant peoples to the support of the tottering fortunes of the central government in a world crisis. None of the other

states here analyzed has approached this remarkable feat of creating and maintaining a type of central loyalty on so large a territorial scale, for so long a period of time, and with such fervency and persistence in times of the greatest possible stress. The most powerful competing loyalty has hitherto been that of the regional, religious, ethnic complex known as the Emerald Island, a source of disturbance to the process of cohesion for centuries, but an instance no longer to be cited in view of the recent adjustment of this troubled question.

The economic basis of English political organization lies in an equilibrium between the landowners, progressively diminishing in importance, the great industrialists, and the highly organized industrial workers. To maintain the balance of these sharply competing groups in periods of industrial stress, within the political structure of a state to which they shall be devoted, is no mean task, but in England thus far it has been measurably attained. The advent of a Labor government has twice been met without a jar; the general strike threatened revolutionary political action, but the storm passed, and the probability of early recurrence is more remote than before. The Labor group shows strong signs of devotion to national interests and policy, in a more definitely libertarian cast, and the chances of an overthrow of the political or economic order in any violent form seem small as compared with the probability of gradual even though fundamental readjustments of the economic and political structure. There is thus far little to indicate that the triumph of a revolutionary labor movement would seriously impair the fabric of the British political state.

Nor has there been a competing religious loyalty of serious proportions in Britain, with the exception of that in Ireland. Predominantly Protestant in religious faith and with an established religion in England and Scotland, there has been no notable challenge from either Catholic or Jewish groups, both of which have been incorporated into the social and civic life of the community. The historic contest with the Roman church left its impress on English history but there have been no such struggles in recent times as have shaken Italy, Germany,

France, Russia, or Switzerland, always with the exception of the problem in the Irish community.¹

The political order and the territorial state could count upon the support of all religions in the maintenance of the basic process of politics and in the great crises of state life. Of course, in the outlying possessions of the empire, there were religious problems of the first importance, in India and elsewhere, but even these were so treated as to minimize the problem of religious alignment against the central state in most cases. In India it is true this was not wholly possible, and the regional, economic, ethnic situation there crystallized into a dangerous threat against the central unity of the empire. But even here finesse and management reduced the problem, apparently insoluble, to its simplest terms. The empire maintained its equilibrium and steadily gained in its relations with communities insistent upon a freer position in the general structure of the state, or complete autonomy if possible.

No nation showed greater skill in dealing with other types of peoples than did the British through the last century. The British problem in comparison with that of any other of the states considered here was extraordinarily difficult from the point of view of the balance of social forces in the equilibrium of the political community. Region, religion, and economic class presented problems of the most serious and apparently insurmountable nature, but with admirable skill they were overcome and the very obstacles transformed into integral parts of a more solid empire. In time of war all of the recalcitrant elements rallied to the support of the mother-state and with admirable alacrity came from the islands of the sea to the defense of the realm (the sole exception to this was the disaffection of the Irish). Neither the Dutch in South Africa, nor the Indians, nor the Arabians, found the remoteness of England the occasion for hostile action, but rather a challenge to their political adherence and support.

Of all these states, the British had the longest tradition, a

¹ Some interesting aspects of the theoretical relationship between church and state are developed in J. N. Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*.

tradition which had often bent but was not broken as was the French or the Italian. Its revolutions ran back to the seventeenth century from which dates a line of unbroken legal succession, however important the actual changes in the seat of power since that momentous century. A wealth of elaborate symbolism aided in the exploitation of traditions.

In England the governmental services and the political parties figure largely in the civic education of the community. The British navy, the army, the civil service, and the parliamentary leaders occupied a prominent position in the life of the people, and they constantly presented to the average man a pleasing picture of the meaning and importance of the political in his life. Above all this was the elaborate and impressive pageantry of the hereditary group still surviving in British political affairs, especially on the social side of life. It has usually been found difficult to take the life from the splendid trappings of power and still retain the symbolic, ceremonial values. What had been sublime may readily become ridiculous. What had been impressive authority may so easily become a symbol of lost authority and present impotence. But in England the transition was made so gradually and yet so effectively that the lightly sleeping sense of the ridiculous was never aroused, and pomp without power became a fact in the political mores of the state. Royalty was sterilized politically and yet retained its ceremonial virility; a difficult operation in political physiology.¹ British public administration has also aided notably in developing the attachment of citizens to their state. While perhaps less technically expert than that of Germany, the British system maintained high standards of integrity and fairness, and had great elements of strength in its flexibility and adaptiveness. The higher civil service was recruited from the ranks of the aristocracy commonly, but exhibited qualities of suppleness that prevented any general accusation of bureaucracy. A similar spirit and practice pervaded other classes of the service to such an extent that even the police were not wholly unpopular. Administrators of the

¹ See Gaus, *op. cit.*, chap. iii, for vivid illustration of this surviving power of ceremonialism in British life.

type of Sir Arthur Salter were important factors in building up the attachment of the Briton to the political order and the nation of which he found himself a part.

The British political parties likewise played a magnificent rôle on the great stage of English parliamentary life. More than in any other nation these parties and their important leaders filled the eye of the observer and inspired him with a sense of state. Disraeli, Gladstone, Chamberlain, Lloyd George, MacDonald, and a host of other figures gave to the British laity an unparalleled course in adult education of a civic sort. Leadership, conference, compromise, *savoir faire* in matters political: these were constantly inculcated in the minds of the oncoming generation of English; and the manners and mores appropriate to such a system were always to the fore. Campaigns in local districts brought the political problem still nearer home to the citizen, and confirmed his political aptitudes and habits. New groups were brought into the charmed circle of power, from time to time, and habituated to the ways of the political authorities. First came the workman and later came woman, both introduced into the arena without difficulty, with scarcely a quiver in the position of authority.

Language, literature, and the press have been powerful supports of the British type of civic cohesion. Unity of language and a literature of unusual richness have been important factors in the creation of cultural unity throughout Britain. While the Welsh and Gaelic have been preserved in the Islands, they have been supplanted by the English tongue which has become the common instrument of communication, not only in the central core of the state, but throughout the whole reach of the empire. Shakspere, Burns and Shelley, and the great broad flood of English literature has flowed steadily through the English territories. The masters of letters brought together great groups who came under their magic spell, and bound them still more closely together in their common experience and possession. Likewise in the outlying territories the English language and literature permeated the intellectual fabric of these communities to their remotest parts.

The British press has also been a builder of political mores in a notable fashion, disseminator of political news, and promoter of the fortunes of the empire. Its extensive reports of parliamentary proceedings in particular have fixed public interest upon the political stage, and have been in themselves a form of political education for the nation. Imperialistic and even chauvinistic at times, the journals have been among the chief bulwarks of the political community. Their influence through a long period of time has been incalculable in the force of its steady pressure upon the political attitudes of great masses of people receiving through journalism their principal form of political facts and opinions. The labor group, for some time almost voiceless, in more recent times has been able to muster political support for its programs and to feel itself a part of the larger political program of the state. Beyond question, then, the British press has been a formidable factor in the development of interest in public affairs, and in the generation of the cohesive sentiment that holds the empire together.

Of civic instruction in the formal sense of the term, little use has been made in England, at least in comparison with Germany or France or the United States. History has been extensively employed, and while this has been chiefly the history of the nation in which the instruction is given, yet this field has not been as narrowly construed as in France. Inevitably the history of England requires the teaching of much of the geography and economics and most of the history of the modern world. From this point of view it could not in any case become wholly provincial. Of formal civics, however, there has been little use.¹

The so-called "public schools" of England have, however, been the training schools of the governing classes of England, both civil and military; and the two universities of Oxford and Cambridge have supplemented and completed this training for the higher parliamentarians.² Thus a degree of control has been

¹ On the tendency to develop more formal attention to civic instruction in the schools see Gaus, chap. viii.

² See Laski in *American Political Science Review*, XXII, 12, "The Personnel of the English Cabinet, 1801-1924."

exerted through this instrumentality, a degree of uniformity in shaping the character of the rulers of the nation. With the rise of Labor, of course, this situation has been changed. An effort is also made in the new secondary schools to transplant the same standards and patterns of civic life as have developed in the older public schools.

Likewise the British system has been employed to an extraordinary degree to shape a type of citizen, especially the responsible citizen, who might be expected to take the lead in affairs political, smaller as well as greater. The doctrine of the "gentleman," and what he does or does not "do," is partly a social pattern, and also in part a political one. The "gentleman" is of course a member of society in the larger sense of the term, with a code of behavior, but he is also in a narrower sense a member of political society and follows a code handed down from the preceding generation. Theoretically this code never or seldom changes, but like all other codes this immutability is only for the eye of the uninitiated, and in fact it changes as situations change. In the British system, however, it is fortunate that the organization of the society develops some person who automatically is acknowledged as the person to determine the conformity of conduct to code, and to say authoritatively just what is or is not "gentlemanly." This flexible unchanging code has of course a survival value in the political world, but always the survival is more important than the code. It is inevitable that such a code should follow the lines of class advantage to a considerable extent, but these lines are changing from time to time, and new classes and groups are admitted to the magic circle and their position acknowledged and acclaimed.

The English system is then one of the most indirect yet on the whole one of the most effective of all those considered in this study. Ostensibly a system without a system, apparently with no effort at all in design or accomplishment, it is in reality one of the most intricate and carefully adapted to the social and economic forces it must interpret. It has not only art, but the art that conceals art from eyes that are not too critical of political presuppositions and educational procedures.

In the central islands of the empire there has developed a strong sentiment of love of locality, or affection for tiny bits of soil and glimpses of landscape.¹ The small compass of the islands themselves has aided in this, notwithstanding the mobility of the population and the increasingly urban-industrial character of the country. A survival of landowning, agrarian days, the sentiment still lingers, however, with very great strength and tenacity. All the more remarkable is the transfer from this intensely local sentiment to the far larger picture of the world empire stretching around the globe. But the contest between the little Englanders and the Imperialists was resolved in favor of the latter, and often with support of the urban-industrial group, to whom the appeal of a world-wide nation was more effective than attachment to a section of a city.

Special associations have been formed for the protection of oldtime places and ways, and an elaborate cult of the antique fully developed throughout the islands—a cult indeed in which many other peoples join in their friendly invasions of England from time to time. On the whole, no nation has developed more fully and strongly the love of small locality than the English, notwithstanding the breadth and variety of the national domain, and the apparent incongruity between the local and the world-wide. But the tradition and the fact is that the closely knit central group, bound by ties of locality and common experience, reach out and dominate the outlying groups, if foreign to English stock, or affiliate them if of the same general stock.

The conclusion that this whole civic process is a work of simple artistic value is of course avoided by an examination of the economic interests involved in the movement of expansion and control. The English markets and carrying trade are covered by the artistic and symbolic phrases woven around them; and concrete industrial advantage, as well as appeal to sentiment, is concerned in the whole problem of adjustment. There is fruit as well as flowers in the English political theory and moral sentiment.

From the point of view of social balance the British state is

¹ See Gaus, *Great Britain*, chap. iv, "The Influence of Place."

threatened by two difficulties—the regional and the industrial. How far can the empire stretch its bonds without encountering difficulty from the geographical isolation of its part? Modern communication fights on the side of the empire at this point, as it tends to draw men closer together and to minimize the dangers of geographical isolation. The economic class struggle may precipitate another revolution in England from which the proletarian group may emerge victorious, but in such case the labor state will assume responsibility without impairment of the political order.

The chief problem of techniques in Britain is the use of direct or indirect means of civic education. There are evidences of increasing interest in more formal methods of inculcating the precepts of the group in the schools and it is not unlikely that the ancient system built around the cult of the gentleman may be modified with universal education and democratization of social life.

FRANCE

Both from the geographic and the ethnic points of view, the French political community presents an extraordinary example of unity and solidarity. With the exception of the French colonial possessions which may almost be ignored in a survey of French civic education, the central territory is unusually compact and self-contained. Relatively small in area with excellent means of intercommunication, France, geographically presents unusual possibilities for the construction of a political unity; and for three hundred years this result has been attained. From the ethnic point of view France is equally fortunate in the possession of a population of much the same stock, speaking the same language, and presenting no breach in the wall of solidarity. This is not to say that there are not important differences between Paris and Brittany, between the North and the South, but by and large the outstanding fact is that of the solidarity of the ethnic group rather than its variations.¹ Nor have waves of emigration swept away great masses of popula-

¹ See Hayes, *France: A Nation of Patriots*; and the Columbia University series of "Studies in Post-War France," edited by Professor Hayes: André Siegfried, *France*.

tion in France as in Germany and England, but in the main the overwhelming tendency has been toward stabilization in the home country. Both emigration and population are practically at a standstill, and the absorption of the new generation offers a relatively simple problem in comparison with that of most Western states. Nor is France disturbed by the sight or thought of French people who are of their stock but not in their state. There are no great blocks of Frenchmen who "belong" in the corporate limits of France either in their judgment or that of the home country. There is no problem of the *irredenta*, now that Alsace-Lorraine is inclosed in the national domain.

Religion classifies France as Catholic, with a few Protestant or Huguenot survivals whose growth was forcibly crushed out centuries ago. There is also a strong rationalistic development, the relic of the revolution. But France has always resisted Roman domination, and resented the political implications of the Roman church. The most recent manifestation of this rivalry is seen in the twentieth-century contest over the monastic orders and in the expropriation of their possessions by the state. The political community may be said to have an important rival in the religious community, and the competition between them, while usually restrained within the limits of sobriety, from time to time flares out in bitterness and recrimination. The religious criticisms of the republic and championship of monarchy are evidences of the flame that never dies. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine offers an interesting illustration of this, since France has disestablished the church while Germany had given it public support; and this is but one of the many ramifications of the complex problem of the interrelationship between the political and the religious community. The church has never carried its rivalry so far, however, as to attack the general basis of the state in the necessity for obedience and common conformity, for these lessons have been almost continuously inculcated by the church fraternity; and in time of war the church has conspicuously supported the claims of the nation without reservation as far as the French clergy were concerned. To some slight extent regional and religious differences have

coincided, as in the case of Brittany, which is Catholic and somewhat monarchistic in disposition. But as the country is preponderantly Catholic in the nominal sense of the term, there has been no special threat from the combined religious-regional complex.

The economic basis of France is a balanced division of authority between agriculture, business, and labor.¹ The urban industrial tendency has not gone as far in France as in Germany or England, and there remains a powerful peasant proprietorship in a strong position both economically and politically. But on the other hand the industrial movement has developed a very powerful movement in the field of organized labor. Syndicalism as it is termed in France includes perhaps the most powerfully entrenched group of workers anywhere in the world, and has taken an advanced position both in theory and in tactics.

While business has been most aggressive and most influential in public affairs, the peasant group has not been far behind, and the labor movement has made itself powerfully felt in the domain of political action. Types like Poincaré, Herriot, and Clemenceau have been representative of the aims of each of the groups in turn, and the new governmental policies have been mindful of the substantial interests of each of these elements in the industrial structure of the state.

No one of these groups has developed an anti-statist complex or a conflicting loyalty, with the exception of the left wing of labor. Business has jeopardized the bases of state activity by striking cases of official corruption, and international banking and other financial interests have doubtless cut across the trail of nationalism, but they have not seriously affected the general trend of the political development in the fundamental sense of the term. Likewise the individualistic tendency of the business group, expressed in the theory of noninterference, has prevented the development of a doctrine of state action similar to that prevailing across the Rhine. The peasants, having helped to overthrow the landlords and hereditary owners of political

¹ See Ogburn and Jaffe in *The Industrial Development of Post-War France*.

power in the French Revolution and having parceled out the land among themselves and established a democracy resting upon it, have remained satisfied with the result; and have been the most consistent and reliable transmitters of the political tradition of the nation.

The proletarian group alone has developed in the left wing something of a competing loyalty to the class movement as against the *patrie*. The followers of the Soviets have proclaimed the solidarity of workingmen without regard to nationalistic lines, and have endeavored to build up a counter-tradition of non-politicism. The bulk of the socialists, however, refused to follow the left, and, under the leadership of Jaurès and later of others, have taken a definitely national and political position. As in Germany they have been integrated into the responsible political structure of the country, and are no longer a rival group threatening or challenging its power. The ministry of Herriot, of Ramsay MacDonald, and the presidency of Ebert are symbolic of the new position of labor in the modern Western state; and they tend to emphasize the continuing significance of the political community in the direction of social affairs.

It may safely be asserted that France is more nearly self-contained than any other state in Europe. French life and French culture centering in Paris are relatively little concerned with the rest of the world. The French do not hate other nations, except Germany perhaps, but they tend to ignore them or to look upon them as quite another thing. There is neither emigration nor immigration to any considerable scale, and the chief element of mobility in population is supplied by the invasion of tourists who for generations have found France a pleasant place to loiter. The colonial expansion of France in Africa and the development of the League of Nations have somewhat changed the complacent position of the nation, but not fundamentally; and one may still say that France has no international attitude except that arising from the alliances of the moment, maintained for the purpose of national security—in France always a consideration of prime importance, to be read as “National Security.” What effect the formation of large-scale units of

business organization may have upon this situation, it is too early to predict.

The line of French tradition has been roughly broken on many occasions within the last 150 years, as far as the form of the political order and the particular holders of power were concerned. But with reference to the basic nationalism of France there has been no revolution, for the continuity of the political community that was organized on the fall of feudalism has not been interrupted. In this sense France is the oldest of the states here discussed. The traditions of the republic are of course relatively new, now only half a century in continuous operation since the events of 1871. The administrative tradition, however, came down from the Bourbons, and has been little altered since its first establishment in its fundamentals of technical ability, permanency, and centralization. The judicial system is likewise much as it has been, with allowances for modern development. The parliamentary system is, on the other hand, relatively new, and its ways less perfectly assimilated. The military tradition is a glorious one and is unbroken in its grip upon imagination and habits of action. The hereditary tradition still lingers in certain titles and in the picturesque survival of shadowy pretenders to a contested throne. But its hold upon actual political life is feeble, arousing interest by reason of its optimistic and dramatic audacity rather than from its practical possibilities of realization. It may also be observed that the French political tradition is transmitted through a channel of social democracy such as is not found in England or Germany, until the very latest times in the latter. The *émigrés* never regained their lost position. The bulk of their landed estates were gone forever, and they were unable generally speaking to adjust themselves to the new régime of industrial enterprise in which the fortunes of new lords were being made.

An outstanding feature of the French system is the employment of the school system for the purpose of civic education. *Instruction cirque* is a fundamental in the curriculum of the French school. The educational system itself is centralized and carries a system of instruction relatively uniform. In this plan

the political looms large. Primarily, the effort centers around the teaching of French history, to the almost complete exclusion of all others, but, secondarily, emphasis is placed upon the political and also social characteristics thought desirable to inculcate in the coming generation. The uniformity and thoroughness of this system are not equaled in any of the other modern states we have examined in this study, and probably nowhere else.¹ The whole background affords an admirable setting for the transmission of civic traditions to the oncoming generation.² Differing in many important details from the German system, it yet resembles that approach much more than either of them does the British method. It is not designed either to produce gentlemen or to make a *staatlich* type of burgher but a French lover of *la patrie*, with the civic and ethical habits that go with the perpetuation of the nation. There is less emphasis upon authority than in the older German system, less emphasis upon the training for an amiable member of the British social aristocracy, and more upon the bourgeois qualities of a supporter of the French social democracy. And there is less regard for other nations, less hate or love and more fixation upon the central scenes of *la belle France*.

Ideologically, France has been the home of the doctrine of sovereignty in its strongest form, as developed by the great sixteenth-century political scientist, Jean Bodin; and also the home of the most disintegrating theories, such as the anarchism of Proudhon and the syndicalism of Sorel, but again claims the social solidarity and pluralism of Duguit and his school. The governmental services in France are of great concern in the French plan of making good citizens. Foremost among these the army has stimulated vivid civic interest and played powerfully upon the imagination of millions of French. Its long record of brilliant performances is a part of French life, a part of the reveries which enter so largely into the mental and emotional

¹ For a full description of this system see Hayes, *op. cit.*, chap. iii; Scott, *Patriots in the Making and the Menace of Nationalism*; Prudhommeaux, *Les Livres scolaires d'après guerre*.

² An outline of the course may be found in the bulletin of the Ministry of Education.

make-up of men. Its great military figures are elements of the existence of France and its individual citizens. The modern army has been kept upon a relatively democratic basis through contacts between officers and men, and has avoided an arrogant attitude on the part of the soldiers of career toward the mass of the population.

The administrative service has also been an educator in French life. Early established by the Bourbons for reasons of state, the administration has survived the revolution or all of them, and continues a substantial factor in the life of the political community. Competence and integrity have characterized its behavior as a whole, although not in the same degree as in Germany, and the contacts between citizen and official have not been exasperating and provocative. The spoils system has eaten into some services to its detriment, and various forms of favoritism have also corroded some sections of it; but on the whole such cases have been exceptional rather than characteristic. The organization of civil servants has precipitated puzzling problems in France as in England and in Germany, but the question has involved the relation of the group of civic servants to the state rather than the special relations of particular functionaries to the citizenry. In contrast with Germany and England the hereditary official group has almost entirely disappeared from administrative life, as a powerful factor altogether. The administration has become a profession in the higher branches and a trade union in the lower.

The party system in France has functioned vigorously, but not for a long period of time, only since the establishment of the present régime in 1871; and even after that the fate of the responsible party government was long in doubt. During this period the parties have had full swing without the check of the traditional authority of the Crown as in England or the presidential authority as in America. Party life has habituated Frenchmen to political action, leaders, and issues, and in this way has been an important factor in the growth of adult political education. The politicians have not, however, succeeded in establishing themselves as thoroughly as the administration,

and corruption and favoritism have often shaken their hold on the sentiments of the people. The multiparty system, based upon the social groupings existing in the country, presents many difficulties in the actual formation of government and its continued conduct. On a smaller scale the local groups in cities have functioned also as awakeners of interest in civic affairs, and as avenues to various forms of public service. The party rôle has, on the whole, been more like that of Germany than of England.

Special patriotic organizations have flourished vigorously in France and have been an important agent in the development of French patriotism. The League of Patriots, the Patriotic Youth, the French League, the Patriotic League of French Women, and the Federation of National Leagues are among these. There is a long series of war veterans who are not, however, united in any central society; there are memorial societies and colonial leagues; there are Boy Scouts and a large number of physical education societies with incidental political education in their train. The dignified French Academy, the Legion of Honor, the Alliance Française, are not without their important relations to the civic position of France at home and abroad.

Language and literature have been especially developed in France and have been extremely effective both in shaping a French culture and also in transmitting the political traditions of the republic or whatever other government there might be at a given moment. There has been no division in language in France, but on the contrary a solidarity of tongue and, beyond that, a tremendous pride in the French language, for centuries succeeding Latin as the medium of European diplomacy.¹ Further, the French have as a rule shown little interest in other languages and have been most of the time a unilingual nation, imposing their speech upon others where this proved possible.¹

The brilliant quality of French literature for the last two hundred years has enabled it to hold a position of very great meaning in the life of the society, and it has inevitably become

¹ See Hayes, *op. cit.*, for examples of recent attempts to revive the local literature and dialects.

one of the most pervasive agencies for the transmission of the political experience of the French people. French masterpieces have often contained a political philosophy of a subtle type, the implications of which are found in the presuppositions of the French political practice.

The press has also been made, in large measure, an instrument of national policy.¹ The inspired and subsidized journal has often been the agent of the administration, coloring and disseminating the governmental point of view. In this respect no special service may be rendered to the state as a whole, but rather to the holders of authority at a given moment—quite a different matter. But in a broader sense the press has served as an agency of public education in civic affairs, and has persistently proclaimed the cult of the political.

French civic education has made full use of the rich symbolism contained in French art and culture. The destruction of the hereditary holders of political power has made it impossible to employ the devices peculiar to a system based upon the biological transmission of authority, but this has not prevented the development of other forms of vivid representation of the inner meaning of political habits. Napoleon created another imagery of his own, in the Legion of Honor, which he imposed upon France, and succeeding generations have bettered his instruction. Music, architecture, and art have pictured the political in a thousand forms of beauty and power. Impressive monuments and memorials are scattered everywhere. The Place de la Bastile, the Pantheon, Les Invalides, the Arc de Triomphe, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier—Paris itself in its many forms of beautiful monument and structure has given life and color to the facts of political power. The stirring notes of the "Marseillaise" are magical in their influence. Holidays, festivals, parades, and demonstrations emphasize the political content of social organization. At this point all the various régimes, autocratic, imperial, republican, have been called upon for their contribution, and all are represented in the varicolored picture of French political symbolism.

¹ Discussed by Hayes with great care.

It is true that the political group has been obliged to compete with the religious and the cultural for artistic representation, but the political has not suffered in the struggle for the decorative symbols of social interest and power. The political has not only taken advantage of the high artistic level of life but has also appropriated many of the most beautiful of the artistic monuments of the capital and of the country. Thus, while the dignity and power of French political symbolism is not as splendid as in the most impressive days of the Bourbons at their height, the present ceremonialism is still fabulously rich in impressive beauty and strength.

The love of the soil in France is conspicuous in the interest-shaping agencies of the state. Compact and self-contained, with relatively little mobility of population, with a well-intrenched peasantry holding the lands for generations, with a landscape of rare beauty and interest, the French had only to weave around this splendid background the spell of the familiar and the artistic to make it a magnetic force irresistibly attractive. French poets and writers have not failed to utilize these artistic charms in forms of great beauty and attractiveness. Paris has risen above the level of many cities and has itself engendered a devotion to locality, a triumph of urbanism, a love of place which is perhaps stronger than the provincial itself, or at least commensurate if comparison be difficult.

On the whole, the French system is characterized by its compact geographical and ethnic position, with a long tradition as a political community, by the balance of its social and economic interests, and by the use of a uniform and formal system of civic education in the schools of the land. Its administrative services have added other politicizing qualities of singular efficacy. French literature and French symbolism have woven a magic spell of beauty over this frame.

La patrie has emerged with an intensity and tenacity of devotion unsurpassed by any modern state, with a content of substantial social and economic advantages, a surpassing symbolism, and a systematic cult of the political in its practical relations to human life. The competing loyalties of the state are

those of the religious group and the left wing of the proletarian movement, but thus far both have been submerged at times of tension by the extraordinary interest in and devotion to the larger state in which they are established. France has passed through a stage not yet fully traversed either by England or Germany in the almost complete abolition of the privileged position of the hereditary holders of political authority, and in this democratic development is a more modern type than either of them. On the other hand, it has not been obliged to face the equally modern problems of mobility, migration, industrialization, and still more widespread and impending urbanism.

GERMANY

The social-economic basis of Germany in many respects resembles that of England and the United States, but in many others differs very widely from them, as indeed from all others.¹ In the modern, industrialized German state, the dominant economic interest is that of business, which assumed the position once held by the agrarians, and in the course of the recent revolution thrust the agrarian-hereditary group still farther into the background. The agrarians occupy a position closely contested by the Labor group, which came earlier to consciousness and political power in Germany than in England or in any large modern nation. The balance between these elements, the agrarian, the industrial worker, the employer, is also more evenly maintained than in most other states. Sharp rivalries between these groups for economic and social position still constitute as in other countries the gravest problem in the life of the state. The proletarian group in Germany has a well-developed class consciousness, and in large numbers has embraced the socialistic economic faith. But this group is definitely allied with the government and the existing political order. The Communist group proclaims the abolition or overthrow of the existing state, but its numbers are relatively small, and the Russian experiment indicates that the destruction either of the political order

¹ See Paul Kosok, *Civic Education in Germany*.

or of the national state is not certain to follow as an inevitable effect of the adoption of the new economic order.

The ethnic basis of Germany presents a degree of unity not found in many other large countries. Practically all of the stock is German with relatively few variations in fundamental types, few in comparison with the wide ranges of variations encountered in England. With the elimination of the reluctant Poles and the Alsace-Lorrainers as a result of the recent war, the population is still more solidly German than before. The Germanic stock outside makes more trouble for Germany than is commonly the case, for large numbers of those who call themselves Germans are still found in Austria, in Czechoslovakia, in Italy. Across the seas in North and in South America are many thousands more, but here the population is more indifferent to the political aspects of the home country.

Religious variations present a more serious problem in the development of the Germanic political community than in some other of the states here analyzed. Germany is the home of Protestantism, and the reform religion still maintains great strength in the northern section of the Reich, but sections of the South and the Rhineland are strongly Catholic in affiliation. The relative strength of the confessions is as follows: Protestant, 40,000,000; Catholic, 20,000,000; Jewish, 900,000. The dramatic struggle between Bismarck and the church in the famous Kulturkampf shook the empire and raised the most serious problem regarding the nature of state authority in relation to the competing allegiance of the ecclesiastical group. The formation of the Centre as the political party of the church thrust the whole problem into the center of the political stage where it still remains. In the main, however, the points of conflict have not reached the roots of state authority; and the church has continued to inculcate the precepts of order and obedience in the civic field without any attempt at abatement of the authority of the political community.

Geographical regionalism is not a serious problem in Germany, with one exception, and that by no means to be ignored. The southern section of the country is traditionally separated

from Prussia in the north, and sections of it are largely Catholic in affiliation. Thus non-Prussian population, Catholic religion and region coincide, and there appears a possibility of opposition to the larger political community. The War of 1866 put an end to this separatism in its most conspicuous form, but a type of opposition still remains, much weaker than before, but yet important to the navigator. The post-war efforts to detach non-Prussian, Catholic, and Southern Germany from the rest of the Reich were, however, unavailing; and perhaps constitute the last gasp of effective regionalism for some time to come. There is at present no overseas problem of holding the loyalty of distant peoples under German management, of the type that confronts Britain, Italy, or France.

The specific means of civic education in Germany reflect the systematic and intellectual tendencies of the people, and differ sharply from those of Britain in their directness and openness of purpose. Two great factors in the German system are the educational system and the governmental services. The German school is a civic agency of the first importance. Not only are the pupils in the schools familiarized with the events of German history, but they are given instruction in the formation of civic habits, formal teaching regarding the important places and scenes in Germany, and under the new constitution they are instructed in the importance of good will to all other nations of the world.¹ *Ruhe und Ordnung* are never neglected in the German curriculum, and however bitter and irreconcilable may be the dispute between the teachers, who are right, left, or middle, the minimum of civic obligation is always inculcated through the educational agency. The problem of reorganizing the educational system after the Revolution in order to provide training for the new political order was promptly and effectively faced, and a new plan was developed in which devotion to the new Reich was made a part of the educational program. Much

¹ See Kosok's chapter on "The School," in *Germany*, and the interesting account of the transition from the old pre-war system of civic instruction to the new post-war type. See also Alexander and Parker, *The New Education in the German Republic* (1929).

depends upon teacher and locality, but there is no question of the earnestness with which the ruling groups have undertaken to inculcate attachment to the new political order. Communists have of course not agreed to the bourgeois political régime, and have proposed a new form of organization following the Soviet type.

On the whole, the vigor and power of the system and its close alliance with religious instruction and the inculcation of mores make its interest in the formation of civic attitudes and practices one of the most weighty facts in the consideration of the German system of civic training.

The intelligence, integrity, and dignity of the governmental services in Germany have been for generations a powerful factor in the development of civic interest and allegiance. The army was for a long time the center of this system but with its passage the public services are stronger than before, as the antagonism aroused by the army group has disappeared. The German civil service, national, state, and local, has long been highly efficient and highly regarded by the community. It has enlisted some of the most conspicuous talent of the community and has dealt with problems of government in such a fashion as to command the confidence of the bulk of the citizens, not only in its intentions, but also in its thoroughness and competence. The ceaseless contacts of an administrative service with the population of a community offer endless possibilities of irritation or of attachment, of developing a sense of antagonism or of affection and respect. In this process the highly trained and competent German civil servants have succeeded, if not in gaining the affection of the people, in maintaining their confidence and their respect. They have helped to perpetuate in actual practice the German philosophical theory of *Der Staat* as the supreme human institution for the accomplishment of man's highest purposes. They have vitalized the state on its constructive side and its active rather than its passive aspects. As propagandists for their political community, their work has been incomparable. There are indications that the integrity and competence of this service may not pass through the transition period to demo-

eratic responsibility without some impairment of its pristine qualities, but thus far the system stands. In recent times they alone face the reorganization of public administration in terms of business skills, and the development of modern technicians as well as the earlier legalism.

The German political parties have also served to educate the citizen and to orient him. Prior to the war the parties were not directly responsible for the conduct of the government and the responsible rôle of the citizen could not be so clearly developed as since that time, except in the urban communities. Since the Revolution of 1918 the democratic system and along with that the party system are really upon trial for the first time, and the outcome of their efforts is not yet as clear as in the older state of England. Great parliamentary leaders and thrilling moments staged on the floor of the Reichstag are not yet so numerous or so frequent as to carry on an effective system of adult education in the presuppositions and the practices of politics. But the rôle the party system may play in the future Germany no one can predict, and already it is serving as a rallying point and as a center of education for masses of Germans.

As in America the German civic education has been supplemented by various forms of special patriotic organizations, devoted to the task of nationalistic development. The pan-German organization before the war was an interesting type of this class of organization. Since the war the Steel Helmet has undertaken the campaign for what is nominally nationalism, but in nearer reality the interests of the special class urging the national. On the democratic side, the Deutsche Reichsbanner has undertaken the defense of the constitutional order and the education of the public in the principles of republican rule. In turn, the communistic organization of the Red Front has been even more active in the conduct of the Soviet propaganda among the German population. These special organizations differ from those of other states in that each of them is committed to a different type of a political order, although nominally the conservative group does not challenge the republic. These groups strengthen the degree of political interest in the com-

munity, but they weaken the pattern of central political loyalty through the competition of diverse systems of legal order. Yet as long as the contest is carried on within or chiefly within the boundaries of a system of public order, the ensuing civic education is by no means negligible, and the general effect may well be the sharpening of attention and greater facility in political reasoning and in organization as well.

German national traditions do not go so far back as those of many other nations or so far as its own legal or cultural traditions. The birth of the modern Reich dates only from 1871 and the democratic régime only from 1918. The regional war of 1866 and the clash of the old political orders and the new, in 1918, are still fresh in the memory of many living Germans. But far back of all these events there is a great mass of Germanic tradition affecting the habits and customs essential to the preservation of a political community and these are perpetuated from generation to generation. More than that the deeds of the builders of Germany are now far enough away to be a part of any traditional system. Thus Frederick the Great and Bismarck are integral elements of a present political thought system or emotional picture. Especially long-lived are the traditions of *Ruhe und Ordnung*, the tradition of efficiency cultivated under the régime of benevolent despots, the tradition of obedience, and the tradition of the cultural function of the government, and above all the tradition of the moral value and significance of the state, always looming large in the German background.

The value of the militaristic tradition is definitely on the decline. It may of course rise again, but for the moment this element of the traditional does not figure largely in the composition of the German system of civil education. Conduct becoming a soldier or particularly an officer still has weight as a standard, but not as in the earlier days, before the war cast its shadow over the military group and its ambitions. The use of tradition by the nobility was one of the important aspects of German life and still continues but with very greatly diminished authority under the new régime. The titles and some of the prestige of the hereditary group still remain, but their political weight is far

less than before. They are not a part of tradition in the earlier sense. Nor does their symbolism cast the same glamor over the social life of the nation. The very elaborate cult and ceremony of the court in the states and in the empire has disappeared. A new symbolism is therefore necessary to meet the new situation, but it has not yet appeared, and in the meantime the political life of the new order is less picturesque and vivid than that of the older days. Even the problems of the flag remain still unsolved. The older musical symbolism and most of the architectural symbolism has been taken over by the new régime and integrated into its methods and structure. But much of it has been discarded of necessity in the new ordering of things political.¹ On the personal side, the figure of Von Hindenburg has done much to incarnate the new republic.

Language and literature have always played a great rôle in the formation of German national interest. The great poets and literary masters are an indispensable element in German political unity. German literature possesses a high unifying power which is felt by all who read the German tongue, and it also serves as the medium through which maxims of political life are inculcated unconsciously. In this respect the German is comparable with the English and the French, and continues to develop in new and powerful forms. For more than a century German literature has been strongly nationalistic, supplying the culture medium in times of political weakness and separatism. Common language and literature paved the way for political community.

The love of locality has always been important in Germany, but less so with the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the empire. Furthermore, the localism of Germany has in many ways proved to be disruptive in effect, although this tendency has tended to disappear since the establishment of the Reich in 1871. The widespread migration from Germany has also had the effect of habituating the population to the idea of habitations not necessarily fixed and stable—an important factor in the fixation of settled homes. In recent years organized efforts

¹ For illustrations of this selective process see Kosok, *op. cit.*

have been made to encourage the knowledge of geography and the beauty spots of Germany through excursions of various kinds in which the school children are familiarized with the territory of their native land.

On the whole, then, the German system is characterized by its strong emphasis on the systematic and conscious cultivation of civic education. A rational philosophy of *Der Staat* lies at the basis of a well developed plan for systematic unfolding of the latent possibilities in the form of civic interests and aptitudes. The traditional history of the several German states and of the Germanic people has been woven into this rationalistic mold and made doubly effective, notwithstanding the newness of the Reich and the many breaks in the continuity of tradition. The development of the new ideology and the education and the new symbolism affords material for one of the most interesting studies in the field of civic training, and one of the best cases of the intelligent study of the situation and its essential needs. The constitutional provision for international education is one of the most striking developments in the whole range of recent experiment, and forecasts perhaps the more general development of the systematic provision in civic education for orderly study of international attitudes.

Philosophy has supplied the imposing doctrine of the state for the Germans, literature has woven a silken bond of union, public administration has impressed the community with the solid values of the political order, the schools have emphasized unceasingly the importance of sound types of social and political behavior. And the product has been the development of a devotion to the *Vaterland*, unsurpassed by love of *la patrie*, or any other modern nation. All this has been set in a strong framework of intercommunication, industrial advantage, scientific and cultural expansion.

UNITED STATES¹

The United States stretches across a continent, sweeps over rivers and mountain ranges, which in Europe would be made the

¹ Bessie L. Pierce, *Civic Attitudes in American School Textbooks*.

boundaries of many empires. Forty-eight states under a federal organization comprise the Union, but they are knit together in a compact national unity. Regions exist, as the East, the South, the Middle West, the Southwest, the Northwest, the Coast, and social and economic conditions vary widely in the different areas. They are in fact more important than the states, but they have never set up a competing loyalty with the nation, with the notable exception of the South in the great Civil War, in which case a regional interest coinciding with the economic geography of slavery and a desire for political independence led to armed conflict.

Broadly speaking, the various regions, notwithstanding their somewhat diverse economic interests, are firmly united in the central political community, and the problem of separatism does not exist at the present time. The lack of interstate tariffs, the development of means of communication, and the unusual mobility of the population both through the habit of migration and the universality of motor transportation, tend to break down ordinary lines of separatism and to build up a standardized unified political community. The overseas dominions, Philippines and Porto Rico, present another problem, not however primarily involved in the organization of the central social equilibrium and central type of political loyalty.

The most striking development in recent times has been the rise of urbanism and the concentration of population in metropolitan regions. In some twenty of these about one-third of the population is now centered (1930). The clash between urban and rural regions is in some instances sharp and well-defined, noticeably in the case of liquor laws, in the distribution of representation, and in revenue legislation. The great urban centers are widely scattered, however, and there is, thus far, no tendency toward a separatism jeopardizing in any way the central national allegiance.

Ethnically the United States rests upon a polyglot basis, but the unifying principle is found in the native stock. From the beginning the English-speaking group predominated and the newcomers were assimilated with remarkable rapidity, perhaps

never paralleled elsewhere. No racial group has assumed an anti-American attitude, but on the contrary there often appeared a form of competition in national enthusiasm and devotion in which the successive waves of immigrants engaged. By a swift process the new arrivals were absorbed in the American groups, and that with almost no friction. An acute antagonism developed between the black and the white, but this was an unusual contest which could scarcely be called rivalry at all. In any case the black professed equal interest in and affection for the central political community. Notwithstanding the wide variety of languages in the United States, the English tongue became the standard medium of conversation, and the older languages dropped out with even too great readiness from the cultural point of view.

The religious substructure of the American system of civic organization reveals a wide variety of religious groups. Protestants predominate, with a strong representation of Roman Catholic and of Jewish. The principle of the separation of church and state obtains; there is complete religious toleration; and there are no religious establishments. The churches have not set up party organizations, although their participation in politics especially upon moralistic lines has been marked from the Puritan days down. All creeds have vied in their support of the civic loyalty and morale, from the national point of view, without a dissenting voice.¹ This has been true notwithstanding the combination of racial and religious complexes which under other circumstances might have become a threat to the unity of the political community. The Catholic immigrants have been so weak from the economic point of view, and the process of absorption in American ways has been so swift, that no serious complications have ensued from this situation.

Traditionally the United States was primarily agricultural in economic composition, and remained so until the Civil War.² After that, came the rapid industrialization and urbanization of

¹ In the North-South war the clergy followed their respective regional lines.

² The relations of these classes are more fully discussed in my *American Political Ideas*, chap. i.

the country, and the rise of the business group to economic dominance in the form of the corporation and highly centralized wealth. The World War intensified this tendency and thrust the agricultural group back into a still weaker position than before. The development of foreign trade in the last thirty years has further complicated the industrial situation, and changed the American position from relative isolation to active participation in the commerce of the world. The dominant note in American industrial organization is that struck by business, and more particularly by large-scale business concentrated in great corporations. The center of this group is in the East and its capital is New York City, with minor capitals elsewhere. This group has in general allied itself, with many exceptions of course, to the theoretical principle of *laissez faire*, to practical governmental subsidy of business through tariffs, declined active and responsible participation in governmental affairs, and evidenced its lack of compelling interest in political corruption. The attitude of the larger business interests has been pro-patriotic and pro-nationalistic, an attitude the value of which was frequently modified by personal political indifferentism and the indirect employment of corrupt methods in dealing with governmental agencies.

The interests of small-scale or middle-sized business were from time to time in conflict with those of the larger industries, and this often threw the small business man into alliance with the farmer and the industrial worker.

On the whole, all business groups were defenders of nationalism and civic allegiance, and in the general balance of social interests contributed to the formation and maintenance of the national political pattern. Whatever the private practice in individual cases, there was no public preaching of governmental disintegration and nullification.

The agrarian group has been traditionally dominant politically, and continues to be very powerful even under present conditions, partly through tradition and partly through the continuance of early systems of representation that discriminate against the newly developed urban regions. Since the war the

economic power of the agricultural group has been seriously weakened, however, and its leadership in the world of politics seriously threatened. But its keen national concern and its political interest remain unimpaired. More than any other group thus far, it has contributed to the construction of the political mores of the democratic type, assuming more responsibility than either labor or business, and with sharper demands for political integrity. The most radical insurgency concedes the importance of maintaining the national allegiance and adheres to political methods within this national pattern of action.

Owing to a variety of causes, among them the free land system and the rapidity of immigration, labor was slower to organize in America than in Europe and has not been a powerful factor in party life, although active in political affairs where labor was concerned. Not primarily interested in efficiency, it has been occupied with the promotion of the broader aims of social justice and the special interests of the working class. Thus far there has been no continuing labor party as such, and there is none in immediate prospect.

From the point of view then of the balance of social interests, it appears that the American political community has had no serious rivals, either in the field of race, religion, region, or industrial relations. Competing social groups have outstripped the state in the race for desirable personnel. Business has had first choice, and the professions have followed, but the effect has not been the rise of a group competing for social control, but a certain form of indifferentism. Wells once said that Americans lack a sense of state, but whether this be true or not the political groups have not been as intense in their interest as in some of the other nations analyzed in this study.¹

The American construction of civic education has developed upon lines different from those of most of the states discussed here. Special emphasis has been placed upon the schools, upon

¹ See Child's interesting study of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the American Federation of Labor as quasi-governmental agencies, *Labor and Capital in National Politics*. See also my *American Political Ideas*, chapter on "Unofficial Government."

political parties, and upon the press. And less use has been made of the government services, of love of locality, symbolism, literature, and of traditions.

Hereditary nobility and its trappings were absent from the beginning and have never played any part in public affairs. Nor have the governmental services been specially impressive. There has been no imposing development of military rulership, and, in any case, the policy of subordination of military to civil authority has been an established policy from the outset. The administrative service was for two generations under the dominance of the spoils system, and only in the last generation began to reach a higher level. The legislative service, except for the National Congress, was not impressive. The judiciary was more imposing and displayed dignity and ability, but not always held popular confidence and support. The governmental services did not, it is true, arouse fear of the tyranny or arrogance of government, but on the other hand they often failed to stimulate public interest through their activity.

The love of locality which may be so powerful a factor in an old country is obviously less impressive in a newly settled state, where migration is rapid and where family ownership of the soil does not commonly go back for many generations. In New England and the South there was a somewhat greater degree of permanence and perhaps a higher development of attachment to a special locality; but, in the main, the very mobility of the population and its detachment from particular spots tended to emphasize the picture of the nation as a whole as the object of allegiance. What was lost by persistence of local attachments was thus gained in the development of the higher instance of authority and devotion.

Uniformity of language aided in the establishment of a group *esprit* over an extraordinary stretch of territory, comparable only to and surpassing that of Russia in intercommunication through the medium of language. But there was not a corresponding development of national literature comparable to the unity and magnitude of the group. English literature dominated the American, and the latter developed only slowly and

with difficulty. In recent times this situation changes and there begins the development of a more typically American literature. Much of this has been critical, like that of Mencken, but in a way stimulative of the development of keener attention and higher standards of social and perhaps ultimately of political life. Hale's *Man without a Country* and Churchill's political novels illustrate the tendency toward politics.¹

Inevitably there developed an American type of symbolism, but not on the European scale of elaboration and artistic background. The British symbolisms suggested at the beginning a form of government and society from which Americans hoped to escape, and hence these symbols were not welcomed. It became necessary to invent new forms adapted to the new conditions. Jeffersonian simplicity was the term that covered the revolt against ceremonialism. All the customary ritualism was developed, but not in so elaborate a form as in the old world—except in the case of the flag, around which a cult was developed after the war. Music, public buildings, inaugurations, funerals, memorials, monuments, and historic places, are featured, but far more impressive in its day to day effect was doubtless the "little red schoolhouse" and the later more elaborate edifices. Holidays and festivals of a political character likewise developed in the course of time, and in America far outranked even those of the church in importance, with the exception of the observance of Sunday. The most impressive piece of political symbolism is the capital city of Washington, made to order and constructed upon an imposing scale, with full regard to the artistic features so often forgotten in American cities and states in the earlier period. But after all the characteristic feature of American symbolism is not its elaborateness but its simplicity. The diplomatic service is typical of the national idea of minor emphasis upon ceremonials and trappings.

From one point of view America is young for traditions, but from another the United States is the oldest of the eight states with the exception of England, with 150 years of unbroken con-

¹ See chap. xiv on "Political Ideas in American Literature" in my *American Political Ideas*.

tinuity of the political order. Socially speaking, furthermore, America is not the land par excellence of traditions, looking backward, but of the present and the future, the land of possibilities and prospects. But in political education, the poverty of tradition has paradoxically led to heavy emphasis upon what little there is, and even to an exaggeration of its significance in the life of the nation. From one point of view America must avoid tradition, because it was hostile to the American principle of government and to the habit of business initiative and enterprise, but from the other a countertradition must be built up. On the formal side, then, the traditions of the Fathers have been given unusual prominence in the scheme of civic education, while informally the test has been pragmatic rather than historic. Washington, Lincoln, and Jefferson have become traditional figures of great prominence in the scheme of political education, but in point of fact their special principles have often been quietly ignored in the very moment and by the very persons who were most loudly proclaiming them as mentors and guides. It must also be observed that the emphasis on political tradition coincides with a period in which the idea of the unchanging Constitution corresponded to the advantage of important industrial interests, concerned in the preservation of the status quo.

The most conspicuous features in the American system of civic training have been the formal schools and the political parties, together with the press and the special patriotic organizations. As in the case of Germany, America has laid great stress upon the value of the school, in America's case as a democratic agency as well as a cultural. There has developed a large amount of formal training not alone in the history of the republic but also in civics or civil government. In many states this has been made obligatory by legislative act, and where there has been no such law, great emphasis has been placed upon this form of education. A wide range and variety of courses in government, many of them superficial and formal, have been set up for the purpose of developing a type of citizen familiar with the history and structure of government. In no other country has

there been a more elaborate development of this particular form of civic training in its formal outlines.¹

This elementary instruction has been supplemented by other series of courses in the universities and the appearance of many special types of instruction in what is termed political science. On the whole, this great expenditure of time and money upon a formal system of school training in civic education is perhaps the characteristic feature of the American system. The school system is supplemented by the organization of the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, the Camp Fire Girls, and other similar organizations for the purpose of general character training and incidentally of civic education in the narrower sense of the term. These groups pursue the familiar methods of the Scout organization now fairly well standardized throughout the Western world. Precept, symbolism, play, excursions, are relied upon to produce a responsible type of citizen in the broader sense of the term and a political citizen in the more restricted sense. There are in America roughly 1,000,000 members of these various organizations.

An important element in civic interest is also the party system. The political parties have enlisted the newcomers in their ranks and brought them into contact with political realities. They have stimulated interest in political affairs on a wide scale, and have made the conduct of public affairs a subject of general discussion. Many of these processes have been crude and on a low level and at times they have defeated their own purpose by arousing the public disgust with incompetence and corruption.² But on the whole the parties have indisputably been one of the outstanding instrumentalities of popular education in civic subjects. The great party leaders, the meetings, the campaigns, the widespread discussion of personalities, and policies, and standards of political behavior, whatever the level, have a far-reaching effect upon the political interest and capacity of the community. All parties are defenders of the nation,

¹ Fully described in The American Historical Association's forthcoming report on *History and The Social Studies*.

² See my *American Party System* for discussion of the functions of the parties.

its chief defenders; all parties are the guardians, the special guardians of political standards and ideals; all parties unite in support theoretically at least of the best types of American citizenship.

One additional feature of the American system is the unusual number of special organizations, specifically interested in the development of national patriotism. The Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution, The National Security League, Americanization branches of countless general organizations, such as the American Legion and the Masonic Order, unite in their effort to inculcate the principles of the Fathers and the habits of sound citizenship.¹ Their energies center largely around the process of Americanization of the newcomers, now a diminishing task, and the combating of the doctrines of the "radicals." More elaborate attempts than anywhere else have been made to insure the speedy and complete assimilation of the immigrant groups, through special classes among foreigners, in factories, night schools, and elsewhere; and through general campaigns in behalf of Americanism and of "sound" traditional principles of governmental action. While the range of these groups is limited to special classes and sections, they are nevertheless to be considered in any summary of the comparative types of approach to the problem of civic education.²

The press in the United States has been a powerful factor in the development of political interest, and in fixing attention on the national pattern, notwithstanding the fact that the journals are regional in scope. In a sense the great newspaper proprietors have been an informal and irresponsible House of Lords. Inadequate as is much of the newspaper instruction in government, the quantity, regularity, and persistence of the press is notable, and it points steadily in the direction of the national rather than

¹ See Pierce, *Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth*.

² Some of these organizations, like the Ku Klux Klan, have taken an attitude of hostility to the foreigner, including the newcomer, the Catholic, the Jew, the Negro, and in some cases the radical, and undertaken a defense of the 100 per cent American. Secret in method, irresponsible in control, bigoted in their policies, they nevertheless exercised for a time a considerable influence, not only in popular elections, but also in the formation of public attitudes.

the local or other social groups. This is true even of the widespread foreign-language newspapers, while no strong opposition to the political group develops either in the religions or the labor press.¹

The extraordinary growth of the radio and the movie in the United States makes these agencies of great importance in the national scheme of civic education. The use of the radio in reporting political meetings is universal, and in presidential campaigns or other great occasions makes it possible for speakers to address the bulk of the electorate. Extensive and increasing use of the radio is also made for purposes of systematic civic education, conspicuously in the service organized by the National League of Women Voters.

The movie-talkie also becomes an agency of instruction, on a limited scale, in the formal educational institutions, and, on a much broader scale, in the commercial employment of the film for amusement purposes. While the political film is relatively unimportant in position, as compared with politics in the press, much space is given to films directly or indirectly dealing with political situations and tending to shape political attitudes. The overwhelming bulk of this is favorable to the cultivation of types of political conformity and allegiance, with some exceptions such as the attitude toward the police and a few other cases.

On the whole, the American political system has had few competing loyalties to make headway against, and in the field of social control has had the field almost to itself. The struggles with church, region, nationalities, and economic class, so common in many of the European states, have been almost unknown in America, with the tragic exception of the Civil War period when region and economics combined against the central political unity. The party system, the schools, and the press have been the chief agencies through which civic education has been developed and disseminated in a polyglot population. Tradition has been invoked but with relatively little effect. Symbolism, love of loyalty, governmental services, have counted for rela-

¹ See Lucy Salmon, *Newspaper and Authority*.

tively little, while popular participation and a sense of democratic responsibility have counted for much. The background of social democracy, of intense mobility, the rich possibilities in the economic situation—these factors have gone a long way to make easy the task of cultivating political allegiance and morale in a diverse and scattered population.

CHAPTER VII

A COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF CIVIC TRAINING—*Continued*

SOVIET RUSSIA¹

Russia is the world's most notable example of an attempt to improvise a system of civic education. The most striking and impressive characteristic of the Soviet system is the conscious, systematic, and orderly approach to the solution of the vast problem of constructing a new type of civic attitude on the ruins of an old régime. Following a revolution in which the political order, the economic order, and the religious order of a thousand years were rudely overturned, the task of reconstructing out of this social debacle the new cult of civic cohesion was enough to have staggered the most unlimited ambition and imagination. This whole challenging problem presents some of the most fascinating aspects of the riddle of citizenship in a modern state. The otherwise enormous difficulties in this undertaking were enhanced by the fact that theoretically the new construction would not be a political-territorial state of the older state, but a proletarian class group without special regard to territorial lines or political demarcations.

The key to this attempt may be found in: 1. the adoption of universal education as the instrument; 2. the adoption of a democratic social system; 3. the aptitude of the Soviet group for schematic construction and for organized and vital forms of propaganda.

Regionally the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (who do not employ the term Russia) cover a wide-stretching but not dissevered sweep of territory reaching from the Pacific almost to the Atlantic, and from the Arctic to the Caucasus in the south. Within this territory there is room for a dozen nations, but there is no special form of regional separatism. In one sense the

¹ S. N. Harper, *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*; and also *Making Bolsheviks*.

whole area was never very closely integrated under the czaristic régime, but the domain has not been weak because of violent and disruptive separation, as in some other states, as much as by reason of lack of any aggressive political interest of any character except the local. The problem of modern Russia was not that of reconciling the quarreling regions, resisting to the death the establishment of any central authority as such or of special economic regions.

Nor is there an ethnic problem of very serious character. There are, it is true, many widely differing types of human beings within the territorial limits of the Soviet state, Russians and Little Russians and Tartars and Turks, but, in the main and by and large, the bulk are describable as Slavs. And if they are not Slavs, they are peoples with whom the Slavs have no special difficulty in arranging an amicable *modus vivendi*. Linguistic and cultural differences are found in abundance, enough it would seem, on the basis of European experience, to wreck the ship of state in almost every storm. But they are not, on the whole, disruptive, and an easy-going policy of toleration of linguistic variations suffices to maintain the necessary morale for common government.

Russia contains the following main ethnic representations:

	Per Cent
Russian (Great Russia)	52.9
Ukrainian	21.2
Finn-Mongolians	5.4
White Russian	3.2
Tartars	2.0
Jews	1.8
Turks	1.1
Others	12.4

Its estimated population in 1930 was 154,000,000.

The state religion of Russia was the Greek Catholic church, but the revolution shattered its power and much of its prestige, and it remains for the moment incapable of effective resistance to the central political authority.¹ Possibly the older church may rise again as a religious group recognizing the political

¹ Spinka, *The Church and the Russian Revolution*.

hegemony of the Soviet government. In the meantime the government remains officially at war with the religion in its old form, competing at this point with an important though, for the moment, disorganized ecclesiastical factor of great strength in modern society. The church was not traditionally either anti-national, that is anti-Russian, or anti-political, but was, on the contrary, both nationalistic and political in its tendencies.

The economic basis of the Russian political community is found in the union of the peasants, who constitute 85 per cent of the population, and the industrial workers, for the moment set up as a proletarian dictatorship. The business group in the older sense of the term was eliminated by the revolution and still remains away, with few exceptions. The revolution broke up the system of large landed estates and there were, in 1928, 26,000,000 landholders in Russia before the collective movement started in 1929. These, with a relatively small number of industrial workers, estimated at 3,000,000, make up the citizenry of the new order both in the domain of economics and of politics as well.

The ideology of the new group or groups is that of the Marxian socialism as developed and applied by the Russian leader, Lenin. It contemplates the elimination of the bourgeois class in society and the formation of a "Toiler's State" in which complete political and economic power shall be vested in the proletariat. The proscription of the bourgeois class and the bourgeois standards is a leading plank in the platform of the Soviet group. On this social basis the Russians have erected a new system of civic education, calculated to produce a new generation of devout Communists and in the meantime to maintain the morale of the political community, and to develop a working type of political habits and practices.

Many of the devices usually employed elsewhere are little used by the Russians. Traditions, love of locality, governmental services, political party struggles, which loom so large in other systems, are relegated to the rear in the Russian construct of civic education. On the other hand the use of the schools, the development of new types of symbolism based upon the new

social situation and the new ideology, and adult education through the instrumentality of improvised schools, of literature and the press, of the radio and the movie, are conspicuous elements in the system of the Soviets.

One of the characteristic features of the new régime is the interest in education with the commitment to the elimination of illiteracy and the encouragement of special talent wherever found. In the development of the new school system, the subject of civic training occupies the foreground, and the instruments of education are consciously and consistently employed for the purpose of indoctrinating the oncoming generation with the attitudes of the communistic group in politics as well as in economics. In no modern school system is so large a proportion of the time devoted to indoctrination in ideology, which runs literally in this case like a red thread through the whole of the educational plans. This is supplemented by the youth organizations in the shape of the Young Octobrists, the Pioneers, the Young Communists, leading finally into the fold of the Communist party in the case of those with special aptitudes. This is still further amplified by means of the establishment of factory education, army education, Communist party education, home education, all designed to raise the cultural level of the community, but incidentally enforcing the principles and policies of the Communist régime. Lenin himself pointed out that the Communist leaders were after all bourgeois born and bred and that the only hope lay in a coming generation trained in the principles of the communistic philosophy.

This system reckons with materialistic motives dominating human nature, and upon the force of symbolism and propaganda in controlling mass action. The indoctrination consequently has been both systematic and, at the same time, symbolic in its essential features. The civic education has been mass education, and the symbolic as well as the rational has been employed in dealing with the population.

The new symbolism centers around the cult of Marx and especially of Lenin. The Lenin Mausoleum, the thousands of Lenin Corners scattered throughout the country, the spread of

stories of the leader's life and philosophy, are the backbone of the new plan. The Red flag, the "Internationale," great mass meetings, parades, demonstrations, festivals, holidays, and revolutionary art symbolize the new order, and fill the abstract theories with vivid color and rhythm. Into this plan the traditions of the older might seem difficult to weave successfully, but to some extent this has been accomplished. The famous Museum of the Revolution commemorates not only the Revolution of 1917 but all of the Russian revolutions in historic times and all their heroes. In a broader sense an international proletarian movement may at times include all of the revolutions of the working-class groups at any time anywhere, and all of their respective symbolisms.

The Kremlin, former home of the Romanovs, stands as the office building of the new régime, and the Red Square of the earlier times, as the new Red Square of Communism. With great care the historical memorials and monuments of the past have been preserved, with due regard for Russian historicity. Symbols of Russian nationalism have not been destroyed, except as they commemorated the personal deeds of the earlier rulers. Some of the older and uglier figures of czarist tyranny have been ironically preserved.

Russian language and literature have been employed as instruments for the dissemination of civic education and for the maintenance of Soviet solidarity. But minor variations in language, as in the Ukraine, have been left undisturbed, with other cultural variations in different parts of the territory under the general jurisdiction of the Soviets. A flexible political system has made this possible to an extent not utilized by the older political order. Books, pamphlets, and press pour out a stream of reading material, into almost all of which the motive of civic training enters openly or obscurely. Never has there been so strenuously developed and systematic an effort to improve the cultural level and at the same time generate a specific civic and economic attitude.

The party system as understood in Western Europe does not exist in Russia. The only party permitted is the Communist,

which only by an indefensible stretch of ordinary terminology can be properly termed a party. The Communist group organization with its widely organized ramifications controls effectively the operation of the government and of industry. But an opposition party is inadmissible in theory and prohibited in fact and practice. The Communist "party," however, serves very important purposes in the development of civic morale and training. Its two million members receive an intensive education as responsible citizens and as responsible governors of politics and administrators of industry.¹ They are presumably not only the governors but also the leaders in the making of social and political mores, and their training and activities are therefore intimately related to the whole process of civic education. In this respect they occupy a unique position, midway between that of a religious order, a political party, and a higher level of civil service in countries like England and Germany. They have back of them, of course, neither hereditary origin, social prestige, wealth, nor professional prestige, and must therefore build their way as they go.

The governmental services relied upon in the old régime were the hereditary nobility and the army, together with the administrative bureaucracy. The modern system retains the Red army, a popular instrument of defense against capitalism and the outsider, but there is no substitute for the trappings of the old nobility. The new civil service is recruited largely from the workers, with, of course, survivals from the old order, but emphasis is placed upon mass participation in government. The most impressive parts of the government are the Communist party and the Red army, while wide support is sought for the whole service through the democratic appeal and through the democratic practice of organizing industrial life in the factory and agricultural life in the rural Soviets.

The Russian system when closely examined is seen to consist of interwoven elements of the most fascinating type—the Communist economic hope and the Slav ethnic reality, the faith in the international proletarian group and the practical develop-

¹ See Harper, *op. cit.*

ment of Russian territorial and ethnic nationalism, a materialist philosophy in dogmatic form, and an actual mastery of mass psychology and propaganda.

Mass responsibility in economics and politics and popular education have produced a form of democratic nationalism, quite unexpected by the founders of communism and in a sense unwelcome to some of them. As in Germany and France the group of workers have not destroyed the political community as some anticipated and advocated, but have assumed responsibility for it and *pro tanto* strengthened it. Nor in this case have they destroyed the territorial-ethnic basis of the political community, but have taken it over and in some respects even emphasized its characteristics appreciably.

In the Russian case an attempt has been made, not merely to modify the ancient régime of politics, but also the entire bourgeois point of view and the religious background of morality. The basic political habits might conceivably be disturbed by this design, but thus far have not been. The peasant detaches his political loyalty from the czar but whether he reattaches it to the proletarians of the world or to the Russian nation may be open to question in many cases. In many instances he will prove more Russian than before with the assumption of his new position on the land, or the new respect for the individual, or the new responsibility for the welfare of the nation once called Russia.

All in all, this is the world's most interesting and suggestive experiment in civic education, rich in materials for the student of civic processes.

ITALY¹

The formation of the Italian political attitude in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries represents an interesting phase of the political process. The struggles of Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour to develop an Italian national sentiment, and the later attempts of Mussolini and his aids to further stimulate *Italianità* and at the same time allegiance to the Fascist régime

¹ See Schneider and Clough, *Making Fascists*; Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*.

are full of meaning for the student of civic training. The Fascist experiment in particular is a striking example of a systematic and conscious attempt to utilize all the known agencies of civic education for the stimulation of civic feeling and loyalty.

The regional problem in modern Italy has not presented serious difficulties, with the exception of the Vatican area later to be discussed under the head of religion. There are wide differences between Sicily and the northern sections of Italy, which in historic times have been the basis of sanguinary struggles, but more recently these ancient antagonisms have faded, and there no longer remains any pronounced regionalism, with political connotations and with separatist inclinations strong enough to serve as the basis of an anti-national movement of any consequence. There is notable cultural pride of locality, as in Florence or Venice for example, but these regional traditions of cultural greatness do not now take the form of desires for political self-expression, and do not profess to compete with the larger political loyalty to the greater Italy.

Nor do the problems of diversity and antagonism of population disturb the dreams of the Italian nation-makers. The ethnic stock of Italy contains many widely different strains, looking toward the Goths in the north and toward the Orient in the far south, and a student of Italian types will of course at once point to many interesting and striking differences in the patterns of various Italian population groups. He will find dialects so far apart as to make mutual understanding between a Genovese and a Neapolitan often difficult, or a Sicilian and Venetian, but amid this wealth of interesting types the outstanding fact is the presence of a common language and a common general type of stock, both of which are far more in evidence than their variations from the central pattern. The Italians outside Italy present another problem, but these *irredenta* only serve to increase the solidarity of those within the political boundaries of the state. Men who can scarcely use their common Italian will unite in enthusiasm for Fiume or other Italian folk outside the national boundaries. Nor do the special types of Italianity cohere in their demands for special recognition with-

in the political unity of which they are a part. In this respect the Italian state is spared the embarrassments of other political communities in which the varieties of race and language and their accompanying cultures are often irreconcilable.

Economic differences in the new Italy have been significant, and are a serious problem in the organization of a central political loyalty. Italy has been primarily an agricultural country, with a rising development of industrial enterprise in the North; but neither the agrarians nor the industrialist workers have been highly organized. The labor movement in Italy has had from the beginning a political action program, and the organized Socialist party during the war maintained a consistent attitude of opposition to the Italian participation in the contest.¹ "Neither help nor hindrance" was their slogan. After the war the attempt of certain workers to take over and operate the factories was for the moment successful but soon collapsed, and in the reaction against this movement Fascism came to the fore.

The new Fascist régime has undertaken to incorporate both industrial employers, employees, and agrarians in corporations which serve as the basis for the government and the state—six organizations of employers, six of employees, and the syndicate of intellectuals. These groups are now woven not only into the structure of the party but also into the government itself, and thus have become an "integral" part of the whole Fascist system of political order. It is not to be presumed that economic class antagonisms have been destroyed or permanently reconciled by this distribution of mechanisms, but for the time at least the safety of the state is not in jeopardy from industrial war. For the moment the characteristic thing about the Italian system is the high degree of formal organization into which agriculture, labor, and capital have fallen, and the elaborate attempt to reconcile these competing economic elements in a synthetic system. For the moment all of these elements are incorporated in the party and the state, but under the supreme guidance of an aggressive dictatorship, ruling in last instance with an iron hand. For the moment at any rate the Italian po-

¹ The Bissolati faction was pro-war.

litical order is not threatened by the menace of another and competing proletarian order, superseding the state.

A far more serious problem is that of the reconciliation of the Cross and the Crown in ancient Rome, the historic seat of imperial and religious authority and to this day the home of the central power of the Roman church. In a sense Italy has borne the burden of the world's tragic inability to reconcile the organization of religion with that of political authority, to integrate the two competing rivals for the regulation of the patterns of human behavior in so large a sphere of human life. The Papal States, situated in the center of the Italian peninsula, long prevented the organization of the Italian nation. They inspired the politics of Machiavelli and the ardent religio-nationalism of Mazzini; and the struggle between Vatican and Quirinal still goes on, in new forms and new channels, notwithstanding the New Concordat between Il Duce and the Pope. There still remains "the bipolarization of Italian society and culture in two great institutions, each competing for the first place in the minds and hearts of the people."¹

The free church in the free state has been set up; compulsory religion decreed in the schools and religious instruction placed exclusively in the hands of the church. The higher officials of the church must still be confirmed by the state. The state recognizes religious instruction as the basis of the state, and the church agrees to pray for the officials of the state.

The struggle for the control of Italian social and intellectual life goes on, for Fascism is itself a sort of religion, with the heroes, the cults, the ecstasies of religion, cast perhaps in more secular form. Catechisms, creeds, and spiritual guides of Fascism abound.² Fascism and Catholicism struggle for the possession of the organizations dealing with the youth, especially, and sharp are the contests over what are commonly called Boy and Girl Scouts, both Catholic and Fascist. The young Catholics may teach the catechism but they must not compete with the Boy Scouts in the field of boys' clubs. "The rivalry between

¹ Schneider, *ibid.*, p. 79.

² See the *Manuale del Fascista; Regolamento spirituale di disciplina*, 1923.

church and state for the souls of Italians," says Schneider, "is keener than it has ever been before."

At this point, then, the prestige of the political organization is threatened by the rival prestige of a competing organization, which while not in purpose primarily political may at any moment construe its moral guardianship of the community as involving action contravening political loyalties or mandates. Italian political cohesion is, we may conclude, strongly rooted in community of race and region, little threatened by the sharper rivalries arising from economic class struggles, but seriously weakened by the presence of a religious rival of first rate importance and with roots going deep down in the soil of Italian life and culture.¹

On the technical side of civic education, Fascism has made full use of all the instrumentalities, both ancient and modern, designed to appeal either to reason or emotion or interest, and has endeavored to combine them in an effective type of political loyalty. No such determined effort has been made by any modern state, with the exception of Soviet Russia. At the base of the system are the elements of tradition, symbolism, language, and literature, and at the top are the devices of formal education and of special patriotic organizations. Parties and governmental services are less relied upon than in other states.

The glory that was Rome is omnipresent in the Fascist construction of civic feeling, Caesarian from the pose of Il Duce to the Roman organization of the army and to the revival of Latin in the school curriculum. Some of this was taken over from the D'Annunzians, but these enthusiasts have been surpassed even beyond the dreams of the fiery poet. They have made Romanism the basic principle of the Fascist religion, and in the New Italy see the revival of the old empire in its most brilliant and powerful days.

Furthermore, a Fascist symbolism has been created, partly a revival of the old Roman, but partly the creation of a new time and a new spirit—the black shirt and the black flag (taken from D'Annunzio), Fascist uniforms and rituals, the salute, the

¹ For the use of other traditions see Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-98.

cry *eia, eia, a-la-la*, and the popular song, "Giovanezza." October, 1922, marks the beginning of a new year, the Fascist year. The day of the anniversary of the march on Rome, the *Leva Fascista* (nearest Sunday to March 23), the birthday of Rome (April 21) to take the place of May Day: these are all parts of the vigorous effort to build up a Fascist symbolism to typify the new spirit of the new political entity and furnish an emotional color for the picture of the new loyalty.

In like manner the glories of the Italian language and Italian literature have been utilized in the weaving of the new fabric of the Fascist state. The cultural conquests of the Latin language and of the Latin and late Italian literature have been fully appreciated and readily incorporated in the spirit of the new political unit. These priceless treasures of a type no other nation can boast have been claimed as the heritage of the Italian people and have been employed to fortify the cultural position of the Fascist group and to arouse and inflame the pride of the Italian group. The conscription of the press may be added here, but the element of censorship involved makes this weapon one of doubtful utility, here as in Russia. Civic enthusiasm does not flourish as well when it is believed that the press is managed or controlled in the interest of the authoritarian group.¹

On the other hand, the measures of formal education have not been neglected, but on the contrary have been enormously developed to meet the new situation. Under the leadership of Gentile² a thoroughgoing reform was undertaken to establish schools for building national character, and perhaps the most complete change made by the new Fascist régime was that brought about in this field. New methods were introduced and a new curriculum, a new system from the kindergarten to the university, neglecting no phase of educational life in the effort for thoroughness and consistency. The underlying basis of this is an interesting combination of Hegelian idealism with Fascist national-

¹ Schneider, chap. ix, "The Fascist Press." "Journalism," said Mussolini, "is the daily parliament, the daily platform where men from the universities, from the industries, and from daily life thresh out problems with a competence seldom found on the benches of Parliament" (1923).

² *Il Fascismo al governo della scuola.*

ism, into which is ingeniously interwoven the implication that "moral freedom is attained by an inner sharing in the cultural and traditional life of the people, not by a formal and mechanical participation in democratic institutions."¹ Civic education is begun in the second year of the curriculum, and continued throughout the course. In every room there is a crucifix, a picture of the king, and a picture of Mussolini. Similar attempts to inculcate the Fascist idea are carried through the higher educational levels, and find their climax in the Fascist schools of political science, and on through an organized system of adult education (*athenei*). As in the Russian system, however, refractory forms of idealism in education are dealt with in summary manner.²

The modern device of special patriotic organizations has not been neglected in the organization of the Fascist campaign for supremacy. Youth organizations include more than a million members, notable among these the Balilla (8-14), and the Avanguardia (14-18), with the Catholic Boy Scouts eliminated; and on the feminine side the Piccole Italiane and the Giovane Italiane (about 300,000). Boys are subjected to military discipline, and their organization modeled after adult Fascists. Veterans' associations include the National Association, the National Foundation, the National Association of War Cripples and Invalids: all active in the dissemination of the Fascist propaganda, directly or indirectly, and, of course, not to the exclusion of the appropriate basic purposes of such organizations of veterans. Nor does this enumeration include patriotic organizations connected more directly with the military establishment, nor those of an imperialistic nature such as the National Union of Reserve Officers or the Italian Navy League, nor those allied with the educational institutions, nor the Foreign Fasci scattered among Italian people all over the world, nor the Dante Alighieri for the diffusion of Italian culture and language abroad, nor the recently formed Committee for the Diffusion of Italian Culture Abroad, hereafter to centralize the care of the Italian abroad under the direct supervision of the Ministry of

¹ Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

² *Ibid.*, chap. v.

Foreign Affairs. All of these agencies are industriously laboring to perfect the civic education of the Italian, and to stimulate his interest in and loyalty to the Fascist state.

The rôle of governmental services in the development of civic feeling under the Fascist régime is unusual in that two organizations, the Fascist party and the Fascist militia, must be included under this general caption as they approximate in the one case the army and in the other the government itself. The regular Fascist army attracts the attention of the citizens and impresses them with its glitter and swank, and in addition to this an element of nationalistic training is provided during the periods of military education, especially for the army officers. "A book and a musket, a perfect Fascist," Mussolini once said to indicate the relation between Fascism and militarism and to direct attention to the importance in the general scheme of the new state.

An attempt has been made to utilize the bureaucracy in the service of civic education. Under the Fascist system, if the civil employee is hostile to the government, he is hostile to the state, and must be dismissed from his position.¹ He thus becomes not merely an official but an agent for the spread of Fascist doctrines. Upon these public servants the régime relies not only for the administration of public services but also for the inculcation of the Fascist idea throughout the nation in such contacts as they make from time to time.

Two special variations of governmental services as civic educators remain to be considered, the party and the militia. As in Russia the party system is actually abolished, but the party name retained for the purpose of quasi-governmental organization and of civic propaganda. In Italy the party is now formally incorporated in the government itself, and its Grand Council has become an official organ of the state, indeed the Supreme Organ, controlling the selection of members of parliament and

¹ "The functionary of the Fascist State should be a Fascist, should be a soldier in the field of eternal combat, should work day in and day out, hour by hour, fervidly and feverishly, for the high mission which has been entrusted to him. Public functionaries should be ardent and patient instruments of an intense national life" (*ibid.*, p. 132).

otherwise ordering the destiny of the nation through its conferences and mandates, subject to the still higher direction of Il Duce himself. It becomes the duty of the party as civic educator to stress the economic necessities of the people, the tradition of heroic suffering, the aspiration toward empire and *la grandezza del popolo Italiano*. And the appropriate forms of activity are military drill and marches, sports, supervision of patriotic education, undertaking useful public works, and professional training for political careers. The party thus becomes an unusual agent for the purposes of political control and for the dissemination of political ideas of the dominant régime throughout Italy. The values of party discussion and debate are lost in this process, and an effort is made to replace them with new functions in the organization of the political system. In this manner the name of the party is preserved while its ordinary uses are missing. As in Russia the party reappears as an agency of central control, using a more friendly name and method than the traditional dictatorship.

The arm of the Fascist party has been the Fascist Voluntary Militia, an organization which grew out of the Black Shirts who marched on Rome in 1922 and were later transformed into a political police force, outside the control of the regular army and the regular police forces of the state. In a sense they police the police, and supervise the ordinary functionaries of government. Some 250,000 in number, there is only a small fraction of them on duty at any given time, but others are held in reserve for emergencies. With ill-defined powers and duties, they assume a general supervision over the performance of governmental functions, and constitute themselves censors extraordinary over the political life of the nation. They are a semi-military arm of the party and in an emergency a personal weapon of the chief. They are fed by promotions from the Boy Scouts, who enter the militia at the time of the great celebration of the *Leva Fascista*, and still maintain their independence of the regular army and of governmental officials as well. In a sense they constitute a super-agency for the enforcement of discipline, and for the development of civic morale. Clashing at times with the regular

army, the government officials, the party, they remain a type of super-government, loyal to the person and the purposes of the Duce.

Fascism has also made full use of the agency of ideology and the flair of personality. The Fascists have evolved a political theory which is anti-democratic and anti-liberal. In place of these conceptions, held by Fascists to be antiquated and impossible under modern conditions, there is presented the political theory of the élite. Not the many but the few are born to rule, and to exercise legal and political functions. The masses are unfit for freedom, which is out of date, but they are to enjoy a full measure of "moral freedom" without any political implications. They are to share "in the cultural and traditional life of the people" but not to have any "formal and mechanical participation in democratic institutions." Their interests are to be interpreted by the élite with their superior intelligence and monopoly of legal power and irresponsibility.

The center of the Fascist system, both of power and of civic education, is the striking personality of Mussolini, around whom a political system and a civic cult have been built. The whole scheme is indeed inseparable from the individuality of Il Duce, and the dramatics of his career, recalling as it does the traditions of the Roman Caesars. As Lenin has been made the center of the Russian cult of Communism, so Mussolini has supplied the basis of the Italian cult of Fascism. One grows out of the Marxian economic doctrines and the proletarian theory slowly maturing for a century, and the other out of an anti-democratic pro-dictatorial sentiment likewise slowly gathering during the same period.

In conclusion then, the outstanding feature of the Italian Fascist system of political cohesion is the problem of dealing with the omnipresent competing loyalty to the church. The system itself is an interesting combination of the older elements of tradition: symbolism with the most modern forms of comprehensive formal civic training through the schools, the special patriotic organizations, and the development of unusual agencies such as the so-called Fascist party and the Fascist militia.

On the whole this constitutes the most systematic and complete attempt to develop civic feeling outside of Russia. And behind all the gentler devices of an educational character is the overshadowing dictatorship, with the use of such force as may be necessary for the propagation of the faith among the skeptics.

SWITZERLAND

The Swiss political system presents one of the most difficult of problems in civic cohesion—a case that might readily have proved the undoing of less competent political workmen.¹ The racial heterogeneity of the population, its sharp religious differences, the intense localism of the regions of the country, offer the most serious obstacles to a unified nation. Yet all these have been overcome and a definite Swiss political loyalty has emerged, triumphant over all the competing affections and allegiances. What has brought this about?

The economic basis of modern Switzerland was originally almost wholly agrarian, but in the new Switzerland about one-fourth of the population is engaged in agricultural pursuits while commerce and manufacturing absorb the energies of the greater part of those gainfully occupied. Yet the peasant proprietors with their small holdings and the manufacturers with their relatively small scale plants are not set over against each other as class against class; on the contrary they have much in common in their attitudes. Nor are the antagonisms between organized business and organized labor as sharply defined as elsewhere, again, perhaps, owing to the relatively small scale of production. It is true that the Social Democratic party, representing organized labor, has until recently declined seats in the Federal Council and responsibility for the conduct of the central government, but this has not prevented the assumption of local responsibilities, nor has it interfered seriously with the development of a national patriotism. The Communists have proclaimed the supremacy of proletarian affiliation as over against national allegiance, but this group is not strongly represented in

¹ These factors are brilliantly discussed by R. C. Brooks in his *Civic Training in Switzerland*.

the community, and thus far has not proved a serious obstacle to national unity.¹

Race, religion, and region, however, present a far different situation. The ethnic composition of Switzerland is: 2,750,622 German, 70.9 per cent; 824,320 French, 21.2 per cent; and 238,544 Italian, 6.2 per cent.² Its religious composition is 57 per cent Protestant and 41 per cent Catholic; and the local spirit of the cantons and smaller communities is very strong. To make all of these groups comfortable in a common patriotism has been a master problem of political adjustment. It is noteworthy also that the foreign-born population of Switzerland is 10 per cent and has reached as high as 17 per cent. In one canton, Geneva, the figure of 40.4 per cent has been touched.³ In the last great war, the racial sympathies of the German and French groups were severely tried, but Swiss sentiment continued nevertheless dominant, and in fact emerged stronger than ever. The Italian group is not large enough to compete numerically with the other two.

These racial elements have not been coherent enough to form political parties and carry on political conflicts on the arena of parliamentary organization, but have yielded to economic or even religious lines of cleavage. Their boundaries have not coincided with those of the religious groups. The Italians have been of the Catholic belief, but the Germans have been in part Lutheran and in part Catholic; and the French have been in part Calvinistic and in part Catholic. Likewise the economic lines have cut across the track of the nationalistic groups.

The ethnic groups are found, however, in separate territorial areas of the nation, but the sharp geographical isolation of Switzerland as a whole helps to create a common solidarity. It is of course clear that this ethnic divergence is the weak spot in the Swiss nationalism, but the course of events has tended to minimize rather than intensify these racial rivalries, and to

¹ A vivid picture of Swiss antagonisms is given in Jacob Bosshart, *Ein Rufer in der Wüste*.

² H. Weilenmann, *Die vielsprachige Schweiz*, 1925.

³ See Brooks, *op. cit.*, chap. xvi, "Foreigners and Foreign Influence in Switzerland."

create a common interest overshadowing and replacing the particularistic interest of the several racial elements held together within the political boundaries of the state. There have been no irreconcilables within or *irredentas* without to constitute permanent obstacles to the unity of the political group, as in Austria-Hungary.¹ The fact that the Swiss government has been decentralized and that much of the actual government is in the hands of the local cantons and smaller communities has helped this situation by allowing the racial groupings free field for their self-expression in these smaller areas, while bringing them together on the larger national field of Swissdom. German, French, and Italian did not need to struggle for the possession of the central government, for they might govern themselves in their own local-political and racial homes.

Religious differences have been much sharper, and the clash of beliefs has threatened the unity of the state on more than one grim occasion. The home of Calvinism and at the same time the seat of powerful Catholic influences, Switzerland has seen the rival confessions come to grips repeatedly in conflict. The Sonderbund war of 1847 was in many respects a war of religions, the Catholic cantons on the one side and the Protestant on the other, with the dominant Protestant group taking the side of nationalism and the Catholics that of localism. This regrettable civil strife ended in the triumph of the nationalists, and since then the asperity of the religious controversy has been softened, although the argument has by no means ceased. Since 1848, although it did not organize itself on a national scale until 1912, the Catholic Conservative party has been in existence and has played an important rôle in the determination of public policies, accepting responsible positions in the Federal Council. The church has on the whole accepted the existing political order, and reinforced the state with its religious sanctions and influences.

Regionalism and localism have been historically strong in the

¹ The old Confederation was predominantly German (1291-1798) with Valais, Neuchatel, and Geneva admitted in 1815, and Ticino and Vaud in 1803.

Swiss area, and for centuries the particularism of these localities was so powerful that no effective organization on a larger scale could be formed. The local loyalties run back for many centuries and are deep-rooted in local tradition and symbolisms. To some extent this geographical regionalism is reinforced by racial and religious affiliations and to a less extent by industrial differences, but these are not sufficient to form complexes of the threatening character indicated by the coincidence of land, race, and religion.

Between the eastern and western sections there are differences of blood, of tradition and history, of religious views and economic interests, and derived from all these a very marked divergence of social psychology. Inheritors of Calvin on the one side of the Saane and of Zwingli on the other are Protestants to be sure, but not the same kind of Protestants by any means. In the veins of the west Swiss still pulses much of the tradition of the French Revolution, despite the assertion often heard there that they alone interpret Rousseau aright, his "back to nature" meaning to them "cultivate the soil." On the other hand the German Swiss are outspoken realists, slow of speech, haters of all posing, steady workers at the most tedious tasks each in his own sphere, lovers of order and discipline, and hence almost too respectful of the powers that be [Brooks].¹

In none of the countries here considered with the exception of Austria-Hungary is the sentiment of localism so strong and so fully expressed in political organization and practice as here. Since the Civil War of 1847, however, this feeling has been on the decline, and modern forms of communication are breaking down the earlier isolation on which the intense localism thrrove for centuries. In one sense the regional tendencies with their expression in forms of local self-government serve as a safety valve for differences that might otherwise under a centralized system have met in conflict on the national stage and battled there to the detriment of the state. The cantonal spirit may express itself under the present order of things in established religion or in local laws and observances of a great variety, leaving

¹ Compare Paul Seippel, *Schweizerische Wahrheiten* (1919), p. i; W. E. Rappard, *Zur nationalen Verständigung und Einigkeit*.

the broader national problems to the determination of the national groups in larger area and assembly.¹

Looking broadly at the competing group loyalties in the Swiss community, the least important seem to be the racial and regional-linguistic, and the most important the economic and the religious. The lines of linguistic and geographical difference seem to fade or at least to lose their political significance. There is still a sharp cleavage between the rival confessions, with a high development of Catholic loyalty; and there is a rising tide of economic class consciousness and internationalism of the proletarian type. This is not to say that either the proletariat or the church is a serious menace to Swiss nationalism at present, but merely to point out that these are the most serious challenges to the unity of the state. And indeed region, language, and religion are all on the decline as differentiators, leaving the economic class interest as the only one on the increase.

The civic education of the Swiss has been primarily a local one with the slow development of a broader national civic feeling. Although the original federation is more than 600 years old, the ties of Swiss national sentiment have developed very gradually, and still rest upon the locality. The geographical isolations of this mountainous country have yielded only tardily to the trends of the modern time toward more intimate communication and a wider range of human relations. The schools are local in nature, not national; the literature is often local in range; the parties have a strongly local tendency; the traditions and symbols are primarily local in their color. There are few important special patriotic organizations and the federal governmental service is not as significant and colorful as that of states such as France and Germany on Swiss borders.

It has been necessary for Switzerland to piece together slowly

¹ "The Swiss are fond of likening their country to a rambling old chalet with twenty-two rooms, all strikingly peculiar, but all under the same broad and sheltering roof."

"The Swiss federal citizen is always in the first instance a Bernese, Basler, Zürcher, Glarner, or Appenzeller. In that which he names his liberty a bit of his native heath is inviolably preserved" (Wilhelm Schäfer, *Briefe aus der Schweiz und Erlebnis in Tirol* [1927]).

the elements of a national allegiance, transferring and adopting some of the local symbols and literature and making them its own; to center attraction, interest, and affection upon the work of the national government, upon the national parties, upon the concept of national citizenship, to develop a love for Switzerland as a whole as well as for Geneva or Zurich or other special locality. In part this has been a negative process, facilitated by the universal fear of absorption either by Austrian or German or French authorities. Swiss experience with Austrian overlordship was not pleasing, and, when the threat of Austria disappeared, the French overlordship was not more welcomed; nor is the prospect of German rule or Italian rule welcomed any more enthusiastically. The French elements in Switzerland prefer to retain their local independence rather than be swallowed up by the French state; the same is true of the German elements who do not look with favor upon annexation to the German state. The localism of the small communities finds expression in self-government of long-standing, and the possibility of merger in some larger and distant unit strikes fear into the heart of the local Swiss. They dread absorption by larger states more than they dislike federal association with each other, uncomfortable as even that may be.

Efforts have not been wanting, however, to build up the national idea through the ordinary mechanisms of civic education. Beginning in 1910 a serious attempt was made to organize formal civic training in the schools as a federal enterprise. This was defeated, however, and training in civic affairs is a local and cantonal affair, in which local allegiance and loyalty are more strongly emphasized than national. The school child learns that he is both a Bernese and a Swiss, with the emphasis on the Bernese. Local tradition and symbolism form the substance of these local courses, but not without reference to the history of the Federation as a whole and some of the common affairs of the Swiss.

The governmental services are not strongly relied upon as a means of civic indoctrination, although not without their influence on the formation of civic attitudes. A service of uni-

form integrity, competence, dignity, and maturity impresses itself continuously upon the community by the slow process of repetition. The army service which is universal and compulsory unquestionably has a strong nationalizing influence, and types of civic instruction are given during the period of military training. Fear of the outsider and the necessity of some form of self-defense are basic in Swiss political thought and full advantage is taken of this opening to make still stronger the Swiss national position and attitude.

The strongest influence exerted by the governmental organization arises from its fundamentally democratic character, from the sense of proprietorship which the Swiss have in a mechanism so obviously under popular control. The national referendums on fundamental questions of Swiss policy, such as admission to the League of Nations, have tended to emphasize this situation, and likewise to oblige all citizens to take for the moment the nationalistic attitude, determining from the point of view of the nation as a whole the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular policy. Local referendums and the mass meetings in some of the smaller communities have had the same effect of giving the community confidence in the genuinely representative character of the government.

Political parties in Switzerland are strongly localistic in their nature and for this reason often present puzzling problems to the student who is unable to follow their detached and sometimes personal ramifications. Yet the national organization has brought about the formation of national parties representing the most important social elements, the workers, the peasants, the Catholics, the larger and less compact group of democratic progressives. The interest is great enough to bring out a large vote, and arouse widespread participation in party activities. These party divisions have obliged the partisans for the moment, and ostensibly at least, to put their problems in national terms, to profess the good of Switzerland as their goal, and thus to make medicine for the nation as a whole, however particularistic their special efforts and interests may be. These parties do not serve as civic educators in the sense or way that English

parties function, but they are powerful agencies not to be ignored in any system of civic education.

Of special patriotic organizations there are relatively few in Switzerland. The most conspicuous is the New Helvetic Society (Neue Helvetische Gesellschaft),¹ which concerns itself with investigation and discussion of national problems and with the strengthening of national unity and loyalty. The problem of the Swiss abroad has occupied them, and they have even considered whether these outside Swiss might not be given a vote on Swiss affairs, in view of the fact that so large a percentage of them return to their native land.² The Union of Swiss Citizenship Courses is another agency of this patriotic type and the Swiss Boy Scouts another.³ The range and intensiveness of action on the part of these societies does not compare, however, with that of similar societies in Germany, France, or the United States.

The rôle of tradition in Swiss life is one of major importance, since a mass of myths has grown up in almost every section of the country.⁴ Many of these are political but local, and many others have a national significance. The names of Tell and Winkelried are known in every land, and enter into the composition of the Swiss political attitude. The most famous federal tradition is that of the Rütli, a meadow across from Brunnen on the western shore of Lake Lucerne, where in 1307 the three cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden entered into a perpetual league in the name of their cantons against the tyranny of Austria. This "sacred meadow" has become a national shrine and a center of patriotic pilgrimages. These heroic figures and situations are used of course for purposes of teaching civic attitudes, and out of them come the inculcation of love of liberty, resistance to tyranny, courage, shrewdness, and self-reliance. And out of this evolves in turn the picture of a Swiss group of

¹ *Schweizer Echo*; Hans Nabholz, *Die Helvetische Gesellschaft, 1761-1848* (1926).

² The publication *Deine Heimat, Das Auslandschweizer Buch* (1927), is a fine example of a textbook for the cultivation of the national spirit. The 300,000 Swiss residing abroad are sometimes called the twenty-third state.

³ Verein der Schweizerischen Staatsbürgerkurse.

⁴ *Schweizer Sagen und Heldengeschichten für Jung und Alt*, 2 vols., edited by H. Herzog.

whom these traits are characteristic, and of which the citizen is proud to be a part.

Swiss language, literature, and press as agents of civic feeling have advanced under many handicaps, for linguistic differences have stood in the way of a solidarity elsewhere achieved. The bilingualism of the people has helped but not wholly offset this as the tendency is to be absorbed in the German or the French flood of literature and appreciation, to say nothing of the Italian. Language and literature have therefore possessed at times a local rather than a national influence. The local and regional writers, however, enjoy a wide vogue within their limited sphere, and many of them have been acclaimed by the Swiss as a whole. Poets and balladists have played a great rôle in Swiss life, and in time of stress a poet of the type of Carl Spittler has deeply affected the current of national thought and emotion. In proportion to population Switzerland has more newspapers than any other country in the world. The Swiss press suffers, however, from the same linguistic separatism, and while there is an extraordinarily large number of journals, they operate within restricted spheres of influence and tend toward localism in their attitudes. The large number of local journals compelled the organization of a federal service which reports national political news much more fully in recent times than was the custom formerly. It is interesting to observe that the Swiss journalists are the second largest group in the federal legislative body.

The rôle of symbolism in Switzerland is an important one notwithstanding the democratic simplicity of the government. In a long series of impressive ways, the local and national political events are brilliantly pictured and brought home to the citizen from day to day. Memorials everywhere commemorate great battles and heroes of Swiss history, local or national. The localities are full of celebrations of various kinds; and there is the *Bundestag Day*, August 1, for the Swiss nation, the anniversary of the First Perpetual League made memorable by fire and bells. Popular festivals and open air plays, even when local, are somehow incorporated in the Swiss circle and help to bind Swiss

together, as the Tell Play with its strong political moral, or the festival of the Winegrowers at Vevey. The open air mass meetings of the *Landesgemeinde* are among the most impressive and colorful spectacles of the political world.

Gymnastic societies, shooting societies, costume demonstrations, flags, and songs enliven the scene, and tend to impress upon each generation the cultural and political values of the Swiss group. Songs like "Dem Vaterland," "An Mein Vaterland," and "Roulez Tambours" are impressive and popular. In a sense the older and more antiquated and local and regional the peculiarity, the more eagerly it has been seized upon recently and pronounced characteristic. It may seem paradoxical at first thought to make peculiarities characteristic, but this is by no means psychologically impossible and is, in fact, entirely feasible.

Taken as a whole, the Swiss problem of constructing a national unity, national feeling, national loyalty, has presented the most serious obstacles, which have been overcome only by centuries of slow knitting together the scattered strands of national sentiment. The barriers of race, religion, and geographical isolation have gradually been overcome in the course of a process extending over generations of wars, rivalries, agreements, wars again, and periods of peaceful adjustment under the influence of economic development and modern modes of communication. The local civic education in Switzerland is easy to understand, for it has all the background of tradition, symbolism, race, language, and religion, supplemented by the modern methods of formal instruction by political parties, by the character and standing of the governmental services. The Swiss local loyalty is indeed one of the closest knit fabrics of political sentiment in the world, combining authority and liberty, sentiment and rationality in a remarkable way.

Federal patriotism has been quite another process, a slow accumulation of national tradition, national community of interest, national organization for governmental purposes. In this process the fear of absorption by other states has been a factor of major importance, a fear directed in turn against Austria,

France, Germany, as one or another threatened the local life and autonomy of the separatistically inclined communities, and drove together the unwilling cantons into closer union. Switzerland to them was apparently a less objectional alternative to complete independence than incorporation in a Greater Austria, France, or Germany, however great the cultural attraction of any of these may have been.

Of the specific federalizing agencies, the democratic character of the government was no doubt of very great importance, as it gave to the cantons a sense of proprietorship over the central authority, and direct participation in it. The institution of the referendum fitted into this situation, and helped to crystallize interest on national issues of fundamental importance. Whether Switzerland should enter the League of Nations was for example a Swiss question upon which a national attitude was defined in a national act. The federal military service is another instrumentality of common attitudes and action, and out of it comes a measure of community of sentiment and feeling in terms of federal Switzerland. Central parliamentary activity, the diffusion of federal news by modern systems of communication, the shift from a rural to an urban industrial basis of life, the influence of the rise of large-scale states on the borders of Switzerland, notably Germany and Italy—all these contributed to the slow development of a Swiss culture in which were closely enmeshed the very peculiarities upon which antagonisms and wars had long been based, but which now were incorporated in a larger and common unity, recognizing and including all the local separatisms in a larger Swissdom.

It might be presumed that the neutral position long held by Switzerland, the international invasion of tourists, and more recently its place as the seat of the League of Nations would tend to weaken the force of the nationalistic idea, and slowly break down the idea of political independence. Thus far, however, no such effect has been produced. The economic penetration of Switzerland by Germany and the divergence of sympathies during the recent war precipitated a serious crisis in Swiss national life, but the outcome was distinctly favorable to

the development and continuance of the modern Switzerland, in that national enthusiasm and spirit were kindled and quickened by the crisis and that political loyalty emerged stronger than before.

An interesting contrast this, with the counter-development in Austria and with the more comparable evolution of Germany and the United States, and a most notable illustration of the growth of a common political loyalty under adverse circumstances.¹

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY²

The Austro-Hungarian method of civic training was developed under very great difficulties and with little skill. Extraordinary problems were presented and extraordinary ineptitude was displayed. The ethnic situation was full of difficulties, in view of the racial divisions in the community. There were in Austria-Hungary the following principal racial groups:

Nation	Total Number	Percentage
Germans.....	12,011,000	23.38
Magyars.....	10,120,000	19.71
Rumanians.....	3,222,000	6.27
Slavs.....	23,416,000	45.59
Others.....	2,585,000	5.05

Each clung tenaciously to its own language and culture and demanded political recognition, and most of the attachments of the ordinary political group were lavished upon the ethnic group. The individual seemed to feel himself primarily a German, or Czech, or a Hungarian, as the case might be, but relatively few were Austro-Hungarians.

Regional differences accentuated this problem, as the ethnic and geographical lines coincided roughly although not perfectly. Bohemia was Czechish; Hungary was, of course, Hungarian, in greater part; and Austria was largely German. And thus the dangerous combination of ethnic and geographic solidarity impeded the development of the wider loyalty to the empire.

¹ See Brooks, *op. cit.*, concluding chapter, "Summary and Estimates."

² Oscar Jászi, *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 277.

The leaders, far from endeavoring to melt these differences under the imperial banner, for a long time deliberately adopted the policy of playing group against group, hoping to find in the mutual jealousy of these regions the guaranty of their security. This hope was vain. And the cultivation of the rival regions led to the rise of rival groups struggling for political independence of each other and the empire.

Religious differences added fuel to the flames of region and race. Predominantly and officially Roman Catholic, the empire had crushed out Protestantism in Bohemia, but the roots still lived. Further, the power of the Roman See and the relations of the Austrian group to the Roman church involved the empire in many expensive excursions abroad and many futile policies at home. Austria, like Italy, France, and Spain, helped to bear the administrative burden of the church, and suffered the consequences in loss of personnel and in involvement of national policy.

Religion unquestionably reinforced the prestige of the empire by its preachments and platitudes, adapted to the imperial régime. But the clergy of Bohemia and the clergy of Hungary were not so disposed and were likely to sympathize with their ethnic and territorial group. Religion in such instances allied itself with race and region, in a combination against the ruling powers in Vienna. The central hierarchy endeavored to stem this tide, but in spite of its great authority was unable to do so with any degree of success.

Nor was the industrial situation more promising. The empire as a whole was agrarian; but there were powerful business developments especially in Austria and in Bohemia, and great banking and financial houses in Vienna dominated the region. The development of the working class was notable in Austria and in Bohemia and on a smaller scale in Hungary, which remained, however, primarily agricultural. The large landowners dominated the agrarian situation, and as hereditary holders both of economic and political power they played a great part in the life of the state. But their tendency was continually in the direction of the local and the regional, feudal rather than na-

tional, and they did not provide a bond of unity for the group as a whole. The working class, which might have served in a fashion to break the ethnic and territorial boundaries by insistence upon the brotherhood of labor, was discouraged and repressed by the authorities, and in the end became local rather than imperial in its attachment.

The business group possessed unifying tendencies, which might have been even more fully utilized than they were, and broadly it may be said that they were one of the bulwarks of the imperial power.¹ Railroads centering in Vienna and central control of credits were important economic considerations. But it proved difficult to reconcile their plans with those of the large landowners upon such items as protection and taxation, and the conflict effected adversely the morale of the social groups involved in the imperial combination.²

Upon this difficult basis a feeble structure was imposed by the imperial guides of the policy of the state. Many of the standard methods of civic training were wanting. Notable among these were the schools, political parties, language and literature, and special patriotic organizations. Education was not systematically developed throughout the empire either for general purposes or for the collateral values of civic training. There was no conscious and deliberate effort to make use of the opportunities afforded by the control of a school system for the propagation of imperial attitudes, or of common political practices conducive to the welfare of the group. The ethnic groups dominated in this respect in the school system, and turned the stream of influence in the direction of the locality rather than of Vienna.

Political parties again were chiefly local rather than imperial, and the party education derived from the party process was not calculated to arouse the civic enthusiasm of any but the local groups. A multilingual parliament was not a breeding-place for common patriotism. It might readily become, and in fact frequently was, a storm-center of racial and regional rivalries of the most bitter kind. Parties of this type served to intensify the

¹ See Jászi's interesting chapter ix on this subject.

² *Ibid.*

local differences, and gave civic training to the local ethnic groups rather than to the central empire.

The deep devotion to locality, an emotion which under other circumstances has often helped to hold the loyalty of the citizen, was appropriated in Austria-Hungary by the local states and employed for their special purposes. Hungary and Bohemia advanced the cult of the worship of the familiar scenes, but they did not think of these in terms of the national unit, or the imperial unit. Their hills and vales and streams were those of the separatists and not of the imperialists. To them the nation was not Austria-Hungary, but their own group, Hungary, Bohemia.

The factors upon which the old government chiefly relied were the traditions of the empire, the glory of the dynasty and the governmental services, and the aid of a type of symbolism appropriate to these elements in the life of the state. The imperial traditions of Austria went far back in history, and might have served as a basis for continuance of authority. But the tradition came to be one of defeat and decline, of decadence rather than of development. From 1866 the Austrian hegemony was overthrown, and the rising power of Germany tended to absorb the interest and pride of many of the Germanic groups in the empire. The nineteenth-century movement for self-determination of peoples aroused the Hungarians and the Czechs but also the Germans, and with these groups eliminated there was little left upon which to build an empire or a tradition.

Democratic nationalism built upon democratic responsibility for the conduct of common affairs, upon universal and compulsory education, was never accepted by the ruling dynasty. The ethnic groups in Hungary and Bohemia seized the slogan of democracy, and formed an ethnic-regional-democratic group that antagonized the empire and proved in the end its destruction. Likewise education expanded in the local rather than in the imperial sense. Although not highly developed in Hungary, it was none the less even here, an important factor in the alignment of the Hungarian patriots.

In short, the great nineteenth-century slogans of democracy, nationalism, and education were appropriated by the special

groups rather than the imperial; and their new life and power was turned against the central political community. Forms of federalistic organization might have brought together the conflicting groups under a central federal power. Tactics as skilful, for example, as Britain in South Africa, or America, Germany, or Switzerland in dealing with the local states, might have effected a different result. But skilful ameliorators and adjusters were not at hand.

The governmental services were employed by the imperial powers with more effectiveness than in the case of most of the ordinary agencies of civic habituation and education. The army and the civil service were useful in building up an imperial picture and imperial interest. The army was in many ways the most useful of the centralizing imperial influences, and played an important rôle in civic training. The civil service was a powerful body of trained officials—if not always competent, at any rate possessing a degree of ability entitling them to respect. They constituted a bond of union that might have been still further developed under more favorable circumstances. Here again, however, the separatist claims rivaled those of the central authority, and the local demands for official position and recognition in the administration were a constant source of recrimination and irritation. Czechs and Hungarians felt that they were underrepresented in the imperial service, and that discrimination was practiced in favor of the Germans and especially the Viennese. Germans objected to the dilution of the service by incompetent representatives of local groups. Even with these difficulties, the imperial service was still a powerful and continuing means of cultivating familiarity with the empire as a political unity and of building a type of interest in and attachment to it.

The empire had at its command a rich array of symbols, coming down from historic times, and constituting an imposing series of devices. In the center of these was the hereditary crown and the hereditary nobility, with all the pomp and ceremony of court. Added to this was the great prestige of Vienna as a center of art and culture, along with imperial authority. The marvel-

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is now appropriate to review the balance of group interests and competing loyalties in the several states considered in this study; to note their outstanding characteristics, their similarities, and their contrasts. What is the trend, we may inquire, of the modern competing loyalties to race, to religion, to economic class, to region, and how are they likely to affect the balance and cohesion of the coming state?

REGION

First of all, the regional political feeling is rapidly weakening under the influence of modern communication and transportation. Geographical isolation becomes increasingly difficult, mobility of persons and goods more marked, and the improvement of technical devices for intercommunication is still advancing. The shift from rural-agrarian to urban-industrial civilization only emphasizes the trend away from isolation in a narrow neighborhood of the old type. In any case the unit of localism tends to enlarge, and the geographical area of political fixation and affection with it. That there is still intense devotion to special localities is undeniable, and this is an essential part of political organization, but the drift is away from the narrower geographical localities and toward a broader basis of political interest and attachment. Of course the combination of the regional with the ethnic, the religious, or the economic class interest always cumulates progressively the intensity and power of the regionalist movement; and these factors may shift with changing situations in the social world.

Four of the states in this group, the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, emerged from the local unit during the nineteenth century into a broader form of national organization. In this process, federal government and the instrumentality of

war were effective agents, except in Italy. In all these instances the local political groupings have tended to lose their strength, and the power of the central government to grow, and with this movement has come the rise of a larger scale political interest and enthusiasm. In all, notably in Switzerland, there is still a powerful local sentiment, but this does not increase in strength as time goes on, but tends to decline. Likewise, Italian regionalism, which was overcome with difficulty in 1870, possesses less and less vitality, and is in no sense a menace to the solidarity of the central political unit of the nation.

In France, the most compact of all the groups, geographically, there is little real trace of regionalism,¹ since the events of three hundred years ago hammered out the central national state. In Alsace-Lorraine there are difficulties, and there are so-called regionalist movements throughout the nation, as in Brittany, as well as a regional reformation, but these latter have more artistic, antiquarian, or administrative value than political force and solidity. Political interest centers in *la patrie* with a force that makes separatist movements absurd.

Nor in Russia is there any developing geographical regionalism of a pronounced type, threatening the central authority of the state. The circumference of Russia may be less firmly knit than its center, but the flexible nature of the massive geographical area constituting the Soviet state makes it necessary to disregard these local sections, from the point of view of the system as a whole. Further, the adaptable nature of the union of Soviet groups makes regional problems less important than might otherwise be the case, and opens the way for local variation within the general limits of the political organization of the system as a whole.

Britain, on the other hand, presents a regional problem of the first order, with its territories flung around the globe, held together by what might seem a slender thread of imperial unity. And even in the Islands themselves there is the ever present problem of the Irish relationship to the central government. In

¹ My colleague, Professor Hayes, emphasizes French regionalism more strongly. See his *France*, chap. xi.

India and Egypt autonomist movements of large proportions develop and challenge the supremacy of the empire; while Canada, Australia, and South Africa demand local authority on a very considerable scale.

But the continuing existence of the far-flung empire is a signal proof of the weakness of regionalism in our day, and of the possibility of successfully overcoming its centrifugal tendencies. Thus far Britain has been able to deal successfully with all types of separatist situations and even to flourish upon them. British trade, the British navy, British diplomacy, and governing finesse have been equal to all demands, and with the exception of the loss of the American colonies have been able to bring the outlying possessions into the form of a unique central union, now known in the latest phase as the British Commonwealth of Free Nations.

The League of Nations with a central organization in which the influence of separatism and isolation is minimized is an evidence of the growing political interrelationship of the world, and, by the same token, of the declining influence of regionalism. The League tends to widen the political horizon of mankind, and to focus attention on broader areas and larger regions within which world justice and world order may be organized as effectively as in the narrower. In more recent times the suggestion of a United States of Europe has met with distinguished support, and, whether on economic or political foundations, may gain strength in the coming generation. In any case it is an indication of the interest and faith in the larger scale state as a solution of many urgent problems of the time.

Thus the organization of the League, the defiance of localism in the British Empire, the wide-reaching areas incorporated in the Russian and the American states, the proposals for a United States of Europe—all point in the direction of less and less emphasis on the local and sectional factors in the organization of the modern state, or the coming state of the near future. It is quite true that this present trend may not continue or may even be reversed, but as things now move, this is the direction.

And finally, regionalism in Austria-Hungary aided in the

downfall of the state, reinforced as was geographical area with ethnic and economic interests—a striking example of what separatism may accomplish if its tendencies are not offset by the cohesive forces of national sentiment and interest.

But on the whole it may be repeated, regionalism tends to decline in importance with the rise of closer communication, more rapid transportation, the shift in economic organization, and the accompanying mobility of persons and goods. As the world shrinks the isolation of its parts is increasingly minimized.

ETHNIC FACTORS

The ethnic factors in the states here discussed tend to decline in importance with the passage of time, although in other parts of the world this is not true. Four of these Western nations have a relatively central strain of race, Italy, Germany, France, Russia; two, the United States and Britain, are somewhat less unified; two are complex in racial composition, Switzerland and Austria-Hungary. In the first-named four, the problem of racial diversity is no longer a serious question, although it was so at one time in the history of these nations. In Switzerland, the most striking case of ethnic diversity, the problem of racial and linguistic differences, while still acute, tends to become less important as the unifying process goes on, and the earlier antagonisms subside. In the United States the rapid assimilation of different racial groups has gone steadily forward and cannot be regarded as a challenge to national unity. Britain feels the force of the rising demand for political recognition of solid blocks of ethnic groups, as in Egypt and India, and these movements constitute a menace to the unity of the central empire. But this is not a new problem for Britain, and may be met by political flexibility and astuteness.

It becomes increasingly evident that much of the dogmatism regarding biological race differences rests upon a very slender scientific foundation, and indeed approaches the most transparent jingoism, differing little from the childish boastings of the juvenile playground, accompanied by savage growls derived from the subhuman stage of animal evolution. Scientific analy-

sis of race differentials will give us much more precise data upon which to raise governmental policies and international relations, and it may well appear that these differences are by no means as fundamental as has been heretofore concluded. They may be found to be social rather than biological in their origin and transmission, and may prove susceptible to developed systems of cultural education in surprising degree. Whether or not this proves to be true on full and authentic analysis, the situation will be much easier to deal with when the facts are known and the limits within which they may be modified and controlled.

However, if we approach the problem from the point of view of what may be termed, in the absence of a more appropriate characterization, cultural nationality, as distinguished from ethnic or biological, we find this factor is by no means diminishing under modern conditions. The pattern of aspirations, ideologies, attitudes, practices, clustering around the French, British, American, "nationality," may have little to do with true biological or racial differentials. But, in fact, these patterns are exceedingly important, and they constitute very significant elements in the cohesion or disruption of the modern state.¹

RELIGION

Among the loyalties competing with the state still stands that of the ecclesiastical organizations,² for while, in the main, their types of control over human behavior are nonpolitical and may always be called so, they inevitably overlap political government at many important points. Drawing the lines of jurisdiction between state and church is a task perpetually recurring and continuously a source of friction and disturbance.

The religio-political struggle for control over human behavior still continues, however, and in four of the states here examined,

¹ See later comment on the rôle of ideologies and on the theory of nationalism. See comment by Hayes in his *Nationalism*, and also in his *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*.

² See Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*; for the Catholic view, J. A. Ryan and M. F. X. Millar, *The State and the Church* (1922); see also G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*. An interesting discussion of the whole problem in A. N. Holcombe, *The Modern Commonwealth*, chap. iii.

Germany, France, Italy and Russia, there have been bitter contests within the last half-century. In a number of these states, official church recognition and financial support continue, as in England, Germany,¹ Italy, and Austria-Hungary. In France, the United States, Russia, and Switzerland² there is no national church establishment; and in Italy the battle between Vatican and Quirinal rages intermittently. In two of the states, Germany and Switzerland, the church supports a political party, and enters actively into the parliamentary activities of the nation. There was also for a time a church party in Italy, and L'Action Française is sometimes regarded as the church party in France, although not really in this category.

Aside from such organized activity, the pastors and priests of all lands are vitally concerned in many forms of state activity, and participate more or less directly in elections and other political movements, partisan or nonpartisan in nature. Their position in this respect may range from that of distant counsel and advice to a place of practical dictatorship in given types of situations, depending partly on the nature of the issue at stake, and partly on the prestige and ability of the clerical representative.

As a social group, the church has a continuing personnel, an ideology, and a cult and ceremonialism of the very greatest social significance, and unquestionably enlists human loyalty in its support in a large and important way. Most of the Western churches, however, do not possess a powerful international organization, with the exception of the Roman, and do not make an extra-national appeal, except in the missionary activities of Western states. On the contrary, they are likely to be found in support of the existing political order, supplementing the sanctions of the state with those of religion. The Roman church with its widespread and powerful international organization is in a more advantageous and also more tempting position to challenge the power of the national state; and on many historic occasions has done so. This church officially maintains that the state should recognize it as the official religion of the community, should protect its members against the spread of false doc-

¹ In part only, as indicated *ante*.

² In local cantons only.

trines, and rejects the theory "of indiscriminate and universal toleration."¹ Theoretically the church cherishes the dream of a Christian commonwealth in which the power of religion would be in effect controlling, but it no longer insists upon external policies reflecting this position.

But whatever the theoretical differences may be, in actual practice the ecclesiastical group is usually found supporting the political order and serving to maintain the political authority as it is. Abundant evidence of this was supplied during the late war, when religious officials almost without exception became partisans of the national political order in which they resided, the French priests pro-French and the German priests pro-German, and German and American Lutherans dividing upon similar lines.

As in the case of other social elements, it is true of religion that it becomes most significant when in combination with other elements reinforcing and supporting it. When religion coincides with race, or region, or economic class, or with all of them together, then there emerges a powerful and intense sentiment, which may be directed against the dominant political authority effectively. The Irish Home Rule movement furnishes an excellent example of such a type situation, for here all the elements—religion, race, region, and economic class—were found in combination, and co-operated to build up a local political loyalty in opposition to that of the dominant British authority. Catholic South Germany furnishes another illustration of the same general class.

On the whole the influence of religion as an antistate factor tends to decline in these states in the last generation. But it is clear that important struggles will occur in the not distant future over the position of religion in the organized party life of the nations, and the control of the schools at the point where ethical or character education dovetails over into civic education. These are storm-centers around which furious controversies may rage, and in which the prestige of the national state may be increased or diminished.

¹ See Holcombe, *op. cit.*, p. 85; Ryan and Millar, *op. cit.*

ECONOMIC CLASS

If we look at the trend of economic class cohesion, loyalties, and tendencies, the prospects of political solidarity are much more clearly threatened than in the case of region or race. In a conspicuously industrial age, the solidarity of the workers tends to increase, and the proletarian class ideal to come to the fore with fresh élan, driving force, and attractive symbolism, intensified by the clash of the workers, at many points, with the authority, austere or corrupt as it may be. The economic interpretation of history, in terms of class domination, greatly weakened the force of law and the prestige of the existing order of things political, and opened the way for a new basis of revolt, quite different from that of the earlier period of the democratic revolutions. This ideology imposed upon a period of economic depression and discontent, often irritated by inflexible and tactless authority, might at any time produce political revolution, and perhaps disruption of the state, in case the workers' loyalty extended across national lines and reached as far as international proletarian brotherhood.

The experience of recent years, however, in the eight states analyzed, does not indicate this outcome. There have been violent revolutions in two of the states considered (including Austria, three); and these have resulted in the overthrow of a particular type of political régime, in all three cases the monarchical and hereditary, but have not modified the central political loyalty to the national unit of government. In Russia the economic order was also overthrown with the monarchy, but the allegiance to nationalistic Russia continues under Red rule, and in the opinion of competent observers is stronger than ever before. Theoretically, national lines are merged in the world union of proletarian states, but for the time the flag of Russian nationalism floats high, although reserving on its red folds space for the other proletarian groups.

In Germany, England, and Czechoslovakia there have been labor administrations, and the labor group has assumed a position of participation in and responsibility for the conduct of the government, yet the nationalistic loyalties have been unim-

paired. Also, in Italy, the labor group has been integrated after a fashion in the scheme of responsible political authority, and has left untouched the central dignity of the state. In Switzerland, the socialists have refused to take a place in the federal government, but have done so in the local cantons and communities.

From the foregoing it appears that the economic class movement is not as serious a threat to the political state and to the national state as it was a generation ago, but that peaceful methods, parliamentary responsibility, and national loyalty are likely to emerge in times of stress. The democratic order and the capitalistic economic order may be menaced or modified, but the dissolution of the cohesive elements in the modern national states is not imminent. It may, indeed, be maintained that a state resting upon a proletarian basis is more secure than one on a rural-agrarian foundation, inasmuch as the reconciliation between capital and labor has been effected in the former, while in the latter case important adjustments were yet to be made.

It is still far too early to conclude, however, that the crisis has been passed in the relations between economic classes, and that there is no threat to existing states in the feeling, attitudes, and interests of employer and employees. On the contrary, there is still menace in these relations both to existing orders of government, to the economic order, and even to the central political loyalties of the modern states. This danger is much more real and vital than the regional and ethnic differences which tend to disappear with the rise of modern technology of communication and education—the very technology in fact which may precipitate economic disturbances and dissensions. Further, the emergence of larger economic units of production which for the moment have produced extranational combinations of capitalists may also tend to bring about extranational agreements and solidarity, more realistic than the preachments regarding the international brotherhood of the proletarians. Steel and coal workers may combine as well as their employers, and economic federalism may develop among them as well as in the ranks of the bankers and investors. Large-scale production and large-

scale markets are making new economic units which will react powerfully against the maintenance of existing political units, on which national sovereignties rest.

But it must also be recognized that in many ways a common economic interest tends to bind together the bonds of the modern state. Control over markets, economic imperialism, the management of raw materials, the delicate relations between area and production, the grave question of dealing with unemployment: these are situations in which the economic trends and tendencies may be unifying politically and nationally rather than divisive. And these factors must be set over against the influence of the sentiment of workers or employers.

If we look at the agrarian group it appears that a revolution against a special political order, against a national order, or against the economic order, is unlikely in view of the depressed nature of industry at the present time, and the remote prospects for rehabilitation in the near future. Scattered and disorganized as small farmers are, weakened by migration to the urban centers, they are not a menace to the political power of the national state. The chief problem in state cohesion lies in the rise of political indifference among them and in the loss of agrarian leadership, often of a very vital sort, in the future of political development on a larger scale. Traditionally the source and center of power, the landowners, have lost much of the prestige they enjoyed for generations and the recovery of their power and position is not in sight; indeed, in the recent past and the present they have been overrepresented. In a modern type of civilization, they will with difficulty retain the position in political life to which their numbers and importance entitle them, as the passage of economic power and political leadership goes on.

Two basic questions may be raised at this point. Is the political organization on the whole on the decline, and does it tend to yield to the organizing tendencies of other and competing groups or of other types of technicians, as for example, the economic societies? The question may well be raised, How is it that the political community continues to maintain itself and in fact to consolidate its position in view of the general attacks upon

its ineffective "omnicompetence," upon the integrity of its servants, upon its failure to utilize the devices of modern science, upon the widespread complaints of its tendency to interfere with private affairs especially in the field of business or of morals, upon the frequent abuse of the power of the state in the interest of dominant economic groups (summed up in charge that it is the tool of capitalism), and upon the unfavorable comparisons instituted between the political group and competing organizations in society? How in the face of all this furious and sustained assault does the state maintain itself?

The answer is that no other group has been able to assume the functions of the state without becoming more intolerable than the state itself; in fact becoming the state in more odious form, religious or otherwise. In a complex social organization the functions of balance and integration, however crudely performed by the political community, are indispensable, and the government must therefore be tolerated as a type of balance-wheel, if for no other more elaborate or complimentary reason. The state again has more thoroughly mastered than any other group the art of group education and morale. Outwardly clumsy as its methods and mechanisms may seem to be and in fact frequently are, they nevertheless are constructed upon rough principles of psychology and upon a certain knowledge of the nature of man, rule-of-thumb rather than scientific, but none the less effective in dealing with concrete and pressing situations such as are encountered all along the social way.

The political group has a functional value as a check on the closed tendencies of other social groupings, compelling them to look out of themselves and to view the interrelation of the parts of the society in which they are set. The ingrowing tendencies of social groups are notorious, and even on the highest levels of intelligence may become a barrier to progress and a menace to the larger group as a whole. Physicians and lawyers are conspicuous illustrations of the resistance to progress that may come from too narrow a view of social relations; for both the medical society and the bar association may obstruct not only their own development through undue conservatism but also the progress

of other outside groups dependent upon them for co-operation. Trade, labor, and agrarian groups with less solidarity, perhaps, have also become exclusive in their attitude and indifferent to the claims of the public to such an extent that the state has again and again been obliged to break up or regulate their private monopolies in the interest of advance.

In time, if the selfish tendencies of these various groups were developed and projected, they would inevitably clash with each other and some sort of a check would be administered from the outside, but the political order provides a more systematic and efficient procedure through which these adjustments may be made with a minimum of friction and waste. If the personal ego of the political group and its own professional interest becomes too highly developed, the anti-authoritarian impulse again, in turn, serves as a check upon the encroaching tendencies of the government itself.

The broadening and deepening of our knowledge in the field of social and political behavior may fundamentally change this whole situation, substituting far more exact knowledge of the motivation and control of human conduct and far more precise instrumentalities for that purpose. The technicians may come in to take the place of the clumsier types of earlier governors, with rough approximations called laws and brutal penalties based upon the simplest of analyses of the fear and force side of human nature. Such a development in wide fields of human behavior is not unlikely, and more than that is highly probable,¹ and, under such circumstances, the shaping of human conduct by the jailor and the warrior would be replaced by far more subtle moldings of human nature and far more comprehensive controls in the fields of physiology and psychiatry or similar science.

There will remain, however, a residuum of problems upon which science is not yet ready to make a declaration, or perhaps declarations in alternative form only, and in this area of decision, the determination will be a practical one, in which the opinion of the expert will be given practical application by the

¹ See my *New Aspects of Politics*.

political *prudentes* of the given time, exercising their best judgment in the light of all the data available. This will be a much more enlightened judgment than has commonly guided political decisions, but there will not be a scientific conclusion, although the point may be scientifically determined at a later stage of the evolution of intelligence upon this particular point. In a somewhat altered form, then, the political and governmental will survive and serve their functional purpose in the structure of the social groupings of the time.

But the further question may be raised, Will the governmental organization now centered in nationalistic groups continue to serve as the focus of political loyalty and sentiment? To this interesting inquiry there can be no satisfactory answer, except that of someone who aspires to the rôle of the prophet. The modern nation-state does not rest upon any more divine basis than did the feudal states or the Roman or other empire, or the city-state or the tribal-state or the nomad-state; and it is subject to the same revision as all other governmental units have been in the great process of history. Nations may be combined into larger units, or be broken up into smaller ones, or all may be linked into one. There is no God-given assurance that fifty odd is the sacred number of independent states. The figure may be seven, or one, or one hundred. Modern methods of communication are reshaping the world; modern methods of industrial organization are likewise remodeling the industrial structure of mankind. And what effect this may have upon the territorial boundaries of modern states, no one can safely predict. We can only say that the trends of the times indicate changes of fundamental importance in the territorial basis of modern states, and consequent modifications in the focus of political loyalty on the part of large numbers of persons. Modern democracy, modern systems of universal education, modern systems of economic production, favored the organization of the present national state, but what the next phase of social change may develop is problematical. The units of aggregation are the urban center; the larger-scale country state, imperial it is sometimes called; a closer meshed international order looming in the

background; and various forms of extranational social groupings on the other hand, such as the international organization of labor, of agriculture, of capital in various forms, of science, of religion, or of urban communities. In the oriental areas, however, precisely at this moment, the development of Western nationalism begins, and the new tendencies in this part of the world may be in the opposite direction of intensification of the national area sentiment—Egypt, India, China, Turkey.

On the surface, we may see the intensification and the triumph of nationalistic civic training, but, underneath, the trained eye may detect other trends. One may observe the break-up of the territorial basis of the national state by reason of communication and transportation, the rise of larger economic units, the challenge of the urban centers, the decline of the militaristic spirit, the merging of new and competing groups, contesting for supremacy with the territorial state.

What is to become of the territorial basis of the state? Will it continue as one of the basic elements in political structure, or shall we look forward to its supersession by types of association not primarily related to the land? The data available on this question are by no means adequate for solid judgment, either quantitatively or qualitatively; and for the time being we may merely watch the process closely in the hope of ascertaining more nearly, as time goes on, the inner trend of the period, and the newly emergent shapes of the new associations appropriate to the newly forming social world.

We do not know what further technical miracles may be wrought; but, if it is even approximately true, as J. B. S. Haldane suggests, that within a few years it will be possible for any person in the world to communicate promptly with any other person anywhere, and to see him also, the element of juxtaposition in the political structure will lose much of its meaning. Under such conditions it is of course thinkable that new bases of unity might be evolved, independent of geography. For example, we might suppose that there would appear types of economic or other social federalisms, in which persons living side by side were members of different political associations widely scattered

over the earth. There might thus be forms of functional groupings, with rule or lawmaking power over their members, but without much regard to the territorial basis of their membership. It seems probable, however, that under such conditions there might be only one central political jurisdiction rather than many, or at least a small number of relatively large areas under a political organization.

TECHNIQUES OF TRAINING

This analysis has covered the examination of the chief techniques employed for the purpose of civic education in the states selected for this study. Schools, governmental services, political parties, special patriotic organizations, traditions, symbols, language, literature, press, and the love of special localities—all have been passed in review. The detail of these analyses, which it is needless to repeat, may be found in the special studies of the particular countries in question. Abundant illustration of a type impossible within the limits of this survey, may there be found, and appropriate documentation supplied for those who wish further detail.

It is now proposed to summarize the material relating to the various types of approach to civic training, and set forth certain general characteristics and trends. Unfortunately, it is not feasible to make any dogmatic appraisal of the relative value of these devices, first because of varying and special situations and also because of the impossibility of any important quantitative measurement of the special forms of training discussed. Yet some obvious characteristics and trends may be observed with reasonable accuracy and advantage.

We may ask, What are the most impressive trends in the use of the various techniques of civic education? Broadly speaking, the use of tradition and of symbolism have long been the principal elements in the organization of civic education, and these factors have been reinforced by language and literature, or in the more primitive forms of folk lore and myth. Governmental personalities and services have added their flair of impressive-

ness and interest and their glamor and pomp to the traditional influences just mentioned. All this was woven on a base of fear, force, and custom, which prevented effective challenge of the existing political authority.

In more modern times, somewhat more systematic agencies have been employed, as the level of intelligence has risen. The school and the political party are especially adapted to modern social conditions in which universal education and democracy are developed. Special types of patriotic organizations for the prime purpose of fanning the flames of civic enthusiasm are also a modern method of civic training. The modern press with its strident and continuous appeals is also an addition to the list of civic educators, a type of adult education. The study of crowd psychology has also led to the development of new forms of symbolism adapted to the new conditions, as in Russia and Italy and, to a considerable extent, everywhere. Thus it is clear that schools, press, parties, crowd psychology, are of increasing importance among the newer devices for the encouragement of political loyalty.

The influence of language and literature continues important even with the sweep of modern intercommunication, and its political value tends to survive in the states here discussed. The presence of a common language is still one of the most powerful agencies in the growth of a cultural community; and, likewise, community of language is a factor of inestimable value to the political unity. It is true that linguistic and political groups do not coincide and also that there are political units based upon a multilingual foundation, but in the latter situation there are many difficulties of the most serious type unless there is one group dominant over the others, as in England. An international language would of course reduce the differential value of the local and to that extent diminish its group-making value, but such a mode of communication is not at this moment in sight. Of course a system of education in bilingual form might and would reduce the distinctive and isolating nature of any

single tongue.¹ There are signs of such a development, more promising than are the indicia of a new language.

Modern literature tends more and more to be internationalized through translations, accessible to larger numbers of readers in different lands, and to this extent its special relationship to a particular form of political culture may be modified, although the bulk of literature still remains housed in the language that gave it birth. Nor is literature the slavish tool of the political community alone; it may also serve the needs of any of the numerous groups which may claim the allegiance of the individual for a wide-ranging variety of purposes. Religion, class, and race may claim its aid. Nor can rulers be sure that literature will meet the purposes of the particular political unit which they desire to support. Literature may be localistic rather than nationalistic; and it may be international as well as national in its tendencies. And whether it will be traditional or prophetic one may never know.

But in the older states, such as Britain and France, it is clear that the linguistic differences are on the wane, as they are slowly elided in the great process of assimilation which goes steadily forward. In newer states, the linguistic factor tends to exert a far more powerful influence than in the older, and often becomes a chief rallying point for national culture.

The modern press functions increasingly as an agency for the crystallization of the sentiment of political unity. The press may of course be local in range of sympathy, but the tendency for the newspaper is to expand, and, in any event, to carry news of other areas and other sections of the political groupment. There are powerful examples of regional, racial, and religious presses, and the influence of these may well be separatistic in character, but, on the whole, the journals of the states studied are nationalistic in tendency, even to the extreme in many instances. They tend to emphasize and impress the idea of devotion to the larger unity rather than the smaller, within the limits of the national.

¹ In this connection Ogden's interesting experiments with a vocabulary of 800 words of basic English are very important. See *Psyche, passim*.

The news most prominently displayed by the press is national in its nature; and in conspicuous positions in special feature stories, as well as in reiterated emphasis, the journals bring home to their readers the behavior of the political community of which they are parts. Even where grave doubts have arisen as to the reliability of the press, the continued repetition of news has a somewhat hypnotic effect on masses of readers upon whom these suggestions are constantly projected, and to whose influence they are likely to succumb. Journalistic repetition is in some ways reminiscent of the beat, beat, beat of the drum in the primitive tribe.

In more recent times the widespread influence of the radio and the movie-talkie has been added to the means of popular education and propaganda. The possibilities of this new device have scarcely been explored as yet, but already the vast possibilities of this new instrument are evident. The Soviets especially have made use of this agency for education in the doctrines and policies of the communistic régime, while in England the government control over the radio is full of significance. There can be little question that these are channels of great influence which no ambitious builder of public morale will be disposed to neglect in the future.

The rôle of governmental services and personalities also tends to decline somewhat in the process of modern civic cohesion.¹ The personal impressiveness of the early warrior and leader tends to weaken in modern days, or at least to change its form substantially. The pomp and glory of the older hereditary monarchy and court entourage have disappeared from modern states, with the exception of Britain and Italy; and their survivals arouse a curious interest on the part of the beholders. Their heroes are attractive, but no longer as gods, but rather as movie idols, artistically admired rather than deeply feared. Other forms of political symbolism appear, but not such as center around the immediate and sacred person of the governmental head.

¹ My colleague, Professor Gaus, emphasizes the rôle of governmental services more strongly.

Furthermore, in a period of transition from aristocracy to democracy, the reputation of public servants for integrity has suffered severely in many places as well as their repute for competence and wisdom. This situation has served in many instances to weaken the position of the governmental services in the esteem of the community, and to lessen their power to impose the idea of the beneficence of the state upon their citizens, as compared with situations where integrity and ability have been the characteristic and evident qualities of the governing staffs.

There is, however, a form of quiet utilitarian impressiveness in the elaborate and permeating services of the modern government, although this is not of the same genre as the dazzling paraphernalia of the earlier civic or military servant, whose uniform and regalia were almost a part of his authority. The democratic basis of public service has also tended to enhance its prestige, and to permit officials to appear as the representatives of the community in a more direct and familiar sense than ever before. In a state like Switzerland, this influence is especially striking.

Armies and navies retain their earlier prestige value and impress the community with their significance and importance. But the determination of state policy by the military class is on the decline and tends to weaken progressively, as is shown by many occasions when the feverish activity of declining confidence is evident. And in an increasingly industrial age with strong desire for peace, the rôle of the military is not likely to grow greater.

The place of the political party in the process of civic education is one of increasing importance, but is, of course, conditioned upon interest in a democratic form of government, and declines with that, as in the case of Italy and Russia, where the party system is only a name for a new form of political association. Elsewhere the party remains as one of the important educators in modern political life, an interesting intermediary between the government and the individuals and groups of which it is made up. The party system tends to compel the several

parties to speak the language of the common good, to profess the commonwealth, to stimulate the political interest and activity of its members and possible recruits; and it ultimately brings them together on a common conference ground where comparisons and adjustments of national interests may be made. This, of course, presupposes a minimum degree of compatibility; for otherwise the parliamentary center may become a provocative of recrimination or even of riotous behavior, as from time to time in Vienna under the old régime. The party cannot bridge over social gaps that are too wide and deep, and in such cases the party meat may actually become poison, as in Austria-Hungary.

The Russian and Italian systems abandon the party as it has been employed in most states, but their very retention of the name party is a tribute to the prestige of the party system, and reflects a desire to set up some agency between the formal government and the citizenry, but an instrument that may serve as the facile tool of the dictator. That the party system will again be established after the downfall of the dictatorial system seems highly probable.

There are many obvious weaknesses in a modern party system, including its tendency toward chicanery, its partiality for spoils and favoritism, its fondness for temporary eddies of sentiment rather than the deeper currents of group life, the emergence of dangerous demagogues; but, on the whole, the party serves for the time being a very useful purpose in the maintenance of the state, and it will remain until a substitute with higher functional value has been discovered; and down to the present no such alternative system is in sight.

The number and variety of special patriotic organizations tend to increase in the states under consideration, and their range to cover every period and phase of life. If the eye wanders over these states, one will not fail to see a long procession of Scouts, Boy and Girl, youth organizations, gymnastic and sport societies, veterans of late wars, dignified academies or the like, winding toward the shrines of the nation. The most colorful of these are the organizations of the soldiers and those of the

youth, in all countries. In France, Germany, the United States, and Italy, these organizations are especially active, and carry on an extensive propaganda of the national cult. On the other hand, in England, their activity is relatively narrow in the direct form, although they are not entirely wanting.

It may sometimes be questioned whether they really guide and direct public opinion; but it appears that, on the whole, they exert a substantial influence in stimulating interest in the affairs of the nation and enthusiasm for the state. Their background is as a rule conservative, but may also have strong middle-class backing, and, in the case of Russia, the radical groups are also strongly enlisted in the movement. These agencies tend to utilize the modern instrumentalities of the press, the schools, and popular propaganda, with strong emphasis on the use of symbolism for the perpetuation of traditions, and with persistence of effort and control of funds may be made to accomplish much.

That they are believed to possess practical value is shown by the struggle between Il Duce and the Pope over the control of the youth organizations in Italy, by the enthusiasm with which the Soviets have seized upon this agency of communistic propaganda at home and elsewhere, and by the wide-ranging scout activity in many lands.

In the main these patriotic organizations reflect the older appeal to tradition rather than interest in the reorganization of civic life under new conditions; but this is not wholly true, and there is no inherent reason why it should be true at all, when the new trends of the time are fully recognized. In some of the youth movements, especially, the recognition of the rôle of invention and adaptation in civic education is clear and well-defined.

The rôle of symbolism tends to decline in the states here considered, or perhaps more accurately to change its form and usage. The pomp and glory of the old landed military aristocracy, and the centering of symbolism on the sacred person of the Lord's anointed tend to disappear, although lingering with great tenacity in states like England and Italy where ceremoni-

alism of the older type still takes deep root. A newer type of symbolism tends to replace the old; and in great spectacles and demonstrations crowds are stirred to action by vastly impressive shows. The antiquarian as such, however, and the doings of the antiquarian survivals tend to lose ground in a modern and realistic world as actual generators of civic interest and loyalty, however interesting they may be as spectacles.

Democracy brought with it for the time, at any rate, the cult of Jeffersonian simplicity, best exemplified now in the United States and Switzerland, as a contrast to the ceremonies of courts and kings. The development of a democratic type of symbolism appropriate to the changed situation is a slow process, but one in which substantial progress is made. New holidays, new memorials, new demonstrations, new music and songs, new insignia and uniforms, come to take the place of the old, and to bring their reinforcements to the interests and sentiment already existing. But these tend to take on less and less the character of personal political religion and more and more the tone of crowd psychology.

The use of group tradition still continues to be one of the chief reliances for the development of group enthusiasm. The early tribal initiations described by Weber in the *Duk-Duks* remain not untypical of the present process of transmission of group allegiance and group political lore. The common memories of the group, their common achievements, their heroes and their aspirations, realized or thwarted, contain an appeal of great power over the attitude of the oncoming generation, and over those of the adult citizen of the group. Accordingly every state sanctifies its ancient deeds and weaves them into a cult of credenda et miranda. In more recent times there come ideologies of various types, related to the particular form of government, as monarchy or democracy, or to the peculiar characteristics of the special people concerned—the British, the French, the Italians; and race psychology sometimes supplements these with so-called proofs of superiority over all or many others. And both traditions and ideologies are often incarnated in outstanding personalities, reflecting the peculiar genius of the

group, the great statesmen and warriors of all times. Freud calls this the transfer from father fixation or mother to that of the larger fatherland or mother-country.

The older a state and the richer its history the easier the use of tradition, as in England; but also, the younger the state, the greater the emphasis to be laid on such traditions as there are. The new state will be driven to intensive study of early tradition in the effort to avoid the implication that it has no record of achievement. For this purpose "ten days that shook the world" may be magnified until they take on the importance of ten centuries or more. Or ten years of the Fascist régime, or the events of any other revolutionary period, may be intensively examined until their "close-up" proportions become adequate for a significant national cult. And after a revolutionary government is once thoroughly established, it may safely adopt some of the traditions of the ancient régime, and many of its more remote heroes, as in France and Germany.

Implicit in tradition transmission, from the earliest tribal days, there has been a form of civic education in the mores of the tribe. The sage sayings of the ancestors, the wise ways and practices, that have been proved by time, are inculcated in the candidate for citizenship and become a part of his social attitudes. To some extent this still survives as youth and adult education, but a great part of this process has been taken over by the formal schooling period, in which these tribal virtues are taught and qualities inculcated. The basis for most of this is still historical teaching, which serves as the great channel of national indoctrination.

The rôle of attachment to locality has been threatened in recent times by the mobility of population and the new economic emphasis on machinery rather than on the soil. Nevertheless, this factor is still of great importance in the cohesion of the modern state. The love of the mother earth goes on; and in older countries such as England, Italy, France, devotion to historic localities has long been cultivated, not merely as a matter of devotion, but as an important source of revenue from tourists.

In nations such as Germany and the United States there has developed recently a systematic effort to strengthen the cult of locality, as seen in the emphasis on the *Heimatkunde* in Germany and in the attention to historic localities, such as Williamsburg, in the United States.

It is also true that new attachments to urban areas supplement the earlier rural centers of fixation, and a pride of place or neighborhood springs up in Paris, New York, London. Mobility of population makes this difficult but not impossible.

On the whole this factor seems to decline in importance, but it still continues a significant element in the maintenance of political cohesion, and builders of allegiance systematically make use of it in the organization of their systems.

The school emerges in recent times as the major instrument in the shaping of civic education. A process, extending over a considerable period of years, now takes the place of the week or ten days once given to the tribal candidate in his period of novitiate, and organizes and schematizes this process with great elaboration. With the development of universal education, the training is extended to the entire population, female as well as male, and the whole community is drawn into the net. In all of the eight states analyzed, this method of formal school training is developed and tends to advance still further as time goes on. Two exceptions only may be noted, one is England in which formal civic education has not been emphasized, and the other is Austria-Hungary in which no national system was adequately developed. The system in Switzerland is also still primarily cantonal in character, but takes on some of the characteristics of the federal plan.

But German, French, American, Russian, and Italian school systems are centers of attention to the development of interest in the deeds of the political community, in the transmission of its traditions, and emphasis on its special traits and attitudes; and the increasing arc of human life spent in the school régime is emphasizing the importance of more and more civic education. Likewise the increasing knowledge of the most scientific methods of inculcating knowledge and attitudes is employed for

the same objective, and tends to make the influence of the school period of increasing importance in the life of the state. Religious instruction, to be sure, affords a competing type of education in mores, but tends to be overshadowed by the rising strength of the secular educational system.

The rôle of formal education, then, looms up largest in the category of agencies of civic instruction. Just here it may be remarked, again, that the comparison of the devices employed by the political group and those utilized by the other social groups, somewhat comparable to the political, would be most illuminating. What are the trends and tendencies of the religious, the economic class, the cultural groupings, which compete on every hand with the political for the interest and allegiance of mankind? Obviously, all have their traditions and their symbolisms, appropriate to their functions and their aims. It is clear that no group has a monopoly over language and literature, but that it figures significantly in all of them. All have services corresponding within their group to what are here characterized as governmental services within the political. Schools are not the monopoly of the governmental groups, although the constant tendency in recent times has been in that direction. More and more the private and the religious school recede into the background and the state school advances in importance in the social groupings. The capture of this agency by the political community is perhaps its greatest triumph in recent years. There remain, of course, large numbers of church schools and various types of trade or class schools, but all these are of relatively little significance as compared with the very remarkable development of the educational system under the auspices of the political body.

Other groups have factions which in the political are termed parties, and the struggles of these factions are important in all of them. In the political community it may be said that the combat of parties is more definitely institutionalized and that the severity of the struggle is somewhat abated by that situation. By the same logic, of course, the vividness of the combat is at times reduced in attractiveness. In other groups, the fac-

tional struggle is apt to become feudistic in character, and the factionalists are not so sure what they may and may not reasonably do, as in the mimic wars of the standardized political parties in modern democratic states. Group literature is not rich in specific material bearing directly upon this problem, but there is a wealth of data ready at hand for the inquiring investigator interested in these devices.

Cutting through these complexes of group balances and special techniques, are other lines which cannot be ignored by the state-builders. The importance and influence of flaming personalities in the political or in other fields, the power of sharply defined ideologies stirring the imagination of men, the ever changing balance of social interests in a given area, the impact of culture patterns of different types within the state or from without, the effect of technical invention and discovery; all these are factors with which the managers must reckon, or which in any case must be unconsciously adapted in the shaping of a central core of interest and loyalty.

It has been predicted that the influence of personalities would decline with the advance of civilization from a period of deification of heroes to a recognition of their human qualities. It is true that much of the ancient glamor surrounding the great men of the state has been removed by a closer look at their origins and activities. They are no longer gods—or even demi- or semigods. The critical biographers and psychoanalysts reveal them in quite another light, and strip them of their divine haloes and other superhuman trappings. Nevertheless, the great personalities still occupy dominant and commanding positions in the life of society, even without their supernatural attributes. They are great even because they are human. Lenin, Mussolini, Gandhi, wield vast influence over the political behavior of masses of men; and in democratic communities, leaders of the type of Lincoln, Gladstone, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, are figures of very great importance. The rôle played by these men is very significant in the political society, and shows little sign of decline, while scientific, industrial, and artistic figures also

loom large in the life of the community, and their luster is reflected in the political.

In the countries examined by our collaborators the rôle of personalities appears a large one, both in living, dominant, and picturesque individuals, and in the perpetuation of the heroes and martyrs of the past, in an appeal to the memory and common interest of the political group. Theoretically the great man has been stripped of many of the elements of his artificial greatness, but practically he has been enlarged in another dimension, as the representative of the mass, the symbol of the crowd whose tendencies and traits, aspirations and ideals, he may incarnate and express in the most dramatic and forceful fashion.

There is no religion, officially, in Russia, but Lenin continues as a popular idol; in Italy there is war between church and state, but Mussolini looms large as a symbol of Italian nationalism; the simplicity of Lincoln raised him high in spite of the lack of ceremony in his background; Bismarck in Germany overtopped the royal puppets in the show.

And these larger figures do not rise to a lonely eminence, but are surrounded and supported by scores of other majestic members of the political community likewise objects of almost equal admiration in the state.

Likewise the influence of ideologies of a national type still remains as an important factor in the construction of political loyalty and enthusiasm.¹ Communism, Fascism, Democracy, are the leading types in the states discussed, and are, in fact, the dominant world-types. The more general idea systems are of course not peculiar to any nation, except Russia and Italy, but are shared with other states. Special defenses of the special systems are also found in all of the states concerned, systems in which the peculiar virtues and excellencies of the British, or the German, or the American, or the French political organization are extolled, and the special excellencies and aptitudes necessary for the operation of these types of political machinery. Justice, liberty, security, and prosperity are attached in diverse ways to each of these forms of government and are presumed to flow

¹ See Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (1931).

from its special qualities. There are, however, particular forms of advantage imputed to the system found in a particular state, as the unique merits of the British parliamentary system, the special advantages of the French or the German improved form of republican organization, or the federal plan of the United States. They are invariably attached to the economic prosperity, the cultural position, the general well-being of the community, and are characterized as the underlying cause of these advantages of the group, as the *sine qua non* for their continuance. They thus tend to integrate the whole social process and advantage with the political process and system, and to identify one with the other in the mind of the average citizen. American prosperity is the outcome of the system of government under which the state has grown up; Britain flourishes because of its admirable form of parliamentarism which has surpassed all other types of political excellence; Russia enjoys its special social and economic advantages because of Soviet rule; and Italy owes its national advance to the distinctive qualities of Fascism and the rule of the élite; French pre-eminence is derived from the excellence of the administrative and political organization hammered out by experience. So one might swing around the circle of the fifty-odd states of the world, presenting their special positions of advantage and the relation of these advantages to the particular type of government in the particular state.

All of these ideologies play an important part in the civic training of each generation, and can never be ignored by the makers of behavior patterns in constructing their types of civic cohesion. These idea systems tend to give dignity and majesty to the conception of political allegiance, and supply a high type of rationalization for the whole political process in the given political community. They lift the rationale of the nation above a selfish purpose and make it the execution of some lofty mission, the unfolding of some large plan for the benefit of all mankind. The national purpose becomes a world purpose. It is true that a nation may change its raiment and take on another garb, as when Russia decks itself out in red, or Italy in the black shirt, but this in no manner interferes with the dignity of the state.

It only signifies that a new form of political theory has been found, and has been incorporated in the body politic. There is no question of the definitive excellence of the system which is for the moment official and authoritative. Civic education is deflected to this new channel, although many of the essentials of the older systems remain unchanged in spite of the revolutionary shift in ideology or in the new personnel of the governing classes. For the time, a large amount of attention is given to effecting the transition to the new régime, but once it is firmly established, the older practice may be resumed without very great change in most cases, unless there is also an economic, a religious, and a social revolution, as in Russia.

There is no indication that the power of these ideologies tends to decline in recent times, for they still hold sway over men's minds and serve as the basis of political idealism and allegiance. There can be no doubt that they will continue to do so, for a long period of time.

Attacks upon statism and governmentalism continue but not in the older forms. About the mid-century and during the last half of the nineteenth century, anarchism and laissez faire theories of state activity occupied a conspicuous place in political speculation. But in more recent times anarchism has found fewer defenders, and the laissez faire doctrines heralded so widely by Spencer, have been materially modified. The rebel philosophy has found refuge in other than systematic forms—in poetry and artistic protest.

Oh, child of superstition that calls itself the State,
Whence came thy right assumed to pose as potentate.¹

Many theoretical assaults have been made upon governmentalism by syndicalists, guild socialists, and pluralists of various forms and various degrees of emphasis and vehemence.²

It is not possible to discuss these doctrines on this occasion, beyond directing attention to the general nature of the attacks,

¹ *Anthology of Revolutionary Poetry*, p. 105.

² Merriam and Barnes, *Political Theory, Recent Times*.

and drawing the conclusion that they have not thus far materially weakened political loyalty and cohesion, in so far as that element is derived from the consideration of or acceptance of some type of political theory.

Furthermore, the economic interpretation of law as an outcome of class struggle and triumph was, a generation ago, a factor in weakening the basis of the political order, inasmuch as it placed large groups of persons outside the group of the law-maker and in the class of those to whom law was dictated. The doctrine of the economic and social basis of law is more strongly developed than before, but on the other hand, Marxian groups, socialistic and communistic, have come into the possession of political power, as sole owners or jointly with other groups, and to that extent their feeling of exclusion from participation in the activities of the state has been materially modified. The state theory has been relieved of the pressure of anarchism and Marxism, but has been subjected to the attacks of the Pluralists, so that, on the whole, the balance of authority has not been notably altered by the events of the last generation.

What is true of the more generalized political order may also be said of the nation-state, namely, that it has been little affected by the ideological developments of recent years. Concepts of the world-state, of the city-state, and some form of pluralistic state, organized around industrial units in some form or other, have been developed in the last generation; but, on the whole, there has been no critical analysis of the basis of the country-state as yet. The presupposition still continues that there are inherent and indisputable values in the large-scale, territorial state of the type of Germany or France, and there has thus far been no very effective challenge of this basis of political construction. The Hindoo poet and philosopher, Tagore, has denounced Western industrial-mechanical civilization and nationalism as well, but, in the main, the Eastern groups have accepted nationalism as a part of their political program and launched out upon struggles to achieve it. Many volumes have been written on the subject of nationalism, critical and uncriti-

cal, but in the main they have not challenged the nation-order as such.¹

Nationality and nation are used in these studies not infrequently in a confusing fashion, and it is not always clear whether the material dealt with is the political unitary group, or a cultural group aspiring to political autonomy.

Other volumes have been freely written on the characteristics of various nations—English, German, French, or otherwise—treatises which in great part are written in anything but an objective manner, and which in the more extreme cases amount to a jingoistic glorification of a particular nation.² These have left unimpaired, however, the ideology of the nation-state, idealizing and expanding rather than criticizing it or analyzing any of its vital processes sharply. As far as the machinery of civic training is concerned, they tend to strengthen it by making more sure of its central objective, the national state.

The right of self-determination or autonomy enters largely into more recent discussions of nationalism, and raises many questions regarding the type of group entitled to self-determination, and the nature and limits of the autonomy to be achieved or allowed. What ethnic groups or what particular cultures or combinations of ethnics and culture are justified in demanding political independence is of course a topic of interminable controversy, ended sometimes by force of arms, again by political adjustment, or by the process of economic reorganization, but always with an appeal to the common judgment of civilized mankind in the background of rationalization.

On the whole, then, the ideological trend has tended to strengthen the position of the political factors in the commu-

¹ The most illuminating of these is C. J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, A Bibliographical Note, pp. 277-79; J. W. Garner, *Political Science and Government*, chaps. vi-vii; W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Rousseau to Spencer*, chap. viii; Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*; Mitscherlich, *Nationalismus*. See also G. P. Gooch, *Nationalism*; René Johannet, *Le Principe des nationalités*; J. H. Rose, *Nationality in Modern History*; Friedrich Hertz, *Die allgemeinen Theorien vom Nationalcharakter*.

From another point of view are Robert Michels, *Der Patriotismus*; W. B. Pillsbury, *Psychology of Nationalism and Internationalism*; G. E. Partridge, *The Psychology of Nations*; Stratton, *Social Psychology of International Conduct*.

² For a better type see Ernest Barker, *National Character*.

nity, in recent times, in so far as it exalts the doctrine of the national-country-state and weakens the doctrines of anarchism and antistatism. On the other hand, the doctrines of cosmopolitanism and pluralism, although relatively ineffective thus far, tend to offset the other tendencies, and, looking forward, one may see dimly lines of theoretical attack upon the position of the political in the community. Indeed, if all possible critics of the state were to combine their forces now, the result would be disastrous to any political régime. If the quasi-political churchmen, the antistatist labor groups, the capitalistic groups restive under governmental regulation, were united, they might make short work of their common denominator in government and set up some other under another name—with similar functions.

Closely related to the ideologies of politics, are the social and ethical value systems found in a given community. The fundamental ideals of the society, its goals of social achievement, its varying standards of life or of civilization: these ultimates, which are everywhere found, condition the character of the more special form of political training. The political must be integrated in the larger system of ideals and values of the community, and indeed of the society outside the community, as the Western or the Oriental; or the Latin or the Teutonic; or the Slav.

At times, it is true, the political values and objects of the community may seem to transcend in importance those of any other genre, but in the long run this is not true, except in the sense that the political values and ideals are a part of the general whole, and not outside the other value systems. Between the dominance of the political attitude and ideal and its exclusion lies the middle road of integration of all social values in one common whole.

The religious aspirations, values, practices; the economic standards and values; the cultural attachments and devotions; the groupistic cohesions and values: all these are a part of the background conditioning political life, and the setting to which the whole process of political education must be closely adapted,

if it is to achieve its highest possible success. So far is it from being true that politics has nothing to do with economics and social forces, these are the very materials out of which the governmental is woven, and without which it has no vitality or value.

To no principle in politics is it more necessary frequently to recur than that of the relativity of political processes to social-cultural, economic forces in which government operates. The arrogance of authority, the hierarchical character of legalistic organization, the deceptive omnipotence of power which has no apparent limit and yet is strictly limitable, the symmetry of juristic theories of political absolutism: all these make easy the conclusion that the government is a thing of itself, and may be treated as if entirely distinct and independent from social government.

And yet from the point of view of civic education it is supremely important that the extrapolitical values and ideals should be related to and integrated with the objectives and technique and spirit of the governmental. No wise builder of state systems will for a moment fail to recognize these vital elements in the life of the society and set his scheme of the state to the broader social pattern.

Is the general trend of civic education in the direction of authority or of liberty? In the older systems respect for authority and implicit obedience were taught the citizen in order to make his response to commands of his technical superiors automatic. To the majesty of the law the sanctions of the church were added, at least when the two were on amicable terms. The change from the personal, *jure divino*, absolutistic basis of authority to the democratic has necessitated a fundamental change in the treatment of the nature of command and obedience.

Obedience is now rendered not to a person but to the political community; and not because of command primarily but by reason of assumed consent. Nominal equality of civil and political rights, and theoretical recognition of the importance and value of the human personality as such, has profoundly altered the nature of the government. The recurring relations of domina-

tion and subordination in political behavior continue to find expression in political life, but the morale so essential to the efficient functioning of modern democratic states presupposes types of co-operation and participation in the exercise of political power, as well as attitudes of responsibility for common affairs. Those who command do so, not merely because of their office, or because of their personality, but because of the general recognition that they serve a useful function in the community—a function in terms of the general welfare as interpreted in last analysis by the generality of the folk in the state.

Modern authority is hedged about by a series of challenges which the individual may invoke against the government, so-called constitutional liberty, and more than that by the general understanding that legalism is subject to review and judgment, by whom it may concern, on the question whether the legal and political order is functioning advantageously in the given community. This latter may be called a moral or ethical check, but it may also be characterized as an extralegal and still political check upon formal political power. The *jure divino* basis of authority is dead and the modern effort of political orders to make themselves sacrosanct through some development of neo-divinity is in contradiction to the spirit and facts of the time.

It will be found that most systems tend to resist the process of inculcating attitudes of independence either in the school system for minors or the system for adult education. The emphasis is likely to be on conformity and docility in the schools, and the public program is likely to include a considerable number of measures of restriction of freedom of speech, press, and behavior, in the interest of public security, it is said—and this not only in times of war but in periods of profound peace. Quarantines are maintained against dangerous ideas coming in from outside, and strict supervision over subversive doctrines from within. Anarchism, socialism, communism, democracy, syndicalism, may be objects of attack, depending on the attitude of authority at a given moment. Authority distrusts those who do not agree with it, and in the name of the community will often build up a series of barricades against the assaults of critics.

Essentially, however, authority that defends itself by suppression of opposing types of attitudes and behavior is itself revolutionary and subversive. So difficult is it for the holders of power to remember that their authority is not personal to themselves but held in trust for the community, resting upon co-operation and joint participation in the re-creation of authority from time to time.

In theory, all governments concede that they are servants of the people and that resistance to government under certain circumstances may be, in the language of the American Declaration of Independence, not only a right but a duty. Yet in practice they find it difficult to allow for resistance, and in civic education they tend to emphasize conformity and obedience as against nonconformity and resistance. What they see is insubordination, disintegration of loyalty, sedition, and possible revolution against existing authority, and from this point of view they tend to minimize the values of free speech, free criticism, variation and independence, and the importance of extra-legal review of official conduct to the morale of the community.

One of the continuing problems of civic education is therefore that of encouraging attitudes adapted to this general *esprit*, the maintenance of which is so vital to the morale of the state, both in peace and in war, alike in internal and in external relations. The problem of political education is not merely one of establishing attitudes of conformity and obedience but also of developing a sufficient counterbalance of independence, criticism, and detached judgment on the part of citizens. Without these qualities the inevitable tendency of authority to excess cannot be resisted without resort to the extreme remedy of revolution. The line or perhaps better the balance is somewhere between servility and insubordination. The establishment of such a balance is one of the prime tasks of civic training which aims at the realization of genuine morale in the great tension moments of the states' existence.

Is the basic trend with which the pattern-maker must deal authoritarian or libertarian in recent times? Students of history are well aware that these tendencies rise and fall from period to

period; that fluctuation rather than stability is the order of the day; and that consequently no general conclusion may be drawn.

In our own period the movement has been in the direction of authority rather than of liberty. In the economic class conflict of our time the trend of advance has been in the direction of collectivism, perhaps for the ultimate advantage and liberation of the individual, but for the moment in the direction of regimentation. As a defense against socialism it has even been found expedient to develop a large amount of governmental regulation in the interest of society. The World War brought with it a wide range of detailed supervision of conduct hitherto unknown, and, although unwelcome, tolerated for the sake of national prestige. Large-scale organization, a familiar phenomenon of economic and social life, has in many instances tended to submerge the individual. The philosophy of individualism has remained the dominant political and industrial theory, but in practice has been obliged to retreat to save itself from a worse evil.

Two of the states here considered have abandoned the formal theory of individualism, the Russian and the Italian, while the others have formally retained it as a part of the economico-political system; England, the United States, and France have materially modified their earlier doctrines of *laissez faire*, and Germany, Switzerland, and Austria-Hungary never adopted it as a part of their thinking upon economic problems.

It may now be permitted to review some of the trends and possibilities in the evolution of systems of civic training. The emphasis will be placed primarily upon the systems or mechanisms of particular states, but more general considerations will be introduced, and to some extent data not embodied in the preceding studies, material drawn from the more extended as well as more special studies and experience of the writer. We may now ask in what direction are we moving and what are likely to be the new developments in the art or science of civic training in the near future? It is not proposed to give a dogmatic answer to this question, but to indicate broad lines of

development in process, and others that seem possible if not immediately probable. These observations are submitted for whatever value they may have in the further elaboration of systems of civic education, as they are taken up by a variety of formulators and critics in various states.

The outstanding fact regarding recent trends in civic education is the systematic attempt to inculcate civic qualities, and the extensive use of the school for that purpose. Defective as the methods may be, the conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the community to consider the problem of civic education emerges as the dominant fact in the situation. It marks the transition from drift to conscious social control, and foreshadows the scientific organization of political education.

The whole social basis of civic education is likely to be altered in the face of modern situations. The factors compelling this are many. Universal education is one of them; general leisure is another, with its opportunities for reflection and participation. The advent of the democratic system is another influence, bringing with it a more general sense of responsibility for civic affairs and a wider participation in civic determinations. Modern economic conditions with changes in modes of production and technical advances in means of communication and transportation are likewise formidable for the old régime. Of still more fundamental consequence is the basically scientific tendency of the times, substituting a pragmatic view of life for the older finalities and dogmatisms and introducing insights into the nature of social control and new techniques of management. All these elements in the social revolution through which we are passing must be taken into account in the consideration of alternative systems of civic education as means of political control.

The old system of fear-force-routine as a basis of civic allegiance is no longer tenable. Fear is disappearing as a factor both in the field of theology and of politics. The avenging power of the gods is no longer the mainspring of religious motivation, and in the political world the divine right of kings has almost vanished. Neither can longer command the unthinking obedience

of masses of subjects, although their ritualism and social prestige may still survive.

Likewise force as a basic element in civic loyalty tends to decline, although of course by no means extinct—on its way, but still here. The whip, a symbol of force in the more general sense of the term, disappears from the family as an instrument of discipline first for the wife and slowly for the children. It drops out of the schools as an agency of discipline. As an instrument of public punishment flogging also fades out. Prisons and wars, it is true remain, but for how long is a question. The prison is being very slowly but very surely transformed into a hospital, and war even more slowly into the argument of opposing counsel or the negotiations of skilled adjusters.

Force and fear were based upon authoritarian types of ideology from which deliberation was largely missing. The theory of the old régime was that reflection upon political processes is a form of heresy or even treason. To challenge the basic presuppositions of the political order was an evidence of an unbalanced mind, likely to meet with punishment of the most severe nature. The modern theories of civic education are based upon a degree of rational justification, which it is true may be more apparent than real, yet which contain a basic appeal to a form of reflection and consideration rather than an effort to prevent thought upon the nature of the process in question.

Likewise the class basis of veneration has changed at many important points. The so-called "better" classes are not so clearly defined nor are they so highly venerated. Warriors, priests, landowners, have suffered a sharp decline in degree of eminence in social groups, and in the political group incidentally. The merchants, the politicians, the scientists, women, all have gained upon them, and tend to supersede them in the guidance of the political community. "Money bags," "frocks," and "professors" tend to assume continually greater and greater power in the social and political domains in contradistinction to the earlier prestige period of the sword, the land and the stuffed shirt of antiquarian antecedents. Doubtless the process will con-

tinue still further, and will correspondingly require adjustments in civic education.

In view of these tendencies, it is increasingly clear that modern systems of civic education tend to be developed systematically and deliberately. This is illustrated by the experience of six of the states studied in this inquiry, and is found, not merely in the relatively new orders of the Soviets and the Fascists, but notably in Germany and the United States, and almost as clearly in France and Switzerland. In England the method of indirection is at this moment challenged by those who insist upon a more direct method of inculcating the precepts of politics.

The school becomes the great civic educator taking the place once held by the army and the church. Citizens in the most impressionable years of their lives enter the schools and remain there for long periods of time, increasing as the educational process develops in range and scope. General principles of behavior are taught in the schools, even where church and state are separated, and civic principles will be inculcated incidentally. Higher institutions than the elementary schools hold the pupils for still longer periods of time, and will train the leaders of the future state. In all the systems appraised in this study, the school emerges as the heart of the civic education of the political community, and in all probability will continue to function increasingly in this rôle. The British system varies from the others in that the teaching is indirect rather than direct. For a system of social aristocracy the English plan has admirably utilized its educational system for the training of rulers on the one hand, and for the indoctrination of social priorities on the other. But for a democracy its utility is still to be tested, and there are signs of its modification in the direction of a more direct and democratic plan than that which has hitherto obtained.

It is further to be observed that in the present cases, the educational system in question is a secular one, in which the rôle of religious education either is minimized or taken over by the state as moral education; that the educational system is

universal in its scope, as against the earlier aristocratic types, and compulsory as well as universal. These conditions constitute a revolution in the bases of organization of the elements of civic cohesion, a revolution of deeper meaning than most of the more sanguinary contests attracting wider attention. For however defective the content and teaching may be, the community recognizes the superior function of the school in the development of group coherence.

Since then the school to so large an extent takes the place of the family, the church, and the army as a civic educator, it is important to examine closely the essential features of the new development. Among the more striking characteristics of the new educational system emerging in various forms are the rôle of indoctrination, the rôle of local national history, the frequent failure to bridge the gap between civic behavior and total behavior, and the inadequate application of scientific methods in civic training.

Thus far the schools, generally speaking, have tended to follow the process of indoctrination, in the main, the literal transmission of the group traditions in inelastic form—a retrospective rather than a forward-looking view of civic situations. In this the schools perpetuate the methods of the tribal groups described in Weber's *Duk-Duks*, but, in fact, fall behind the early systems, in that the primitives endeavored to train the candidates for citizenship in some of the tribal skills of war or the chase as well as in a knowledge of the tribal traditions handed down by the wise men. Even in the Russian system which is the most recently contrived, an ideology, that of communism, is the chief subject of instruction. To inculcate the theory of the Marxists and the Lenin cult: these are the chief goals of endeavor, although not the only ones. In older orders the process is substantially little different, and the national theories, precepts, and traditions take precedence over everything else. Presumably a complete education would be the attainment of perfection in the knowledge of national biography, assuming impeccable heroes, and in historic national political theory, without much regard to the actual ways of political

living, and with little attention to the unfolding of the future political process.

Furthermore, emphasis is laid upon the existing political order and the existing territorial ethnic state, and not the basic mores of the political group. Allegiance to Russia and the Soviet system looms largest in the scheme of the Soviets; allegiance to France and to democracy in the French; allegiance to America and the American system of government in the United States. To criticize private property in Russia is as welcome as the opposite would be in France; or to commend democracy as easy in Italy as the opposite is difficult in the United States.

What is typically French or typically German or typically American is pushed to the fore and inculcated as an action pattern in its own system. All this of course is in the light of the social balance at the given moment; all this is with due regard to the ethnic relations and values, the religious, the economic classes, and the regions and neighborhoods. But always with a territorial delimitation in mind and at hand, France to her borders, Italy to her borders, Germany to her borders unless, of course, there is some unclaimed *irredenta* just beyond. In short, the overwhelming emphasis is placed upon those sections of political behavior directly and immediately related to the existing political order and to the existing geographical borders as well, while the inner content of the political process as related to types of political behavior is relatively little stressed.

History is the main instrument in this task, and local history of an undiscriminating character, strongly tinged with boastfulness and provincialism. An examination of a wide variety of school texts by our investigators reveals this with unmistakable clearness. In its mildest form history teaching merely ignores the existence of other peoples, or places them in a perspective too small for their actual importance in the modern world. Of this the French system supplies an excellent example. It is perhaps inevitable that a nation should overstress its own history and achievements, just as an individual without too great egocentrism would overestimate his own rôle in the world, but in nationalistic systems this stress is an emphatic and, it ap-

pears, an exaggerated one.¹ Unquestionably a degree of egotism in the individual has a functional survival value, and the same may be said of nations, but it is equally true that the overselfish individual imperils his position and prospects in a group of equals, where interdependence is important for their common advancement. In a rapidly changing world, where intercommunication develops at an unparalleled rate, the overdevelopment of the ego-complex in nations may be unsalutary for the nation or nations developing it. In an interesting debate some years ago in the French Senate, M. Poincaré declared that without the French army there would be no question to discuss; to which M. Herriot replied, "And without the good will of the world there would be nothing to discuss at this moment."

In a world of highly critical biographers with new techniques of analysis, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain the position of many heroes, and with increasingly penetrating analysis of racial differences, the special virtues of each group become less secure in their superior position. And in a world of larger and changing economic units, the earlier preaching of the inferiority and viciousness of the enemy will also prove progressively embarrassing. However, the further discussion of this point may well be reserved for later analysis of newer tendencies and possibilities in civic education. It is, of course, always easier to carry on a system of mass indoctrination in the theories or prejudices of the group arising out of its past than to develop a critical or constructive attitude toward the political process looking forward. And something of this sort happened in the nineteenth century with the advent of universal education and democracy and with the clamorous demands of nationalism for conscripting everything in its cause. It is sufficient at this moment to call attention to the predominant rôle of history—local history—in the scholastic system of civic training as practiced in modern states.

It may of course be contended that some form of indoctrina-

¹ See H. E. Barnes on "Historiography" in *Encyclopedia Americana*; Bessie L. Pierce, *Civic Attitudes in American School Textbooks*; Scott, *The Menace of Nationalism*; E. H. Reisner, *Nationalism Education since 1879*.

tion is indispensable in the education of the oncoming generation; that some fundamentals must be laid down; some definitive values established beyond possibility of doubt. And it may be maintained that some such indoctrination is necessary, even if only for a stage of immaturity, as a temporary scaffolding. It is of course true that in the transmission of the experience of the race, much must be accepted provisionally by the novitiate who cannot at once prove everything over again for himself. Indoctrination as used here, however, goes beyond this provisional acceptance of the results of experience, and closes the book of experiment. Doctrines are presented as finalities without critical examination of the way in which useful experiences are incorporated in the life of the group, or without an intimation that with new experiences the earlier conclusions may advantageously be modified in the course of time.

From the point of view of the group itself the indoctrination process has the effect of producing a stiff and inflexible type of citizen who finds difficulty in adjusting himself to the changing circumstances of life. What he acquires is not a set of skills but a set of dogmas, which were skills perhaps in one situation, but not of necessity now. He will not shoot at the enemy for fear of wounding the sacred animals, and as a result he perishes himself, perhaps. In the fields of industry and science the new generation is equipped not with doctrines of an inflexible nature, but with standard skills such as the group possesses and the attitude and means of discovering or inventing new ones as he goes along.

RÔLE OF INVENTION AND CHANGE

Modern systems of civic education are fundamentally defective in their overemphasis on the rôle of the inflexible elements in the state and in their failure to recognize adequately the rôle of invention and adaptation. It is, of course, true that great areas of human behavior lie in the domain of the automatic or unconscious, or that of unreflecting habit developed by constant repetition to a point where no conscious effort is required. The values of habit are, everyone must recognize, very great, and no one would venture to suggest the abandonment of the advan-

tages they bring with them. "Habit," said William James, "is the enormous fly wheel of society, its most conservative agent.

. . . . The great thing then in all our education is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy."¹

The margin of adaptability and change, however small, is nevertheless of incalculable consequence in the organization of human relations, and contains survival values of the very greatest importance for individuals and societies. The strange stereotypes of behavior found among ants and bees illustrate the seemingly blind alleys in the development of progressive evolution of human types.

A fundamental problem in the field of civic education is that of the relation of tradition to invention and adaptation in the development of types of political behavior. It is of course possible that tradition may include invention, but in another and in the more common sense traditional is used as if contrasted with the changing and the new. The traditional way is the old way; the new method is opposed to the ancient tradition which it supplants or attempts to supplant.

Historically, civic education has been chiefly a training in the traditional, the transmission of what the group has done, with the veneration of the past, sometimes even its deification, and usually with the presupposition that what has been done should be literally done again and that what has been is a model for future situations. It may even be true that the primitive initiations laid less emphasis upon this than the later, for they stressed alertness and readiness in war and chase, although they of course sanctified the stereotyped ways of their ancestors.

The classic systems were built upon the theory that change is an evil in the political world, and that if our intelligences were keen enough and adroit enough in inventing the necessary devices, the ideal state would remain static. This conception was unfolded by Plato and Aristotle, both of whom regarded the avoidance of change as the triumph of the political scientist, and advocated all manner of practical preventives against it. The ideal state must be set back from the sea to avoid contacts with

¹ *Psychology*, p. 121.

roving sailors who might bring in new and contraband ideas; only the adult may be allowed to go abroad and then must teach the superiority of the local system of government on his return; even new dances and new tunes must not be introduced lest they might start a new rhythm, even in the field of recreation. Nothing must come in to upset the established harmonies of the state.¹ This continued to be the ideal of political savants until the sixteenth century, when Bodin declared the task of politics was not that of preventing change, but of recognizing its necessity and of making the necessary transitions as easy as possible, with as little loss as might be to the community.²

Most modern systems provide for the inculcation of the traditional without recognition of the inevitability and the desirability of change in institutions or mores themselves. It may be said, moreover, that they are often more concerned with elements of the state where change is threatened than with those of a more permanent character. Thus the special form of political order in the given state, and the special territorial ethnic pattern, must be more carefully guarded than the general principles of political behavior. The maintenance of monarchy and the particular holders of power is much more in need of buttressing than the more commonly accepted axiom of the necessity of some form of command and obedience. The supreme court must be made more sacred than the principle of adjudication of differences as it has come down historically in all tribes and groups everywhere. National boundaries must not change, although all systems permit of their enlargement, it seems. Italy is Italy centuries after, and its rulers wear the crown of the Caesars; and England is England and its kings still kings long after the substance of power has died away.

Under modern conditions, however, survival values are found in mobility and adaptability as well as in routine, conformity, and tradition. In the industrial world and in the scientific world tradition has been almost discarded and progress and profit too depend upon quick adjustment to swiftly altering situations. No one feels himself bound by the previous studies of the atom;

¹ See Plato, *Republic*; Aristotle, *Politics*.

² *De la République*.

no one in modern production adheres consciously to the methods of his ancestors. No one anywhere insists upon driving an ox team because his forefathers did so. The religious revolution of the sixteenth century, the political revolution that followed, and the industrial revolution have shattered the old traditions and have produced a modern world in which change is the watchword of the time. Science has added to the tendency toward mutability in social arrangements.

The uncritical use of tradition and of indoctrination in the ideologies of a special order is usually hostile to the quality of adaptability. They set up as the ideal type of political behavior adherence to a form of theory or a historical character, and tend to regard these type forms as sacred and unchangeable. In this way the critic and the rebel are inhibited, but also the inventor and the constructive genius. A true view of national heroes and of national doctrines becomes difficult and is placed under the ban of the law or of public opinion.

The chief task, however, of a modern citizen is that of intelligent discrimination between competing types of persons as leaders and between competing types of policies in a changing world. Assuming a degree of interest in and attachment to the community of which he is a part, the value of the citizen to his group depends upon the intelligence and discernment with which he makes necessary choices and adjusts himself to changing situations. In fact, the differences in ability to make readjustments is ordinarily the margin between survival and destruction in political as well as in economic and social life. It is precisely here that we find the danger of excessive use of uncritical tradition.

Stefansson in his interesting description of his Arctic explorations tells of groups of Indians who would not make use of heather grass as a means of cooking their meals because they had always been accustomed to willows. They therefore insisted upon searching for willow stems and roots while other members of the party gathered the grass, cooked their meals, and went to sleep before the searchers for the willows returned. The willow searchers, however, were not willing to give up the traditions of

their fathers, for this they felt would bring upon them the odium of their group, and as Stefansson said, they held out for a month before they were willing to adopt a new method.

Traditions have unquestionably a definite value, but they are useful only as long as they are applicable. In some situations they may become harmful patterns of conduct instead of wise and sound precedents. There is in tradition an element of reason and unreason, an element of ceremonialism and sentimentalism, and an element of intelligence and discrimination. There are circumstances in which a line of conduct may lead to life; there are other circumstances in which the same line of conduct would lead to death or at least to difficulty. It is a curious paradox of modern life that, while nationalistic hatreds frequently lead to wars of the most destructive type, ostensibly to preserve the traditional, when these wars are once precipitated, the bitterest foes do not hesitate to borrow from each other in the field of war whatever new device may insure success. If the enemy uses poison gas, the other quickly adopts it. If the enemy uses airplanes or tanks, the other quickly follows, but not the other's language, or religion, or culture.

If traditional education is carried through completely, it endangers its own purposes, for, if every citizen were convinced that every technique used by his ancestors was perfect and unalterable, that type of technique would be continued to the destruction of the group itself. If we insisted on using exactly the same weapons as our forefathers, we would lose all modern wars; if we insisted upon acting upon their complete patterns of ideas, we should find ourselves ill-adapted to a modern world. Un-critical tradition and rigid indoctrination, in other words, tend to make rigid and inflexible types of attitudes which in a changed and shifting world are inapplicable. Tradition tends to produce fossilization and crystallization where flexibility and adaptability may be of prime importance.

When I was in Czechoslovakia in 1924, there was an interesting struggle still raging. The defenders of John Huss insisted that the trial of Huss, in 1415, should be reopened, that he should be retried, vindicated, and absolved from judgment and

penalty inflicted upon him over 500 years ago. This question did not actually become a political issue, but it was by way of becoming an issue—a troublesome factor in the maintenance of a working majority in the Czech government.

In the United States, if we followed the Fathers' example literally, we would disfranchise over three-fourths of our voters, re-establish human slavery, set up property and religious qualifications for office, re-establish religions, set up penal and reformatory institutions of the most primitive type, and rebuild a whole series of institutions which we should find absolutely intolerable and impossible.

The past may readily be made a defense for vested wrongs as well as for vested rights. Probably the most common defense of a notoriously selfish interest is to cover itself with an alleged group or unselfish interest. In this case, all the teachings of tradition are capitalized against the group itself, and in reality the intelligence of the community is directed against itself.

The significance of fidelity to the past in any group is very great, but beyond a certain point what was originally meat becomes poison. The distortion of loyalty may, in effect, be disloyalty. Or, from another point of view, the exaggeration of loyalty may become intolerance, bigotry, and oppressiveness of the most odious form, designed, however, to protect the interests of some selfish individual or group. In no atmosphere does the demagogue thrive more freely than in that of excited intolerance and overinflamed civic enthusiasm built upon overemphasized tradition.

The citizen trained in hero-worship alone finds himself in a strangely different world when the time comes for real action. His texts and dates and biographical narratives do not seem sufficient. His book heroes made no mistakes; their lives were never gray but always either white or black; their policies were always wholly right and never wrong, or partly right and partly wrong. Their decisions seem to have been made under conditions strangely unlike those puzzling situations confronting the modern citizen and consequently of little help to him.

In practical life the citizen finds that he must frequently de-

cide between two persons as leaders neither of whom exactly measures up to his standards; or must decide between two mixed sets of politics neither of which he fully approves. Perhaps one of these men may be a hero later on, or one of the policies a sound national ideal later on, but not now. What he has before him is not a heroic situation but a practical case in which discernment, discrimination, and judgment are of the highest value. But the traditionally educated citizen has not been taught this, if he has been taught solely in terms of hero worship and tradition. Apparently Washington had no problems; apparently Bismarck had an open field at all times; apparently Clemenceau had only to tread the simple path of duty. The citizens of Washington's, Bismarck's, and Clemenceau's day had only to follow their great men, of whose qualities there was no doubt, and those clear ways which nobody could mistake; and apparently everyone was always with them, applauding their every act. From this peaceful atmosphere of high Olympus it seems a long way to the average municipal or state or national election. Here the puzzled citizen finds that many difficult choices must be made. He can, of course, follow his impulses or his emotions or the beating of the ready tom-toms, but these may not be satisfactory guides, either for him or for the community. What he must really do in cases where the community is usefully served is to distinguish between the genuine and the sham, between the sound and the unsound, between types of behavior that are useful for his group and those that are dangerous.

The watchword of modern life is change and adjustment, even to the point of restlessness and dissatisfaction. Unquestionably, readjustment is, and for some time will continue to be, a larger part of the life of our time, at least in the Western world. Politics cannot continue to live upon tradition and force, two of its great allies in the past, but must rely upon invention, adaptation, adjustment, if it is to continue as a useful part of that modern life in which conscious control over human evolution looms up larger and larger.

I attended, in 1926, in Vienna an International Conference

of Town Planners in which the characteristics of the modern political world seemed to me to be most clearly emphasized. Some 1,100 delegates from many countries came together for the purpose of considering how the city of the future should be built, and how the modern city could be progressively changed and adapted to new conditions. They were not worshiping the old mansions in Vienna or elsewhere. On the contrary, they took great pride in exhibiting to us the new structures just erected. There was not much interest in the early types of street structure or the rich moldiness of ancient city outlines. The planners were primarily concerned with adjusting old structures to modern conditions of communication developed by the street railway and by the automobile. For them the test of value was utility in the present and in the future, rather than the past. They were builders, inventors, adapters of an old to a changed and changing new world. Their proceedings were not enlivened by emotional appeals or traditional harangues, or ancestral worship, but their discussions turned upon questions of engineering, of finances, and of human health, comfort, and convenience in our own day. Their civic training had been in large part in invention and adjustment rather than in uncritical hero worship and rigid indoctrination of ideas, or belief in the immutability of a particular political or economic system. It is in groups such as this that we may find the clue to the type of civic training most useful to the coming generation; and on the other hand it is precisely this type of attitude that seems to me most commonly neglected in what we call civic education.

Modern governments now approach a severe test. Now for the first time everyone is made a citizen and a responsible citizen; now everyone is given the elements of an education; now everyone begins to have a measure of leisure; and equally important, the world begins to change at a rate never before equaled in human history. Magic and myth of earlier days are outdone every decade by modern science with its unexampled power over nature and man. This is the age of advance and adjustment—the period of new patterns of conduct in every walk of life. Traditions still survive, but never in the world's history

were they weaker than now in business, in education, in mores, whatever way we turn. The surviving types of life and conduct are those that are able to adjust themselves to this changing world, and raise new temples on the ruins of the old.

It would be a supreme tragedy if government alone still worshiped at the shrine of the past, satisfying itself with the symbols and ceremonials of outlived situations. For this can only mean that the new masters of mob psychology weave out of the patterns of traditionalism the cloaks for their own daring enterprises in popular confusion and control. The demagogue and the rogue will not fail to utilize the prejudices, the hates, and the bigotries of mankind for their own purposes, and with their tongues in their cheeks take over the government of mankind in the name of the supreme order of the charlatan.

Another statesmanship might not be so misled. It could recognize the rôle of political invention and adjustment in the new world, and the part they must play in the life of the coming citizen. It could provide for the cultivation of discernment and discrimination, for the forward look as well as the backward sweep, for tests of adaptability and inventiveness as well as memory, for appreciation of the inventor and the social technician in the present as well as in the past. It could unfold the political world as a shifting scene with constantly changing situations rather than as a closed book left only to be revered. It could picture the ideal citizen not as a devotee of the past but himself as father and founder, joint creator of a new world. The great values to be drawn from the illustrious past need not be lost, but may be placed in their true light, not as magic or mystery, but as preliminary to the understanding of the possibilities of the greater future.

In a sense there is more danger from unwise indoctrination with various ideologies than from the earlier inculcation of the hero worship of the tribe; for the latter were often depicted as brave, strong, resourceful types of men, hunters, warriors, wise men, meeting a variety of new situations with unexpected and unusual ability. But a modern set of theories may be set down with dogmatic certitude and without possibility of contradic-

tion, whether it be the ideology of communism in Russia, or Fascism in Italy, or democracy in France, or the perpetuation of the peculiarly French national ideology or other national ideology as if it were fixed and unchangeable.

It may again be observed in nationalistic systems of civic education that the tendency is to apply the doctrine of immutability most persistently to those elements of the state which are most likely to change rather than to the fundamentals of government which are not threatened. Thus a particular form of political order, such as communism or Fascism or democracy or capitalism, becomes *sacrosanct*, and criticism of it in the educational system at least tends to be tabooed. Or the boundaries of a particular state or its *irredenta* are more inflexibly laid down than are the essentials of political behavior upon which group cohesion and power really rest in last analysis. In other words the greatest hardness of political dogma may be found at the weakest part of the structure of civic education, even from an objective, outside point of view favorable to group maintenance. When some group like the Holy Roman Empire, or at the opposite pole, some localism, feudalism, or federalism goes down before the sweep of events, we recognize the social value of this movement, and even the advocates of the lost cause will do so, although at the time of conflict they could not, or would not.

The emerging struggle, then, in the development of civic training is that between the older system of traditional indoctrination, and one in which much greater stress is laid upon the elements of invention, adaptability, and adjustment in a changing world. Thus far the fixed and rigid systems have been triumphant almost everywhere, but there is growing recognition of the unsatisfactory nature of this method, and it is likely that students of the educational process will observe notable changes at this point. The older systems, resting upon a type of political inflexibility, will long and tenaciously resist the new tendencies, but it seems improbable that they can maintain their position in a world of dynamic change.

It may well be that these new elements will come at first

through traditionalism itself, which might recognize the qualities of adaptiveness in ancient heroes in the crises of the life of the state, and emphasize the desirability of these very elements in political character. There may be a tradition of flexibility as well as one of absolutism and inflexibility, and the old medium may be used to enforce the importance of the new, paradoxical as it may seem. But later it is likely that the open recognition of the inventive and adaptive quality will emerge and be made an integral part of the civic equipment which is sought.

It is precisely in this field that there is opportunity for the reorientation of the individual personality in his relations with the state of which he is a part. For here it becomes clear that authority may stand in its own light by too great emphasis upon obedience and conformity. Automatism and discipline are important and indispensable factors in the political society as in other organizations, but independence, initiative, inventiveness, are of equal value; and this becomes especially clear in the great tension moments of the body-politic, when blind obedience is not enough to save the life of the community, or to carry through its purpose. Nonconformity may be one of the qualities tending to insure survival, even in war.¹ Mobility as well as weight is an important element in any contest between human beings, and in the life of the state mental mobility on the part of its citizens is of prime importance. Overemphasis on authority tends to repress the free growth of the personality and to inhibit those types of inventiveness and resourcefulness which are often the decisive factors in times of stress. The wise state-builder will take pains to leave free field for the play of individual criticism and construction in the face of authority. There may be levels or tensions of civilization in which this is undesirable, although this may be questioned even in the primitive stage, where fear, force, and routine are the staple methods of control. But in the modern period of intense mobility and widespread mechanization, there is every reason to encourage the growth of the richest and finest types of personalities. Eccentricity and variability must be encouraged, artificially if necessary.

¹ See Mayer, *La Psychologie de commandement*, on the inadequacy of discipline alone in many military crises.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS—*Continued*

SYMBOLISM

It would be a serious error to conclude that symbolism has no place in civic training under modern conditions.¹ On the contrary, it possesses distinct values in any educational system, and may contribute important elements of strength to any plan of control in a political community. While a system placing principal emphasis on symbolism may be ineffective under modern conditions, the opposite extreme of complete neglect of ceremonial values is equally far short of attaining the full strength of civic educational possibilities. Symbolism may be either an abdication of intelligence, a tribute to the unknown, a form of totem or taboo, adding emotion to attitude; or it may contain an element of reason in the background. It may substitute automatism for reason either because there is no reason, or in reinforcement of a valid function. Historically, it has been chiefly the former; but technically there is no reason why this should be true. Especially in the political community where the hereditary system prevailed, the prevailing symbolism was employed as one of the chief supports of the dynastic principle and the personalities who were its beneficiaries. "The boast of heraldry, the pomp of power" were assets of the ruling class, and their meaning was not merely that of artistic expression but was definitely related to economic and social privilege in the shape of landholding, taxation, and an array of prerequisites, privileges, and forms of prestige. The cult of the court and the elaborate ceremonialism of the crown were symbolic methods by which the will of the ruler was imposed upon the subject.

When the fury of revolution burst upon the ruling group, and a new set of governors emerged through the storm, the em-

¹ See A. N. Whitehead, *Symbolism*; G. H. Mead, "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *Journal of Philosophy*, 1922; John F. Markey, *The Symbolic Process*.

blems of the aristocratic and monarchical lords were thrown down. Statues, memorials, names, intimately associated with the ancient régime, were likely to be ruthlessly destroyed, even at the expense of artistic values they might contain. But this is not the end of ceremonies and symbols. The revolution too has its dramatic scenes, personalities, places; and these reappear in a new form of vivid representations of the new order. New monuments, new statuary, new uniforms, new heroes: and these are the property of the rising forces of the community.

In more recent times many of the older symbols have been appropriated by the nation and have become an adjunct of nationalism in the abstract or the country in the concrete rather than of persons and families as under the old order. The succession of prestige follows the line of the corporate state rather than that of biology. The nation in turn has employed them for the same purposes as the rulers did in the earlier period, namely, chiefly for their prestige value, a short cut to imposition of an ideology or a sentiment. National heroes, monuments, memorials, holidays, art, and culture have been woven together in the ceremonialism of the modern political society. What has been lost in the transition from the easy incarnation of the political idea in a set of hereditary personalities has been regained in the far broader popular basis everywhere given to the new nationalism even in the nominally monarchical states. The holiday in celebration of "us" is as significant as the holiday for "them," and the monument to the people as effective as the memorial to the reigning house.

Even a leader of the type of Napoleon, little interested in the general theory of democracy, was an instrument for the creation of a new symbolism replacing the old. The Legion of Honor in a way took the place of the older decorations and yet almost immediately became vastly effective in its influence. He opened lines of recognition to the unrecognized, and under the ancient régime unrecognizable, and thus uncovered wide sources of support never touched by the older rulers in the aristocratic system. A comparable case is the symbolism of the Soviets, likewise tapping a new source of strength in the "group of toil"

practically unrecognized under the Romanovs, but now suddenly confronted with great possibilities of prestige and recognition. The Red flag and the "Internationale" are symbols of great specific value in enlivening the general theory of the social order. The distribution of titles by the Labor group in England is another illustration of the new uses of ceremonialism; and the New Order of Lenin is equally notable.

On the whole there has unquestionably been a simplification of symbolisms during the last hundred years, owing partly to the Puritan and partly to the democratic movement. But there still remains a wide range of symbolic devices and many of these tend to assume, as time goes on, the character of protective devices for the past rather than control devices for the present, or myth devices for the future. Prestige earned in one situation is likely to be translated into unearned prestige in another. This is not possible as in the case of individuals holding hereditary political power, but the transmission may be made in the case of groups or classes claiming privilege under ancient systems, and fortifying their claims with the taboos of symbolic sanctity. This is particularly important in states where hereditary rule still survives in nominal form only, where a constant effort is made to employ this modicum of survival power for defense of special situations. The power of the House of Lords, for example, has been consistently utilized for the purpose of protecting the landlords and the propertied classes from the advance of the new heirs to economic power—business and later labor. In America the symbolism of the changeless Constitution is invoked to protect corporations against regulation of their enterprise in the general interest. In the larger states the national symbolism is employed in defense of the imperialistic or expansionist movements now characterizing their development.

It is, of course, inevitable that the dominant group should endeavor to use the current symbolism for the protection of its special interests, and capitalize the experience of the whole group for its particular advantage. This struggle is unceasing. The tendency is, however, for the symbol to lose the essence of its meaning and to become formalism alone or chiefly so. In

modern systems of civic education, it is clear that the symbolic often loses its essential survival value for the group as a whole, and becomes either an appeal to unreason or a defense of a special interest group. At this point it is intimately related to the inflexible type of training which has just been discussed in the preceding paragraphs in connection with the subject of invention and tradition, and may become one of the most effective supports of the routine, traditional unadaptable form of civic education. This situation might lead in turn to a reaction against ceremonialism, ritualism, and all forms of political symbolism, not merely on the earlier Puritanical ground that they were the defenses of ancient privilege, but that they tended to inhibit constructive thought on actual problems of state and aided in the development of an inflexible type of political mind.

There are, however, distinct values in symbolism, and it is not necessary to abandon them, because of the possible or actual misuse of this important agency of social control. There are emotional values in symbolism that reach below the levels of ideology and tap basic sources of human energy profoundly important in the organization of human behavior. Whether in stimulating emergency action, or in the slower development of long-time mores, or in the learning process of civic education, the symbolic relationships are indispensable. "There has been no great people without processions," said George Eliot, "and the man who thinks himself too wise to be moved by them to anything but contempt, is like the puddle that was proud of standing alone while the river rushed by."¹ Unorganized and untrained emotions are likely to be the servants of prejudice and impulse, and these impulses may become the masters of conduct as in panic and rout, or may be exploited by designing interests and by demagogues. That the children of darkness are wiser in their day and generation than the children of light is a saying applicable here. The technically untrained but practical specialists have often given this subject more attention than the more highly trained students, devoted exclusively to ideologies.

In this sense the unscientific have sometimes been more in-

¹ *Romola*.

telligent than the presumably scientific, for there is no reason why the functional values of symbolism should not be employed in the service of modern systems. It is sometimes assumed that symbols have only a retrospective value, but this is an error, for they may have a prospective value as well. They may look forward as well as backward, become symbols of hope as well as symbols of memory. A flag may be the mark of the conquests of a ruling class in some distant period, or it may also be the vivid token of a day not yet dawned, as the Red flag in theory is the symbol of the brotherhood of workers and the economic emancipation of mankind. In earlier days this was the meaning of the flag of the French revolution, which became a symbol of political freedom from oppressors, and of the American flag. The visual appeal through color, the rhythms of music, the form appeal of sculpture and monument—these as such have nothing to do either with action or inaction. They may be used in defense of either. The symbolism of political behavior as distinguished from that of the special political order or the special form of a national state may be in the future as well as in the past, may be essentially forward-looking, fixing its eyes on a state of human relations not yet attained, one in which the crudities of the existing orders are progressively eliminated and finer forms of adjustment constantly made.

Art may serve the present and the future as well as the past. If symbols point back, this is not the fault of the symbols, but of the way in which they are employed by a special order or of a special territorial state. Perhaps the Romanovs or the Hohenzollerns may resist this; and unquestionably vested interests will endeavor to use symbols to aid them in their struggle for retention of power or prestige. But the emerging interests and patterns will develop their competing symbolism, and the contest is on. The German struggle over the flags of the old and the new order is a present-day example of a vivid sort, indicating clearly the features of this struggle constantly going on.

Given adaptability or flexibility as an objective of training, the task is then that of the artistic invention of adequate symbolism corresponding to the new aim. Much of religious sym-

bolism and of cultural symbolism is of the prophetic type, looking forward to higher worlds or finer types of grace and beauty. A richer and more glorious life is indicated and suggested as within the range of possibilities. Religion, it is true, may teach resignation and passivity, and during a great part of the world's history has done so, but this is not the only mission of religion or of its accompanying symbolic features. The symbolisms of the devil, death, and hell, are of course a part of an attempt to discipline the individual through the agency of fear, and have no necessary part in the organization of the religious. The whole range of artistic and aesthetic beauty is as ready to serve the possibilities of mankind as its limitations, pains, and penalties.

Hence it is wholly unnecessary to abandon the great treasures of the symbolic to the uses of the stereotyped and set forms of the historic past. The reaction against elaborate ceremonialism has made this inevitable in the transition period, but for the future there are striking possibilities in the cultivation of more skilful use of the symbolic and the ceremonial in the process of civic education. We may see in the future the more scientific study of political symbolism and more extensive use of its possibilities in civic training, not only of the formal, but also of the informal type.

This important field is so wholly unexplored that it is not possible to anticipate the developments which might ensue from its careful examination by experts, but a few possibilities have been suggested. For example, the formal entrance into mature citizenship is at present signalized by no meaningful ceremony. On the contrary, the citizen approaches the first exercise of his franchise in the modern state under circumstances which are wholly uninspiring. In the United States, he will probably approach the ballot box in some barber shop or basement of some unattractive building. In other countries the initiation into the suffrage is almost equally drab and unattractive. From the psychological point of view, the political community loses a moment of great importance in the life of the initiate, a moment when he might be impressed with his entrance into a new world of opportunity and of corresponding responsibility. Various

forms of introduction might be devised, and of the possibility of improvement over the present gray and unattractive situation there can be no doubt in the mind of any person endowed with ordinary imagination. An interested community would readily devise the ways and means of dealing more gracefully and beautifully with this civic crisis, now so sadly wasted. The symbolism of change and adaptation might be developed much more effectively than at present. Comment has already been made upon the fact that much of political symbolism of the new world has been based upon the hypothesis that change is undesirable; that some fixed and perfect state of political society is the ideal form; or that particular systems must ponderously protect themselves against the disintegrating influence of change.

In a world of great mobility in social organization and relations this old form of symbolism does not correspond to the needs of the time and might readily be replaced by another, more nearly related to the evolutionary tendency of the times. Politics does not involve permanence but relativity of relations in some form of working equilibrium, which is no sooner born than it begins to die. The relations shift and the center of gravity shifts with them, if it is to remain the center of power. The emphasis on permanence was the result of a situation now changed by the logic of political progress and the newer types of conscious social control and direction.

What this symbolism should be, I do not undertake to say, nor could anyone say. We may merely indicate the possibility of other forms of symbolic interpretation of changing political relationships, and point out the possibility that new forms of symbolism may replace the older and outgrown. When once the doctrine of conscious control over social and political evolution is conceded, then it becomes possible for types of builders, creators, inventors, and apostles of change to emerge as figures in the world of political art and symbolism. The sensitiveness of the economic and nationalistic order may delay this development, but in the long run it is certain to appear and to compete with other symbolisms.

That the capacity for creation of symbols is dead is vividly

negated by the brilliant devices of the Reds and the Black Shirts, with their array of colorful and inspiring cults and ceremonies. The mass demonstrations in the Red Square in Moscow and the crowds in the great square in Rome, "Giovanezza" and the "Internationale," the *Fascio* and the hammer and sickle, are only a few of the new contrivances arising from the desire for symbolic representation of the new order of things. And that like features will be woven into the civic education of the future is easily possible.

INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES

The most startling gap in modern political education is the bankruptcy of training in aptitude for international relations—an amazing weakness in a world of unparalleled facility in intercommunication. Broadly speaking, the typical child emerges from the schools inadequately informed regarding other groups of the world, quite unsophisticated in international behavior in a world tenanted by fifty-odd other states. He is brought up as if he were an only child, not only the lone child in the family, but the lone child in the world. The academic secrecy that is thrown around sex relations is rivaled by the silence regarding international relations and the lack of information regarding the nature of international intercourse in a modern world. Thus far, history as a means of such education has been unreliable because of its lack of perspective and its tendency to distort the face of the enemy and to idealize beyond outside recognition the portraits of its friends. In war times this type of teaching goes mad.¹

In the realm of intergroup relations the state of civic education is wholly undeveloped. The question what should be taught regarding international relations has seldom been faced at all, and nowhere has there been thorough discussion and mature deliberation by competent personnel.² The new German consti-

¹ See Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*; D. A. Prescott, *Education and International Relations. Report of Subcommittee of the League of Nations on Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League of Nations* (1927 and 1930).

² See *Proceedings of International Secondary Schools* at Geneva, August, 1926, for discussion of the subject of training in international attitudes in the secondary schools.

tution requires that there shall be adequate education in the spirit of international good will,¹ but this has never been thoroughly analyzed and has not been carried out at all satisfactorily in practice. It contains, however, the germ of a program, such as no other state has ever adopted, and may point the way toward a scientific approach to the whole problem.

The traditional attitude toward the stranger was of course that toward the enemy, but in modern times he is also potentially an ally and must be so regarded in the long view of things.² Under a democratic régime the popular education in international attitudes becomes even more important than ever before. In the earlier period of dynastic rule, the interrelations of political groups might be conducted by a relatively small set of persons, many of whom were related and all of whom constituted a privileged class. The bulk of the people of the several countries followed them without much criticism or reflection; professionals could readily be mobilized for the attack on the neighboring group one day and in alliance with it on the following. The decisions of a small number of persons were quickly ratified, always assuming that they did not contravene too far the social interests of the mass of their people, and that reasonable security, prestige, and advantage followed in the wake of the rulers.

But, with the decline of this era of personal family government, the responsibility for the fixation of international attitudes devolves on the generality of the community, and, in a period of universal education, the problem of the attitude of one group to another becomes a matter of unparalleled importance. It is a new question in the development of the race, and one to which thus far little scientific attention has been given by competent investigators of mature judgment. Pacifistic and imperialistic ideologies have generally assumed to take the rôle of counselor, guide, and teacher, for which they were ill-adapted, and in the course of which they presented the most bizarre and extreme views. An objective analysis of the fundamental questions involved in the new situation, and, in particular, an analy-

¹ See Article 148.

² J. Prudhommeaux, *Pour la Paix par l'Ecole* (1928).

sis of the objectives of civic training in the international zone, would constitute a very valuable contribution to the political order of the world. It is not to be assumed that there would be complete agreement upon such an analysis, but it might reasonably be expected that some minimum essentials would emerge upon which there might be general agreement, and which might serve as the basis for a constructive program in the several states of the family of nations.

It seems easier to alarm and arouse the fear and hate complexes than to organize the emotions of friendliness and gregarious sympathy, and to relegate the intergroup relations to the limbo of the obscure and unknown than to lift them to the level of intelligent understanding and appreciation; but the task may not be an impossible one and in view of the revolutionary disintegration of older social conditions it is not unlikely to be attempted in the near future, even while pessimists are proclaiming its impossibility.

Even the military value of fear and hate tends to lose its force under modern conditions of warfare. It is well recognized in athletic contests that rage and fear are incompatible with the most advantageous utilization of the competitors' abilities, and the same may well be true of nations. A high level of intelligence and determination are more important than the perpetuation of the blinder devices. The fundamentals of military training may even be altered in view of the new conditions of social organization, and hate and discipline alike may be subjected to the most severe scrutiny in the future.¹

It is perfectly patent that in the world into which we are coming the relations between the fifty-odd states which comprise the membership of the family of nations will be much closer than ever before; and that new types of arrangements and understandings must be developed to meet these new situations. In the transformed world of modern times, isolation becomes increasingly difficult, and with the technical develop-

¹ Mayer, *La Psychologie du commandement*, on discipline; also on ideologies and their uses in war.

ment of intercommunication will be still more so, even without further miracles of invention.

Of even greater significance are the developments of larger economic units, and the great industrial concentrations of an international nature. Quiet changes at this point are forcing a revolution in interstate relations more significant than any since the rise of the modern state. They are setting up a new world in which the ways of isolation possess a very dubious survival value from the narrower point of view of the most exclusive group. Likewise, the rise of international law, of modern diplomacy of the World Court and the League of Nations, of large far-flung territorial groups like the United States and the British Commonwealth and the Pan-American Union, and the projected United States of Europe are forming new political relations which it is essential to understand, and in the midst of which it is important for the citizenry to have a balanced habit of action.

For the time being, the attempts at international civic training are obstructed by the antagonism between the pacifists and the imperialists and militarists, and between advocates and opponents of the League of Nations. Those who fear disarmament and the development of a noncombative morale recoil from any intelligent consideration of the permanent basis of international relations; and they are able to prevent the serious consideration of the type of world and the type of political habit it is essential to cultivate in an enlightened race, while pacifists look with alarm upon all movements in the direction of the use of force in the maintenance of world order. Shall we adopt a general system of education in militarism, or in imperialism, or in pacifism, or in the spirit of the League of Nations, or in some form of superstate? The clash between these competing systems has thus far prevented the organization and presentation of any attitude at all, and has left the race at the mercy of the war psychosis in times of stress and that of suspicion and distrust in the meantime. It is inevitable that the pressure of events will force careful consideration of the underlying problem, which

does not at bottom involve militarism or pacifism but some more adequate system of envisaging intergroup relations.

The difficult problem, What are the actual and realistic objectives of training in this field? has seldom been raised. There is no embarrassing wealth of carefully worked out alternative sets of objectives or of means of attaining them. What do nations wish to teach the coming generation regarding their fellow-men outside their political state? This is a question that cannot long escape the most searching analysis. What are the goals of training? What are the ways of achieving these objectives? Or, in the absence of complete analysis, what are the practical devices possible in the given situation?

It would perhaps be possible to bring together some basic political maxims of education upon which there might be general agreement, at least within certain broad culture areas, and these might serve as the foundation. It might be possible then to modify these to fit states with a special form of political order as democracy or Fascism, observing the differentials. It might not be possible to agree upon the national differentials, as that would be the task of the several states, but perhaps there might be a general agreement on a limited number of these characteristics as applied to a wide variety of states, or a statement accompanied by local comment. It might finally be possible to find the minimum essentials of an international education program. Or if not, perhaps the very failure to agree and the points upon which the agreement was wrecked would be almost equally illuminating. For, in such case, there would appear at the very center of the problem the specific differentials of which we are in quest. In the course of time basic texts might appear and find their way in whole or in part into the systems of civic education in the principal states of the world, if not in the formal schooling, which might be too much to hope at this moment, at least in the adult education of several political communities.

It would be possible to organize thoroughgoing research in the objectives of international civic education on a co-operative basis, under the auspices of eminent scholars of different states. It might even prove feasible to set up a commission on interna-

tional education. But without such an agency it is entirely within the bounds of possibility at the present time to develop detailed inquiry into many important phases of this question. These studies would provide a point of departure for local efforts to organize and rationalize the training of their people in international behavior, and perhaps time might show the survival value of international sophistication.

Important steps in the direction of education in international attitudes have been taken by the League of Nations through the Subcommittee of Experts for the Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League, under the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation.¹ The general purpose of this work is stated as follows:

"To regard international co-operation as the normal method of conducting world affairs" implies far more than instruction in the history and work of the League of Nations. The form of words adopted by the Assembly at its sixth ordinary session puts forward the principle that co-operation is normal and strife abnormal in the life of civilised mankind and that in the world of today co-operation must be ever more widely extended.

Civilisation in all its principal manifestations is a record of co-operative effort from the family, the village and the work-shop to the vastly more complex institutions of today. To imbue the child with a deep and lasting affection for its family and country remains today, as in former times, the first principle of sound education.

But a true patriotism understands the patriotism of others; and a recognition of the permanent necessity of co-operation, both within and without the State, must be emphasized in any education that is to fit young persons for modern life.

Such instruction cannot be carried out merely as a subject or part of a subject in the school curriculum. It must permeate all the child's surroundings. The influence of the home and the Church is here of enormous importance, but this subject lies beyond the competence of this Committee. For other influences outside the school one may rely with confidence on such important organisations as those grouped in the Liaison Committee of the major international associations which meets at the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.

To effect these purposes a wide variety of means are proposed. The list includes schools, libraries, the cinema, broadcasting,

¹ See report for 1930 and the earlier report of 1927. Very important and useful material is contained in the publication *Educational Survey*.

interschool correspondence, games, fêtes and pageants, interchange of masterpieces of art and literature, comparative study of civilizations, interchange of professors and pupils, and many other like measures, all aimed at "solidarity between children and students of different nations." Administrative machinery for this purpose is also indicated, with especial emphasis on the importance of an Educational Information Center at Geneva.

Of great significance is the request of this group to the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation "to investigate the possibility of an inquiry regarding school text-books used for instruction in history and geography, civics and morals, and on the readers in use in the various countries."¹

Of great importance in this connection is the important inquiry already made by M. Prudhommeaux under the auspices of the Carnegie Corporation, a part of which has been published under the title of *Enquête sur les livres scolaires d'après guerre*.² The admirable effects of such an inquiry in France are well summed up by Prudhommeaux in his discussion of *Pour la Paix par l'Ecole* (1928).

It should be noted also that an investigation of the contents of history textbooks has been initiated by the International Committee of Historical Sciences, and is now in process.³

In all of these cases, however, there is difficulty in avoiding offense to the supersensitiveness of various nationalistic groups, and it may perhaps not prove feasible to obtain as objective and incisive an inquiry as may be necessary from such quasi-governmental sources.

Nor can efforts in the direction of the formation of broader international attitudes be passed by without reference to the remarkable work carried on for many years by Pierre Bovet through the International Institute of Education in Geneva. This notable center has for many years served as an important

¹ The Caseres proposal of 1925 authorized National committees to take steps in this direction but this has not been effective. See 1930 *Report*, p. 18.

² Unfortunately not all of this manuscript has thus far been published and a considerable mass of material remains in the hands of M. Prudhommeaux.

³ See *Bulletin, passim*, and especially Vol. II, Part III.

point in the interchange of information and in the initiation of new types of research in this field.

In this connection the international education directed from Moscow is also of great importance. The Communist International, the Red Trade Union International, the Communist International of Youth, and the International Woman's Day are all a part of an organized and active effort to draw attention to the international aspects (if international is the word to use here) of the proletarian movement under Bolshevik direction. Other international movements also have their effective organizations, but in none of them is the educational movement as well advanced as with the Soviet group.

The ingenious and insistent Cotesworth in his plan for a thirteen-month year has provided for an extra day to be used as an international day for the inculcation of international good feeling and good will. Even without this, there is an additional day every four years which might be devoted to the same purpose, if it were desired to utilize this occasion for education and for the development of a form of international symbolism. Even without a change in the calendar, it would be possible to utilize more fully the values of Christmas, in the advancement of international good will. This day is not a part, however, of the theological and educational systems of all states of the world, and would therefore not provide a sufficiently broad basis for international agreement. As Grotius, founder of international law, pointed out three hundred years ago, the basis of an international system must go deeper down than any religion, and must include, not only those of all faiths, but the unbeliever as well. In this field, Prescott says: "It is this sort of unemotional factual approach to actualities that is needed rather than an abstract idealization of humanity or a vague cosmopolitanism that avoids any loyalty whatsoever."¹ A type of ceremonialism is growing up about Geneva and the League of Nations, and this may well develop into still more colorful symbols of international faith and understanding. Yet entirely apart from the League there might be developed other symbolic phases of the

¹ *Education and International Relations*, p. 199.

same human endeavor toward reconciliation, through the agency of literature, art, and music, on a much more extensive scale than ever before. Action need not wait upon the formal movements of the political agencies which in the nature of the case will move slowly. The emotions and sentiments of the several peoples of their lands will permit greater license to the author, the painter, and the poet.

In any event it is plain the possibilities in the direction of international symbolism have never been approached, to say nothing of exhausted. Enormous energy has been expended upon juristic treatment of the international problem, but practically nothing upon the psychological and symbolic bases of understanding, which have a more subtle appeal to human nature than the ponderous arguments of the lawyers. Symbolism springs out of the common life and cannot be expected to advance far beyond it, but there is no reason why it should lag behind the common desires and expectations of mankind regarding their political organization.

The important consideration is not the specific suggestions just enumerated, but that sustained and scientific thought be given to the question of developing aptitudes for international relations as a part of a comprehensive system of civic education in all the states of the world. It is reasonable to believe that a concerted and persistent attack upon this aspect of civic feeling might well produce effects of the most important nature within the next generation, and that, in the absence of such consideration, the peace and order as well as the prosperity of the peoples of the world may be menaced by the absence of adequate sophistication in this, a central problem of modern states.

INTEGRATION OF TOTAL BEHAVIOR

Another basic problem of civic education is that of the integration of patterns of civic behavior with other patterns of social behavior and with the pattern of behavior as a whole. Centuries ago Aristotle asked the question whether the virtue of a good man is the same as that of a good citizen? And the answer was yes, in an ideal state, but otherwise no. We are not

concerned merely with the reconciliation of the political with the ethical as was the Greek philosopher, but with a broad variety of pluralistic patterns of group behavior developed in a wide range of social settings. We have to deal not only with political interest and loyalty but with the interest and loyalty of religious, racial, regional, economic, and cultural unities, each of its own special type. It is inevitable that from time to time these interests and patterns should compete and conflict, and that patterns should disappear, be merged in others, and that entirely new ones should develop.

Each of these types has its own system of group training cultivating the special forms of mores essential in that society. There are even aggregates of an antisocial nature that curiously enough have many of the characteristics of other groups. There are bands of thieves and robbers, with their own codes of honor, discipline, and morale. There is scarcely to be found a wholly negative type—a type loyal to no one, for this is a very difficult attitude for any human being to maintain consistently, however determined he may be to achieve the goal. At any time he may betray his inconsistency by faithfulness to his mother perhaps, or his child, or to his country. In time of great stress he may yield to the temptation of becoming a member of the foreign legion or the arditi. Or he may be faithful to his gang of cut-throats, inadvertently as it were—the law of the outlaw this might be called. Political anarchism may be achieved in the defiance of the formal state, but it is hard to follow it through all the multiple phases of the network of human interrelationships.

What happens when the family is called upon to surrender the son who is a fugitive from justice?¹ Will they protect the mores of the family or those of the state? What happens when the friend or the neighbor is called upon to testify against his friend and neighbor? What happens when the union orders one thing and the state the other in time of industrial disturbance? What happens in the conflict between the possible profit of the merchant and the law of the state of which he is a part?

¹ Galsworthy, *Justice*.

Dr. Stein, editor of the *Vossische Zeitung*, came down to his office one morning during the German Putsch and found it commandeered and closed by the leader of the revolution. "Send for the commandant," he said. His nephew proved to be the officer in charge. He saluted his uncle. "Nephew, what are you doing here?" "Your paper is suspended!" "Nephew, clear out of here!" And he did.

Which of you will fire upon his Emperor? asked Napoleon on returning from Elba, facing a squad of soldiers with guns leveled upon him. They threw down their arms and embraced him. Maupassant in *Le Boule de suif* relates the story of a demi-monde traveling with a sister and a group of respectable bourgeois into German-occupied territory. The German officer insisted upon thrusting his advances upon the demi-mondaine, who repulsed them for nationalistic reasons. The officer in return detained the whole party until such time as the woman should yield. Finally he was aided by the entire French party, including the sister, who talked of the necessity of sacrifice on the part of everyone. All felt that nationalistic reasons should not stand in the way of professional activities, while the professional strongly asserted the French position. In the end she capitulated to the entreaties of the party.

Are there common elements in all forms of group training and if so, what are they? There are types of persons in competing groups with much more in common than with many others within their own group. This is pre-eminently true of the managerial sets in the various groups and of the docile in various groups. Thus the social differentials in many cases are secondary in importance to other resemblances; and a cross-section of competing groups with competing loyalties might show the most surprising and interesting results. To what extent and with what limitations are these group qualities transferable from one to another? And what are the differentials between the group qualities of the several forms? To these fundamental questions we are not able to return satisfactory answers down to this time, but there are indications that important steps forward

will be taken in the near future.¹ The study of child welfare and the study of psychiatry are likely to throw an important light upon these questions. The influence of child-play in organized forms upon the social and political attitudes of children, and the effect of various forms of self-government are likely to throw much light upon the question of how political attitudes are formed and how they are modified, with reference to physical condition, mental balance, personal experience, social environment and contacts, and a whole series of other factors with which we are now unfamiliar but which are likely to be uncovered as the various forms of research go on.

Of the technical problems in dealing with the development of civic interest and loyalty too little is known. In endeavoring to train an individual, What are the chief areas of resistance, and what are the centers most susceptible to suggestion, either in the individual or in the group? Some of the large-scale cases have been examined here, but much more might be done with these instances and many more cases might be assembled. Studies of long-standing political orders, studies of revolutions and rebellions with a view to determining just where they failed or broke through the crust, studies of unstable equilibriums, individual or group, studies of the shifts of migrant groups, studies of the changing of allegiance for economic reasons or for other types of reasons, cultural and social—all these would add greatly to our knowledge of just what goes on in the disintegration and integration of social loyalties.

Often the transition is like a flash of lightning in the vividness of its revelations regarding the inner meaning and texture of allegiance. The immigrant returning to his native land discovers that he is no longer a native in spirit. The wanderer from home learns that he is loyal to his native land after years of absence and indifference. The criminal lifts his dying head to catch a last glimpse of the flag of the country whose laws he despised. The rebels are stopped at the toll gate because they do not have the toll money. The nativist finds another land more comfortable, more free, more inviting.

¹ Snedden, *Civic Education*.

In a series of such instances strong light is thrown upon the inner nature of the civic process and the factors of which it is made up; how its responses are conditioned; and what are the limits of plasticity and modifiability. In these instances or others like them, What is the relative rôle of temperament, physical, mental, or both; of obvious interest, individual or group; of familiarity, habit, and custom; of formal ideology, and of social pressure? If we understood these factors better we should better know how to attack the problem of integration or disintegration of civic patterns.

The two groups with the most highly developed system of formal group training are the church and the state. With a unified religious hierarchy and a pluralism of feudal states, the supremacy of the religious organization was evident. But with a pluralism of religious organizations and the rise of the powerful modern nationalistic state, the tables were turned, and the civic organization came to the fore. The separation of church and state has characterized recent times, and was a device to permit the free functioning of each organization within its own sphere. This purpose was accomplished, but at the cost of the basic separation of the patterns of behavior, and a division in group training into religious training and civic training.

The virtues of the good churchman and the good statesman, the virtues of the good citizen and the good believer, are thus separately cultivated, at times with tragic results, but on the whole with far greater advantage than in the period of the combination of the altar and the throne. Priority is likely to be determined in the future by their relative facility and promptness in seizing and utilizing the technique developed from the study of modern science. In the meantime social and medical research seem likely to set the pace for both of them in the deeper study and more delicate understanding of the essential nature of group allegiance and the modern techniques for controlling it.

Ethnic and territorial groupings are likely to find themselves hard-pressed as the tide of science sweeps along and tests their presuppositions and their functional values. The ethnic differentials are certain to be submitted to the most severe critiques,

far different from the racial mythology that still prevails even in certain scientific circles. And their differences in terms of group training will become increasingly difficult in this case, making it necessary to appeal to obscurantism and prejudice rather than to any reasoned form of group education. Or it will be necessary to twist the education into special molds of emotional appeal, based upon ignorance rather than intelligence.

Likewise the territorial unities in the swiftly readjusting world of intercommunication and economic organization may find difficulty in discovering a rational interest basis for their perpetuation and hence will experience trouble in fitting into a plan of integration of human behavior. Localisms and parochialisms will resist co-ordination and centralization with all their force for a long time after the *raison d'être* of the localism has vanished or has become so attenuated as to possess little substantial content.

The new types of cultural, professional, economic class organizations seem on more certain ground, and are likely to find their course coincident with lines of discovery and development in the near future. They will play an important rôle in the new forms of perpetually recurring pluralism of social organization. And consequently their types of group education and their adaptability to central integration of behavior patterns will be increasingly important as the others tend to decline in meaning. With the exception of the agrarian group, all of these are essentially modern in their position and forward-looking in their outlook, likely to fit in with new lines of economic and social reorganization. The agrarian groups have found difficulty in effecting co-operative organization, or in taking on the scientific technique of modern times; and their philosophy of life is based fundamentally upon rural ways of existence, now so sharply contrasted with the developing urban attitude and interest.

Thus there appears a wide range of behavior systems with which the political must somehow be reconciled, from time to time, in a continuous process of combination and dissolution of the diverse types. Individuals must constantly work out their patterns of conduct, by weaving together the various standards

of behavior indicated to them by family, race, religion, business, and state, into a livable form of total behavior; and however little of a statesman or philosopher the individual may be, he is obliged in one way or another to accomplish this task. Somehow the metes and bounds of his interests and his loyalties must be marked out.

In a sense it is in this field of adjusting and combining and appraising loyalties and allegiances, that the individual might remain a little lord, so to speak, ruling over a realm of his own, and organizing his kingdom as he will. True, he may be borne along by the conditions of his physical constitution, or by the rush of social influences against him, and swept about like a chip on a flood. But it is at least pleasant to think that within certain limits, however narrow, he may exercise a degree of choice and control over the shaping of these realms in which he lives, and among which he may select the flag or flags he wishes to salute, or determine the knee-angle of deference to competing authorities.

It is clear then that sustained attention is likely to be given to the problem of integrating civic education with the total pattern of social education, of political behavior with social behavior. The separatism of religion, and the indefensible character of certain ethnic and territorial and class aspirations will present many difficulties to the organization of an integrated plan of social behavior. It may readily and plausibly be contended that no rational analysis can very deeply influence the slow-moving forces that must gradually clear the way for new syntheses in the distant future, with war and attrition as their chief instrumentalities. Perhaps this is so; and on the face of what has been and of the traditional modes of procedure, this would seem most probable.

But intelligence influences the course of events through the control of natural and social forces, presumably untamable and uncontrollable, and we are entering a period of rapid development of conscious control over our behavior and over social behavior. The crude appeals of a thousand years ago are giving way to much more refined and precise processes in social or-

ganization as well as in medicine. It is reasonable to assume, and it must be an assumption, that the near future will witness unprecedented developments in the knowledge of political and social behavior and unparalleled changes in the modes of regulation and organization. If this is true, some of the apparently insuperable difficulties now confronting the student of a system of civic education will become progressively less formidable. In any case, it is the very specific task of the political functionaries to find a basis of adjustment, a means of organization, a formula of order, which will best express the possibilities in the given situation taken as a whole. Politics cannot get more from the social facts, interests, and attitudes than there is in them. If the common factor is a high one, it will be all that is obtainable, and if politics has found this, it has accomplished its social function. Perhaps the common denominator in all group training will be more readily found than that in political training alone. It is of course impossible to expect a higher degree of integration in the patterns of education or in the behavior of the child than is found in the community itself. Nothing will be detected and disregarded more quickly than an unreal standard of civic behavior, out of line and in conflict with other types of behavior in the community. At this point much civic training in the narrower and social training in the broader sense of the term goes on the rocks.

In view of the intricate character of social life and relations, there will always be many types of allegiance and loyalty to many forms of groups; and this pluralism is not something to be destroyed or preserved merely because it is or is not plural, but to be encouraged where it contributes to the enrichment of human life, and modified when it stands in the way of orderly and convenient existence, and then replaced in a higher synthesis. Least of all need the political group be concerned with uniformity, and most of all with the reconciliation of variety in an endless series of adjustments and harmonizations continually disintegrating and reorganizing with the evolution of social and economic patterns of action. The failure to distinguish between special privilege and general interest, the common use of force

as the chief solvent of problems, the resort to magic and unreasoning tradition as the chief agency of civic education—these have been among the outstanding difficulties in reconciling political with general behavior, although at times they were also the faults of competing social organizations. These obstacles tend to be minimized with clearer views of general and special interest, with less frequent use of violence as an argument, and with the growth of systematic and self-conscious social control.

PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES

A view of the trends of modern science indicates that systems of civic education are likely to provide in the future a much more substantial basis in physical and mental constitution than has traditionally been the case. Physical and mental well-being and capacity have hitherto been urged by advocates of strong citizenship on the basis of their general relation to group defense and to group productivity. Sparta was a conspicuous example of physical development and Athens of intellectual; and in a broad way all national authorities have encouraged these basic qualities, much as they might look with favor on the productivity of the soil. There is, however, a much more intimate relation to the political pattern of behavior than is indicated by these general intimations of advantage. The more intensive study of the human personality reveals the close relation between types of physiological and mental organization, the personal constitution on the one hand and the political behavior pattern on the other, as well as the social behavior pattern in the broader sense of the term.¹

Centuries ago Plato described the ideal citizen in terms of harmony of a crude physiological-psychological type. The ancient Greek philosopher knew nothing of modern science, but he made a shrewd guess from his general knowledge of human nature. In our day the great advances of science make it possible to do with technical efficiency what he hinted at centuries ago. And this impression becomes stronger as we examine more

¹ See bibliography cited by Lasswell in *Psychopathology and Politics*, Appendix A.

closely the drift of present-day studies of human personality and of psychiatry and physiology.

It will be found important to study the whole subject of personality structure in the most intimate relation to the constitutional setting within which the personality, political or otherwise, lives and moves and has its being. It must be conceded that the investigation of the difficult and baffling problem of personality is still in its infancy, notwithstanding many notable pieces of research in this field by many competent and persistent inquirers. From the point of view of psychiatry, of psychology, of psychoanalysis, and of physiological constitution, a converging assault is being made upon the secrets of this elusive aspect of human nature, and important progress is being made in this sector of social relations. Much remains to be done, but enough has already been accomplished to show the fundamental necessity of observing with the very greatest care the relations between personality in general (and political personality in particular for our purposes) and the physical and mental constitution in which the behavior patterns are developed as well as the reaction of these patterns on the surrounding social world.

This is a neglected field in the study of civic education and one which at first blush may seem to have no relation to the problems of politicization. The training systems of the several states here considered largely ignore this aspect of the civic problem, with few exceptions here and there. The Russians are studying the disorganizers with a view of socializing them, and in other countries there are many studies of the personality problem, but without special relation to its political implications. There are many indications, however, that this situation will change in the near future, and there will emerge a keen and persistent interest in the basic problems of personality as an indispensable part of a civic education. Whether or no the predictions of the more ardent behaviorists regarding the possibilities of molding the race are fulfilled, it is highly probable that significant progress in this direction will be made in the near future, and that the results will be most vitally related to the problems of civic education. Just as we now recognize that the

“bad” boy may be suffering from bad teeth or nose or throat difficulties and that when these are removed he becomes “good,” so we may discover that the “bad” citizen may be rescued or prevented from the beginning by giving more thought to his constitutional background, his physiological and temperamental equipment, and his mental hygiene, either or both of which may estop him from entrance into the life of the normal citizen. Difficult as the way may seem, it is in this direction that notable advances are likely to be made at points where the aid of medicine, psychiatry, psychology—all the techniques of bodily and mental constitution—are invoked to aid in the process of constructing types of social and political personalities in different states. The balanced body, mind, and temperament will be found the inevitable basis for the construction of the effective type of citizen.

The study of human personality, political personality, in its social setting is fundamental to all scientific methods of civic training, and is the only foundation on which a modern structure may be built. When the veil is lifted from what is now obscure, there is reason to believe that it will be possible to re-organize civic instruction in different forms and processes from the ground up. If much of the present apparatus and technique is doomed to destruction in the process of readjustment, it will prove only one more of the compelling transitions wrought by science in the social and political worlds.

The early traditional and the later ideological character of much civic training has avoided the exploration of such considerations as these, by assuming that indoctrination in the accepted practices was the main task of political education, and, in the larger sense, of social training itself. It has of course always been recognized that a hardy and vigorous type of man was a desirable citizen, inasmuch as he might produce more and fight better than the opposite.

In more recent times and especially since the war, there has been a great revival of interest in gymnastics, sports, and athletic exercises of all types, in all national systems and especially the Continental, and these are conceded to have a definite relation

to types of citizenship. Part of this interest may have a military background, since mass exercises may serve as a substitute for army training, but another part rests on the conviction that a sound physical base is of the utmost importance in the citizenry, in times of peace as well as in war; and that the state should in every way encourage the development of the physical health of its citizens.

In any case, there has been an extraordinary development of athletic sports in all European countries, and, in all instances, this has been associated with the conception of civic practice. This is as true of Soviet Russia as of Germany or France. The symbolism of these occasions is national in character, patriotic exhortations are usual, and the whole tone of the proceedings is in keeping with the idea of community spirit and political cohesion. The Swiss and other shooting societies are excellent examples of the intimate and useful relationship that may readily be set up between accurate marksmanship and the national service.

Much greater attention will be given in the future to the development of civic education and its physical and psycho-physical bases, to the constitution of the child, the adolescent, and later of the adult. Vigorous citizenship rests upon soundly constituted types of personality, and the nature of this fundamental soundness is an important part of the making of the future citizen. Indoctrinations and interpretations of interests are built upon the substructure of the physical and psychic patterns of individuals, and these are the great limiting factors in the superstructure.

The antisocial and non- or apolitical types are a central problem in political and social education, and they cannot be omitted in any scheme of political education whether in the school or without it. It is not merely the enemy or the criminal outlaw who obstructs the development of orderly relations of co-operation among men, but also the type who is neither; who may be called a disorganizer, a nonconductor, a resistant to the general process of socialization. How to deal with him, and how to integrate him into the political community without de-

stroying the individuality and the eccentricity that may border upon genius, is one of the central problems of modern social and political education; and unless this is solved, relatively little progress can be made in other directions. This is the limiting factor in the construction of the citizen.

The indoctrination and education of the balanced types is relatively easy, but the indoctrination of the unbalanced may do much more harm than good and the education of these types only increases the difficulties of the occasion. The heavy expense of the state for the maintenance of internal order, police, prisons, and courts, is largely due to this failure in political training; and on a larger scale the disastrous relations between nations may be attributed to the low level of political education prevailing in the conflicting communities, a level in part attributable to the disintegrating influence of the political disorganizer. Great loss is occasioned by the resistance of these reluctant members of the group to readjustment and change. They have never been oriented and a balance is always difficult.¹ Or at times their low-level suggestibility leads to the control of the group by demagogues and wreckers of the state. How to reach these unsocial or unpolitical types early and to provide opportunity for their development through physical and mental orientation, as well as through suitable environment, is one of the major problems of civic education. In a sense it may be said that the number and types of extreme social deviates are a measure of our social efficiency. Out of these are recruited the outlaw, the slacker, the indifferent. Out of these come the twisted judgment, the distorted standard of appreciation, which both set the standard of political action, perhaps on a relatively low level, and also obstruct its forward movement, limiting the political community both negatively in delay and cost and positively in the adoption of more highly constructive courses of community action.

It is difficult to arrive at common understandings as to the meaning of order and justice with the neurotic; it is hard to deal with the phantasies of those who struggle for the maintenance

¹ Jean Vinchon, *Les Deséquilibrés et la vie sociale*.

of their own personal balance; or those twisted through early experience or because of constitutional difficulties far beyond the point of calm appreciation of the nature of political balance and sanity. It is in the body of citizens, not only uneducated, but even highly educated, who are incapable of balanced judgment, that the great drag upon the political community is found. Out of these come the political lunatics, both radical and reactionary, the dictators, demagogues, criminals, and a mass of their readily deluded followers.

The traditional method of procedure in dealing with extreme types of these elements has been the use of fear and force to subdue and repress. The lash, the prison, and the gallows are the prescriptions for failure to reach adjustment of conflicting social interests. In less extreme cases the outcome is a citizen's lifelong feeling of discontent and *malaise* toward the body politic and susceptibility to obsessions and hypnotisms. These measures prove to be enormously costly, however, and they tend to disappear in modern society with the advance of science and the more intimate understanding of the springs of human behavior. Gradually they are displaced by preventive measures and by milder types of amelioration.

From time to time all those who criticized the existing order have been looked upon as disordered persons, fanatics, and unbalanced. Some of these undoubtedly were of this description and warranted the characterization bestowed upon them, but others were highly rational and constructive in their efforts. No distinction was drawn, however, between them and the disturbers of the abnormal type.

It is also to be considered that the process of a politicization begins far down the scale both in organization and in years. The point of departure for civic education is the child, and the goal may be that no one escapes the formal educational system with a disintegrated, disordered, or unbalanced personality, of a type that will obstruct the processes of orderly human relations in the field of the political. Social and political attitudes are determined far earlier than is commonly supposed, many of them in fact in pre-school years. Observations show that politi-

cal party allegiance in the United States is often fixed at the age of eight or ten years, as a result of social contact and pressure, but more fundamental attitudes determining the character of political behavior may be reached earlier in many cases.

Civic educators will profit by attention to the newer developments in the field of constitutional studies, conducted by psychiatrists, physiologists, and others in the same zone of endeavor. These groups are actively at work on the boundaries of physical and mental constitution and derivative types of social and political behavior. If lines of discovery already reaching out in this direction are still further projected, surprising results may be obtained at this critical point. There is already ample reason for suggesting the presence of representation from the physical-mental constitutionalist group on a board of civic education, with a view to progressively more active participation in outlining the boundaries and types of civic training.

It is of incalculable importance to the next generation that its citizens should emerge into civic responsibility with as few as possible physiological defects, mental twists, unbalanced constitutions of personality which play so large a part in the attitudes of our political population. As between states, the survival value of the group equipped with such a civic basis should be very great, and aside from intergroup relations the most effective basis of citizenship is of vast importance to the whole life of the social group.

In many instances what the child may need is not indoctrination with the ideology of communism or aristocracy or democracy or of some particular state, but the analysis of a skilled constitutionalist to straighten out a tangled physical or mental condition, likely otherwise to remain forever indifferent to the most expert inculcators of civic traditions, skills, or ideals. Furthermore, the grades of civic interest, proficiency, or aptitude may not follow the serial rankings of the school, but some other system of a quite different type, depending perhaps upon physical or mental constitution or social experience and adjustment or maladjustment long since achieved. A closeup of a thousand school children subjected to modern civic education might read-

ily show such wide variations in constitution and social experience as to indicate that ungraded civic instruction is doomed to failure or inefficiency from the beginning.

Not only do we have no clear view of the relation of disorganized constitution to political behavior, but we do not have a view of the normal type which might be expected in a group or in various groups—the standard type which might represent the median. Nor we do know the extent to which these conditions are modifiable under controlled conditions. Nor do we understand the genetics of the civic feelings, how they proceed from the earlier stages, and especially how they may be affected by adolescence and the many adjustments and adaptations at that time. It goes without saying that in the absence of such basic data as this we cannot organize intelligently a system which will meet the full possibilities of the situation. Without such knowledge, however, we proceed at our own scientific risk to build on sandy foundations. There was indeed a sounder psychiatry in the tribal initiations of some of the primitives who, after hours of isolation, fear, fatigue, and hunger, sent their wise men to inculcate the principles of the tribe into the heart of the trembling initiate than in modern systems of inculcating uncritical tradition in terms of books or of crowd psychology.

There is reason to believe that with reasonable energy we may approach more nearly the solution of some of the foundation problems so vital in their relation to political and social behavior. It is possible to build the citizen from the ground up, using as a point of departure the controls of body and mental balance now emerging from scientific studies to revolutionize our knowledge of political nature and our ability to deal with it successfully. An admirable beginning has already been made in the development of medical care for school children, but it will be necessary to extend this to cover new types of attention based upon new studies of the human constitution, physical and mental; and to adjust the organization of civic training to this new basis in the new realism.

It may be said that an unscrupulous or corrupt government

endowed with these far-reaching powers to shape personality might inflict incalculable injury upon the race and set it far back. But the same argument may be made as to high explosives of any sort, capable of use against the very intelligence that unearthed their secret. The inventions of mechanism either material or of social and political control will not stop because they may be turned to antisocial uses; for in the long run the assumption must be that they are useful for the race. Even if they were not, the quest would still go on.

ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVES

A basic need is the more careful analysis of the objectives of civic education. What is the content of civic training? What is it designed to produce in the way of attitudes, dispositions, forms of reaction to stimulus, types of political behavior: (1) from the point of view of political behavior in the broad sense of the term; (2) from the point of view of the special political order under which he lives, such as monarchy or democracy; or (3) from the point of view of the special state group of which he is a part, as the German or the English?

Obviously, these qualities, traits, or dispositions differ somewhat in various periods and systems and are an integral part of the social values and standard of the group. The basic traits, however, are not so widely disparate as might be supposed and run through the gamut of types of political society from the primitive to the most modern. They are partly the common aspects of what might be called gregariousness or social living, and partly the special adaptations necessary for purposes of the political community.

The proverbs of every land are filled with allusions to the characteristics of the good and the bad citizen. The traitor and the patriot are depicted in all languages, literature, and lore; and obedience and disobedience in various forms are everywhere celebrated as indispensable qualities of citizens. Respect for officials and for laws is universally inculcated, with some reservations. Competence, diligence, and honesty on the part of the official class are also everywhere encouraged by the general

run of the common sayings and teachings.¹ Love of liberty appears in more recent types.

Even in the rites of the primitive tribes it is not difficult to discover some of the presuppositions upon which their elaborate ceremonials rested. Among them are the recognition of the hierarchy of political life and the obligations incident to it (who's who), and acquisition of a minimum degree of the self-control, courage, and skills essential to a tribesman.² Further, the initiate often acquired, in lieu of an ideology, a mystical relation with the unseen. He came into the special guardianship of some spirit or symbol which hovered over him throughout life, his guardian and protector. This was in a sense the political theory of the world of which he was a member.

Most of these suppositions continue in the organization of training in the modern group—knowledge of the tribal ways, appreciation of the tribal hierarchy, response to tribal stimuli in times of stress especially, and ordinary obedience, honesty, and respect on other occasions—these are still taught everywhere, but without much attempt at an analysis and with more dependence upon rule-of-thumb than upon technical analysis. These primitive teachings are supplemented by the powerful pressure of the group in all cases where a special type of action is necessary; and those who are dubious or inert are swept along by the more interested or enthusiastic, either against their will, or even with it at the end when the excitement becomes more intense, or when the rule becomes widely accepted and resistance no longer feasible.

But there is lacking a keen and critical analysis of the traits, dispositions, attitudes, and drives, which are sought in the citizen either in a special instance or generally. And in place of this there often appears a very hazy and vague enumeration of "virtues" of all sorts hastily thrown together under the general description of citizenship. The large number and wide disper-

¹ Interesting examples of earlier instruction are found in the mirrors of princes, written commonly for heirs apparent. One of the most famous of these is the *Télémaque* of Fénelon for the Dauphin of France.

² On this point see Weber, *Duk-Duks*.

sion of these traits indicate the lack of sharp thinking upon this important and central question, fundamental to the whole problem of civic education,¹ and the more carefully this lack of clear-cut objectives is examined the more it appears symptomatic of the failure of much civic training.

Apart from the more generalized qualities of citizenship, those of the special order are likely to be more consciously developed than the basic habits necessary for group life. There is an ideology of the particular order whether it be democracy, or fascism, or sovietism, or aristocracy, or monarchy, or federalism, or centralism, or whatever other form of organization may be dominant in the group at the particular moment. Political theory is full of multicolored interpretations of all forms of political organization, setting forth in rational form its special and exclusive advantages and the difficulties and dangers of all other systems in any manner differing from them. These ideologies are naturally a part of every system of civic training, both school and adult, in all modern states, and occupy a central position in the process of education. In the formal school system, criticism or questioning this basic political order is not permitted or at least not encouraged, and in the larger process of adult education, the system may or may not be subject to challenge freely. Of the eight states here studied, criticism is impossible in Russia and Italy, more possible in Germany and France than elsewhere, and not at all encouraged in the others, although not positively forbidden. In England one criticizes the constitutional system, but even the more radical thinkers seem to avoid criticism of the Crown. In America criticism of the basic principles of democracy and the special position of the Constitution is not common, but not impossible; while criticism of the economic order, let us say on a Communist basis, is surrounded by many difficulties, even on the basis of theory alone. In Germany especially and in much less marked degree in France there are powerful

¹ See for types of broad definitions of civic attitudes or qualities, Snedden, *Civic Education*. An important analysis of the objectives of the social studies will be found in the forthcoming report of the American Historical Association's Commission on the Social Studies.

groups openly favoring a reorganization of the political order.

It is of course true that the special political order may be fundamentally changed, without much alteration in the basic mores of the political community. Thus the transition from monarchy to democracy in Germany found a people whose basic political habits or virtues were well adapted to the new régime, and fitted in with very little adaptation. And a similar case is seen in Italy and Russia with the advent of the revolution in these states.

Just how to inculcate the special objectives of these several systems has not been, however, the subject of scientific analysis even in the formal educational system where they are specifically taught.¹ The clearest examples of this are seen in the shift in civic instruction in Germany from the pre-war to the post-war period, and in the inculcation of the new ideologies in Italy and Germany in the post-revolutionary periods in these states. Ample illustration is here found of the adjustments made in the civic education designed for a new régime, and here it is clearly evident that much more stress must be placed upon the qualities essential to the new order than to those necessary for any political order.

The new way of life is always connected with material advantages which the ideology illuminates and interprets. Thus communism as a form of government signifies land for the peasant and factories for the workers; otherwise the ideology would soon be threadbare. In Germany the democratic theory is associated with the decline of militarism and the special economic privileges of the nobility. Crudely presented in its most naked light each system appears as one in which the citizens are "better off" than in any other or than in the old order of life. There is nothing new in the economic or social aspects or content of politics, for they have always been inseparably united.

Civic education in the merits of the special territorial-ethnic country or nation, as England or Germany, is still less carefully analyzed. From the point of view of many of the educators,

¹ See Montesquieu, *Esprit des lois*, for discussion of the traits to the several types of orders; virtue in a democracy, moderation in a monarchy, and fear in despotism.

formal or otherwise, these objectives are not subject to analysis; they are to be accepted without consideration or question. Whether a part of Germany might better be in France or vice versa is a legitimate subject of discussion anywhere except in the state whose territory is thereby diminished. The special qualities of the several states are fully and vividly presented in all systems, but with a minimum of reflective analysis. The differential superiorities of the English, the German, the American, are a part of the material employed to produce group solidarity and cohesion, as are, on the other hand, the solid economic and social advantages arising from the fact that one is an Englishman, German, American. Every system of civic education is full of the glorification of the country in question and its general or specific superiorities over all others. It might be assumed that a type of education corresponding to these traits would be developed, but in general the analysis has not been carried so far, and, in fact, probably cannot be. Nationalistic education is often on the ceremonial level, and prefers the flights of jingoism and self-glorification, as if it feared the more sober examination of the alleged advantage or traits of the particular state or area or group.

Volumes have been written in alleged analysis of national characteristics, but most of them possess little value, either from the comparative point of view, or from that of an analytical student of civic education. They are so deeply colored with national prejudices, either native or alien, and so little allied to the modern methods of analysis, that they possess value chiefly as examples of the national methods of celebration and glorification. War-time estimates of national traits are notoriously and ridiculously unreliable, and even apart from periods of stress the group estimates are almost equally fatuous in their characterizations of themselves at least. In some systems, in fact, there can be no relation between the national traits and an educational system, because these national characteristics are assumed to be biological or even God-given, exclusive inheritances of the special group, which they did not consciously acquire, which no one

else may acquire, and which may not be altered or questioned except by the process of race evolution or by the act of God.

From this point of view, the objective of civic education must be a celebration of these special qualities by every method adapted to this purpose. For such purposes, obviously, ceremonialism and ritualism are better adapted than more rational analysis and instruction in critically examined facts. These national traits become a second religion, and veneration and acceptance is sought rather than deliberative analysis and conviction. The national heroes, victories, superiorities, are taboo in a certain sense, and analysis or question is something akin to disobedience or even to treason—itself a quality unadapted to group life. What is most advantageous here is not the appearance of a really scientific method but the assurance that the cult will emerge with its prestige undiminished, strengthened by the additional halo of the rational and scientific approval. It is not intended to submit to the test of reason, however, but to annex its approval while avoiding its analysis. It would be absurd to conclude that this is characteristic of all phases of civic education, but it colors large areas of the training in group desiderata in many modern states, and it tends to preponderance unless sharply challenged by substantial elements of the group itself.

The scientific task of discovering a central core of traits, dispositions, tendencies, useful and desirable in citizens, is the easiest to develop, while the determination of the special virtues useful in monarchy or communism or democracy is more difficult; and finally the description of the special qualities necessary in a German or a Frenchman or an Englishman is still more complicated and difficult. It is likely that in the near future incisive analyses of the objectives of civic education will be made by many students of the subject. This inquiry will include the more general principles of political behavior, the special principles appropriate to a particular kind of political order, the special differentials necessary for special territorial areas, and the general objectives, in alternative form perhaps, of inter-group behavior. These analyses will illuminate the whole prob-

lem of citizen training and make possible much more direct and effective treatment of the question. It will then be possible to organize whatever system is desired, not necessarily a system sought from some idealistic point of view, but a more technically organized and better controlled system of civic education.

We must face the possibility and perhaps even the probability that at the outset the new techniques developed may be employed by quite different groups in the community. We must face the certainty that when the special nature of objectives is more fully understood, there will follow a struggle for the determination of the objectives in the interest of one group or another, and for their application through the new and more scientific methods to the community in general, just as any new force or new contrivance may be utilized by agencies antisocial in their nature. Reckless demands by unscrupulous demagogues or by cunning advocates of special group interests may override the general sentiment of larger groups or of the community as a whole, and inflict a type of civic training such as was never imagined by the most successful tyrant of antiquity. But in the main it is reasonable to suppose that the group balance of interests will emerge with an intelligent solution of the problem, whatever the temporary situation may be, and that out of it all will come a different type of civic education from any that has ever appeared before.

ANALYSIS OF TEACHING PROCESS

There is every reason to believe that in the near future much closer attention will be given to the technical side of civic education, to analysis of the teaching process, to equipment and training of teachers, to content of courses, to the level of placement of work, and finally that much of the task of determining the nature and content of civic education will fall under the guardianship of the professional students of this subject rather than casual propagandists. In these various directions it is probable that striking progress will be made within the next generation.

Once the objectives of civic education are more fully ana-

lyzed, it will be possible to begin the testing of the attainment of these objectives, and to determine to what extent they are actually effective in practice. At present there is only the roughest and readiest method of ascertaining how far the vast amount of civic education is actually useful in the equipment and aptitudes of those who are instructed. It is, of course, easy to find out to what extent the memory retains certain specific names and dates and wise sayings; but how far attitudes and aptitudes have been vitally affected is another question, to which thus far no sufficient answer has been given. We may question whether it will be possible to make an entirely adequate analysis of civic objectives, or to measure the achievement of them, but it is clear that progress is being made in this direction, and that determined attempts will be made in the near future to apply some of these methods and results to the work of civic training.

It may further be maintained that the civic objectives are too closely integrated with broader social objectives to be susceptible of analysis, or even that direct teaching of these aims, civic or social, is futile.¹ This may mean that our first task is the analysis of these social objectives and the determination of the more limited civic aims later. In such case, the attainment of more precise understanding of the nature of civic education will be somewhat delayed, but when it does arrive the background and basis of the understanding will be sounder than before. This process would emphasize the great importance of the integration of civic with total behavior, and the value of an all-round view of political feeling and loyalty. It is quite clear to any student of civic feeling that this aspect of human life cannot successfully be isolated from other feelings and attitudes which go to make up the web of life, and the civic educationist would be the last to insist upon an artificial separation of elements fundamentally related.

It will be found necessary in the interest of adequate civic education to scrutinize carefully the equipment and training of teachers in this field. And beyond doubt it will be found that in

¹ See on measurement of political attitudes, Thurstone and Chave, *Measurement of Attitude*.

many instances the standards attained are far below those essential to any carefully developed system. Successful work requires the aid of selected personnel adapted to the special requirements of this type of work, and of rigid training in the fundamentals of the material with which they must deal; training not merely in the art of pedagogy but also in the types of situations which are the subject matter of the instruction they undertake. The mere transmission of traditions may be accomplished by persons and processes of a more nearly routine type, but the new civic training of a flexible nature adapted to the changing world of modern times will require much greater effort on the part of the instructor, and will necessitate the selection of types of personalities especially adapted to such work. Ineffective teachers and ineffective teaching may negative the purposes of civic training and produce dissatisfaction and lack of civic interest, or may harden the thinking process into a form of routine from which it will be difficult to arouse the student on later occasions. This has already occurred in many instances and will recur increasingly with the difficulty of the larger task, unless extraordinary precautions are taken to equip the staff with the necessary fundamentals requisite to skilful instruction. At the same time, of course, the community must be willing to provide adequate reward for the special services sought.

Another essential field of inquiry is that of the age-level at which civic education may most successfully be undertaken, or in what successive stages. We are in point of fact very much in the dark as to the time when civic education may most easily and effectively be taken up by the student. No adequate experimentation has been made in this topic and we are almost wholly without scientific data upon which to frame a judgment as to the serial order of courses in this work. However, with the more careful determination of the objectives of civic education and with the mechanisms for more accurate testing of the attainment of these objectives, we shall have much more definite knowledge upon this point and be able to organize instruction upon a much more rational basis than at present. We will know at what stages of development the various aspects of civic in-

terest and capacity may most successfully be introduced into the system, and be able to adjust the whole plan of education to meet these favorable moments in the evolution of the child and youth. We will also know how to adjust the types of civic education to the growth of the student through the critical periods of child life, ending with the dramatic transition through adolescence to maturity and the assumption of full civic responsibility. The wrecks of adolescence may often be avoided. This might also point the way toward more successful extension of the same idea through the period of adult education, yet little developed in a scientific way.

With closer attention to the science of civic training, and with the development of a larger corps of trained personnel of teachers and researchers, we may look forward to more systematic efforts on the part of the professional group to develop the nature and content of the civic curriculum. They will possess more complete and exact information of this subject; they will have the practical experience acquired by contact with larger numbers of students; and they will be in a position to take the initiative in outlining and elaborating courses in civic instruction. They will be able to compete more equally with various types of propaganda organizations attempting to thrust into the school system some one-sided idea, which, however well intentioned, may prove to be seriously detrimental to the system as a whole.

It is not to be supposed that these professional groups will remain isolated from the community and indifferent to the group ideals of political behavior and its value systems. Civic instruction will inevitably reflect those community practices and ideals which are a part of the process of group cohesion. Assuming that the group has a functional value, which is of course sometimes contrary to fact, the type of civic training will be directed toward the facilitation of this function, the universe indeed in which the whole local system of civic education itself functions. There is, to be sure, an inner core of civic education, common to many systems and to many types of group relations; and it may be found on more careful inquiry that the nature of civic instruction is not as widely varying as might be

supposed, apart from the need for the protection of special dynastic interests or special ethnic and territorial situations, or apart from the protection of one form of special privilege and another, just as in public administration or in military science the inner core of method used is often transferable from one country to another without very much loss in transmission.

On the other hand, professional groups of high type, such as lawyers and physicians, often develop characteristics of an antisocial nature and may at times check the very progress they are devised to serve; and for this reason the professional servants of civic instruction must of necessity be supervised and checked from time to time by the larger view of the community itself, in the broad sweep over a wide variety of considerations where civic education may be only one. The chief danger at the present moment, however, is that there is not sufficient professionalism and expertness among civic instructors rather than too much of it; and the chief need accordingly is the development of broader training and a more lively sense of responsibility for professional initiative.

In the absence of expert information and professional training with the *esprit de corps* and the prestige that accompany them, there is certain to be undue influence exerted upon the course of civic training by various types of pressure groups, seeking to impose their opinions upon the course of political instruction. Various kinds of social, economic, religious, military, and cultural interests will endeavor to shape civic training to meet their own views of the situation, perhaps without much or without adequate regard to all the important factors in the case; and the results may not be the best, even for the community or the group concerned.¹ The resultant training may be narrow, inadequate, distorted, from any broad point of view. Ordinarily these pressure groups will offset each other if the professional group is strong enough to protect itself adequately to insure analysis, reflection, maturity of decision, and balance of views.

The broad question whether the most advantageous method of civic education is direct or indirect is raised by an examina-

¹ See B. L. Pierce, *Citizen's Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth*.

tion of the systems here considered, and constantly recurs in discussions of the problem of civic instruction. Of the eight systems analyzed, six pursue fairly direct methods, and two, England and Austria-Hungary, the indirect method. It might be more accurate to omit Austria-Hungary on the ground that it had no system worthy of the name. The British system stands as a classical example of a highly successful system of civic education in which little emphasis is laid on direct teaching of governmental or civic subjects. The substitute is the history of Britain and the organization of the social system in the various schools, especially those in which the higher rulers have hitherto been trained.

There is much to be said against a formal system of civic instruction of the type found in many modern schools, in which somewhat feverish emphasis is placed upon the immediate or total indoctrination of the youth in a special set of dogmas, which will not perhaps arouse either temporary or permanent enthusiasm in him, or aid him materially in the solution of the complicated civic problems that constantly confront him in the course of his experience. Many of these systems are wooden and many of them are damaging even when effective. They may become either harmless and superfluous, or virile but harmful.

On the other hand, there is unquestionably a field of social studies with which the youth must be made familiar, not only in the higher institutions of learning, but also in the secondary and elementary. The range and variety of such teaching is rapidly increasing and it seems probable that the interest and instruction in such studies will still further develop in the near future; and it is important that it should develop alongside of natural science and the humanities. That such instruction in economics, politics, sociology, and history will avoid the field of civic training seems improbable, and undesirable if probable. Civic instruction will inevitably be interwoven with the social studies as they develop in the modern school system, and become an inseparable part of it. This may not be direct exhortation to become "good" citizens or positive preaching of the duties and responsibilities of members of the community, but

will, without doubt, have a direct bearing on the civic balance of individuals, on their critical faculties in dealing with civic problems, on the cultivation of special skills useful for the citizen in the performance of his civic experiences; and all of this may be related to the physical and mental basis of life and to the total behavior situation.

The more frantic and impatient systems of instantaneous indoctrination will perhaps be reserved for special and critical situations akin to military conscription in times of war; and the more comprehensive and mature systems of training in social science, based on the fundamentals of physical and mental health, will take their place. It is to be expected that provincial or propagandist history, heavy civic indoctrination, and traditional symbolism will decline in amount and importance as the more systematic and scientific systems of instruction in social science appear in the schools, and, with competent directing personnel, begin to make themselves felt in the educational system of various states of the world.

The trends and changes, above indicated, taken together constitute a revolution in civic education, and when effected will completely alter its basic character and features. The old system is in fact outworn and its continuance not only useless and wasteful but positively harmful in many instances. It is perhaps difficult to realize that the modern system is essentially defective and much of it functionally useless, but such is the inevitable consequence of careful analysis of the important features of modern systems in their most impressive form. These systems may have been adapted to a world now passing away and to the level of education and to the pace of the social forces of their day; but with the modern world with its changing techniques they are out of joint, and in the long run must be replaced by methods quite widely removed from those that have been traditionally employed for the cultivation of civic feeling and loyalty.

It may be said of many modern systems of civic training that they seek the color of science rather than its quality—the appearance of intelligence rather than its actuality. These systems shrink from incisive functional analysis, penetrating to the

inner significance of the indoctrinations and attitudes it is sought to inculcate. Part of this is the survival of the old times when reasoning about the basis of authority was treason to the state, at least on the part of all but a few of the high priests of the régime; part of it is the fear, reasoned or unreasoned, that the particular territory, order, or system might not bear too close analysis; but most of it is the lack of careful attention to the broader purposes and functions of civic feeling in the group. But the next most striking fact is the tendency toward reorganization of the older methods in the light of the more modern knowledge of society and the modes of its control.

GENERAL SUMMARY

It is now possible to pass in review the general trends in civic education, evident in the Western states considered in this series of studies; first as to group tendencies, then as to special types of techniques, and finally in the light of important developments in the imminent future.

I. In examining the tendencies of political cohesion with reference to region, race, religion, and economic class, it appears that the influence of region and race is declining; that of religion taken over a long period is declining but at present shows a tendency to revive somewhat; that of economic class is most disruptive. By earlier standards, the ideally cohesive political unit would be constructed upon a basis of territorial unity, ethnic homogeneity, subordination of church to state, and either one economic class or a working balance of classes. This still holds good, but experience shows that it is possible to construct a state without regional unity, and with wide differences in racial composition, as in the classic instance of Britain. Unrecognized or inadequately recognized ethnic and cultural minorities constitute a grave menace to political unity, but under a flexible political system minorities may be woven into the fabric of the state without serious difficulty. The makers of modern states and the molders of political loyalties have in short a freer hand than ever before in the construction of the political pattern.

The political scientist may advise the strongest possible combination of territorial unity, racial homogeneity, economic class balance, and harmony between church and state, but he must also advise the state-maker that under modern conditions, any one or more of these factors may be omitted without the destruction of the political complex. Britain defies territorial unity. Italy carries the world's burden of conflict between the political and the moralistic regulation of human behavior in large areas, but possesses strongly marked territorial integrity. Racial minorities are successfully incorporated in the Swiss republic and in other powerful states, with flexible arrangements permitting local cultures under a unified political system. The class conflict in the industrial world rages in many countries, without destroying the central allegiance to the state, in fact with the ready assimilation of the state by whatever class comes to the surface of power.

The political scientist may advise the state-builder that in a mobile world of modern transportation and economic expansion and reorganization it will be found useful to inculcate in citizens an understanding of international affairs and to foster international attitudes and adaptabilities of a modern type. Otherwise the position of the nation will be jeopardized in times when the state must make combinations and maneuvers which are impossible without the intelligent appreciation and co-operation of the mass of the political communities concerned. Under a democratic régime this facility in international understanding becomes more necessary than in times when political sophistication was the property of a very few, and international affairs the plaything of a small number of diplomats and sovereigns.

To anyone wishing to effect the disintegration of a political unity, the example of Austria-Hungary is most impressive, and a careful examination of the situations here developed will reveal the best methods of breaking up the state. For it appears that practically all possible measures in this direction were first and last utilized by the Austrian rulers. Educational disunity, military disunity, class repression, linguistic differences, reli-

gious intolerance—all were found in this most interesting example of the disintegration of a state.

II. An examination of the various techniques employed in civic training indicates that fundamental and far-reaching changes are likely to be made in the future by such experimenters as are concerned with the reorganization of the process of producing citizens. These possibilities of change taken together are likely to result in the most significant alterations in the methods now in vogue, and to establish new ways and means of a kind not now in existence or even contemplated in many places.

Of the special types of techniques of civic education, which are the most successfully, and most generally, employed? Of the older forms, it appears that love of locality, governmental services, language and literature, and symbolism tend to decline in importance in the special states under consideration in this series of studies. It must be said, however, of language, that in other states its importance is still a major one.

It must also be noted that state-builders will undoubtedly avail themselves of all these techniques in the organization of their system of political education. The love of locality, while weakening in states like America, is still powerful in Britain. Governmental services may have lost much of their earlier *em-pressement*, but they still continue as very powerful elements in the showmanship of the state. Linguistic unity is defied in a state like Switzerland and Britain, but remains strong in France and Germany and indeed powerful everywhere. Symbolism earlier associated with the pomp and ceremony of the *ancien régime*, loses strength, but new types appear and become impressive factors in the new régime, as is seen with especial brilliance in Italy and Russia. Builders of political morale in old states or in new will without doubt continue to employ these methods in the development of political loyalty and enthusiasm, and will find them useful in the task of magnetizing the elements of the state.

The newer techniques of civic education are the use of the press, the political parties, the special patriotic organizations,

and, far more important, the employment of the formal school system of the political community for the development of political unity.

The press is an immensely important agency in the presentation, interpretation, shading, and coloring of political events, and in the propaganda of special points of view. In England, Germany, France, and the United States, the great journals are especially powerful, and loom large in the scheme of political organization. More narrowly, they may dictate specific political policies and leaders, but in the more fundamental sense they are significant agencies of popular education. It may always be disputed to what extent they create and to what extent they reflect public opinion, but in any case they are formidable agents in the creation of political interest and loyalty. The press, it is true, may not always promote the integrity of the state, as in the case of racial, religious, class journals, hostile to the dominant political cohesion and struggling to weaken its hold on the popular imagination. But the bulk of the journals, in the countries here considered, are pro-political and their discussions tend to build up the forces of political loyalty, except in unusual cases. The state-builders will find it advantageous to utilize the agency of the press for the advancement of the national interest, so useful in fact that they will experience difficulty in allowing that degree of liberty of the press and that form of criticism of the powers that be which is desirable in any community. Even an inspired or controlled press, however, is influential in the formation of political attitudes, through sheer force of repetition and advertising. The radio and the movie will also find a wide place in future types of civic education, and must be reckoned in any comprehensive plan of this type.

Political parties are another of the recent agencies for political education. However crude their methods may be under the least desirable conditions, they are nevertheless, under a democratic régime, educational agencies of the very highest value. They provide an emotional stimulus not otherwise to be found; they arouse interest in thousands of otherwise indifferent citizens; they compel many to assume positions of quasi-responsi-

bility in the state; and on the whole tend constantly to throw into the foreground the picture of the state and its intimate relations to human life. The presupposition of all or most parties is the acceptance of the basic principles of the dominant political order, modified somewhat perhaps, but broadly maintained and defended. Party and parliamentary struggles appeal to the imagination of the mass of the community, powerfully, while personalities and principles become real to great sections of the people, on different levels of appreciation and understanding, but nevertheless in an effective and persistent manner.

Even in undemocratically organized states, such as Italy and Russia, the value of the party has been found so great that forms of parties have been continued, the Communist and the Fascist, even when the substance has entirely disappeared—a high tribute to the value of the party even as a name and a form. No one can predict the future of the political party, and much caustic comment has been made regarding its failure to achieve the level of genuine political education, but at the present time there are no legible signs of its dissolution, and it appears that the party will for a long time to come function as one of the most important politicizing agencies in the modern state.

An interesting phenomenon of modern times is the rise of the special patriotic organization for the purpose of promoting civic interest and zeal. In the states here considered there is a wide range and variety of such special types of societies. In many instances the eyes of these organizations are turned backward toward a world of tradition, but in others, as in Russia, they look forward toward a new régime. Some are concerned about the maintenance of a special political order, as democracy, Fascism, communism, and others like the Boy Scouts are busy with social behavior in the broadest sense of the term. These organizations are almost invariably accorded respectful treatment by the community, but it is difficult to measure their actual influence. Frequently, their efforts seem somewhat strained and their pleas a little forced. As permanent establishments in the body politic, their future may be uncertain, but they are bound to exercise, from time to time, influence of a

perceptible and important nature. Their relation to the formal school system is also a question the answer to which depends in large measure on the strength and skill of the professional, teaching, and research organization for civic education.

There can be no doubt that state-makers will find this device useful especially for the purpose of influencing the oncoming generation toward the formation of attitudes favorable to the dominant political unity. The Russians and the Italians have been quick to see the advantage of such societies and have pushed forward their organization and activities with great skill and zeal. The struggle between the Vatican and Mussolini for the control over the youth organization is an evidence of the value imputed to these societies in the formation of behavior patterns of interest to state and other social organizations as well. Likewise the Russian formation of an analogue to the Boy Scouts in the Russian Pioneers and the Young Communists. Adult organizations are likely to encounter more difficulty, whether with indifference if they are in the middle of the road, or opposition if they are propagandists of a cause.

The practical maker of political patterns will doubtless find it useful to utilize some form of these patriotic societies for the promotion of the political interest and loyalty he desires to foster. However, the fundamental controls seem to lie deeper down on other levels than those of societies with the specific purpose of arousing and maintaining civic interest alone.

The use of tradition continues as one of the foremost of the agencies of civic education, although in the case of Russia it has found it necessary to take a forward rather than a backward look. But even the Soviet society has found it possible to utilize the revolutionaries of previous generations and combines them all in the song, "They Died for Us." The experiences, triumphs, and achievements of the group are everywhere heralded as the basis of common attachment and association. This tradition transmitting process is in the main one of glorification of ancestral deeds, and indoctrination in the dominant ideologies of the group. Utilized in this manner, it produces a common enthusiasm for a common past with which the citizen in a manner

identifies himself, and to that extent helps to develop a type of group cohesion. One of the chief instruments employed for this purpose is the study of national history, although of course not the only agency.

Political pattern-makers generally reach for this device from the first, as a means of constructing a common basis for united political action. This process may be more clearly observed in nations outside the group with which we are immediately dealing, but it is plain enough in these particular states. This is perhaps the typical method of endeavoring to set up political interest and develop a form of political loyalty.

The transmission of group experience has of course a special value which will not be suffered to die in any system. In more recent times, however, the tempo of change in social and economic affairs has been accelerated, and there is grave danger that insufficient emphasis may be placed upon facility in change and adaptation on the part of citizens. If traditions are passed on in such a manner as to indicate that the skills acquired by the preceding generations were the result of experience and must be tested again in the light of later experience, nothing will be lost in the process. It is only when previous experiences are hardened and crystallized to a point where they are impossible or difficult to change that there is danger to the group under their spell.

The state-builders who construct the new states will perhaps start with traditions of early vintage, but they will find it possible to advance beyond this to a point where the advantages of invention and adaptation are transmitted not as unchangeable skills, but as experiences subject to reanalysis and readaptation. The citizen's training will not be a mass of credenda, but of aptitudes and skills necessary in changing situations. This may mean less emphasis on a certain type of hero, who depends for his position upon uncritical admiration, but it will aid many others by making them more real. Heroes are useful in proportion as they are human, solving problems through trial and error rather than by special revelation or weird genius. At the moment then there is strong and excessive emphasis upon tradition

transmission in the narrower sense of the term, but incredible as it may seem in view of the flood of tradition acclaiming in various states, there is a slow undercurrent away from this tendency; and it will be found advantageous to builders to observe the force of this new tendency and its fundamental effect upon the nature of civic education in modern states.

On the whole, the school emerges as the dominant figure in the new process of civic education, and in all probability will continue to hold this position for some time to come, and to strengthen its influence with the adoption of more scientific methods of analysis and instruction. Here will center the struggles, scientific and political, for the control of social and political behavior, at one time or another centering around the family, the army, the church.

The state-builder of the future will address himself to this strategic point in the organization of political interest, allegiance, and ideals. To be sure, the school cannot be effective unless it is integrated with the life of the community, and supported by social morale and a sense of political and social values outside the educational institution. But assuming that the school and society are not too far apart in their codes of behavior, the educational organization under such circumstances will wield enormous power over the oncoming generation in the formation of interests, drives, attitudes, and skills. It is here, consequently, that those interested in the formation and continuance of state attitudes will address themselves for assistance in the prosecution of their plans.

The school is by all odds the most important of the techniques employed in the process of civic education in the states here considered, and there is every reason to conclude that it will continue to be so. In this connection, the school should be taken to mean not merely the teaching function but also that of research and inquiry into the basic social and political patterns and their application in a given society—a development even now on the horizon.

The formal training system is confronted with many grave problems in the technical field of civic education. Among these

basic questions are the closer analysis of the objectives of civic instruction, the most appropriate levels of education, the training and equipment of teachers, the content of courses, and, above all, the closer study of the nature of the political process in the juvenile and youth periods, itself closely related to the larger problem of political interest, drives, and controls, in the larger sense. In most of the countries studied in this series there has been little systematic attention given to these problems, and it cannot be said that very notable progress has been made in this direction. It is all the more important, therefore, to consider some of the outstanding developments and questions in this field.

Among the fundamental problems in civic education are the constitutional (physical-mental) bases of citizenship, the reconciliation and integration of pluralistic social allegiances and codes as well as of intergroup, political allegiances and codes; the adjustment and balance between the rôle of tradition and that of invention and adaptation; the application of social symbolism; the technical analysis of the nature of political behavior on the one hand, and perfection of the teaching and transmitting process on the other.

These seem likely to occupy the center of interest and activity in the forthcoming development of this process in the period directly before us. They are all large fields of enterprise, however, and no one can predict the discoveries likely to be made in such widespread areas as those just enumerated.

The intensive study of human behavior and its control systems will inevitably reveal facts and relations quite out of sight at the present moment, and likely to condition the whole advance of the narrower aspect of civic training. Entirely new lines may be indicated by what is discovered in the larger field of human relations, and, of course, contributions to this study may be made by civic science itself.

Summing up these trends, it may be said that it is possible to integrate much more closely than hitherto the formal training in civic qualities and habits with the scientific studies of behavior and of the physical and mental constitution of personal-

ity. The diligent inculcation of proverbs, ideologies, and maxims of behavior may be tied in with the work of the physician, the psychologist, the psychiatrist, the constitutionalist, much more closely than ever before; and this would revolutionize the process of political and social training.

It may be found possible to consider more closely than hitherto the essential and desirable training for intergroup relations and for international attitudes; and also to reconcile the pluralism of group allegiances within the state, often so puzzling to the individual confronted by conflicting standards of conduct, in church, state, business and social groups of various types. This will inevitably shade over into social training in the broader sense of the term, and transcend the process of the political, giving depth and richness to the attempts to facilitate the development of political skills and aptitudes, and thus transforming the whole nature of civic education.

It will be found possible to establish a better balance between the element of tradition in civic education, with the conservation of established values, and, on the other hand, the element of adaptation and change in social and political affairs in such a manner that a more flexible type of citizen may emerge, with a higher survival value than the wooden and inflexible type. This process also will involve a fundamental shift in emphasis on civic education, and a transition from overemphasis on tradition to a genuine recognition of variation and survival values in the political world similar to those in the economic and social world in which we live. This process will involve recasting from the ground up many of the established systems of education and the substitution of an entirely or largely different system of training for citizenship in which the major emphasis will be placed, not on dogmas, but on skills and the methods of developing new types of skills progressively. Nothing will be lost in the process, however, that is valuable. Much of the appeal to tradition arises from the desire of a dominant group to avoid the issue of the present day by an appeal to the past, as in the case of industrial, ethnic, or even religious groups endeavoring to capitalize the past for the benefit of their present interests.

It must frankly be recognized that much of the content of civic training defeats its own purpose in the light of modern conditions and tends to develop a wooden and inflexible type of citizen, unadapted to the world in which he must really live; and that what is more useful is the development of the idea and spirit of change, as conditions change, of adaptation to new sets of situations as they arise in the life of the community. In an age when the tempo of change is faster than ever in the history of mankind, the prevailing type of social education may profitably take cognizance of the dominant note of the time, and embody it in the basic systems of instruction.

It will be found possible to adopt the multifarious machinery of symbolism to the present and the future as well as the past. Flags, music, architecture, language, may point forward as well as backward. Tradition may be identified with symbolism, but it is just as feasible to relate invention and construction, forward-looking plans or ideologies to some form of symbolic representation, which will release emotions and recall the basic outlines of some larger pattern of life. This whole process may well be closely identified with the transition from education primarily in traditions to an education based more completely upon invention and adaptation.

In the reorganization of systems of civic training, it will be found possible to analyze much more sharply than ever before the objectives of civic education. Doubtless many will shrink from this effort, and will avoid it as long as possible; but the logical and searching examination now made of the educational process will in the long run compel it; and the attempt will be seriously and persistently made to determine more definitely the goals of civic education. Civic training may prove to be a cross-section of social training and both intimately related to training of the constitution, physical and mental, of mankind, but unquestionably it is possible to establish more definitely and specifically the functional values sought in citizenship training and their relation to other values in social life. It is of course possible to overdo the effort to schematize all the traits and skills of citizenship, and this will be avoided in the sounder ex-

periments in this direction, but such a danger will not stand in the way of a much richer and fuller understanding of the desiderata in civic education than we now possess, and far better understanding of the relative positions of liberty and authority in the modern state.

It may well be discovered that the objectives of different systems do not vary as much as might be supposed, and the variations may be due to situations which have essentially little value; it may also be discovered that the difficulty of attaining a common objective in regard to civic training and attitudes regarding the relations of the several states of the world is not as great as might be supposed in a new world of a different type in regard to communication and transportation.

The notable development of knowledge regarding the learning and teaching process is still going on at a rapid pace, and it is to be expected that instruction in civics will benefit from this increased knowledge of this basic process. Thus far in civics and the social studies the application of modern scientific discoveries has been less cultivated than in some other branches of learning, and the possibility of conspicuous progress at this point is therefore all the greater.

It may be expected that there will be developed in the near future minimum standards of teacher training and equipment, more intimate knowledge of the grade level of instruction, more experimental knowledge regarding the effects of various types of instruction, and that this will materially alter the whole type of training in this field. A revolution is likely to occur at this point, farther reaching in its implications for the nature of political behavior than a hundred revolutions rolled together.

It may also be anticipated that in the near future the determination of courses and types of training will be established primarily by the experts in the field of political research and by the teachers actually engaged in the task of instruction. Propagandists of various types will no doubt continue to be active, and the community as a whole will determine the basic trends and ends of civic education, but these determinations and these values having once been fixed, the professionals will be left free

to outline and execute the work in civic instruction. Pressure from interest groups will be forced more fully into the open and into situations where the whole community after deliberation decides upon some foundation policy to which it is devoted.

As time goes on there should develop with the progress of social science a much more intimate knowledge of the processes by means of which civic loyalties are organized and disintegrated. It should prove possible to arrive at a deeper and more thorough knowledge of the inner secrets of the political process as a whole and this particular process in particular. Scholars should be able to rely upon a much more penetrating knowledge of civic feeling in a given state or group or individual, if they wished to make an artificial construct, or to observe and analyze a process under investigation. We should know better how to set up civic loyalties or tear them down on different levels in different cultural groups and in different tension moments in the life of the group.

The study of these basic factors lies at the foundation of scientific instruction in civic education, and they must be much more thoroughly understood before it will be possible to organize the process of transmission and training. The teachers cannot be expected to develop the subject they are dealing with, unless they have the co-operation and assistance of the technical experts in the field of governmental research. Too great emphasis cannot be placed upon the far-reaching importance and the urgent necessity of the most thoroughgoing and penetrating research in the type of topics just suggested, and others that will inevitably unfold as the intensive inquiry goes on. In far larger measure than is commonly understood, they condition the growth of political education and of political civilization itself.

Summing up the whole situation as shown by the study of these states, it is evident that the process of developing civic cohesion goes ceaselessly on, in great part the unconscious and uncontrolled impact and equilibrium of social and economic forces blindly struggling for expression, recognition, dominance. A whirling mass of social groups with their loyalties, codes, and

personalities finds in some way a territorial locus, a population, a political order, a ruling personnel—a balance which may last for a hundred years or a hundred days, until its habits of domination and subordination, its crowns, its flags, its pains and penalties, and its prestige melt into some other imposing hierarchy of power. Fear, force, routine magic, and mumbo jumbo play their part in producing the cohesion and the morale necessary for the performance of the functions of the political order. A few crude devices directed at the simplest and widest felt of human emotions are employed to engage the interest and loyalty of the community at large.

But in time there emerge more consciously organized and directed ways of generating loyalty and giving the desired direction to the attitudes of the mass of the political group. In modern times, the press, the parties, the special patriotic organizations, the appeal to history, and, above all, the agency of formal schooling are all employed with a conscious plan of setting up a type of civic education to make its impress on youth and adults as well. Speaking of France in which civic loyalty has been developed to a high degree, Professor Hayes says:

French nationalism is not exclusively or chiefly a product of physical geography or racial heredity. It is the product of human cultural forces. It rests on traditions of politics, religion, language, war, invasion, conquest, economics and society, which have been fashioned by peculiar and often fortuitous circumstances which have been preserved and synthesized by great writers and other intellectuals. And what is most artificial about the whole phenomenon of contemporary French nationalism is the fact that it has been consciously taught to, and thereby imposed upon the mass of Frenchmen.¹

Builders of patterns of state solidarity and morale may be concerned with the following conclusions which are derived from the observation of a series of types of civic educational systems.

1. Increasing attention is given to the systematic and conscious development of elaborate mechanisms of civic training, and less reliance is placed upon unorganized drift.
2. The school becomes the chief center of interest and activity in the development of civic attitudes and skills, followed by the press, political parties, and organized propaganda.

¹ Hayes, *France*, p. 26.

3. Fundamental and revolutionary changes are likely to be made in the future and indeed are already under way in the following important fields:

- A. Adjusting the overemphasis on traditions to the need for attitudes and aptitudes of adjustment in a rapidly changing modern world.
- B. Bridging the gap between civic precepts and social behavior—the conflict between competing allegiances and codes of behavior of various types of social groups, by viewing behavior as a whole, and placing the political in its social setting.
- C. Development of workable international attitudes and codes of behavior as between competing political groups.
- D. Closer integration of our knowledge of the whole constitution of man, both physical and mental, with plans for the development of types of behavior, and by adjusting the one to the other.
- E. Radical improvement in the technique of civic instruction through more complete organization of the pedagogy of civic education.
- F. Broadening the scientific basis of our knowledge of the political man and the patterns and controls of political behavior.

These lines of development may seem to lack specific direction or content, but in the nature of the case they are merely types of reconstruction, indicating broad outlines. They are architectural trends rather than building specifications;¹ and they are trends that may shift and change with fuller knowledge of the political and social process and its many forms of controls or with different social drives. Furthermore, these tendencies are applicable in great measure to all modern forms of political order, and are likely to be utilized by any of them, with such variations as are necessary for the purposes of the special form of government, or ethnic group, or geographical area. Communism, democracy, Fascism, monarchy, Occident, and Orient are likely to find developments in this direction underlying the growth of their civic educational plans. Even outlaw gangs, that profess to be outside the law, may find the modern devices useful in maintaining the level of morale and solidarity necessary for their purposes.

It is not unlikely, however, that state-makers outside the Western group may take over the very elements in our political

¹ The specifications of a plan will be developed by the American Historical Association's National Commission on the Social Studies, engaged in a five-year study of underlying principles and many detailed phases of this problem in the United States.

educational process which we are beginning to find least useful from a modern point of view, such as overemphasis on traditions and the accompaniment of pseudo-scientific historical propaganda, rigid indoctrination of ideologies, artificial development of the political outside of its integrated social setting, failure to consider the constitutional (physical-mental) relations of civic education, lack of intergroup education, and inadequate attention to scientific pedagogy of civic training. It is therefore not out of the question that these suggestions regarding the nature of political education may have some value for students and builders of civic morale in a variety of states just coming to national consciousness and activity.¹

If present trends continue, the coming citizen will enter the political world far more adequately equipped than his predecessors for participation in the political behavior essential to the well-rounded life, and protected from many of the deformities, diseases, and obsessions that make political relations a zone of darkness and trouble to so many persons, and often so heavy a burden to the community itself. The long, long line of those who have marched to their doom, in slavery, prison, or the grave, in the tragic struggles for political readjustments, is not yet ended. But there is reason to believe that it is possible for humanity to train itself in such a way as to reduce the terrible and agonizing cost of men's adaptation to each other and to social change, and to release the finer, richer, more beautiful, and satisfying possibilities of co-operation in mankind.

No more fateful enterprise confronts the scientists who work with human relations; or the builders of the coming states.

¹ Interesting material on this field is found in Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East*.

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